Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP00596, Date: 2025-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP00596, Date: 2025-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse Department: 82 City of Los Angeles, et al. Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

Petitioner Juan Paz (“Petitioner”) was a police officer with the Los Angeles Police Department (the “Department” or the “LAPD”). Petitioner was charged with submitting “inaccurate” field interview reports for two suspects, which were Counts One and Two. Petitioner was charged with using a fellow officer’s password “to access the Cal/Gangs database,” which were Counts Three and Four. The then-Chief of Police imposed a six-day suspension, which Petitioner appealed to a Board of Rights (the “Board”). Following a hearing, the Board recommended termination based upon its finding that Petitioner had “manufactur[ed] false evidence” and had “falsely wrote” information in the field interview reports, suggesting that Petitioner had “fabricat[ed]” evidence and committed criminal acts. The Chief adopted the recommendation and terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of mandate challenging this decision. Although the court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings that Petitioner was guilty on the four counts, the court finds that Petitioner did not receive a fair trial and due process of law. Petitioner was charged with submitting “inaccurate” field reports. However, after the close of evidence and the conclusion of closing arguments, the Board made new findings that Petitioner had manufactured, falsified, and fabricated evidence. The Board did not seek to amend the charges in the administrative complaint to include these alleged offenses. Nor did the Board provide Petitioner sufficient notice or a reasonable opportunity to defend against these new allegations. Accordingly, the court grants the petition, sets aside the penalty, and orders the Board to reconsider the case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment.

At the time of the Board hearing, Petitioner had been employed by the Department for 21 years. (AR 64.) On August 26, 2008, Petitioner signed an agreement, titled “CalGang Security Notification,” acknowledging that he read and understood the security notifications and terms of use for Cal/Gangs, which is a confidential database “on street gangs and taggers.” (AR 7.)[1] Among other things, Petitioner acknowledged that an officer’s “log in name and password are confidential and to be used only by [that officer].” (Ibid.)

From June 2018 to August 2018, Petitioner was assigned to the Metropolitan Division. (AR 64.) During this time, section 4/269.20 of the Department’s Manual specified that indicators of gang membership shall include at least two of the following criteria:

(AR 18; see AR 12-13 [Administrative Order No. 14, which revised section 4/269.20 in December 2017].)

On June 23, 2018, Petitioner conducted a traffic stop of Sergio Reyes and filled out a field interview report, also known as a field interview card (“FI card”). (AR 10, 70-73.) In the FI card, Petitioner documented Reyes’ name, address, sex, height, weight, clothing, personal oddities (such as tattoos), moniker/alias, and gang affiliation, among other information. (AR 10.) In a section of the form titled “Gang/Club,” Petitioner wrote “Alley Tiny Criminals” followed by “S/A,” or “self-admitted,” and Petitioner’s serial number. (Ibid.) As shown by Petitioner’s Body Worn Camera and his testimony at the Board hearing, Petitioner did not ask Reyes if he was a member of the Alley Tiny Criminals Gang, and Reyes did not verbally admit to any gang affiliation. (See AR 11, 76.) Rather, Petitioner believed that Reyes had admitted to being a member of the Alley Tiny Criminals gang because Reyes was detained at 39th Street and Walton Avenue, a location associated with the Alley Tiny Criminals gang, and because he openly displayed a tattoo stating “T.K.S.” (AR 77.) Petitioner testified that “T.K.S.” stands for “tokers” and is a clique of the Alley Tiny Criminals gang. (Ibid.)

On July 3, 2018, Petitioner conducted a pedestrian stop of several men, including Johnnie Gray, at the corner of 67th Street and Normandie Avenue. (AR 27-28, 84-85.) Petitioner prepared a FI card stating, in pertinent part, that Gray self-admitted to being a member of the Eight Tray Gangster Crips gang. (AR 29.) As shown by Petitioner’s Body Worn Camera and his testimony at the Board hearing, Petitioner did not ask Gray if he was a member of a gang, and Gray did not verbally admit to any gang affiliation. (See AR 31, 92-93.) At the Board hearing, Petitioner testified that he wrote that Gray admitted to being a member of Eight Tray Gangster Crips gang because: (1) The area of the stop, 67th Street and Normandie Avenue, was the “stronghold” of the Eight Tray Gangster Crips; (2) One of the officers with him that night was previously a gang officer and recognized Gray as a gang member; and (3) Gray said “Hey Cuz,” which is a common phrase used among gang members to refer to each other. (AR 92-93.)

