Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP01652, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCP01652    Hearing Date: January 22, 2025    Dept: 82

Protect Sierra Madre                                               Case No. 24STCP01652

 

v.                                                                     Hearing: January 22, 2025

                                                                        Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

                                                                                    Department: 82                                       City of Sierra Madre, et al.                                            Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

                       

                                               

[Tentative] Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandate

           

 

INTRODUCTION

 

            The City of Sierra Madre (the “City”) and its City Council approved Resolution 24-12, including Tentative Tract Map 22-01 and Vesting Tentative Tract Map 83966, affecting the property located at 700 North Sunnyside Avenue.  (See Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) Prayer ¶ 2.)  This tentative tract map would include a 42-unit single family housing development near the base of the San Gabriel Mountains.  Now, Petitioner Protect Sierra Madre (“Petitioner”) seeks a writ of administrative mandate directing the City to set aside its approval.  Petitioner contends that the City did not comply with the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations or with the City’s subdivision ordinance in its approval of the tentative map.  The City, as well as the real parties in interest—NUWI-Sierra Madre, LLC (“NUWI”) and the Congregation of the Passion, Mater Dolorosa Community (the “Congregation”) (collectively “Real Parties”)—collectively oppose the petition.

 

            The court has limited authority to set aside the City’s decision.  The court may only reverse the City’s decision if Petitioner demonstrates that, based on the evidence in the record, “a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the [City].”  (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Commission (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.)  Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the tentative tract map fails to comply with any of the applicable fire regulations or the City’s municipal code, notwithstanding that this project is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone that was recently affected by the Eaton Canyon fire.  Therefore, the petition for writ of mandate is denied.  This order is without prejudice to Petitioner filing a petition to challenge any approval of the final tract map if the City fails to make any necessary changes to the tentative tract map. 

 

BACKGROUND

 

A.        The Project and the City’s Environmental Review

 

The Congregation owns real property located at 700 North Sunnyside Avenue, Sierra Madre, CA (the “Property”) and operates a 90-guest retreat center there known as the Mater Dolorosa Retreat Center.  (AR 1216.)  The Congregation partnered with NUWI, a developer, to develop approximately 17.3 acres of the Property with up to 42 single-family detached residential units (the “Project”).  (AR 722, 1168, 1193, 1216.)  A draft specific plan was prepared for the proposed development, which is referred to as “The Meadows at Bailey Canyon” (the “Specific Plan”).  (AR 552-721.) 

 

In June 2020, the City gave notice of its intent to prepare an environmental impact report (the “EIR”) for the Project to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).  (AR 2791.)  In relevant part, the EIR describes the Project as follows:

 

NUWI Sierra Madre LLC (applicant) is proposing to develop an approximately 17.30-acre site (Assessor’s Parcel Number 5761-002-008) located at 700 North Sunnyside Avenue (project site)…. The northwestern portion of the project site borders the City of Pasadena, while the base of the San Gabriel Mountains is located approximately 460 feet north of the site (see Figure 3-1, Project Location). Approximately 9.19 acres of the 17.30-acre project site would be developed for single family residential uses; 3.68 acres would be developed as roadways; and approximately 3.39 acres of the project site would be developed as open space, which includes a 3.04-acre neighborhood public park. A 1.04-acre grading and landscape buffer would be provided at the northern portion of the site.

 

The project site is surrounded by Bailey Canyon and Bailey Canyon Wilderness Park to the east, and existing single-family residential development to the south and west, and the Mater Dolorosa Retreat Center, which is primarily used to host religious and silent retreats and other activities, to the north…. There are currently two access roads that run north to south through the project site to the Mater Dolorosa Retreat Center, including North Sunnyside North Sunnyside Avenue, which crosses through the western portions of the site, and Carter Avenue, which extends along the eastern portion of the site. North Sunnyside Avenue would become a public road that would serve the project site and provide access to the Mater Dolorosa Retreat Center, while Carter Avenue would be improved to provide secondary egress and ingress access to the site, as well as provide internal circulation throughout the project site.

 

(AR 2333.)

