Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP02411, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP02411 Hearing Date: April 30, 2025 Dept: 82
Roshawn Helmandi, Case No. 24STCP02411
v.
Hearing:
April 30, 2025
Location:
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Chika
Sunquist Real Estate Department:
82
Commissioner for the State of California Judge:
Stephen I. Goorvitch
[Tentative] Order Denying Petition for
Writ of Mandate
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Roshawn Helmandi
(“Petitioner”), a licensed real estate broker, and his brother purchased a
parcel of property from George and Debra Tash.
Due to a scrivener’s error, two parcels were transferred to Petitioner
and his brother. Petitioner refused to
correct the error, dishonestly maintaining that the transaction was for both
properties. Eventually, the Tashes were
forced to file a quiet title lawsuit against Petitioner and his brother, and
even then, Petitioner and his brother refused to correct the error until the
Tashes paid them $99,000. Finding that
Petitioner had acted dishonestly and in bad faith, Respondent Chika Sunquist,
Real Estate Commissioner for the State of California (“Respondent”), revoked his
real estate license and issued a restricted broker license. Now, Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate
setting aside that decision. The
petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
In October 1976, George and Debra
Tash (the “Tashes” or the “Sellers”) acquired two parcels of land in
Northridge, California. (AR 12, 205.) The first parcel of land is a commercial
property with a street address of 19450 Business Center Drive, Los Angeles,
California 91324, APN 2783-025-068 “(Parcel A”). (AR 202, 205.) The second parcel of land is also a commercial
property with a street address of 19438-19444 Business Center Drive, Los
Angeles, California 91324 (“Parcel B”). (AR 202, 205.) Parcel B’s two units (19438 and 19444 Business
Center Drive) have a single APN (APN 2783-025-069). (AR 207, 211.) Parcel B is located next to Parcel A, with
Parcel A occupying the “corner lot.” (AR 211, 1345, 1340-1341.) The Tashes rented out Parcel A and Parcel B to
tenants. (AR 1357-58.)
In 2021, the Tashes decided to sell
the two properties. (AR 1358.) The tenants in Parcel A expressed interest in
buying that parcel, and they recommended Petitioner’s brother, Haron Helmandi,
as a purchaser for Parcel B. (AR
1360-1361, 206.) After discussing the
price and terms of sale with George Tash, Haron Helmandi
sent
a completed Commercial Property Purchase Agreement, dated April 22, 2021, to
the Tashes. (AR 207, 226.) The purchase agreement listed “19438 &
19444 W BUSINESS CENTER DR” and “Assessor’s Parcel No. 2783025069” as the “REAL
PROPERTY to be acquired.” (AR 226.) In
other words, the purchase agreement only applied to Parcel B. The purchase agreement listed Haron Helmandi
as the buyer and a purchase price offer of $2,600,000 for Parcel B. (AR 226.) The purchase agreement was executed by Haron Helmandi and the Tashes on April 23, 2021. (AR 235, 1366.)
Debra
Tash testified as follows: Escrow moved slowly because Haron Helmandi did not lift contingencies listed in the purchase
agreement or provide a lender verification.
(AR 1367.) The Tashes eventually
met with Haron Helmandi and his brother,
Petitioner (collectively, the “Helmandis”), to discuss the transaction. (AR 1369.)
During the meeting, Petitioner stated that he was a real estate broker with
experience obtaining lenders and provided his business card. (AR 1369-1371, 275.) Petitioner stated that he would like to buy
Parcel A. (AR 1369-70.) Debra Tash informed Petitioner that she and
her husband had promised Parcel A to the tenants. (AR 1370.) Petitioner did most of the talking during the
meeting and that Haron said “very little.
(AR 1370-72.)
Following
this meeting, Haron lifted the contingencies and produced a hard money lender,
Mohammad Shubair Humkar, who agreed to provide the loan only if Petitioner was
a co-borrower. (AR 1377, 2085-2086,
2216-2217.) Humkar agreed to provide the
$2 million loan because he knew Petitioner had collateral, specifically a
property in Malibu. (AR 2217.)
