Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP00615, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP00615, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Gabriela Barrios (“Petitioner”) was arrested and detained by deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (the “LASD”) for driving a vehicle purportedly stolen from a car dealership in the Antelope Valley. Petitioner filed a federal civil rights action against the County of Los Angeles (“Respondent” or the “County”). Although Petitioner pursued discovery in the federal action, she filed this petition for writ of mandate seeking the records under the California Public Records Act (the “CPRA”). The County refused to produce the requested records under the CPRA because they relate to an investigation by a law enforcement agency and therefore are exempt from disclosure. Instead, the County produced the records—arrest videos, body worn camera footage, interview videos, radio dispatch audio, arrest reports, booking records, photographs, a probable cause declaration, among other records—in the federal action and certified that there are no additional records that are responsive to Petitioner’s CPRA request. Nevertheless, Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directing the County to produce all non-exempt records, as well as a judicial declaration that Respondent violated the CPRA by withholding non-exempt, responsive records (so Petitioner can seek attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with this petition). The court finds that the petition is not moot, but denies the petition. Petitioner does not satisfy her burden of establishing that the County failed to disclose any non-exempt, responsive public records or information. Based upon the nature of the request, it is clear that the requested records relate to an investigation by a law enforcement agency and therefore are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA.

On or about November 3, 2022, Petitioner was arrested and detained by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (the “LASD”) for driving a vehicle that had been reported stolen by Antelope Valley Chevrolet, a car dealership. (Opening Brief (“OB”) 4:11-5:6; Opposition (“Oppo.”) 2:5-12.) In the verified petition, Petitioner alleges that she was “detained for more than 7 hours, including the time she was pulled over, arrested, handcuffed, fingerprinted, interrogated, and jailed (for more than 5 hours).” (Petion for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) ¶ 13.) Petitioner further alleges that “the police took away her special lactation bra, even after Barrios explained the necessity for the bra” and she “leaked through her shirt.” (Pet. ¶ 14.)[1]

On September 29, 2023, Petitioner filed a civil rights lawsuit against the LASD in state court asserting various claims arising out of her November 3, 2022, arrest. (See Gabriela Stephanie Barrios v. Antelope Chevrolet, Inc. et al., L.A.S.C. Case No. 23STCV23668.) The lawsuit was removed to federal court and is now pending in the United States District Court – Central District, Case No. 2:23-cv-10476-AB (JCx) (hereafter, the “federal action”) (Gupta Decl.

On or about December 11, 2023, while her civil lawsuit was pending, Petitioner submitted a CPRA request to the LASD seeking “all pertinent documents and records related to the call for service, report of any crimes, the investigation, the detention, the [November 3, 2022] arrest, the release, and any reports concerning Gabriella Stephanie Barrios.” (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) ¶ 17; Aguirre Decl. ¶ 3.) Specifically, Petitioner requested the following 10 categories of records:

1. Complete Arrest Records: Including time of arrest, officers involved, and detailed charges. Specifically, we are seeking every document that describes what information was provided to the agency to determine there was probable cause to arrest, any information obtained through a police investigation, interviews conducted by the department, or otherwise.

2. Police Report: The full police report pertaining to Ms. Barrios’s arrest.

3. Body-Worn Camera Footage: From all officers involved in the arrest, including any footage capturing the arrest process, interactions with Ms. Barrios, and subsequent procedures.

4. Jail Records: Including booking information, any incident reports during her incarceration, and records relating to her release.

5. Surveillance Footage: From all officers involved in the arrest and any surveillance video from the jail during her custody.

6. Witness Statements and Interviews: Related to the arrest and any interactions at the jail.

7. Evidence Collection and Logs: Detailed logs of evidence collected during the arrest and subsequent processing.

8. Internal Communications: Emails, memos, or other communications within the department regarding Ms. Barrios’s arrest and time in custody.

9. Property and Personal Effects Records: Detailing items seized at the time of arrest, including their condition and current location.

10. Service calls: Detailing the information provided to the department that would have initiated the investigation.

(Aguirre Decl. ¶ 3; Pet ¶ 17, emphasis in original.) Notably, the CPRA Request included the descriptions of the requested records that are italicized and included after each of the then categories of records.

