Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP01379, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP01379, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Hooman Nafissi (“Petitioner”), an officer with the Los Angeles Police Department (the “Department” or the “LAPD”), filed this petition for writ of mandate. Petitioner was engaged in a vehicle pursuit. The Watch Commanded recommended that no discipline be imposed. The Commanding Officer and subsequent layers of review recommended that Petitioner receiver an “administrative disapproval” with “formal training” due to his “pursuit tactics.” Petitioner appealed the decision, and the hearing officer recommended that the Chief of Police (the “Chief”) should not sustain the discipline. The Chief disregarded the hearing officer’s recommendation and impose an administrative disapproval with formal training. Petitioner now seeks a writ of mandate setting aside that decision. The court grants the petition because the Chief made no findings and did not address the conflicts in the evidence.

Petitioner has been a police officer with the Department for a little over 12 years. (AR 64.) On Monday, April 24, 2023, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Petitioner was a training officer assigned to work patrol with a probationary officer, Kevin Vega. (AR 65.) The officers were on patrol in the area of Florence Boulevard and Denver Avenue, and Petitioner was the driver. (AR 65, 148.) The officers became aware of an individual in a Nissan Rogue in a McDonald’s parking lot, smoking what appeared to be a marijuana joint. (AR 148.) They asked the individual to pull forward into a gas station and conducted a traffic stop at the gas pumps. (Ibid.) As the officers approached the car on foot, the vehicle exited the gas station at a high rate of speed. (Ibid.) The officers returned to their vehicle, activated their lights and sirens, and broadcasted that they were in pursuit of a DUI driver. (AR 148, 102.) The duration of the pursuit was two minutes and 21 seconds, and the length of the pursuit was approximately 1.8 miles. (AR 149.) The officers drove through two red lights at 69th Street and 66th Street before losing sight of the suspect and terminating the pursuit. (AR 148-149, 102, 28-40, 72-74.)

Department policy and California law require an officer involved in a vehicle pursuit to “drive with due regard” for public safety. (AR 103, 160, 19-20.) Department policy states: “Vehicle pursuits are some of the most dangerous activities undertaken by law enforcement, for officers, the public, and fleeing suspects. As such, officers initiating a pursuit must continuously balance the seriousness of the offense against the dangers which pursuits present.” (AR 138.)

After reviewing the Digital In-Car Video of the pursuit, the Watch Commander did not recommend any discipline. (AR 148-152, 153-154.) Captain Ahmad Zarekani, the Commanding Officer, subsequently reviewed the vehicle pursuit report, and viewed and listened to the videos of the incident. He determined that the Involvement/Pursuit Tactics for both officers be classified as Administrative Disapproval/Training 4/205.19, Vehicle Pursuit Driving Tactics. (AR 154.) Zarekani wrote:

Officers did not drive with due regard for the safety of the public during the pursuit. Initially, Officers are seen slowing for a red light as they are westbound on Florence Avenue. As the Officers are northbound on Vermont Avenue they fail to slow for a red tri-light at 66th Steet. Currently the suspect is far enough out of sight that the officers were not going to catch the suspect. Officers should have used better judgment and slowed for the red light and discontinued the pursuit.

(AR 154.) Each successive level of review within the Department concurred with that recommendation to impose an administrative disapproval. (AR 161, 147.)

Petitioner appealed the discipline, and an administrative hearing was held before a hearing examiner. The Department offered testimony of Sergeant Arturo Ramos, the officer in charge of the Department’s Pursuit Review Unit, which reviews about 950 to 1000 vehicle pursuits per year for compliance with Department policy. (AR 12-13.) Based on his review of the Digital In-Car Video and other evidence, Sergeant Ramos opined that the way that Petitioner drove through Vermont and 69th and Vermont and 66th was out of policy, including because he failed to slow down to clear the intersections properly. (AR 31-33, 35-36.) In contrast, Petitioner testified that he believed he appropriately cleared the intersections in accordance with Department policies and procedures and adequately slowed down. (AR 72-74.) The hearing examiner declined to resolve the conflict between the testimonies of Sergeant Ramos and Petitioner, concluding that both “appeared credible and gave clear, concise testimony.” (AR 162.) Instead, the hearing examiner concluded that the Department did not meet its burden of proof because it “could have presented evidence from the ‘black box’” of the vehicle; “called an expert in estimating vehicle speed based on video;” or “called the officer with whom Appellant was partnered during the incident.” (AR 162.) Accordingly, the hearing examiner recommended that the Chief should not sustain the discipline. (AR 162-163.)

