Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP02005, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCP02005    Hearing Date: March 21, 2025    Dept: 82

Oscar Ramirez, Jr.                                                   Case No. 24STCP02005

v.                                                                     Hearing: March 21, 2025

                                                                        Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

                                                                                    Department: 82                                       Department of Motor Vehicles                          Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

[Tentative] Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate

[Tentative] Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

INTRODUCTION

            Petitioner Oscar Ramirez, Jr. (“Petitioner”) was involved in a traffic collision and allegedly refused to submit to a chemical test.  The Department of Motor Vehicles (the “DMV” or “Respondent”) held a hearing at which there was a hearing officer, but no advocate for the DMV.  Following the hearing, the DMV suspended Petitioner’s driver’s license for one year.  Now, Petitioner challenges that suspension, arguing that the DMV combined the roles of hearing officer and advocate in violation of the principles of due process, per California DUI Lawyers Association v. California Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517 (“DUI Lawyers”).  The court agrees because the hearing officer also acted as an advocate during the hearing.  Therefore, the court has no choice but to grant the petition for writ of mandate.  The court denies Petitioner’s motion for attorneys’ fees.     

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

When a driver petitions for a writ of mandate following an order suspending his or her driver’s license, the trial court is required to determine, based on its independent judgment, whether the weight of the evidence supports the administrative decision.  (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 448, 456.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.”  (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.)  The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations.  (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)  However, “in exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817; accord Hildebrand v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1568 [administrative findings of the DMV “come before the superior court with a ‘strong presumption of correctness’”] and Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1233 [same].) 

The court exercises independent judgment on questions arising in mandate proceedings.  (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)  The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law.  (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.)  “A challenge to the procedural fairness of the administrative hearing is reviewed de novo on appeal because the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.”  (Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) 

DISCUSSION  

Petitioner contends that the DMV violated his due process rights by using a single hearing officer format in which the hearing officer acted both as an advocate for DMV and as the trier of fact.  (Opening Brief (“OB”) 5-7; Reply 5-8.)  Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the hearing officer engaged in advocacy for the DMV when he “decided which documents to use as exhibits;” “moved those documents into evidence;” and “ruled on evidentiary objections to those documents.”  (OB 6:22-25.) 

            In DUI Lawyers, the District Court of Appeal held that “combining the roles of advocate and adjudicator in a single person employed by the DMV violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the California constitution Article I, section 7.”  (77 Cal.App.5th at 532-533.)  Summarizing prior appellate decisions, the DUI Lawyers Court reasoned as follows:

Although procedural fairness does not prohibit the combination of the advocacy and adjudicatory functions within a single administrative agency, tasking the same individual with both roles violates the minimum constitutional standards of due process. The irreconcilable conflict between advocating for the agency on one hand, and being an impartial decisionmaker on the other, presents a “particular combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias.” 

(Id. at 532.)  Notably, in DUI Lawyers, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the DMV had a policy, found in its Driver Safety Manual (“DSM”), that mandated its hearing officers to act both as advocates for the DMV and as the triers of fact.  (Id. at 523, 527.)  The DMV admitted, in responses to requests for admissions, that the DSM “accurately reflects the policies and practices of the DMV” and that the DSM defines the role of hearing officer as “a trier of fact as well as an advocate for the department and driver safety.”  (Id. at 527.) Accordingly, in remanding the case to the trial court, the Court of Appeal instructed that the modified judgment shall state that “the DMV is permanently enjoined and restrained from having its APS hearing officers function as advocates for the position of the DMV in addition to being finders of fact in the same adversarial proceeding.”  (Id. at 538.) 

As noted by Respondent in opposition (see Oppo. 15-16), DUI Lawyers states that the DMV may allow its hearing officers to perform multiple functions, as long as the hearing officers refrain from advocating on behalf of the DMV.  (See DUI Lawyers, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 533, fn. 5 [“CDLA concedes the DMV may task the same person with both collecting and developing the evidence and rendering a final decision…. He or she must refrain, however, from advocating on behalf of the DMV ….”].)  Subsequently, in Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, the Court of Appeal established the following test for analyzing a driver’s due process challenge to a DMV hearing:

[T]o resolve such a challenge, it is first necessary to determine whether a particular driver's due process right to an impartial adjudicator was violated. Consistent with DUI Lawyers, that determination is made by assessing the administrative record and the revocation decision to see if the public hearing officer actually acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, or merely acted as an adjudicator and a collector and developer of evidence. If the relevant documents demonstrate that the public hearing officer did not act as an advocate, then the driver's due process right to an impartial adjudicator was not violated, and the constitutional issue is resolved. If the relevant documents demonstrate that a public hearing officer actually acted as an advocate, then the driver's due process right to an impartial adjudicator is violated. In the latter circumstance, because we conclude that a violation of the due process right to an impartial adjudicator is a structural error, then the driver is entitled to a new APS hearing before a constitutionally impartial adjudicator.