On or about December 14, 2023, the LASD’s Public Records Act Unit acknowledged receipt of the CPRA Request and advised Petitioner that the LASD was currently “receiving an exceptionally large volume of PRA requests” and was therefore “experiencing an extended delay in processing them.” (Aguirre Decl. ¶ 4.) The Public Records Act Unit further notified Petitioner that upon completion of its review, it would advise her “as to the availability of the responsive records,” if any. (Ibid.) On or about January 11, 2024, the Public Records Act Unit sent Petitioner’s counsel a letter stating that the records sought were “exempt from disclosure under Government Code [§] 7923.600-7923.625 except to victims or their representatives” and that Petitioner did “not meet this specific legal criteria, therefore, records cannot be released to her or her representative.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Accordingly, the LASD’s Public Records Act Unit did not produce any records to Petitioner. (Ibid.)

In April 2024, in response to civil discovery in the federal action, the LASD produced records relating to Petitioner’s arrest, including the arrest videos, body worn camera footage, interview videos, radio dispatch audio, arrest reports, booking records, photographs, a probable cause declaration, among other records. (Gupta Decl. ¶ 7.) These records were produced pursuant to a protective order entered by federal court. (Ibid.) In the federal action, pursuant to an order of the district court and a stipulation with Petitioner, the LASD is in the process of reviewing the items designated as “confidential” pursuant to the protective order, determining which items may be produced without such designation, and “de-designating” the appropriate items. (Id. ¶ 7.)

In opposition to the writ petition, Respondent submits a declaration of Lieutenant Jose N. Aguirre, Jr., the Unit Commander of LASD’s Discovery and Public Records Act Units. (Aguirre Decl. ¶ 2.) In his current position, Aguirre is a custodian of records for the LASD. (Ibid.) Aguirre declares that he is “generally familiar with the types of records that exist that are associated with arrests made by the LASD” and that he is “not aware of any other records that relate to Ms. Barrios’ CPRA request that were not already produced in the Federal Action.”

Pursuant to the CPRA, Government Code section 7921.000 et seq., individual citizens have a right to access government records.[2] In enacting the CPRA, the California Legislature declared that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” (Gov. Code, § 7921.000; see also County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.)

Article 1, Section 3(b) of the Constitution affirms that “[t]he people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business.” The Constitution mandates that the CPRA be “broadly construed,” while any statute “that limits the right of access” must be “narrowly construed.” (See National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 507.) The CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (Gov. Code § 7921.300.) “Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by law.” (Gov. Code § 7922.525(b).)

To establish an agency has a duty to disclose under the CPRA, the petitioner must show that: (1) the record qualifies as a “public record;” and (2) The record is “in the possession of the agency.” (Anderson-Barker v Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 528, 538, citation omitted.) Once that initial burden is met, the agency has the burden to prove “that a particular record is exempt from disclosure.” (Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System v. Superior Court (2013) 195 Cal.App.4th 440, 453.)

Petitioner’s request for judicial notice, filed September 17, 2024, of Exhibits A and B is granted. Petitioner’s evidentiary objections are overruled. The settlement communications are not offered by Respondent to prove Petitioner’s “liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.” (Evid. Code § 1152(a).) Regardless, the court’s decision would be the same, even if the court did not consider the parties’ efforts to resolve this issue. There is no dispute that the County produced records responsive to the CPRA request in the federal action.

At the trial setting conference (“TSC”) on June 7, 2024, the parties advised the court that some of the documents at issue in this CPRA action may be produced in civil discovery in the federal action. Accordingly, the court ordered Petitioner’s counsel “to make clear in the opening brief which documents still are at issue in this CPRA action.” (Court’s Order dated June 7, 2024.)

In her opening brief, Petitioner states that the LASD has not produced any documents in response to the CPRA Request and that “all topics remain at issue.” (OB 7:4-9.) In opposition, Respondent contends that it produced all the records requested by Petitioner under the CPRA in the federal action; that Petitioner failed to identify which records were still at issue; and that the petition should be denied as moot. (Oppo. 7-9.) “California courts will decide only justiciable controversies.” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573.) “The pivotal question in determining if a case is moot is therefore whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief.” (Id. at 1574.)