During the pedestrian stop on July 3, 2018, Petitioner accessed the Cal/Gangs database to determine the identities of certain of the individuals and “if they’re wanted.” (AR 94-95; see AR 11 at 13:30-14:14.) Petitioner did not remember whose password he used to access Cal/Gangs on July 3, 2018. (AR 95.) Petitioner testified that: (1) He was often “locked out” of Cal/Gangs; (2) He emailed the Cal/Gangs coordinator for a password reset “numerous times” and it would take the coordinator “a couple of days” to respond; and (3) He did not believe it was misconduct to use another officer’s password to access Cal/Gangs under these circumstances. (AR 127-137.) Petitioner admitted that he may have used the password of Officer Aguayo, one of his previous partners, to access Cal/Gangs on July 3, 2018, because he was “locked out … of the system” at that time. (AR 137.)

On or about August 7, 2018, Petitioner conducted another pedestrian stop at the corner of Hillcrest Drive and Exposition Boulevard. (AR 96.) Petitioner completed FI cards for several individuals, including Ryan Coleman, William Wade, and Marquis Crawford. (AR 30-35.) An audit of Officer Aguayo’s Cal/Gangs access showed inquiries into Coleman, Wade, and Crawford on August 7, 2018. (AR 225-226.) Although Petitioner did not recall using the Cal/Gangs database that day, he admitted that it was possible he again used Officer Aguayo’s credentials to access the Cal/Gangs database. (AR 96-99, 139.)

In February 2023, after an administrative investigation, the Department served an administrative complaint on Petitioner suspending him for six days from his position as police officer. The complaint alleged the following four charges:

Count 1: On or about June 23, 2018, you, while on-duty, submitted an inaccurate Field Interview Report for S. Reyes.

Count 2: On or about July 3, 2018, you, while on-duty, submitted an inaccurate Field Interview Report for J. Gray.

Count 3: On or about August 7, 2018, you, while on-duty, inappropriately used Aguayo’s password to access the Cal/Gangs database.

Count 4: On or about July 3, 2018, you, while on-duty, inappropriately used Aguayo’s password to access the Cal/Gangs database

Petitioner challenged the disciplinary action and an evidentiary hearing was held before a Board of Rights (the “Board”) on October 4, 5, and 19, 2023. (AR 43, 209, 341.) On October 19, 2023, after hearing arguments and deliberating, the Board unanimously found Petitioner guilty of all four charges. (AR 365-371.)

On November 16, 2023, the Board recommended that the Chief terminate Petitioner’s employment with the Department. (AR 436-442.) In justifying the penalty, the Board stated that Petitioner “was found guilty of manufacturing false evidence.” (AR 441.) The Board concluded that Petitioner “falsely wrote” information on the FI cards. (AR 436, 437.) The Board suggested that Petitioner had fabricated evidence: “We would hope that our action here will deter other

officers from fabricating evidence . . . .” (AR 442.) The Board suggested that Petitioner acted intentionally in this regard:

Why would Officer Paz access the CalGangs database in these incidents in violation of LAPD’s strict policy? There may be multiple reasons, some legitimate like to verify someone’s identity. However, that could be done by accessing other non-gang-related databases. Another more reasonable explanation is that Officer Paz accessed the CalGangs database precisely to gather the information that he included on the FI card. He then improperly indicated that Mr. Gray, quote, “self admitted” to being a gang member.

(AR 437 [emphasis added].) Finally, the Board suggested that Petitioner had committed criminal acts:

California Penal Code 115 states that every person who knowingly offers any false statement or instrument to be filed or recorded in any public office within this state is guilty of a felony. California Penal Code 134 further states it is a crime to prepare false evidence in any legal process. FI cards are official LAPD reports that are regularly utilized in the criminal justice system and were formally collected in the California CalGangs database. When an FI card contains false information, it has consequences that can last a lifetime, not just for the person named in the FI card, but even for their friends and family. . . . FI cards are also designed to be utilized by prosecutors, judges, and jurors in legal proceedings. When false information is included in an FI card, it misleads every other party to that information. . . .

(AR 438-439.) On November 22, 2023, then-Chief of Police Michel Moore executed an order adopting the recommendation of the Board and terminating Petitioner’s employment. (AR 449.) This writ petition followed.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Because the termination of Petitioner’s employment as a police officer concerns a fundamental vested right, the court exercises its independent judgment on the administrative findings. (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

The court exercises its own independent judgment on questions of law arising in mandate proceedings. (See Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.) “A challenge to the procedural fairness of the administrative hearing is reviewed de novo on appeal because the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.” (Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.)

“The propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Williamson v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1343, 1347.)

Petitioner argues that the weight of the evidence does not support the Board’s findings that Petitioner was guilty of the misconduct. The court disagrees.