(Id. at 193.)  Significantly, Knudsen observed that “it is possible that in a particular case, the public hearing officer merely collected and developed evidence and then rendered a decision without actually engaging in advocacy or acting as an advocate.”  (Id. at 207.)  “If a hearing officer does not actually act as an advocate, but instead merely collects and develops evidence and then renders a decision, then the due process right to an impartial adjudicator would not be violated in a particular case because the adjudicator did not actually act as an advocate.”  (Ibid.)

            In Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267, the Court of Appeal applied the analysis set forth in Knudsen and found that a due process violation occurred under the specific facts of the case before it.  (Clarke, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at 1270-1277.)  The Court’s majority declined to hold that a single DMV employee could never discharge multiple functions during an APS hearing in a manner that will satisfy due process requirements.  (Id. at 1277.)

            Here, the court finds that the hearing officer acted as both a neutral and an advocate for the reasons articulated by Petitioner’s counsel.  The record suggests that the hearing officer was selective in terms of which exhibits were introduced, i.e., the record does not make clear that the hearing officer was collecting all of the evidence concerning Petitioner in the DMV’s possession.  For example, it is unclear why the hearing officer did not consider body camera and/or dashboard camera evidence from the Pomona Police Department.  The certified administrative record contains the evidence introduced at the hearing, not necessarily all of the evidence in the DMV’s possession relating to Petitioner.  This ambiguity undermines the DMV’s argument.  In opposition, the DMV argues that Petitioner does not identify what evidence was missing.  It was the hearing officer’s role to make a clear record that he was considering all of the evidence, and he failed to do so.  Then, the hearing officer stated that he was moving the exhibits into evidence on behalf of the DMV:

            Hearing Officer: . . . Any objections to these three documents now sir?

Petitioner’s Counsel:  Well, are you moving it on behalf of the [DMV]?

Hearing Officer: It’s being moved --

Petitioner’s Counsel: Your -- you said you were introducing the documents.

Hearing Officer: Yes. Well, yes.  Any objections as far as moving them into evidence?

Petitioner’s Counsel:  You’re moving it in on behalf of the [DMV], right?

Hearing Officer:  Yes, it’s their evidence.  It’s evidence by the [DMV].  I am -- I am acting as a neutral factfinder.  It’s not documents that’s being presented to me as -- as evidence, and it’s being moved into evidence.  Yes.

Petitioner’s Counsel:  Okay.  So, you’re moving it on behalf of the [DMV]  Okay.  So, I am going to object under [Kundsen] [and] [DUI Lawyers] . . . .  Okay.  So that’s one of my objections.  Another objection would be lack of authentication and lack of foundation and Evidence Code 1280.

Hearing Officer:  Thank you, counsel.  Objections are overruled at this time. . . .

(AR 35-38.)  Then, the hearing officer overruled Petitioner’s counsel’s objections.  Finally, the hearing officer ignored obvious deficiencies in the evidence.  For example, on the Form DS-367, which was introduced as Exhibit #1, it is unclear whether Petitioner refused because there is no answer after the following questions: (1) Will you take a Breath Test? and (2) Will you take a Blood Test?  (See AR 9.)  A neutral hearing officer should have addressed the deficiencies to explain why they did not compel a different result.  The hearing officer’s failure to do so suggests that he was engaged in advocacy.   

In sum, the combination of all of these factors suggests that the hearing officer was engaged in advocacy, which violates the principles of due process and the holding of California DUI Lawyers in this case.  Therefore, the court grants the petition for writ of mandate.  Nevertheless, the court denies the motion for attorneys’ fees.  The court cannot say that the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary or capricious, because the record reflects that he was trying to navigate the line between neutral and advocate (albeit unsuccessfully).  The instant case is not as egregious as other cases in which the court has ordered the DMV to pay attorneys’ fees.   

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

            1.         The petition for writ of mandate is granted.

            2.         The parties shall meet-and-confer and lodge a proposed judgment.

            3.         The court denies Petitioner’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

            4.         The court’s clerk shall provide notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated:  March 20, 2025                                              ______________________________

                                                                                    Stephen I. Goorvitch

                                                                                    Superior Court Judge