Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP02630, Date: 2025-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP02630, Date: 2025-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Gregory Williams (“Petitioner”), an “ocean lifeguard specialist” with the County of Los Angeles Fire Department (the “County” or the “Department”), had consensual sex with a subordinate, L.R., at a County-owned facility while Petitioner was on-duty. At the time, L.R. was experiencing mental health issues and was taking prescription medications for anxiety and depression. Petitioner was aware of these facts immediately before the sexual encounter. About six weeks later, L.R. “broke down” to her immediate supervisor, and on July 31, 2021, he reported a potential issue to the Department. Following an investigation, the Department served Petitioner with a Notice of Intent to Discharge on August 10, 2022. Petitioner challenged the discipline; a hearing officer sustained the penalty of termination; and the Civil Service Commission (the “Commission”) adopted that decision.

Now, Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to set aside the penalty. Petitioner argues primarily that he is a “firefighter” and therefore subject to the one-year statute of limitations under the Firefighters Bill of Rights Act (the “FFBOR”). The court need not resolve whether an “ocean lifeguard specialist” is a “firefighter” for purposes of the FFBOR. Even assuming Petitioner is entitled to the protections of the FFBOR, the statute of limitations was tolled while Petitioner was on various leaves of absences during the relevant time period. The FFBOR prohibits the Department from interviewing firefighters in an investigation that could lead to punitive actions against them unless there is an imminent threat to public safety, which made Petitioner “unavailable” as a matter of law. Petitioner also argues that the Commission failed to exercise its independent judgment on the penalty and that termination was a manifest abuse of discretion. The court rejects those arguments as well, and denies the petition for writ of mandate.

Petitioner started working for the Department in 2007. (AR 1194.) On October 15, 2013, he became an Ocean Lifeguard Specialist (“OLS”), which is a permanent, year-round position. (Ibid.) As an OLS, Petitioner was assigned to “Baywatch” on Catalina Island, and he was provided living accommodations there in a dormitory-style setting. (AR 78-79.) At the time of the incident leading to his discharge, Petitioner was certified as an Emergency Medical Technician and a Paramedic. (AR 300.) Petitioner had also completed a 40-hour course in Boating Marine Fires from the California Department of Boating and Waterways. (AR 312.) In his tenure with the Department, Petitioner had no prior disciplinary history and his performance evaluations have been good to outstanding. (AR 87, 447.)

The County’s job description for OLS defines the position as “Performs specialized ocean lifeguard and rescue duties.” (AR 466.) “Incumbents are scheduled to one of, or rotate among, a number of specialized assignments including, but not limited to, rescue boat crew, sub-area lead lifeguard, dispatcher, and specialized rescue units.” (Ibid.) Examples of duties for the OLS position include, but are not limited to:

Serves as lead ocean lifeguard in charge of a sub-area of the beach; observes the area to ensure proper performance of assigned ocean lifeguards; provides technical direction to ocean lifeguards.

Evaluates beach activities, weather, and ocean conditions; requests and deploys additional ocean lifeguards on a sub-area of beach in appropriate locations according to beach activity and hazards; requests additional lifeguards and reassigns or releases according to given conditions.

Responds to major incidents such as multiple-victim ocean rescues, medical emergencies, or unlawful acts; notifies area officer of situation and initiates or directs corrective action by utilizing Incident Command System (ICS) principles.

Operates an emergency vehicle equipped for major rescues; responds to observed or reported routine or major incidents such as cliff rescues, medical emergencies, distressed vessels, dive emergencies, river or flood rescues; initiates corrective action pending arrival of area officer….

Serves as crewmember of a rescue boat on day and/or night shift and operates the rescue boat or distressed vessel as instructed by ranking officer.

Performs as rescue boat deckhand or distressed vessel observer, looking for hazards such as malfunctioning or out-of-position navigational aids, distressed vessels, and hazards to navigations.

Provides 24-hour watch and response in all weather or ocean conditions to incidents such as burning, capsized, and/or sinking vessels; operates marine firefighting, dewatering, and pumping equipment, attaches towing lines, and swims or dives to execute rescues or provide emergency medical care.

In the Summer of 2021, L.R. worked as an Ocean Lifeguard – Recurrent assigned to “Baywatch” on Catalina Island. (AR 78.) In this position, L.R. was Petitioner’s subordinate. (AR 1056.) Petitioner was also L.R.’s Ocean Lifeguard Academy Instructor. (AR 1197-1200.) He described himself as a “mentor” to her and said that she would come to him when she had work-related questions. (AR 1200-1201.)