Petitioner has stated her position that all records are still “at issue.” (OB 7:4-9.) However, Petitioner has not made “clear” what public records must still be produced by Respondent in light of the production of the records in the federal action. In that respect, Petitioner did not comply with this court’s TSC order. Petitioner does not cite any authority suggesting that a court in equity must issue a writ of mandate directing a public agency to produce the exact same public records that were just recently produced to the requestor in a civil lawsuit, especially where the records have been “de-designated” as confidential and are no longer subject to a protective order. “[T]he writ is an equitable remedy, and will not always issue as a matter of right…. The decision whether to grant or deny the writ lies within the sound discretion of the court, and one of the chief considerations in the exercise of that discretion is the effect of the court's order in promoting the ends of justice.” (McDaniel v. City and County of San Francisco (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 356, 360-361.)

In the opening brief, Petitioner seems to argue that the CPRA action is not moot because the records were produced in the federal action pursuant to a protective order and were designated as “confidential.” (OB 7:27-8:5.) If a CPRA court were to rule that a public agency must produce the requested records pursuant to the CPRA, the records would be deemed “public” and may not be subject to any restriction on public disclosure, regardless of any confidentiality designation asserted in the civil litigation. (See County of Los Angeles v. Sup. Ct. (Axelrad) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 819, 926 [under the CPRA, there are no “limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure”].) In the opposition brief, Respondent submits evidence that a process for “de-designation” in the federal action is ongoing. (See Gupta ¶¶ 7-8.) However, in reply, Petitioner represents that as a result of a stipulation “nothing related to this matter is now designated” as confidential in the civil litigation. (Reply 8-9; RJN Exh. B; Reply Verdun Decl. ¶ 8.) Accordingly, Petitioner does not articulate a valid reason to issue a writ in this case simply because the records were originally produced pursuant to a protective order.

Nevertheless, Respondent, which has the burden on the affirmative defense, does not prove that this CPRA action is entirely moot. Petitioner suggests that the CPRA Request may encompass certain records not produced in the federal action. (OB 8-9.) While Respondent disputes that assertion (Oppo. 7-8), there is a justiciable controversy as to whether Respondent has produced all responsive records sought by Petitioner under the CPRA. Moreover, Respondent’s compliance with the CPRA remains at issue for purposes of Petitioner’s claims for declaratory relief and attorney’s fees. As phrased by the District Court of Appeal under similar circumstances, Respondent’s production of records “does not render the matter moot, however, because the question of petitioner’s entitlement to the documents in the first place remains to be determined in light of the opinions expressed here.” (Fairley v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1419.) Because a ruling on the merits of the petition could result in “effectual relief” for Petitioner, this action is not moot. (See Wilson & Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 1573.)

On January 11, 2024, less than one month after the CPRA Request was made, Respondent provided a response to the request. Respondent determined that the requested records are “exempt from disclosure under Government Code [§] 7923.600-7923.625 except to victims or their representatives” and that Petitioner did “not meet this specific legal criteria, therefore, records cannot be released to her or her representative.” (Aguirre Decl. ¶ 5.)

Government Code section 7923.600 generally exempts the following documents from disclosure under the CPRA:

[R]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, the Office of Emergency Services and any state or local police agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local police agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes.

(Gov. Code § 7923.600(a).) “The animating concern behind the records of investigations exemption appears to be that a record of investigation reveals (and, thus, might deter) certain choices that should be kept confidential—an informant's choice to come forward, an investigator’s choice to focus on particular individuals, the choice of certain investigatory methods.” (American Civil Liberty Union v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.) The records of investigation “exemption extends indefinitely, even after an investigation is closed.” (Rivero v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052.) Unlike “investigatory files,” “records of investigation” do not require a “concrete and definite” prospect of enforcement for the exemption to apply. (Haynie v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061, 1068-69.) Further, the exemption applies to records of investigation from “routine” police investigations, such as traffic stops. (Id. at 1070-71.)

