Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP00768, Date: 2025-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP00768, Date: 2025-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Ben Camacho (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for a writ of mandate under the California Public Records Act (the “CPRA”). Petitioner sought to compel the City of Los Angeles (“Respondent” or the “City”) to produce records of the Los Angeles Police Department (the “LAPD” or “Department”) related to an officer-involved shooting. After the petition was filed, the parties engaged in a meet-and-confer process that lasted from April 2024, to December 2024. Respondent produced the requested records with redactions on a rolling basis, and removed many of the redactions after Petitioner’s counsel objected. The City complied with its CPRA obligations on or about December 9, 2024. Now, Petitioner seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $68,367.50, as well as costs in the amount of $777.90. Respondent agrees that Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees but challenges the amount. The court grants the motion and orders the City to pay Petitioner’s counsel $44,000 in attorneys’ fees based upon 88 hours at a reasonable billing rate of $500 per hour, as well as $777.90 in costs.

In 2018, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1421, which “amended Penal Code section 832.7 to recognize the right of the public to know about incidents involving shootings by an officer or the use of force by an officer that results in death or great bodily injury, as well as sustained findings of sexual assault or dishonesty by an officer.” (Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 897, 909.) “As amended, section 832.7 specifies that records pertaining to such incidents and findings are not confidential and must be made available for public inspection pursuant to the CPRA.” (Ibid.)

This petition arose from a series of CPRA requests made by Petitioner, an investigative journalist, and West Side Storytellers, Petitioner’s production company, for LAPD records related to an officer-involved shooting that took place on June 3, 2020 (the “OIS”). On March 23, 2023, Petitioner made the fourth (and final) CPRA request (the “Request”), which is the subject of this writ action. Specifically, Petitioner requested “[a]ll SB 1421 and SB 2 records for the June 3, 2020 incident #F025-20. Intersection at Broadway and 86th.” (Wong Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 1.) In the request, Petitioner specified the types of records that he sought:

[I]nterviews (audio, video), search warrants, arrest warrants, summary reports, findings, evidence logs, investigatory reports, any document pertaining to this incident, emails, text messages, memos, discipline history, discipline records, IA reports, IA interviews, any record in LAPD’s possession that pertains to this. Records may also not have been originally created by LAPD but are now in LAPD’s possession.

(Ibid.) Between May 26, 2023, and August 8, 2023, Respondent disclosed multiple video records related to the OIS in response to Petitioner’s earlier CPRA requests for videos and body worn videos. (Wong Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 5.) However, Respondent did not produce the records requested in the Request before Petitioner filed this petition. (See Pet. ¶¶ 25-37 and Exh. C, D.)

On March 13, 2024, Petitioner filed the instant petition. On April 4, 2024, Deputy City Attorney Amanda Wong informed Petitioner, in an email, that Respondent “identified responsive items, but anticipate[s] that we will have to make productions on a rolling basis.” (Wong Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. 6.) On April 5, 2024, Wong and Petitioner’s attorney, Joshua Nuni, held their first meet-and-confer session. According to Wong, Respondent “conceded LAPD’s statutory obligation to disclose responsive records and acknowledged Petitioner’s role as a catalyst for that disclosure.” (Id. ¶ 9; see also Nuni Decl. ¶ 14.) Counsel agreed that Respondent would produce the records on a rolling basis thereafter. (Ibid.)

Respondent released the first set of records in response to this litigation on April 24 and 25, 2024, with various redactions. (Nuni Decl. ¶ 15.) After Petitioner’s counsel objected that certain redactions were not authorized by the CPRA, Respondent removed some of the redactions and maintained others. (Id. ¶¶ 15-28, Exh. 4-11.) This process—of Respondent releasing batches of records; Petitioner raising objections to redactions; and Respondent agreeing to remove some, but not all redactions—continued through early December 2024. (Ibid.; see also Wong Decl. ¶¶ 15, 18, 26, 38, 45, Exh. 5-17.) On or about December 9, 2024, the parties agreed that “Respondent has fulfilled its substantive obligations to release records responsive to Petitioner’s CPRA request no. 24-2891, the subject of the instant writ petition.” (Fifth Stipulation and Order to Continue TSC, filed December 13, 2024 at 5:2-4; see also Wong Decl.

The City requests judicial notice of two orders written by different judges. Petitioner does not object to the request. The court takes judicial notice of the orders under Evidence Code section 452(c).

“If the requester prevails in litigation filed pursuant to [the CPRA], the court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the requester.” (Gov. Code § 7923.115(a) [emphasis added].) Under the CPRA, an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff is mandatory. (Fontana Police Dept. v. Villegas-Banuelos (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1252.) A petitioner “prevails” within the meaning of the CPRA when he or she files an action which results in defendant releasing a copy of a previously withheld document.” (Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transp. Authority (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391, citation omitted.)