 

            As relevant to this writ petition, the draft EIR included the Meadows at Bailey Canyon Fire Protection Plan (the “Fire Protection Plan”).  (AR 5364-5441).  The Fire Protection Plan “evaluates and identifies the potential fire risk associated with the project’s land uses and identifies requirements for water supply, fuel modification and defensible space, access, building ignition and fire resistance, and fire protection systems, among other pertinent fire protection criteria.”  (AR 5368.)  The final EIR also includes a section titled “Wildfire,” which “describes the existing wildfire conditions within the vicinity of The Meadows at Bailey Canyon Specific Plan (project or proposed project) site, identifies associated regulatory requirements, evaluates potential impacts associated with wildfire and contribution to regional wildfire conditions, and identifies mitigation measures related to implementation of the proposed project.”  (AR 2697.)

 

            As Petitioner points out, the Fire Protection Plan and the EIR “make[] clear that fire risk on the project site is a serious concern.”  (Opening Brief (“OB”) 7:17-18.)  The EIR states:

 

Wildland fires are a common natural hazard in most of southern California with a long and extensive history.  Southern California landscapes include a diverse range of plant communities, including vast tracts of grasslands and shrublands, like those found adjacent to the center of the project site. As a result of the anticipated growing population of Los Angeles County wildland–urban interface areas, and the region’s fire history, it can be anticipated that periodic wildfires may start on, burn onto, or spot into the project site. The most common type of fire anticipated in the vicinity of the project area is a wind-driven fire from the northeast moving through the native vegetation in the Angeles National Forest.

 

(AR 2532.)  The EIR further explains that the project site “is located within a wildland–urban interface location that is statutorily designated as a Local Responsibility Area Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) and the Sierra Madre Fire Department.”  (Ibid.) 

 

            The EIR incorporates the Fire Protection Plan as a project design feature with which the Project must comply.  (AR 2705.)  Structures on the site would “comply with enhanced ignition-resistant construction standards,” and “the project would include fire protection systems, including fire hydrants, automatic fire sprinkler system, fire alarm systems, and residential hazard detectors.”  (AR 2707.)  Landscaping must also comply with fire prevention requirements throughout the Project site. (AR 2707-08.)  The EIR also analyzes roadway access to the Project site, including “the capacity of Carter Avenue … during emergencies and non-emergencies.”  (AR 1428-29, 2709-10.)  The EIR concludes that, with implementation of the Fire Protection Plan, the Project’s environmental impacts associated with wildfire would be less than significant and no mitigation measures would be required.  (AR 2711.)

 

In September 2022, the City Council approved a resolution adopting the Specific Plan, certifying the Final EIR which included the Fire Protection Plan, and approving a Development Agreement between the City, NUWI, and the Congregation. (AR 1216-17, 348-350, 549-551.) It appears that neither Petitioner, nor any other individual or entity, challenged the Specific Plan, Final EIR, Fire Protection Plan, or Development Agreement in court.  (See Oppo. 3:16-17.)

 

B.        The City Approves the Tentative Tract Map for the Project

 

The Development Agreement required the Real Parties to submit an application for a tentative tract map (“TTM”) for approval by the City.  (AR 726, 727.)  As relevant to this writ petition, the Development Agreement states that “[w]ithin 24 months after the Effective Date, Developer shall make all commercially reasonable efforts to acquire the right of way for the offsite improvement of Carter Avenue from the County of Los Angeles … and obtain all required approvals from the County … for construction of Carter Avenue offsite improvements.”  (AR 731.)  The Development Agreement states that “[c]ompletion of the offsite improvements … will be made a condition of any Tentative Tract Map approval.”  (AR 727.)