Counts One and Two charged that Petitioner submitted “inaccurate Field Interview Report[s]” for S. Reyes and J. Gray on June 23, 2018, and July 3, 2018, respectively. (AR 1, 48.) The Board found that Petitioner was guilty of these counts because Petitioner admitted that Reyes and Gray “never verbally admitted to being a gang member,” and that he never asked about gang affiliation. (AR 366.) The Board found that the evidence, particularly the Body Worn Video, demonstrated that Reyes and Gray “never verbally or nonverbally admitted to being a gang member,” which rendered the FI cards prepared by Petitioner “inaccurate.” (AR 368.) This is sufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings.

Petitioner argues that “self-admit” includes “nonverbal indicia of gang membership.” The Board rejected this argument:

The Defense argument is contrary to the plain meaning of that phrase as found in Exhibit 5, page 7 [Department Manual section 4/269.20], which discussed what constitutes gang membership criteria. While multiple criteria can establish gang membership -- and the Board accepts these other criteria -- the Department reasonably expects that if an officer

is relying on those criteria, they will note that and not mischaracterize it as a self-admission.

(AR 367.) Exercising its independent judgment, the court concludes that the Board’s interpretation of Department Manual section 4/269.20 is legally correct. At the time of Petitioner’s alleged misconduct, section 4/269.20 of the Department’s Manual specified that indicators of gang membership shall include at least two of the following criteria:

(AR 18 [emphasis added].) Based on the plain meaning of the term “admit,” the most reasonable interpretation of the first criteria is that the person must either: (1) verbally acknowledge or confess to being a gang member; or (2) must acknowledge being a gang member in some other way, such as by nodding his or her head in response to a question about gang affiliation. This interpretation is supported by comparison to the other criteria in section 4/269.20, which include non-verbal indicia of gang membership such as “displaying gang symbols and/or hand signs,” “frequenting gang areas,” “wearing gang dress,” and “gang tattoos.” If the drafters of section 4/269.20 had intended these nonverbal indicia of gang membership to be evidence of “self-admission,” then they would not have made them separate criteria. When interpreting a regulation, the court “may neither insert language which has been omitted nor ignore language which has been inserted.” (See People v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 277, 282.) “[I]nterpretations which render any part of a [regulation] superfluous are to be avoided.” (Young v. McCoy (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083; see also Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 806-807 [“when a statute contains a list or catalogue of items, a court should determine the meaning of each by reference to the others”].)

Petitioner argues that he should not be found guilty on Counts One and Two because “[t]here was no training or policy that the phrase ‘self admit’ had to be verbal.” (Opening Brief (“OB”) 9:4-5, citing AR 205-206, 236.) The issue is not whether a self-admission must be verbal. Rather, the issue is whether the person acknowledged his or her gang membership, either verbally or non-verbally. Petitioner does not dispute that Department Manual section 4/269.20 had been adopted by the Department and applied to Petitioner at the time of the alleged misconduct. Nor does Petitioner dispute that he knew, or reasonably should have known, the policy. Because the policy is clear on its face, Petitioner does not demonstrate that formal training was required on what it means to “admit” gang membership.

Similarly, Petitioner argues that he and other officers received “informal training from other more experienced officers” that a suspect could “self-admit” to gang membership through nonverbal indicia, such as tattoos, throwing a gang sign, or using gang lingo. (OB 9-10, citing 106, 111, 205-206, 283, 290, 312-313, 394-395, 405.) But Petitioner admits that he never received formal Department training to this effect. Further, Petitioner testified that the “informal training” he received was not consistent and that some officers instructed him that “self-admit” required a “verbal admission.” (AR 101-102.) Given the clear language of Department Manual section 4/269.20, Petitioner’s testimony about inconsistent, informal practices within the Department does not establish that his FI cards complied with the Department’s policy.

Finally, Petitioner argues that the Department did not discipline him for stating on an FI card that a different suspect, Jeffrey O’Malley, self-admitted to gang membership. Petitioner contends that the Department’s analysis of this allegation shows that “the phrase ‘self admit’ could also be used on an FI card for nonverbal cues.” (OB 11, citing AR 42.) In that case, O’Malley said that “he used to be a gang member.” (AR 42.) By contrast, Reyes and Gray made no such admissions. Regardless, any error by the Board in exonerating Petitioner with respect to the O’Malley FI card does not invalidate its findings on Count One and Count Two.

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings of guilt on Counts One and Two. The court has considered Petitioner’s arguments, which are not persuasive.