Haynie is instructive. The petitioner, who was driving a van with three teenage passengers, was stopped by police in response to a citizen’s complaint of a possible crime. The petitioner submitted a CPRA request for “any crime reports, arrest reports, evidence reports, use-of-force reports, canine reports, officer-involved-shooting reports, follow-up reports, handwritten notes, supervisors' reports, notes or reports of interviews of witnesses, and tape recordings (including recordings of radio calls leading up to the incident, recordings containing any information forming the basis for Haynie's detention, and recordings of any communications between the deputies and Haynie or anyone else present at the time of the incident).” (Id. at 1065.) The trial court denied a writ seeking disclosure, but the District Court of Appeal reversed and ordered disclosure of a radio broadcast, tape recording, and witness statements related to the traffic stop. On review, the California Supreme Court reversed the District Court of Appeal and held that “the investigation that included the decision to stop Haynie and the stop itself was for the purpose of discovering whether a violation of law had occurred and, if so, the circumstances of its commission. Records relating to that investigation are exempt from disclosure by section 6254(f).” (Id. at 1071.)

Here, similar to the request in Haynie, Petitioner sought records related to Petitioner’s arrest by the LASD, including the arrest report, body-worn camera footage, jail records, surveillance footage, witness statements and interviews, among others. (Pet. ¶ 17.) Petitioner expressly seeks disclosure of investigatory records, stating: “We are seeking every document that describes what information was provided to the agency to determine there was probable cause to arrest, any information obtained through a police investigation, interviews conducted by the department, or otherwise.” (Ibid.) Similarly, Petitioner seeks body-worn camera footage “capturing the arrest process [and] interactions with Ms. Barrios;” “detailed logs of evidence collected during the arrest;” and “the information provided to the department that would have initiated the investigation.” (Ibid.) Such records are exempt from disclosure under section 7923.600.

Petitioner contends that “[t]he LASD provided no specific explanation as to why Ms. Barrios does not meet the criteria to be considered a victim or representative, especially given that she was the subject of the arrest and detention.” (OB 12:11-13.) Pursuant to section 7923.605, a state or local law enforcement agency “shall” disclose certain information from the records of investigation “to the victims of an incident,” unless disclosure would endanger “[t]he safety of a witness or other person involved in the investigation” or “[t]he successful completion of the investigation.” Petitioner has not filed a declaration describing the incidents that led to the arrest. However, in her opening brief, Petitioner states that she was arrested and detained by the LASD for driving a vehicle that had been reported stolen by Antelope Valley Chevrolet, a car dealer. (OB 4:11-5:6; Oppo. 2:5-12.) Based on the record, the court concludes that Petitioner was the suspect of the reported crime and the subject of LASD’s investigation, not a victim of the incident under investigation within the meaning of section 7923.605.

Petitioner next contends that “even if some records were exempt, the LASD had an obligation to produce non-exempt portions of records and to assist Ms. Barrios in identifying records that could be disclosed.” (OB 12:16-18.) Petitioner correctly summarizes the law. (See Gov. Code §§ 7922.525(b) & 7922.600(a).)[3] However, Petitioner has not supported her claim with sufficient evidence. Respondent withheld all responsive records based on the records of investigation exemption in section 7923.600. (Aguirre Decl. ¶ 5.) Respondent did not state in its response that the request was too broad. Thus, Petitioner does not show that there was any need for assistance “to make a focused and effective request that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records.” (Gov. Code § 7922.600(a).) Further, any “records of investigation” that are responsive to the request are wholly exempt from disclosure, except for information for which the Legislature has created a statutory duty of disclosure. (See Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1072 [by enacting section 7923.610 (formerly section 6254(f)(2)), the Legislature “required the disclosure of information derived from the records while, in most cases, preserving the exemption for the records themselves.”].) Based upon the nature of the request, it is clear that any of the requested documents would be exempt for the reasons discussed.

Under the circumstances of this case, Petitioner has not satisfied her initial burden of establishing that the requested records are “public records” subject to disclosure or that there are additional responsive documents in the possession of the County. To the contrary, the County has demonstrated that the records at issue are exempt from disclosure. In April 2024, the County produced records in the federal action relating to Petitioner’s arrest, including the arrest videos, body worn camera footage, interview videos, radio dispatch audio, arrest reports, booking records, photographs, a probable cause declaration, among other records. (Gupta Decl. ¶ 7.) These are essentially the same categories of records that Petitioner sought under the CPRA. Indeed, the County’s attorney in the federal action declares that the documents produced in the federal action “fall into” the categories of records sought in the CPRA request. (Id. ¶ 8.) Similarly, Lieutenant Aguirre, the Unit Commander of LASD’s Discovery and Public Records Act Units, declares that he is “generally familiar with the types of records that exist that are associated with arrests made by the LASD” and that he is “not aware of any other records that relate to Ms. Barrios’ CPRA request that were not already produced in the Federal Action.” (Aguirre Decl. ¶ 7.) Petitioner submits no evidence to the contrary.