 

NUWI submitted its application for a TTM on October 3, 2022.  (AR 1217; 1-48.)  The City prepared an analysis under CEQA comparing the TTM against the Specific Plan and determined the TTM is consistent with the Specific Plan, Final EIR, and Fire Protection Plan. (AR 273-347.)  The Planning Commission considered the TTM on February 1, 2024.  Petitioner submitted a comment letter prior to the hearing, objecting to the TTM on grounds it did not comply with various provisions of the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations, California Code of Regulations (“CCR”) title 14, section 1270 et seq. (AR 1054-1057.)[1]  Among other things, Petitioner asserted that “[t]here is no discussion in the staff report that the City has presented the

proposed tentative tract map to CAL FIRE,” as required by section1270.04 of the regulations. (AR 1054.)  The Planning Commission voted to recommend approval of the TTM to the City Council “pending any commentary by Cal Fire such that this be remanded to the Planning Commission in the event that there are substantive notes that need further deliberation.”  (AR 1161-1162; 1207.)

 

On February 9 and 11, 2024, the City’s Fire Marshal provided Cal Fire notice of the pending TTM.  (AR 1343-1345.) On February 16, 2024, Cal Fire responded as follows:

 

We received the notification of your intent to potentially approve a Tentative Tract Map within the LRA VHFHSZ of the City of Sierra Madre. The notification completes the requirements of 14 CCR 1270.04 for the City of Sierra Madre. The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection will not be reviewing or commenting on the Tentative Tract Map.

 

(AR 1343.)  The City Council considered the TTM on February 27, 2024, and voted unanimously to approve it, subject to several conditions of approval, which must be complied with before any Final Map subdividing the property can recorded.  (AR 1369, 1399, 1257-1260.)  This writ petition followed. 

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

In its second cause of action for administrative mandate, Petitioner challenges the City’s approval of the TTM.  (Pet. ¶ 53.)[2]  “Approval of a tentative subdivision map is a quasi-judicial act subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.”  (Youngblood v. Bd. of Supers. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 644, 651, fn 2.)  An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc.

§ 1094.5(b).) 

 

Where, as here, a land use decision is challenged by administrative mandamus, courts are to apply the substantial evidence standard of review.”  (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317.)  Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Board (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 575, 584-85; Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 305 n. 28.)  Under this standard of review, “[c]ourts may reverse an [administrative] decision only if, based on the evidence …, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the [City].”  (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Commission (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.)  

 

Petitioner bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that substantial evidence does not support the administrative findings.  (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 513.)  An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties.  (Evid. Code § 664.)  “[A] trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)  When an appellant challenges “the sufficiency of the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely [her] own evidence.” (Toigo, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 317.)  A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.)

 

The court exercises its independent judgment concerning question of law arising in mandate proceedings.  (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)  Interpretation of a statute or regulation is a question of law subject to independent review.  (Ibid.)   

 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

 

            Petitioner requests judicial notice of State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations, 2021, California Code of Regulations, title 14, § 1270.00-1276.04 (see AR 1061-1106) and Exhibits 1-7.  Respondents do not oppose the request.  The request is granted.

 

            Petitioner’s also requests judicial notice of a portion of a map prepared by Cal Fire of the Eaton Fire.  (See Palmer Decl. in support of Reply Brief ¶ 2, Exh. A.)  The court denies the request for several reasons.  This request should have been made with the opening brief, and because it was made only in reply, Respondents have not had sufficient notice and opportunity to object.  Moreover, the court need not rely on this map in ruling on the merits of the petition.  The administrative record makes clear that this property is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.  Therefore, this request is denied. 

 

DISCUSSION  

 

A.        The City Did Not Make Any Denial Findings

 

Pursuant to Government Code section 66474, a local government “shall deny approval of a tentative map” if it makes, inter alia, any of the following findings:

 

(a) That the proposed map is not consistent with applicable general and specific plans as specified in Section 65451.

 

(b) That the design or improvement of the proposed subdivision is not consistent with applicable general and specific plans.

 

(c) That the site is not physically suitable for the type of development.

 

(d) That the site is not physically suitable for the proposed density of development.

 

(e) That the design of the subdivision or the proposed improvements are likely to cause substantial environmental damage or substantially and avoidably injure fish or wildlife or their habitat.

 

(f) That the design of the subdivision or type of improvements is likely to cause serious public health problems.

 

(g) That the design of the subdivision or the type of improvements will conflict with easements, acquired by the public at large, for access through or use of property within the proposed subdivision. 