Counts Three and Four charged that Petitioner “inappropriately used Aguayo’s password to access the Cal/Gangs database” on August 7, 2018, and July 3, 2018. (AR 1, 48.) The Board found that the Department proved these charges. (AR 365-371.) The weight of the evidence, including Petitioner’s own admissions, supports the Board’s findings that Petitioner used Aguayo’s password to access the Cal/Gangs database on the dates alleged. (See e.g. AR 94-99, 137-139, 225-226; see also AR 11 at 13:30-14:14.) Petitioner has not advanced an argument to the contrary. (See OB 11-12.)

Petitioner contends that he was not guilty of Counts Three and Four because “it was common practice during the time he was assigned to Metropolitan Division for officers to get locked out of Cal/Gangs and they would use other Metropolitan officer’s passwords to access the system.” (OB 11:26-12:1, citing AR 128-129, 131, 143, 145, 149, 296, 318-320.) The court is not persuaded by this argument or the cited evidence. Petitioner acknowledged in the Cal/Gangs Security Notification, which he signed in 2008, that an officer’s “log in name and password are confidential and to be used only by [that officer].” (AR 7.) Petitioner clearly violated this written policy when he used Aguayo’s password to access the Cal/Gangs database. Petitioner does not show that an informal practice of some Department employees of sharing Cal/Gangs passwords can supersede this formal written policy. Furthermore, as the Board found, Petitioner could have submitted a request for Detective Cooper to reset his password, called his watch commander, or asked another officer to access Cal/Gangs. (AR 437-438, 228-229.) Accordingly, the weight of the evidence supports the Board’s findings that Petitioner was guilty of Counts Three and Four.

Petitioner argues that he did not receive a fair trial and due process because the Board terminated his employment based upon findings that he falsified, fabricated, and manufactured evidence even those these allegations were not raised in the administrative complaint. (OB 13-15 and fn. 1; Reply 9-10.) The court agrees. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues include whether there was a fair trial. “Generally, a fair procedure requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . and an opportunity to present their objections.” (Doe v. University of Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 240 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) Similarly, “[n]otice of the charges sufficient to provide a reasonable opportunity to respond is basic to the constitutional right to due process.” (Ibid.)

At a minimum, an individual entitled to procedural due process should be accorded: written notice of the grounds for the disciplinary measures; disclosure of the evidence supporting the disciplinary grounds; the right to present witnesses and to confront adverse witnesses; the right to be represented by counsel; a fair and impartial decisionmaker; and a written statement from the fact finder listing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the determination made.

(Burrell v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 568, 577.) “In the present context these principles require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.” (Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 268.) Procedural errors, “even if proved, are subject to a harmless error analysis.” (Hinrichs v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.)

In this case, the administrative complaint alleged that Petitioner submitted “inaccurate” reports, a charge that does not require scienter. Accordingly, the administrative complaint did not provide sufficient notice that Petitioner would need to defend himself against charges that he intentionally engaged in dishonest behavior, charges that may result in a far more severe penalty than initially imposed.

The City argues: “The Board did not change any charges. The Board simply characterized Petitioner’s actions as more serious – ‘false’ vs ‘inaccurate’.” (Opposition Brief at 11:17-18.) That is precisely the point. The Board did not seek to amend the charges, which would have provided sufficient notice to Petitioner.[2] Then, after the close of evidence and the conclusion of closing arguments, the Board “characterized Petitioner’s actions as more serious.” The Board then imposed a penalty far in excess of the original penalty, one that would be appropriate for falsifying, fabricating, and manufacturing evidence, which was never charged. “Disciplinary action cannot be founded upon a charge not made.” (Wheeler v. State Board of Forestry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 522, 527.) Because Petitioner was not given sufficient notice or opportunity to respond to the Board’s new allegations and findings, he was denied a fair trial and due process of law. The court need not address Petitioner’s remaining arguments. The court expresses no opinion whether termination would be a manifest abuse of discretion for submitting “inaccurate” reports based upon negligence or recklessness.

2. The court shall issue a writ of mandate setting aside the penalty. The court orders “reconsideration of the case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment” and “shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(f).) The court expresses no opinion whether termination would be a manifest abuse of discretion for submitting “inaccurate” reports based upon negligence or recklessness.

3. The parties shall meet-and-confer and shall lodge a proposed judgment forthwith.

[1] The notification form refers to the database as “CalGang,” but the administrative charges and the parties’ legal briefs refer to the database as “Cal/Gangs.” (See AR 1.) For consistency, the court uses the terminology from the administrative charges and legal briefs.

[2] Respondent does not dispute that the Board could have requested that the Chief of Police amend the charges, per the Board of Rights Manual section 345.30, as argued by Petitioner. (See OB 13 fn.1.)