On June 6, 2021, Petitioner was with L.R. in a common area shared by the Ocean Lifeguard Recurrents. (AR 1201.) Petitioner described her as being “a little bit more somber,” “disheartened,” “kind of melancholy,” “off,” and “tired and kind of low energy and a little bit sad” that evening. (AR 1201-1202.) L.R. told him that she had been suffering from anxiety and depression. (AR 574.) While standing in the common area, Petitioner looked into L.R.’s private dorm room and noticed bottles of pills on her desk. (AR 1206-1207.) Petitioner walked into L.R.’s dorm room and learned that the pills were medications for anxiety and depression. (AR 1207-1208, 574, 79.) After discussing how L.R. was regulating her medication, Petitioner noticed that she had a diary in her room. (AR 1219.) Petitioner opened her diary and read from it. (AR 1220, 79.) He saw some comments in her diary which he described as “very self-deprecating.” (Ibid.) Petitioner wrote statements in her diary which he described as “positive or uplifting to give her more of a sense of self-worth.” (AR 1221, 79.)

Petitioner then sat on L.R.’s bed. (AR 1222-1223.) Petitioner testified that K.R. leaned towards him and they kissed, which then led to consensual sex. (AR 1222-1224.) At the time, Petitioner was on-duty, and the encounter occurred on County-owned property. (AR 79, 1228.) Afterwards, Petitioner tried to contact L.R. many times. (AR 343-344.) He texted her that if she pressed sexual harassment charges, “it would impact [his] life tremendously and be an end to a hard earned career.” (AR 343-344.)

On July 31, 2021, Rescue Boat Captain Steven Powell, L.R.’s immediate supervisor, noticed she was “out of sorts” and inquired about her well-being. (AR 1297, 1303.) L.R. started crying and told Powell that the issue “involved” Petitioner, though she did not tell him that she had had sex with Petitioner. (AR 1298.) That same day, Powell filed a County Policy of Equity (“CPOE”) complaint on L.R.’s behalf which stated: “An incident occurred between Ocean Lifeguard [L.R.] and Ocean Lifeguard Specialist Greg Williams of some possible sexual harassment or misconduct that made [L.R.] extremely uncomfortable. I did not ask the exact nature of what occurred.” (AR 412, 1300-1301.)

Petitioner was first informed he was the subject of an investigation on August 2, 2021. (AR 62, 80, 1170.) Petitioner was on a “protected” COVID-19 leave of absence from August 7 through August 21, 2021. (AR 786-787.) Petitioner was on vacation from August 22 through September 17, 2021. (AR 788.) Petitioner was on a “protected” leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) from September 18 through October 1, 2021. (AR 455, 786-787.) Finally, Petitioner was on a baby bonding leave, which is “protected” under the FMLA, from February 28 through March 13, 2022. (AR 787.) Petitioner was interviewed on-the-record on June 9, 2022. (AR 557.)

On July 14, 2022, the Department provided Petitioner with notice that it intended to toll the one-year statute of limitations under Government Code section 3254(d)(4) due to his absences. (AR 463.) On August 10, 2022, the Department served on Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Discharge him for having sexual intercourse with a subordinate in a County dormitory and while on duty, among other alleged misconduct. (AR 346-354.) On October 28, 2022, after a Skelly meeting, the Department served a Notice of Discharge on Petitioner. (AR 441-449.)

Petitioner appealed the discharge, and an administrative hearing was held before a hearing officer on multiple dates in October and November 2023. (AR 75.) Multiple witnesses testified for the Department and for Petitioner. (AR 76.) The complainant, L.R., did not testify. (Ibid.) The hearing officer issued a proposed decision to sustain the discharge. The hearing officer found that Petitioner had a “consensual sexual relationship on June 6, 2021, with a subordinate female Ocean Lifeguard Recurrent, while on duty and in a Department facility.” (AR 77, 99 ¶ 1.) The hearing officer recommended that the Commission deny Petitioner’s appeal and find that the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner’s service “for his failure to exercise sound judgment and violation of Department policy.” (AR 77; see also AR 94, 100.) The hearing officer also found that there was no violation of the one-year statute of limitations in the Fire Fighters Bill of Rights Act (the “FFBOR”). (AR 96.) The hearing officer found that Petitioner was not classified as a firefighter and thus the FFBOR’s protections do not apply to him. (AR 95-95.) Alternatively, the hearing officer found that the limitations period was “tolled” while Petitioner was on COVID-19 leave, vacation, and FMLA leave from August 7, 2021, through October 1, 2021. (AR 96.)

