Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP02370, Date: 2025-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP02370, Date: 2025-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Department: 82 Los Angeles Unified School District Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (“Respondent” or the “District”) demurs to the petition for writ of administrative mandate filed by Petitioner Madlyn Prudhomme (“Petitioner”) for failure to state a cause of action, misjoinder of parties, and uncertainty. Petitioner, a self-represented litigant, timely filed and served an opposition to the demurrer. The District has not filed a reply brief. The petition states a cause of action for administrative mandate, and the court cannot determine from the face of the pleading that the petition is necessarily barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the demurrer is overruled.

Petitioner was employed by the District as a Special Education Assistant Trainee at an elementary school. (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) Exh. 1, Hearing Officer Recommendation (“Decision”) at 5 of 19.) Petitioner was terminated for failure to submit proof of a Covid-19 vaccination as mandated by the District’s policies. Petitioner claimed an exemption to the mandate due to sincerely held religious beliefs, and the District did not dispute the sincerity of Petitioner’s religious beliefs. Petitioner requested accommodation but the District concluded that Petitioner could not be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship to the District, including to the health of the special education students with whom she worked. (Id. at 2, 4, 7, and 10-19.)

After Petitioner appealed, an administrative hearing was held before a hearing officer, who recommended that the termination be upheld. The Personnel Commission agreed with the hearing officer’s recommendation and, on April 18, 2024, the Personnel Commission entered a final order sustaining Petitioner’s dismissal from employment. (Id. Exh. 1, at Final Order re Appeal.) On April 25, 2024, the District’s Personnel Director sent a letter to Petitioner, apparently by e-mail, informing her of the Personnel Commission’s written decision dated April 18, 2024. (Id. Exh. 1, at April 25, 2024, Letter.) This letter advised Petitioner that “[t]he time within which judicial review of the decision must be sought is governed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6.” (Ibid.) On July 29, 2024, Petitioner filed her petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the Decision.

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) The allegations in the petition must be liberally construed in favor of Petitioner on demurrer. (See Mobil Oil Corp. v Exxon Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 942, 947.) “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Respondent’s request for judicial notice of an “attached document published from the District website explaining the role of the Personnel Commission Appeals Unit” is denied. Respondent has not provided sufficient information about this webpage to enable the court to take judicial notice of the matter. (See Evid. Code § 453(b).)

Respondent contends that the petition is time barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6. (Dem. 5-6.) “A demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily barred. It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred.” (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881, citations omitted.)

Here, section 1094.6(a) states that “[j]udicial review of any decision of a local agency, other than school district, … may be had pursuant to Section 1094.5 of this code only if the petition for writ of mandate pursuant to such section is filed within the time limits specified in this section.” (emphasis added.) Respondent fails to explain why it relies on a limitations period that applies to local agencies, other than school districts.

Furthermore, the 90-day limitations period in section 1094.6 only commences if certain requirements are met. Specifically, section 1094.6(b) states: “If there is a provision for a written decision or written findings, the decision is final for purposes of this section upon the date it is mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid, including a copy of the affidavit or certificate of mailing, to the party seeking the writ.” The statute of limitations does not begin to run if this affidavit or certificate of mailing is not included with the written decision. (See Donnellan v. City of Novato (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1106.) Respondent does not address this requirement in the demurrer or show that the requirement was satisfied or inapplicable. Notably, Respondent does not provide an affidavit or certificate of mailing, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6. Therefore, the demurrer based on the statute of limitations is overruled.

The District contends that the Personnel Commission is a necessary party and that “the Petition is defective for failure to join a necessary party pursuant to CCP §430.10(d).” (Dem. 6.) If a party is necessary pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 389(a), and “cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 389(b).)

The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 389(b); see generally Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1178-79.) “Whether to dismiss an action for failure to name an indispensable party is subject to the discretion of the court.” (Tracy Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1298-99.)

The District has not shown that the Personnel Commission is a necessary party. As the demurrer states, the Personnel Commission is a “department” of the District. (Dem. 6:9-11.) Thus, a writ directed at the District could also apply to the Personnel Commission. Furthermore, the District has not advanced an argument that the Personnel Commission is an indispensable party based on the factors set forth in section 389(b), which the District does not analyze in its demurrer. The demurrer for misjoinder of parties is overruled.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

The District contends that the petition does not state a cause of action for administrative mandate, but the District does not discuss all pertinent allegations in the petition. (Dem. 6-8.) Specifically, the petition alleges that Petitioner’s “termination violated federal law 45 CFR 46.116(b)(8) that prohibits … persecution for refusing to participate in an investigational drug experiment.” (Pet. 2:22-28.) The petition alleges that this argument was raised in the administrative proceedings and the hearing officer ignored and failed to address the issue. (Pet. 2-4 and Exh. 3.) The petition alleges that the hearing officer prejudicially abused his discretion, and deprived Petitioner a fair trial, when he “ignored” Petitioner’s arguments and “exclude[ed] her brief from the administrative record.” (Pet. 2:15-17 and 3-4.) These allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for administrative mandate. The general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action is overruled.[1]

Demurrers for uncertainty are strictly construed. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.) The petition’s allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for administrative mandate, and the District can reasonably determine the claims stated. Therefore, the demurrer for uncertainty is overruled.

3. The opening brief shall be filed and served at least 60 days in advance of trial.

4. The administrative record shall be lodged on a thumb drive at least 60 days in advance of trial.

5. The opposition brief shall be filed and served at least 30 days in advance of trial.

6. The reply brief shall be filed and served at least 15 days in advance of trial.

[1] The State Bar complaints filed by Petitioner are extrinsic evidence and are not determinative of whether the petition states a cause of action. Accordingly, the court does not consider the declaration of attorney Hyman concerning the State Bar complaints. (Dem. 8.) To rule on the demurrer, the court also need not decide the District’s contention that Mark A. Williams, Petitioner’s domestic partner, was “treading perilously close to unauthorized practice of law.” (Ibid.) The petition sufficiently alleges that the hearing officer refused to consider legal briefing and arguments that were submitted or made by Petitioner. The court must accept the truth of those allegations in ruling on demurrer.