Petitioner was subsequently added as a buyer at the close of escrow on
October 14, 2021. (AR 2149, 2221.)
After
the close of escrow for Parcel B, Debra received a LifeLock alert informing her
both Parcel A and Parcel B had been transferred to Haron and
Petitioner. (AR 1379.) Specifically, the grant deed for Parcel B
erroneously included the APN and legal description of Parcel A. (AR 208, 427- 29, 276-80.) While the grant deed listed the correct
address for Parcel B (“19438 and 19444 West Business Center Drive, Northridge,
CA 91324”) it listed the APNs for both Parcel A and B, APN 2783-025-068 and APN
2783-025-069, respectively. (AR
1383-1384, 277.) This scrivener’s error
was not noticed by the Tashes or by the escrow officer and/or title officer at
Chicago Title prior to the close of escrow.
(AR 1384, 1539-1541, 1579.)
The
escrow officer at Chicago Title attempted to correct the error by reaching out
to the buyers—Petitioner and Haron Helmandi—to make arrangements for signing
and notarizing the corrected documents. (AR
1542, 531-540.) Specifically, Lovelace
emailed Petitioner and Haron Helmandi on November 7, 8,
9, 10, and 30, 2021. (AR 531-540.) Haron Helmandi initially
responded on November 8, 2021, that he was out of town and would call when he
returned. (AR 532.) After that, Lovelace did not receive any
further response from the Helmandis. (AR
1543, 2225.) The Tashes then filed a
lawsuit for quiet title against the Helamandis to force them to return Parcel
A. (AR 1382-1386, 281.) On or about April 1, 2023, the parties
reached a settlement pursuant to which the Helmandis agreed to execute and
notarize a corrective quitclaim deed to reconvey Parcel A back the Tashes in
exchange for $99,000. (AR 889,
2134.) A correction quitclaim deed was
recorded on or about June 21, 2023, and was signed by Haron and Petitioner. (AR
1393, 417-20.)
On June 22, 2023, Respondent filed
an Accusation against Petitioner. (AR
11.) The Accusation alleged that
Petitioner violated Business
and Professions Code section 10177(j) (fraud or dishonest dealing). (AR 14.)
It also alleged that Petitioner failed to act honestly and fairly, in
good faith, and/or without fraud or deceit pursuant to Katz v. Department of
Real Estate (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 895 and Prichard v. Reitz (1986)
178 Cal.App.3d 465. (AR 14.) Petitioner
filed a notice of defense. After an
administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a proposed
decision to revoke Petitioner’s real estate license but grant him a restricted
broker license. (AR 1240-1266.) On June 10, 2023, Respondent adopted the
ALJ’s proposed decision. (AR 1267-1296.) This writ petition followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the
respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial,
and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the
agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not
supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the
evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)
Because “the right
to practice one’s profession is a fundamental vested right,” the court “must
apply its independent judgment to its review of the facts underlying the
administrative decision.” (Vaill v.
Edmonds (1991) 4 Cal.App.4th 247, 257-258.)
Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines
the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent
judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130,
143.) The court may draw its own
reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the
credibility of witnesses. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of
Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a
trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the
administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision
bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are
contrary to the weight of the evidence.”
(Fukuda v. City of Angels
(1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)
At the agency
level, “the standard of proof to revoke a professional license is
clear and convincing evidence. . . .” (Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Bureau
of Sec. and Investigative Services (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 445, 454.) “Clear and convincing evidence” reflects “a
high probability of the truth of the facts” asserted. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young &
Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 847–848.)
Respondent applied a clear and convincing standard in this case. (AR 1256.)
The
Court of Appeal has held that “a trial court reviewing an administrative
agency’s findings under the independent judgment standard of review in section 1094.5 must . . . account for the standard of proof required and
applied in the underlying proceeding.” (Li v.
Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 836, 844.) Accordingly, in this ruling, the court uses
the phrase “weight of the evidence” to refer to sufficient evidence to support
a finding taking into account the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof applicable at the agency level.
The court
exercises its independent judgment on questions of law arising in mandate
proceedings. (See Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) “A challenge to the procedural fairness of the administrative hearing is
reviewed de novo on appeal because the ultimate determination of procedural
fairness amounts to a question of law.”
(Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los
Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.)
DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner Received a Fair Trial
Petitioner argues that he was denied a fair trial
because the administrative findings and decision were not based on the
allegations in the Accusation. (Opening
Brief (“OB”) 10-11, 12:11-15, 13:14-19, 14:14-18, 16:25-28, 19:5-9.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that “[t]he
only basis in the Decision for the discipline are the findings in paragraphs 52
to 56 of the Decision cited in Legal Conclusion 9” and “these findings are not
based on any allegations in the Accusation and the Real Estate Commissioner has
already found in Legal Conclusions 7 and 8, that there were no violations as
alleged in the Accusation.” (OB
10:25-28.) Petitioner relies on case law
stating that “disciplinary action
cannot be founded upon a charge not made.”
(Wheeler v. State Board of Forestry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 522,
527.)
Petitioner’s fair trial arguments are not
persuasive. “Generally, a fair procedure
requires ‘notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action . . . and an
opportunity to present their objections.’”
(Doe v. University of Southern
California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 240.) Procedural
errors, “even if proved, are subject to a harmless error analysis.” (Hinrichs
v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.) “[T]he appellant bears the duty of spelling
out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice.” (Thornbrough v. Western Placer Unified
School Dist. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 169, 200.)
Here, the Accusation
alleges as follows: (1) Petitioner and his brother agreed to purchase Parcel B,
per Paragraph 7; (2) The Grant Deed erroneously included both Parcel A and
Parcel B’s APN numbers, per Paragraph 8; (3) After the error was discovered,
Petitioner and his brother refused to correct the issue, per Paragraphs 11 and
12; and (4) Petitioner and his brother took possession of Parcel A and demanded
that the tenants pay rent to them, per Paragraph 13. (AR 13-14.)
The Accusation further alleges in Paragraph 15 as follows:
The conduct, acts, and/or omissions of [Petitioner]
as described in Paragraphs 3 through 13, above, constitute [Petitioner’s] failure
to act honestly and fairly, in good faith, and/or without fraud or deceit” and
states that real estate licensees acting as principals in real property
transactions are still subject to the duties required by the Business and
Professions Code pursuant to Katz v. Department of Real Estate (1979) 96
Cal.App.3d 895 (Katz) and Prichard v. Reitz (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d
465.
(AR 14.)
In Katz, the Court of Appeal found that the real estate licensee
was properly disciplined under Business and Professions Code section 10177(f)
and (j) for his lack of candor and dishonest behavior. (See Katz, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d
at 899-901.) The Accusation in this
case also alleged that Petitioner violated Business
and Professions Code section 10177(j), which authorizes discipline for “any
other conduct, whether of the same or of a different character than
specified in this section, that constitutes fraud or dishonest dealing. (AR 14 [emphasis added].)
Here,
consistent with these allegations of the Accusation, Respondent found that
Petitioner failed to act honestly and in good faith when he attempted to “take
advantage of” the scrivener’s error in the grant deed and “asserted the
meritless claim that erroneous escrow documents prevailed over the terms of the
April 23, 2021 Commercial Property Purchase Agreement.” (AR 1291, ¶ 9.) Respondent also found that Petitioner was
dishonest when he “claimed the erroneous escrow documents properly expressed
the Tashes’ intent to sell both Parcel A and Parcel B to his brother.” (Ibid.) These findings are sufficiently tied to the
allegations of dishonesty in the Accusation.
Further, as discussed below, these findings are supported by the weight
of the evidence. Thus, unlike Wheeler,
supra, and Negrete v. State Personnel Board (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d
1160, cited by Petitioner, the disciplinary action was based on allegations
pleaded in the Accusation and the evidence presented at the hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner received a fair
trial.