 

(Gov. Code § 66474.)  The City considered each issue and could not make any of these findings.  (See AR 1359-1362.)  In its petition and legal briefs, Petitioner does not argue that the City should have made any specific denial finding under section 66474.  (See OB 23:7-13.)  Nor does Petitioner develop an argument that the City’s decision not to make these findings is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Instead, Petitioner argues that, for several reasons, the City “did not comply with the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations or with the City’s subdivision ordinance in its approval of Vesting Tentative Tract Map 83966.”  (OB 23:15-17.)  Specifically, Petitioner argues that the City violated two procedural provisions of the Fire Safe Regulations: (1) A notice requirement of section 1270.04(a) and (b), and (2) A consultation requirement of section 1276.03(a)(1).  Petitioner also argues that the TTM did not comply with substantive requirements of the Fire Safe Regulations and the City’s Municipal Code. 

 

            B.        Petitioner Did Not Exhaust Administrative Remedies

 

            As an initial matter, Petitioner did not exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to the City’s alleged non-compliance with section 1270.04(a) and (b).  “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes judicial review of issues, both legal and factual, that could have been raised but were not raised, at the administrative level.”  (Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co. LLC v. Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 453, 469.)  “While less specificity is required to preserve an issue for appeal in an administrative proceeding than in a judicial proceeding … [t]he objections must be sufficiently specific so that the agency has the opportunity to evaluate and respond to them.”  (Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536.) 

 

On February 1, 2024, Petitioner submitted a letter to the Planning Commission asserting that “[t]here is no discussion in the staff report that the City has presented the proposed tentative tract map to CAL FIRE,” as required by section 1270.04 of the regulations. (AR 1054.)  In response to Petitioner’s comment, the City gave two notices to Cal Fire about the pending TTM application:

 

1.         On February 9, 2024, the City’s Fire Marshal sent a letter to Chief Littlefield of Cal Fire’s San Bernardino Unit stating that the City “has a proposed Tentative Tract Map 83966 located within the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ)” and that “the city wishes to inform you of the Sierra Madre City Council’s intent to review and potentially approve this tract at their February 27th, 2024 meeting.”  (AR 1345.) 

 

2.         On February 11, 2024, the City’s Fire Marshal sent an email to Chief Littlefield, stating: “Please accept this notification of our intent to potentially approve a Tentative Tract Map within the LRA VHFHSZ of the City of Sierra Madre, as required by Title 14.”  (AR 1343.) 

 

On February 16, 2024, Cal Fire responded as follows:

 

We received the notification of your intent to potentially approve a Tentative Tract Map within the LRA VHFHSZ of the City of Sierra Madre.  The notification completes the requirements of 14 CCR 1270.04 for the City of Sierra Madre.  The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection will not be reviewing or commenting on the Tentative Tract Map.

 

(AR 1343.) 

 

In the staff report for the meeting of February 27, 2024, before the City Council, the staff summarized these communications and included a copy as Attachment M.  (AR 1220.)  The Ralph M. Brown Act—Government Code sections 54950 et seq.—requires the City post its City Council meeting agendas and staff report materials 72 hours prior to a meeting.  Petitioner does not argue that the City failed to post the staff report at least 72 hours prior to the February 7, 2024, meeting.  Petitioner did not submit any written comments prior to the City Council meeting arguing that the notices of February 9 and 11, 2024, failed to comply with section 1270.04.  (See AR 1346-1357, 5747.)[3]  The Fire Marshal also appeared at the City Council meeting, summarized the correspondence with Cal Fire, and stated that the City had made “notification” to comply with section 1270.4.  (AR 1389.)  The City attorney asserted at the meeting that Cal Fire had been given notice in compliance with section 1270.04 and “this isn’t the first time CalFire has seen this project.”  (AR 1374-75.) 