The Chief rejected the hearing examiner’s proposed decision and entered an order sustaining the administrative disapproval. (AR 157, 163.) As Petitioner notes, however, the Chief did not make any findings or “provid[e] any basis” for his final decision to sustain the discipline. (Opening Brief (“OB”) 4:26-27.) This writ petition followed.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Because the administrative disapproval imposed on Petitioner concerns a fundamental vested right, the court exercises its independent judgment on the administrative findings. (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

Respondent requests judicial notice of Section 9.0 and Article 9.1 of the City’s Memorandum of Understanding Number 24. The court denies the request as moot. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).)

Petitioner asserts that the Chief did not make any findings or “provid[e] any basis” for his final decision to sustain the discipline. (OB 4:26-27.) Petitioner raises an issue of whether the administrative decision complies with the findings requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b) and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 506.

Under section 1094.5(b), an abuse of discretion is established if the decision is not supported by the findings. In Topanga Assocation for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 506, 515, the Supreme Court held:

We further conclude that implicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.

[F]indings enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis. Absent such roadsigns, a reviewing court would be forced into unguided and resource-consuming explorations; it would have to grope through the record to determine whether some combination of credible evidentiary items which supported some line of factual and legal conclusions supported the ultimate order or decision of the agency.

“The findings requirement serves to conduce the administrative body to draw legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of its ultimate decision; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and minimize the likelihood that the agency will randomly leap from evidence to conclusions.” (West Chandler Blvd. Neighborhood Ass’n vs. City of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521-22, citation and internal quotations omitted.) “Administrative agency findings are generally permitted considerable latitude with regard to their precision, formality, and matters reasonably implied therein.” (Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 938, 954.) However, “mere conclusory findings without reference to the record are inadequate.” (West Chandler Blvd. Neighborhood Ass’n, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1521-22.)

Here, the Chief did not make any findings for sustaining the administrative disapproval. Therefore, the decision to sustain the discipline clearly does not comply with Topanga.

The hearing examiner’s proposed decision, as well as the parties’ legal briefs, show why findings are important. The hearing examiner declined to resolve a conflict between the testimonies of Sergeant Ramos and Petitioner, concluding that both “appeared credible and gave clear, concise testimony.” (AR 162.) The hearing examiner also “repeatedly viewed the video and was unable to reach a conclusion either way” about whether Petitioner slowed down at the red lights at 69th Street and 66th Street. (AR 161.) Similarly, in the parties’ legal briefs before this court, Petitioner and Respondent sharply disagree over how this evidence should be weighed. Topanga requires the agency “to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.” Because the Chief did not adopt the hearing examiner’s decision[1] or make or adopt any other findings, the court “cannot discern the analytic route the [agency] traveled from evidence to action.” (West Chandler Blvd. Neighborhood Ass’n, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1521-22.) Accordingly, the Chief’s decision fails to comply with Topanga.

Based upon the foregoing, the court grants the petition for writ of mandate and shall issue a judgment setting aside the administrative disapproval due to the lack of findings. The court orders reconsideration of this case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment. The court does so because, in theory, based upon this record, the Chief could make sufficient findings to justify his predecessor’s decision to impose an administrative disapproval with formal training.

1. The petition for writ of mandate is granted. The court shall issue a judgment setting aside the administrative disapproval due to the lack of findings.

2. The court orders reconsideration of this case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment. Because the court’s judgment “shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent,” Respondents may re-impose the administrative disapproval provided that they make sufficient findings that comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b) and Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 506.

3. Respondents shall file a return demonstrating compliance with the writ issued by the court within ____ days. The return shall indicate whether Respondents re-imposed the administrative disapproval with sufficient findings or whether Respondents elected not to re-impose the administrative disapproval.

[1] As Respondents point out, the hearing examiner’s proposed decision is non-binding on the Chief. (Oppo. 9; RJN Exh. A, MOU § 9.0.) Thus, while Petitioner argues that this court “should find the Hearing Officer’s conclusion persuasive” (OB 13:13), the court has no occasion to review the findings of the hearing examiner.