B. The Weight of the
Evidence Support the Administrative Findings
Petitioner contends that certain fact findings and legal conclusions in
the decision are not supported by the weight of the evidence. (OB 8-19.)
Petitioner’s arguments and record citations are not persuasive.
1. Factual Findings 52 to 55
Petitioner maintained
that the Tashes intended to sell both Parcel A and Parcel B, so the escrow
instructions were correct. (AR
1283-1284.) Petitioner testified: “The
mistake was with Haron’s drafting of the purchase agreement, not [with] the
escrow instructions.” (AR 1284.) In Factual Findings 52 to 55 of the decision,
the hearing officer rejected that testimony, finding that Petitioner made
“factually unsupported claims” in order to “take advantage of the scrivener’s
error originating with the Chicago Title Company to assert an ownership
interest in Parcel A.” (AR 1283-1285; see
¶ 55.)
The weight of the evidence shows that Parcel A was
erroneously transferred to the Helmandis because of Chicago Title’s scrivener’s
error. The purchase agreement listed
“19438 & 19444 W BUSINESS CENTER DR” and “Assessor’s Parcel No. 2783025069”
as the “REAL PROPERTY to be acquired.” (AR
226.) While the grant deed listed the
correct address for Parcel B (“19438 and 19444 West Business Center Drive,
Northridge, CA 91324”) it erroneously listed the APNs for both Parcel A and B, APN
2783-025-068 and APN 2783-025-069, respectively. (AR 1383-1384, 277.) This scrivener’s error was not noticed by the
Tashes or by the escrow officer and/or title officer at Chicago Title prior to
the close of escrow. (AR 1384,
1539-1541, 1579.)
The
weight of the evidence also shows that Petitioner acted dishonestly and in bad
faith. As discussed, the purchase
agreement was only for Parcel B. (AR
226.) As discussed, the purchase
agreement made clear that the transaction was only for Parcel B. Moreover, the hearing officer was entitled to
credit Debra Tash’s testimony that the transaction was for Parcel B, and that she
expressly told Petitioner that the deal was only for Parcel B because the
Tashes had promised to sell Parcel A to the tenants. (See AR 1367-1372.) Finally, Petitioner conceded in his closing
argument below that “[t]here was an error by the Chicago Title Company and
Chicago Escrow in identifying the Business Center property as both Parcel A and
Parcel B with both the Assessor Parcel Numbers.” (AR 126.)
In his writ briefing, Petitioner similarly concedes that Chicago Title
made a “scrivener’s error” when it included Parcel A on the grant deed. (OB 3:11-13, 13:25-27.)
2. Factual Finding 56 and Legal Conclusion
9
In Factual Finding 56,
the hearing officer found: “It is established by clear and convincing evidence
[that] [Petitioner’s] conduct asserting an ownership interest in Parcel A under
the facts and circumstances of this case evinces dishonesty and an absence of
good faith, as alleged in paragraph 15 of the Accusation.” (AR 1285.)
In Legal Conclusion 9, the hearing officer found that Petitioner
“engaged in conduct, acts, and omissions constituting dishonesty and an absence
of good faith, as alleged in paragraph 15 of the Accusation.” (AR 1291-1292.) As
discussed, the weight of the evidence supports these findings, which support
the imposition of discipline. “Honesty and
truthfulness are two qualities deemed by the Legislature to bear on one’s
fitness and qualification to be a real estate licensee.” (Golde v. Fox (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 167,
176.)
3. Factual
Findings 25, 27, 32, and 50
Petitioner also challenges Factual Finding 25, 27, 32, and 50 in his
opening brief. In Factual Finding 25,
Respondent found, among other things, that Petitioner “unconvincingly disputed
Debra’s account of his participation during [the] August 2021 meeting claiming,
‘She lied.’” (AR 1277.) In Factual Finding 27, Respondent found that
Shubryre Mohammed Humkar and Roohina Humkar, who were friends of Petitioner,
provided a six-month hard money loan for the sale and purchase of Parcel B on
the condition that Petitioner became a co-buyer on the transaction. (AR 1277.)