 

Neither Petitioner nor anyone else raised any concerns with the City’s compliance with section 1270.04.  During the oral public comment session at the City Council hearing, no speaker raised the issue.  (AR 1393-1396.)  Nor did Petitioner argue previously that the notices or Cal Fire’s response did not comply with section 1270.4.  Petitioner’s comment before the Planning Commission, on February 1, 2024, did not fairly apprise the City of a contention that the subsequent communications with Cal Fire were deficient.  Accordingly, Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies on that issue.

 

C.        The City’s Notice to Cal Fire Complied with Section 1270.04

 

In the alternative, Petitioner’s argument that the City failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 1270.04(a) and (b) is not persuasive.  Petitioner raises a legal question about the proper interpretation of the regulation. 

 

The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.  To determine legislative intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.  When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.

 

(Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340, internal citations omitted.)  These same rules apply to the interpretation of a regulation.  (County of Sacramento v. State Water Resources Control Board (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1579, 1586.)

 

Here, section 1270.04(a) and (b) provide in full: 

 

(a)   the Local Jurisdictions shall provide the Director of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) or their designee with notice of applications for Building permits, tentative parcel maps, tentative maps, and installation or use permits for construction or Development within the SRA, or if after July, 1 2021, the VHFHSZ.

 

(b)   the Director or their designee may review and make fire protection recommendations on applicable construction or development permits or maps provided by the Local Jurisdiction.

 

(emphasis added.) 

 

            Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, section 1270.04(a) does not prescribe a specific time frame in which a local agency must provide Cal Fire with notice of an application for a building permit, use permit, or tentative map.  (See OB 19:1-2.)  The regulation also does not require the local agency to provide Cal Fire with any specific information about the proposed tentative map, as Petitioner argues.  (OB 18:17-19.)  When interpretating a regulation, the court cannot “insert language which has been omitted” or infer requirements that are not supported by the regulation’s plain language.  (People v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 277, 282.)   And, as Petitioner acknowledges, section 1270.04(b) “allows Cal Fire to exercise its discretion whether or not to respond to a local agency notification.”  (Reply 7:24-8:1.) 

 

Here, Cal Fire did not request additional time to review the TTM application or assert that it was declining to provide comment because of insufficient notice.  (AR 1343.)  Rather, Cal Fire exercised its discretion not to review the tentative map.  Under these circumstances, the court is not called upon to decide whether section 1270.04(a) should be interpreted to require some minimal amount of notice before the local agency’s approval of a tentative map.  The regulation directs the City to provide “notice” of an application for a tentative map, which is what the City did.  (AR 1343-1345, 5747.)  Cal Fire affirmatively stated that it “will not be reviewing or commenting on the Tentative Tract Map.”  (AR 1343)  Cal Fire did not request additional time to review the matter or supplemental materials.  (Ibid.)  Instead, Cal Fire certified that the City had complied with the requirements of section 1270.04.  (Ibid.)  Therefore, the City fulfilled the notice requirement of section 1270.04(a) and (b).   

 

Respondents argue that “[t]he contemporaneous administrative construction of a regulation by the agency charged with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight.”  (Department of Alcoholic Beverage v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1687, 1695.)  Accordingly, Respondents suggest that the court should defer to Cal Fire’s assessment that “[t]he notification completes the requirements of 14 CCR 1270.04 for the City of Sierra Madre.”  (AR 1343.)  The court need not defer to Cal Fire’s assessment.  The court’s independent review confirms that the City complied with section 1270.04(a) and (b). Therefore, the petition for writ of mandate is denied on this ground. 

    

D.        The City Did Not Violate the Consultation Requirement of Section 1276.03(a)(1)

 

Petitioner also argues that the City violated section 1276.03 of the Fire Safe Regulations.  Section 1276.03 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

 

(a) When Building construction meets the following criteria, the Local Jurisdiction shall determine the need and location for Fuel Breaks in consultation with the Fire Authority:

 

(1)   the permitting or approval of three (3) or more new parcels …. [¶]

 

(b)   Fuel Breaks required by the Local Jurisdiction, in consultation with the Fire Authority, shall be located, designed, and maintained in a condition that reduces the potential of damaging radiant and convective heat or ember exposure to Access routes, Buildings, or infrastructure within the Development.

