Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP02281, Date: 2024-10-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP02281, Date: 2024-10-25 Tentative Ruling

Jackie Contreras, Department: 82 Director of DPSS Los Angeles County Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

The court posts this tentative order in advance of the hearing, scheduled for Friday, October 25, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. The court provides notice: If Petitioner does not appear, either remotely or in-person, the court will take this hearing off-calendar and adopt these tentative orders. If Petitioner wishes to appear remotely but is experiencing difficulty, or if she is running late, she may contact the court’s clerk, Roberto Mendoza, at (213) 830-0782.

Petitioner Adeshola Helen Adegoroye (“Petitioner”), a self-represented party, filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging Respondent’s decision to deny benefits to her father. Now, Respondent demurs to the petition and moves to strike a prayer for relief. The court sustains the demurrer because: (1) Petitioner does not have standing since her father was the Claimant; (2) Petitioner cannot represent her father because she is not an attorney; (3) Petitioner did not include her father as a petitioner, and did not name the California Department of Social Services as a respondent; and (4) Petitioner does not clearly allege that her father exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer. The court shall grant leave to amend for the Claimant or a lawyer representing him to file an amended petition/complaint, but the court denies leave to amend for Petitioner to do so. The court denies the motion to strike as moot.

On or about September 26, 2018, William Adegoroye, a 76-year-old man (the “Claimant”), applied for In-Home Supportive Services (“IHSS”) in Los Angeles County (the “County”). (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) pp. 2, 34.)[1] “In 1973 the Legislature enacted the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program to enable aged, blind or disabled poor to avoid institutionalization by remaining in their homes with proper supportive services.” (Miller v. Woods (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 867.)

The County denied the application in a “Notice of Action,” dated November 16, 2018, on the grounds that: (1) The Claimant did not provide enough information to the County to determine if he qualifies for IHSS services; (2) The Claimant did not provide the County with a health care certification form as required to authorize services; and (3) The Claimant was ineligible for IHSS services due to his having less than five years of legal residency. (Id. p. 34.) On November 22, 2023, the Claimant, through his authorized representative—Petitioner—filed an administrative appeal to the California Department of Social Services (“CDSS”). (Id. pp. 32, 34.)

The Claimant won his administrative appeal before CDSS in a decision issued on April 5, 2024 (“Decision”). In the Decision, the administrative law judge overturned the 2018 denial of Claimant’s application and issued the following order:

The claim is granted. Los Angeles County shall rescind its November 16, 2018 Notice of Action, continue processing the claimant’s September 26, 2018, IHSS application; notify the claimant of any additional information necessary in writing; notify the claimant in writing of its determination; and aid the claimant as otherwise eligible.

On July 18, 2024, Petitioner Adeshola Helen Adegoroye, filed the present lawsuit in her own name. The cover sheet is entitled, “Writ of Mandate and Civil Rights.” Petitioner states that she is “appealing [the Decision] because they want to deem my income as a sponsor on sponsor deeming income rules which is only applicable to Sponsor’s of SSI benefit applicant.” (Pet. p.10.) Petitioner also states that she is “suing the CDSS Los county for misrepresentation because they are falsely try to deem my income and they submitted lies to the judge.” (Ibid.) Petitioner also purports to sue “for misrepresentation, discrimination and emotional distress.” (Id. p 11.) As remedies, Petitioner states that her “dad [i.e., Claimant] seeks justice and remedy for the payment of the years me his daughter and authorized representative who had provided excellent IHSS care services from the 26 September 2018 till today.” (Id. at p. 11.) Petitioner states that the amount of the claim is $342,504 and she is also requesting the continuous hourly wage of $18 per hour every month. She also requests “damages for the pain and suffering they made me and my dad go through.” (Ibid.)