In Factual Finding 32, Respondent found that Petitioner “functioned as a
licensed real estate broker or performed the duties and responsibilities of a
licensed real estate broker when [he] solicited the Humkars as lenders of the
mortgage loan in connection with the sale and purchase of Parcel B.” (AR 1278.)
Finally, in Factual Finding 50, Respondent found, among other things,
that Lovelace made multiple “unsuccessful attempts” to contact the Helmandis to
correct the grant deed in November 2021.
(AR 1283.)
Petitioner does not show that the decision to revoke his license was
based these findings. (See AR
1291-1292, ¶ 9 [legal conclusion that Petitioner engaged in dishonesty was
based on Factual Findings 52-56].) Thus,
Petitioner has not shown that any error in these findings was prejudicial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).) Regardless, having reviewed Petitioner’s
record citations, the court concludes that these findings are supported by the
weight of the evidence. (See, e.g., AR
1369-1373, 2214-2217, 2246-2247, 2085-2086 [Findings 25 and 32]; AR 2217-2218
[Finding 27]; AR 1542-1558, 531-540 [Finding 50].)
C. The Decision Complies with Topanga
Petitioner contends that Legal Conclusion 9 “does not state the
statutory basis of the Legal Conclusion so that this court can trace and
examine the mode of analysis and ‘bridge the analytic gap’ between the evidence
and the decision.” (OB 19:13-14.) Under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5(b), an abuse of discretion is established if the
decision is not supported by the findings.
In Topanga Association for a
Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515, the
Supreme Court held that “implicit in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1094.5
is a requirement that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set
forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate
decision or order.” “Administrative
agency findings are generally permitted considerable latitude with regard to
their precision, formality, and matters reasonably implied therein.” (Southern
Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1987) 191
Cal.App.3d 938, 954.)
Here, as discussed
above, the Accusation alleges in paragraph 15 that Petitioner’s actions
following the close of escrow constituted a “failure to act honestly and
fairly, in good faith, and/or without fraud or deceit” and states that real
estate licensees acting as principals in real property transactions are still
subject to the duties required by the Business and Professions Code pursuant to
Katz v. Department of Real Estate (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 895 (Katz)
and Prichard v. Reitz (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 465. (AR 14.) The
Accusation also alleged that Petitioner violated Business and Professions Code
section 10177(j), which authorizes discipline for “any
other conduct, whether of the same or of a different character than
specified in this section, that constitutes fraud or dishonest dealing.” (AR 14 [emphasis added].) Factual Findings 52 to 56 and Legal
Conclusion 9 sufficiently “bridge the analytical gap” between the evidence in
the record and the findings of dishonesty.
Accordingly, the decision complies with Topanga.
D. The Penalty Does Not
Constitute a Manifest Abuse of Discretion
Finally, Petitioner argues that the
penalty is excessive. “The propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative
agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may
not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Williamson
v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1343,
1347.) “[T]he court does not exercise
its own judgment and may not substitute ‘its own ... discretion for that of the
board with respect to the penalty to be imposed.’” (Bryce
v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1474.) “If reasonable minds may differ with regard to
the appropriate disciplinary action, there is no abuse of discretion.” (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service
Commission (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 620, 634.)
Petitioner argues that the penalty was
“excessive” because the weight of the evidence does not support the underlying
findings. (OB 20.) The court disagrees for the reasons discussed. Further, given the findings of dishonesty,
the court concludes that Respondent acted within her discretion in revoking Petitioner’s real estate license and issuing a
restricted broker license.
///
///
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based
upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:
1. The petition for writ of mandate is
denied.
2. The parties shall meet-and-confer and
lodge a proposed judgment for the court’s signature forthwith.
3. The court’s clerk shall provide
notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: April 30,
2025 ______________________
Stephen
I. Goorvitch
Superior
Court Judge