Petitioner has had possession of these records since April 2024. At the TSC in June 2024, the court ordered Petitioner “to make clear in the opening brief which documents still are at issue in this CPRA action.” (Court’s Order dated June 7, 2024.) In her opening brief, Petitioner does not advance any argument that Respondent has possession of specific categories of public records that are responsive to the CPRA request and that have not been produced to Petitioner. Petitioner also has not developed an argument that Respondent improperly withheld any specific public records or information based on a claim of exemption. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Nelson v. Avondale HOA (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862-863.) While Petitioner argues that she “does not know the exact identity of all the documents that exists” and “whether a thorough search for these records has been conducted” (OB 8:18-19 and 10:23-25), it is Petitioner’s burden to make the initial showing that there are “public records” that are “in the possession of the agency.” (Anderson-Barker, 31 Cal.App.5th at 538, citation omitted.) In this case in particular, Petitioner could have conducted discovery related to the issue of possession or the adequacy of Respondent’s search. (See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Anderson-Barker) (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 284-290.) Petitioner also could have also made arguments, based on the records from the federal action, if she believed that the County’s production was deficient. Petitioner failed to do so.

Petitioner asserts that section 7923.600 is “limited in scope” and “does not apply to records of factual information provided to the district attorney, recordings related to the incident, or the identities of officers involved in the incident.” (OB 12:19-23, citing § 7923.605(b).) Petitioner’s reference to section 7923.605(b) is inapplicable, as that section excludes from disclosure that portion of investigative files “that reflects the analysis or conclusions of the investigating officer.” To the extent Petitioner argues that certain information from the arrest records should have been disclosed under section 7923.610, Petitioner does not show that Respondent had a legal duty to produce such information in response to the CPRA request.[4] Even if so, Petitioner does not show any practical reason for disclosure of the information stated in section 7923.610 given LASD’s production of the arrest records in the federal action.

The court has considered Petitioner’s arguments in reply. Respondent was not required to provide a “document-by-document justification for withholding records,” especially when it is clear that the records fall within the scope of the exemption. (See Reply 6:27-28 and Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1075.) Because investigatory records are exempt under section 7923.600, a balancing of public interests in disclosure and non-disclosure does not apply. (Reply 6-7; see Gov. Code § 7922.000 [catchall exemption].) Petitioner’s argument that the “criminal proceedings have concluded” is not relevant to this petition. (Reply 7:5-6.) The records of investigation “exemption extends indefinitely.” (Rivero, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at 1052.)[5]

Neither party has argued, or shown, that in camera review is necessary for the court to decide the petition. (See e.g. Gov. Code § 7923.105(a); see American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Cal. V. Sup. Ct. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 74.) Therefore, there is no basis for the court to conduct an in camera review.

The second cause of action for declaratory relief is derivative of the writ cause of action. (See Pet. ¶¶ 79-81 and Prayer ¶ i.) The court declines to issue declaratory relief because Petitioner has an adequate remedy in the writ cause of action. (See General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470-471; Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324.) Alternatively, the court finds that Respondent complied with the CPRA and denies declaratory relief on that basis.

2. The court declines to issue a declaratory judgment. In the alternative, there quest is denied on the merits.

3. Petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs is denied because she did not prevail in this action. (See Gov. Code § 7923.115(a); Fontana Police Dept. v. Villegas-Banuelos (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1252.)

[1] Petitioner has not submitted a declaration with her opening brief describing the November 3, 2022, arrest and detention.

[2] The CPRA statutes were re-numbered effective January 1, 2023.

[3] “Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by law.” (Gov. Code § 7922.525(b).) The CPRA requires the public agency “to assist the member of the public make a focused and effective request that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records.” (Gov. Code § 7922.600(a).)

[4] “Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a state or local law enforcement agency shall make public all of the following information, except to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation: …. [various categories of information].” (Gov. Code § 7923.610.)

[5] While the records of investigation exemption has been narrowed by the Legislature with respect to certain police records, see Penal Code § 832.7(b), Petitioner has not cited or discussed section 832.7 in her legal briefs or shown that it applies to this case.