The court finds that Petitioner is the prevailing party because this action resulted in Respondent producing the records sought in the March 23, 2023 Request. (See Nuni Decl.

¶¶ 11-31; Wong Decl. ¶¶ 8-49; Los Angeles Times, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 1391.) Respondent agrees that Petitioner prevailed and is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (See Oppo. 7:2-9; Wong Decl. ¶¶ 9, 51.) Rather, Respondent disputes the amount and seeks a negative multplier.

The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee begins with the “lodestar,” which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1085, 1095.) Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is the rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616.) In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.) “A trial court may not rubberstamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Sweetwater, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at 994.)

“The verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) The moving party also “can carry its burden of establishing its entitlement to attorney fees by submitting a

declaration from counsel instead of billing records or invoices.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 487-488.) If the motion is supported by evidence, the opposing party must respond with specific evidence showing that the fees are unreasonable. (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 560-63.) The court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford, supra at 395.)

In the motion, Petitioner contends that his attorney, Joshua Nuni, reasonably spent 76.2 hours prosecuting this case and should be compensated at an hourly rate of $725 per hour, for a total lodestar fee of $55,245 through the filing of the motion. (Mot. 6:9-17; Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 46, 47.)[1] In his declaration, Nuni authenticates billing and cost records; summarizes his legal credentials and experience; and describes the work performed on this case. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3, Exh. 1-2; 4-10; and ¶¶ 11-34, Exh. 3-18.) In reply, Petitioner submits evidence that Nuni incurred an additional 15.1 hours preparing the reply brief and estimates that he will spend another 3 hours attending the hearing on the fee motion. (Reply Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 30-33, Exh. 1.) Thus, in total, Petitioner contends that Nuni reasonably incurred 94.3 hours of legal work at $725/hour, for a total lodestar fee of $68,367.50. (Id. ¶ 34.) Petitioner also requests an award of costs of $777.90. (Nuni Decl. ¶ 42; Reply Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 36-36, Exh. 2.)

Based on the court’s knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, among other factors, the court finds that the requested hourly rate of $725 is excessive. (See 569 East County Boulevard LLC, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at 437.) In Los Angeles County and the surrounding region, reasonable rates for CPRA litigation are generally lower than $725 per hour and often range from approximately $300 to $600 per hour. This is based on the court’s experience, as well as the authorities cited by Respondent. (See e.g. RJN Exh. A at 5-6; Nguyen Decl. ¶ 4; Kinney v. City of Corona (2023) 99 Cal.App.5th 1, 16; Lacy v. United States Dep’t of State (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2023) 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195381 at *21-23; RJN Exh. B at 6-7.) In determining the reasonable hourly rate, the court has considered the declarations of Barrett S. Litt and Dan Stormer. Neither of these declarations provides information about the reasonable hourly rates in Los Angeles or the surrounding region for CPRA litigation, much less an uncontested CPRA case. Further, attorneys Litt and Stormer both appear to overstate Nuni’s litigation experience. (See Litt Decl. ¶¶ 32-33 [9 years]; Stromer Decl. ¶¶ 25-26 [referring to Nuni as a “partner” with an admission date of 2016]; cf. Nuni Decl. ¶ 8 [acknowledging non-litigation government roles from around 2019-2023].)

Although higher rates are possible for CPRA litigation—depending on counsel’s experience, the complexity of the case, and other factors—Petitioner has not justified an hourly rate of $725. Petitioner’s counsel was admitted to the California Bar in 2016, clerked for a federal judge for a year, practiced law with a civil rights law firm for about two years starting 2017, and then worked in government before opening his own law firm in September 2023. (Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 5-9.) Although Nuni has been involved in drafting and responding to CPRA requests previously, he has only litigated one other CPRA case, which was also resolved without motion practice or a trial. (Reply Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.) Petitioner’s counsel acknowledges that he has not litigated a CPRA case through the discovery stage, a dispositive motion hearing, or trial. (See Ibid.) Under these circumstances, the court finds that the reasonable lodestar fee for Petitioner’s counsel for this case is $500 per hour.

Petitioner improperly relies on new evidence in reply to argue that a higher hourly rate should be approved. (Reply 7-9; Reply Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 4-11.) Petitioner had the initial burden to show the reasonableness of the requested hourly rate, and he does not show good cause to submit this evidence about the hourly rate for the first time in reply. On that basis, the court rejects this new evidence. (See Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010.) Regardless, even in consideration of this evidence, the court finds that $500 is the reasonable hourly rate for this action. Petitioner does not show that the hourly rate approved for him in settling UNITE HERE Local 11 v. City of Irvine is comparable given the lower number of hours and total fee at issue (25.8 hours and a total fee of $17,000). Petitioner also does not provide sufficient information about the qualifications (including CPRA litigation experience) of the two civil rights attorneys he consulted or the circumstances of the cited CPRA cases to justify a higher rate in this case. (Reply Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 4-11.)