 

[¶¶]

 

(e) Fuel Breaks shall be completed prior to the commencement of any permitted construction.

 

(§ 1276.03(a)(1), (b), and (e), emphasis added.) 

 

            Petitioner has not shown that the City violated section 1276.03.  In fact, the City “determine[d] the need and location for Fuel Breaks”—which by definition includes fuel modification zones—when it approved the Specific Plan and certified the EIR.  The regulations define “Fuel Break” as “[a] strategically located area where the volume and arrangement of vegetation has been managed to limit fire intensity, fire severity, rate of spread, crown fire potential, and/or ember production.”  (§ 1270.01(n).)  The term “fuel modification” is used in the Specific Plan, EIR, and Fire Protection Plan to convey a similar principle as “Fuel Break.”  (See e.g. AR 2544, 2545, 2704-09, 5396-97.)  The Project’s Fire Protection Plan analyzes the need for, and location of, fuel breaks and fuel modification at the Project site.  (AR 5396-97.) This analysis included fire behavior modeling, and described how that modeling considered the Project’s “fire environment, the enhanced building features, fire protection systems, and exterior site design layout.”  (AR 5397.)  The Fire Protection Plan established the design and maintenance requirements of the various fuel breaks and modification areas incorporated into the Project’s design. (AR 5396-5399, 5436.)  The Fire Protection Plan incorporated and relied upon Cal Fire data. (AR05376, 5383, 5416.)  The Fire Protection Plan was included in the certified Final EIR at Appendix F2 (AR 5362-5441) and compliance with the Fire Protection Plan was made a condition of the Project approval. (AR 2340, 2348.)

 

            Petitioner focuses on the “consultation” requirement, but as a procedural matter, section 1276.03 does not establish any timing requirements for consultation with Cal Fire, and it does not prevent approval of a tentative map if consultation has not occurred.  The only timing requirement established in section 1276.03 is the mandate that fuel breaks, if they are required, “shall be completed prior to the commencement of any permitted construction.”  (§ 1276.03(e).)  Petitioner does not show, with evidence, that building permits have yet been issued.  Accordingly, consultation with Cal Fire about the Fire Breaks required by the Project plans and approvals could still occur consistent with the regulation. 

 

            Finally, substantial evidence in the record shows that “Cal Fire was among the

state agencies reviewing the Project” and Cal Fire did not provide comments on the draft EIR by the deadline.  (AR 1220.)  Further, as summarized above, the City gave notice to Cal Fire of its intent to approve the TTM and Cal Fire did not request that the City alter its fuel modification requirements in any way. (AR 1219-1220, 1343-1345, 5747.)  For all these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the City’s approval of the TTM violated the consultation requirement of section 1276.03. 

           

            E.         The City Complied with the Fire Safe Regulations and the Municipal Code

 

            1.         The TTM complied with the section 1270.04(c)

 

The TTM’s conditions of approval require compliance with the Fire Safe Regulations.  The Fire Safe Regulations state that “the Local Jurisdiction shall ensure that the applicable sections of this Subchapter become a condition of approval of any applicable construction or Development permit or map.”  (§ 1270.04(c).)  Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the TTM complies with this requirement.  Specifically, General Condition of Approval #2 for the TTM states: “The applicant shall comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, State and Los Angeles County law and regulations, including but not limited to the California Environmental Quality Act.”  (AR 1256.)  This condition necessarily requires compliance with the Fire Safe Regulations, which are state regulations.  Petitioner cites no authority, and the court has found none, in support of Petitioner’s position that section 1270.04(c) requires each “applicable section” of the Fire Safe Regulations to be referenced specifically in the conditions of approval.  (See Reply 12:1-16.)  Thus, the court concludes that the City complied with section 1270.04(c)

 

2.         The TTM’s conditions require offsite improvements to Carter Avenue

 

The Fire Safe Regulations provide that “[r]oads … whether public or private … shall provide for safe access for emergency Wildfire equipment and civilian evacuation concurrently, and shall provide unobstructed traffic circulation during a Wildfire emergency….”  (§ 1273.00.)  With respect to road “width,” the regulations further provide in relevant part:

 

All roads shall be constructed to provide a minimum of two ten (10) foot traffic lanes, not including shoulder and striping. These traffic lanes shall provide for two-way traffic flow to support emergency vehicle and civilian egress, unless other standards are provided in this article or additional requirements are mandated by Local Jurisdictions or local subdivision requirements. 