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Upon motion, the court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436.) As with a demurrer, “[t]he grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (CCP § 437.) Courts take a “cautious” approach to motions to strike. “We have no intention of creating a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the civil defendant.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1683.) “Judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

To have standing to seek a writ of mandate, a party must be “beneficially interested.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086.) “A petitioner is beneficially interested if he or she has some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.” (Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 899, 913.) “This standard … is equivalent to the federal ‘injury in fact’ test, which requires a party to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” (Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361-362, citation and internal quotations omitted.)

The petition seeks writ relief and civil rights remedies on behalf of the Claimant, who is Petitioner’s father. Specifically, in the petition, Petitioner states:

I am seeking equal protective [sic] right[s] [on] behalf of my dad as my dad’s authorized representative. My dad seeks justice and remedy for the payment of the years me his daughter and authorized representative who had provided excellent IHSS care services from the 26 September 2018 till today . . . .

(Pet. at p. 11.) Petitioner lacks standing to assert these claims. Although Petitioner alleges that she has “standing as a direct recipient of IHSS personal care salary,” in fact, her father is the beneficiary. Thus, only the Claimant, not Petitioner, has standing to challenge decisions concerning his benefits.

Because Petitioner is not an attorney, she cannot represent her father in court. As an exhibit, Petitioner has presented an un-notarized form designating her as her father’s authorized representative. (Id. at 13.) However, “it has been well settled that persons may represent their own interests in legal proceedings but may not practice law [for another] in this State unless [they are] active member[s] of the state bar.” (Drake v. Sup.Ct. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830.) Further, “[a] power of attorney is not a vehicle which authorizes an attorney in fact to act as an attorney at law.” (Id. at 1831.) Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, section 120222 of title 22 of the California Code of Regulations does not permit her to represent her father in a court of law. (Oppo. 11-12.) Although Petitioner states that she is “appealing” the Decision, the Decision pertained to an application for IHSS benefits of Petitioner’s father, the Claimant. Petitioner, who is not an attorney, lacks standing and legal authority to file, in propria persona, a petition for writ of mandate on behalf of her father.

Respondent demurs to the petition for misjoinder of parties and contends that the California Department of Social Services (“CDSS”) is the true respondent for challenges to the Decision, and William Adegoroye, the Claimant, is the true petitioner. (Dem. 15; see CCP § 430.10(d).) For the reasons discussed above, the court agrees that the Claimant must be named as a petitioner to any petition for writ of mandate challenging the Decision. Further, since the Decision was made by the CDSS, that government agency must be named as the respondent.

A petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before prosecuting a petition for writ of mandate. (See, e.g., SJCBC, LLC v. Horwedel (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 339, 345.) This is necessary because this court’s review is limited to review of the administrative agency’s decision. (See Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-515.) Petitioner does not clearly allege that the Claimant exhausted his administrative remedies.[2]

A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend when there is no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) There is no reasonable possibility that Petitioner can assert these claims unless she retains counsel to represent her father. Therefore, the court denies leave to amend for a petition filed by Petitioner as a self-represented party. The court grants leave to amend for a petition filed by the Claimant himself or counsel representing the Claimant.

3. The court denies leave to amend to the extent Petitioner seeks to proceed as a self-represented party.

4. The court grants leave to amend for William Adegoroye or counsel representing him to file a petition/complaint. Any such petition/complaint shall be filed within 60 days. The court provides notice: If no petition/complaint is filed within 45 days, absent good cause, the court will dismiss this case without prejudice.

5. The court issues an order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to file an amended petition/complaint. The OSC hearing shall be held on December 13, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. The court provides notice: If William Adegoroye or counsel represent him does not appear at the hearing, either remotely or in-person, absent good cause, the court will dismiss this case without prejudice.

[1] Only the first 10 pages of the petition were paginated by Petitioner and there are no exhibit numbers or tabs for the attachments to the petition. Accordingly, like the Respondent, the court cites to the .pdf page numbers of the entire petition (pages 1-135). (See Demurrer 7, fn. 1.)

[2] The court need not resolve Respondent’s ripeness argument in order to rule on the pending motions.