The court finds that Petitioner’s request for 76.2 hours is reasonable. This is less than two standard work weeks for: (1) conferring with his client; (2) researching and drafting the verified petition for writ of mandate; (3) reviewing the records produced by Respondent and the redactions made to them; (4) meeting and conferring with Deputy City Attorney Wong on an ongoing basis from April 2024 until around January 2025 about redactions, attorneys’ fees, and other matters; (5) reviewing and/or editing a joint status conference report and several stipulations filed with the court; (6) appearing at the trial setting conference on January 21, 2025; and (7) researching and drafting this fee motion and supporting declarations. (See Nuni Decl.

¶¶ 11-41, Exh. 1.) Based on the court’s knowledge of the case and review of the billing records and other evidence, the court finds that it was reasonable for Petitioner’s counsel to spend 76.2 hours on these tasks.

The court authorizes 9.8 hours to prepare the reply brief and related pleadings. The court authorizes two (2) hours to prepare for and attend the hearing. These hours are also reasonable given the contested nature of this motion and number of arguments raised by Respondent in opposition. However, Nuni should not have required more than this amount (especially considering that the evidence accompanying the reply brief was inappropriate). Therefore, the court authorize a total of 88 hours.

The court is not persuaded by some of Petitioner’s counsel’s arguments and representations. Given the relatively limited amount of hours, the court is not persuaded by Nuni’s argument that he “turned down other work due to the time this case has required .....” (Nuni Decl. ¶ 44 [emphasis added].) Further, since this CPRA action was not contested and since Respondent “acknowledged Petitioner’s role as a catalyst” as early as April 2024 (see Wong Decl. ¶ 9), Petitioner was statutorily entitled to fees and there was no significant “contingency” risk. Thus, the court does not find grounds for increasing the hourly rate or number of hours based on such factors. (See Mot. 12.) In all other respects, Petitioner does not request a multiplier. (Ibid.)

Nor is the court persuaded by Respondent’s arguments. Respondent does not show that any of the hours requested by Petitioner are unreasonable or that the lodestar fee should be adjusted downward. (Oppo. 10-16.) Among other things, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim of 19.6 hours for reviewing records and redactions is “excessive” because Respondent disclosed every record that was requested and the parties’ resolved the redaction disputes and Respondent did not remove all of the redactions. (Oppo. 12:13-17.) Respondent argues that these hours should be reduced by at least 20% to 16 hours. (Ibid.) Deputy City Attorney Wong acknowledges that Respondent removed many of the redactions based on arguments made by Petitioner’s counsel during the meet and confer process. (Wong Decl. ¶¶ 15, 18, 26, 38, 45, Exh. 5-17.) Further, this process required ongoing work from Petitioner’s counsel from April 2024 to December 2024. (Ibid. and Nuni Decl. generally.) Even if Petitioner’s counsel was not successful in removing all redactions, the hours spent on redactions were reasonable and necessary. Furthermore, as argued in reply, Respondent does not appear to account for the 10% reduction that Petitioner’s counsel already imposed in his billing judgment. When that 10% reduction is considered, Petitioner’s lodestar hours for several tasks, such as preparing the petition, responding to redactions, or litigating this fee motion, are not that different than the lodestar hours proposed by Respondent. (See Reply 3:5-12, 4:12-22, 5:26-4; see also Nuni Decl. ¶ 29 [15.2 hours for redaction]; Nguyen Decl. ¶ 5 [a fee motion could require 21-43 hours in a CPRA writ action].) The court has considered Respondent’s other arguments and none convinces the court that any reduction in the requested hours is justified, including any negative multiplier. (See Oppo. 10-16.)

The court’s independent judgment is that $44,000—based upon 88 hours at a rate of $500 per hour—is a reasonable fee for this case. The court reaches this conclusion based upon its knowledge and familiarity with the legal market; the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees; and the difficulty and complexity of the litigation, among other factors. (See 569 East County Boulevard LLC, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at 437.) Stated differently, the court finds that a fee of $44,000 is commensurate with what the court would expect for a legal action of this nature, given the outcome. Petitioner also requests an award of costs of $777.90. (Nuni Decl. ¶ 42; Reply Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 35-37 & Exh. 2.) Respondent has not challenged the requested costs.

2. The court orders the City to pay a total of $44,777.90 to Petitioner’s counsel within 120 days.

3. The court orders the parties to lodge a stipulation to modify this order as necessary to correct any obvious mathematical or typographical errors.

4. The court orders the parties to prepare and lodge a proposed judgment forthwith if necessary.

[1] Nuni declares that he spent 84.7 hours working on the case but that, exercising billing judgment, he “made an across-the-board write-down of 10%” to 76.2 hours. (Nuni Decl. ¶¶ 43-45.)