 

(§ 1273.01.)  In addition, road surfaces “shall be designed and maintained to support the imposed load of Fire Apparatus weighing at least 75,000 pounds.” (§ 1273.02(a).)

 

Petitioner argues that, in its current condition, Carter Avenue does not meet minimum travel lane width requirements of the Fire Safe Regulations.  (OB 19-20.)  However, the Specific Plan expressly includes improvements to Carter Avenue, and these improvements will provide travel lanes of at least 10 feet. (AR 579; see also AR 611, 679-681, 1257-59.) 

 

Petitioner also argues that “the manner in which the off-site improvement of Carter was included in the Development Agreement and the Tentative Tract Map does not ensure that that the ingress and egress requirements of the Fire Safe Regulations will eventually be satisfied.”  (OB 20:19-21.)  Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Development Agreement could be renegotiated and does not actually require Real Parties to improve Carter, and that Government Code section 66462.5(a) creates “the risk that a final map will be recorded without the improvements.”  (OB 21-22.) 

 

As a preliminary matter, the final EIR contradicts Petitioner’s claims and states clearly that “the existing Carter Avenue access [will be] improved to meet fire apparatus access road requirements,” and that “[a]ll roads [will] comply with access road standards of not less than 24 feet, unobstructed width and are capable of supporting an imposed load of at least 75,000 pounds.” (AR 2706.)  The EIR also concludes that, with implementation of the Fire Protection Plan, the Project’s environmental impacts associated with wildfire would be less than significant and no mitigation measures would be required.  (AR 2711.)  Petitioner did not challenge these material findings in the EIR and cannot do so now. 

 

Regardless, Petitioner’s arguments are speculative and unpersuasive.  As discussed above, the TTM was conditioned upon compliance with all applicable sections of the Fire Safe Regulations.  (AR 1256.)  Specific Condition of Approval #3 also requires the development be constructed and maintained consistent with the Specific Plan, which includes the offsite Carter Avenue improvements as part of the Project. (AR 1257, 579, 588, 680-681.)  The Development Agreement also requires that construction of the improvements commence prior to the issuance of the first building permit.  (AR 731.)  Although the Real Parties theoretically could seek to renegotiate the Development Agreement if they are unable to secure the rights from the County to complete the offsite improvements to Carter (AR 1183), any future renegotiation of the Development Agreement would be a discretionary action of the City Council, subject to public notice and hearing, as well as the provisions of CEQA.  Any renegotiated term could not override an applicable Federal, State, or local statute or regulation, including the Fire Safe Regulations.  These issues are not ripe for resolution in this petition.    

 

Petitioner’s reliance on Government Code section 66462.5 is misplaced.  This statute “places an obligation on the local governing body to acquire an interest in land upon which the subdivider is obligated to build improvements within 120 days of the filing of the final subdivision map.  The failure to abide by the statutory time limit results in a waiver of the obligation to construct the improvements.”  (Hill v. City of Clovis (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 438, 445-446.)  Furthermore, section 66462.5 “is relevant only in the situation in which approval of the final map is being delayed or refused.  (Id. at 449.)  Here, the Development Agreement requires the Real Parties, not the City, to acquire rights to Carter and only requires construction of the offsite improvements to be completed prior to issuance of the 11th building permit.  (AR 731.)  Under these circumstances, there is no evidence, or reason to believe, that the City will unjustly refuse or delay issuance of a final map.  Accordingly, section 66462.5 is not applicable and, furthermore, it is pure speculation for Petitioner to argue that any waiver under the statute will occur.  Finally, as discussed, the TTM was conditioned upon compliance with all applicable sections of the Fire Safe Regulations.  (AR 1256.)  Thus, even if waiver under section 66462.5 somehow occurred, Petitioner fails to show that the result would be non-compliant with the Fire Safe Regulations. 