On March 14, 2024, the Commission notified the parties of its proposal to accept the hearing officer’s proposed decision. (AR 106.) Petitioner submitted objections. (AR 149-198.) The Los Angeles County Lifeguard Association (“LACOLA”) submitted an amicus brief in support of Petitioner’s objections on the issue of whether Petitioner’s position as an OLS constituted a “firefighter” within the meaning of Government Code section 3251(a) of the FFBOR. (AR 108-123.) On July 3, 2024, the Commission notified the parties it had overruled the objections and adopted the hearing officer’s proposed decision to sustain the discharge. (AR 200-202.) This petition followed.

The petition is brought, in part, pursuant to Government Code section 3260 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. (Petition ¶¶ 21-34.) Government Code section 3260(b) provides that the court has “initial jurisdiction over any proceeding” alleging a violation of the FFBOR. There are two essential requirements to the issuance of an ordinary writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085: (1) a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.)

The petition is also brought, in part, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (Petition ¶¶ 13-20.) Under section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b).)

Because the termination of Petitioner’s employment with the Department concerns a fundamental vested right, the court exercises its independent judgment on the administrative findings. (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

The court exercises its own independent judgment on questions of law arising in mandate proceedings. (See Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.) “A challenge to the procedural fairness of the administrative hearing is reviewed de novo on appeal because the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.” (Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.)

“The propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Williamson v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1343, 1347.)

Petitioner requests judicial notice of relevant excerpts of the California Public Employee Relations Pocket Guide to FFBOR and certain Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules. Respondent does not object. The court grants the request under Evidence Code section 452(c).

In his second cause of action for writ of ordinary mandate, Petitioner contends that the discipline is untimely under the one-year limitations period in section 3254(d) of the FFBOR. Specifically, Petitioner contends that he is a “firefighter” within the meaning of the FFBOR; the Department has “consistently interpreted” the FFBOR as applicable to Petitioner and the OLS position; and that the limitations period was not tolled. (Opening Brief (“OB”) 13-18; Reply 2-8; Pet. ¶¶ 21-34.)[1] LACOLA, as amicus curiae, joins some of these arguments and also contends that the Department has a “practice” of applying the FFBOR to its lifeguards. (Amicus Brief 12.)

The court need not resolve whether an “ocean lifeguard specialist” is a “firefighter” for purposes of the FFBOR because the statute of limitations was tolled while Petitioner was on various leaves of absence. The one-year statute of limitations in the FBOR does not apply “[i]f the investigation involves an employee who is incapacitated or otherwise unavailable.” (Gov. Code § 3254(d)(4).) The statute does not define “unavailable.” The party asserting that the statute of limitations was tolled has the burden of proof of that issue. (See Seto v. Szeto (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 76, 86.)

There is no dispute that Petitioner was on a series of “protected” leaves as follows:

(1) A “protected” COVID-19 leave from August 7 through August 21, 2021; (2) Vacation from August 22 through September 17, 2021; and (3) A “protected” FMLA leave from September 18 through October 1, 2021. Amber Sturdivant, the Acting Departmental Human Resources Manager testified that the Department is not permitted to contact employees on “protected” leaves of absence and can only interview employees when they are on-duty:

First of all, when an employee is on protected leave, we’re not allowed to reach out to the employee because we’re not allowed to interfere with an employee’s protected leave. The second reason is that we . . . don’t ask employees to come in for an interview. We don’t ask whether they’re available. We tell them to come in. And so when he was out on leave, he was not on duty. We’re required, under the Firefighter Bill of Rights, to interview employees only while they’re on duty unless there’s an eminent threat of public harm. And so to instruct an employee to come in while he’s on protected leave and come to duty and then give him orders to answer question would be completely inappropriate under any sort of protected leave.

(AR 788-789.) In reply, Petitioner argues that this testimony “is not supported by any legal authority.” (Reply at 7:19-20.) In fact, the FFBOR makes this clear:

When any firefighter is under investigation and subjected to interrogation by his or her commanding officer, or any other member designated by the employing department or licensing or certifying agency, that could lead to punitive action, the interrogation shall be conducted under the following conditions: ¶ (a) The interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, at a time when the firefighter is on duty, unless an imminent threat to the safety of the public requires otherwise.