 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has not proven that the Project, as conditioned, violates the ingress and egress requirements of the Fire Safe Regulations. 

 

3.         The TTM has no other deficiencies under the Fire Safe Regulations

 

Petitioner argues that the TTM violated the Fire Safe Regulations because the conditions of approval do not “address the provision of emergency water,” do not include detailed requirements for fire hydrants, and do not provide “discussion” of “which mechanisms are being imposed to reduce structure-to-structure ignition.” (OB 22:8-15.)  As discussed, the TTM was conditioned upon compliance with all applicable sections of the Fire Safe Regulations.  (AR 1256.)  Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the conditions of approval do address the applicable requirements of the Fire Safe Regulations.  Furthermore, Petitioner ignores the detailed analyses of wildfire risk and fire safety that were included in the Specific Plan, final EIR, and Fire Protection Plan, including analyses related to water supply, the location of fire hydrants, and mechanisms to reduce structure-to-structure ignition.  (See e.g. AR 2697-2711, 5368-69, 5393-5394.)  The Fire Safe Regulations do not require these issues to be incorporated in the TTM itself.

 

            4.         The TTM complies with the Municipal Code

 

Petitioner contends that the TTM did not include the required information regarding the width of Carter Avenue immediately “adjacent” to the site, as required by section 16.12.040.A.5 and 7 of the City’s Municipal Code.  (OB 22-23; see RJN Exh. 1, 7.)  Based on the court’s review, the TTM appears to include sufficient information about the width of Carter Avenue.  (AR 261-267.)  Petitioner has not adequately explained, with discussion of the record, how the TTM is deficient in this regard.  (See OB 22-23.)  Moreover, subsection 16.12.040.C of the City’s Municipal Code states:

 

The director of planning and community preservation may waive any of the foregoing requirements when, in the determination of the director of planning and community preservation, any such requirement is not necessary due to the nature of the proposed subdivision of land, or other circumstances justify such waiver.

 

(RJN Exh. 1.)  As discussed, the Specific Plan, Final EIR, and Development Agreement all addressed the current and future condition of Carter Avenue in detail.  These documents were included in the City Council Staff Report for the February 27, 2024, meeting at which the City Council approved the TTM. (AR 1230-1231.)  Even if Carter Avenue ran “adjacent” to the TTM, it would have been reasonable for staff to conclude the record justifies not depicting the off-site Carter Avenue improvements on the TTM.  Moreover, the City had all relevant information regarding the existing and proposed condition of Carter Avenue before it approved the TTM application.  Therefore, assuming without deciding that the TTM lacks sufficient information about the width of Carter (see AR 261-67), Petitioner has not shown a prejudicial abuse of discretion or other legal error that would justify invalidating the TTM.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

 

            1.         The petition for writ of mandate is denied.  This order is without prejudice to Petitioner filing a petition to challenge any approval of the final tract map if the City fails to make any necessary changes to the tentative tract map. 

 

            2.         The court declines to issue a declaratory judgment because Petitioner has an adequate remedy in the writ cause of action.  (See General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470-471; Hood v. Sup.Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324.)  In the alternative, the court denies the declaratory relief claim for the same reasons it denies the petition for writ of mandate.

 


 

            3.         The parties shall meet-and-confer and lodge a proposed judgment.

 

            4.         The court’s clerk shall provide notice.   

 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED

 

 

Dated: January 22, 2025                                             ______________________

                                                                                    Stephen I. Goorvitch

                                                                                    Superior Court Judge



[1] Unless otherwise stated, regulatory citations are to title 14 of the California Code of Regulations.

 

[2] Petitioner dismissed its first cause of action under the California Public Records Act.

[3] After the opening brief was filed, the City amended the administrative record in several respects, including to “include the February 11, 2024 email formatted such that the attachments are clear.”  (Notice of Certification, filed December 20, 2024 at 3:12-15.)  Petitioner has not shown it needs additional briefing to respond to the amendments.  (See e.g. Reply 7, fn. 1, 10:12.)