(Gov. Code § 3253(a), emphasis added.) Accordingly, Petitioner was “unavailable” as a matter of law during these time periods, which tolled the statute of limitations. Someone is “unavailable as a witness” when they cannot be compelled to appear and testify. (See Evid. Code § 240(a)(4); see also Berroteran v. Superior Court (2022) 12 Cal.5th 867, 882 fn. 8.) The instant case is analogous to that situation because the law prohibited the Department from interviewing Petitioner while he was on “protected” leaves.[2]

Petitioner argues that he was not unavailable because the Department communicated with him on March 8 and March 9, 2022, and sought to conduct a “clarifying interview” on March 11, 2022. None of these contacts were governed by section 3253(a). As Petitioner himself admits, these communications related to a complaint filed on his behalf, i.e., a different matter. (See OB at 17:22-23; see also AR 337, 1258-1260.) These are not communications that “could lead to punitive action” against Petitioner and therefore are not prohibited by section 3253(a). In other words, Petitioner was not legally unavailable for an investigation in which he was the victim. By contrast, the Department was prohibited from interviewing Petitioner about the instant case while he was off-duty because such an interview “could lead to punitive action.” Accordingly, Petitioner was unavailable as a matter of law under section 3253(a) as it relates to this investigation and the statute of limitations was tolled.

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that even if Petitioner is a “firefighter” for purposes of the FFBOR, the Notice of Discharge was not untimely. L.R.’s supervisor made a report on July 31, 2021, and the Notice of Intent to Discharge was served on Petitioner on August 10, 2022. However, the statute of limitations was tolled during the following time periods, any one of which is sufficient to render the action timely under the FFBOR: (1) August 7 through August 21, 2021, which is 14 days; (2) August 22, 2021 through September 17, 2021, which is 26 days; and (3) September 18, 2021 through October 1, 2021, which is 13 days. Therefore, the petition for writ of mandate is denied on this basis.

Petitioner does not challenge the findings of fact or legal conclusions adopted by the Commission with respect to the charges of misconduct alleged against him. (See AR 96-99 [findings of fact and legal conclusions].) Instead, Petitioner argues that the Commission failed to exercise its independent judgment on the penalty, and that termination was a manifest abuse of discretion. (OB 18-20; see also AR 94 and 100.)

The record does not support Petitioner’s argument that the hearing officer and the Commission failed to exercise independent judgment. In the proposed decision, the hearing officer defined the issues to be decided as follows:

1. Are the Allegations contained in the Department's letter of October 7, 2022, true?

3. Was there a violation of the Fire Fighters Bill of Rights Act, Government Code Section 3254(d)?

(AR 76-77.) By defining the issues in this manner, the hearing officer showed that he understood his duty to decide, independently, whether the allegations against Petitioner are true and “what is the appropriate remedy.” In his 26-page proposed decision, the hearing officer then explained in detail why he concluded that Petitioner committed misconduct when he had consensual sex with L.R., a subordinate female Ocean Lifeguard Recurrent, while on duty and in a Department facility. (AR 77, 91-99.) The hearing officer also explained why he found that termination is the appropriate penalty. (See AR 77, 94, 100.)

Petitioner highlights the following paragraph from the proposed decision as evidence that the hearing officer and the Commission did not exercise their independent judgment on the penalty:

The primary objective of discipline is to correct rather than punish. Thus, for most offenses, employers should use one or more warnings before suspensions, and suspensions before discharge. Yet, some offenses are sufficiently serious to justify serious discipline for a first offense. The Appellant intentionally having a consensual sexual intercourse relationship with a subordinate while on duty and at a County-owned property is a very serious violation of Department policy and justifies a serious level of discipline for a first offense. Based on the totality of the evidence, I believe that the Department’s decision to discharge the Appellant was not unreasonable or inappropriate.

(OB 18, citing AR 94, emphasis added.) Read in context of the entire decision, this passage does not support Petitioner’s position. In the prior sentence, the hearing officer found that “intentionally having a consensual sexual intercourse relationship with a subordinate while on duty and at a County-owned property is a very serious violation of Department policy and justifies a serious level of discipline for a first offense.” (AR 94emphasis added.) The hearing officer then found, based on the totality of the evidence, that the decision to discharge Petitioner was “not unreasonable or inappropriate.” In other words, the hearing officer independently found that discharge was a reasonable and appropriate penalty.

Nor is there any basis to find that the Commission did not exercise its own independent judgment. The Commission overruled Petitioner’s objections and adopted the hearing officer’s proposed decision to sustain the discharge. (AR 200-202.) By doing so, the Commission showed that it exercised its own independent judgment on the findings and penalty. Petitioner has not cited any evidence to the contrary, such as statements from the Commission hearing. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandate is denied on this basis.

Petitioner argues that termination was a manifest abuse of discretion. Petitioner has a high burden:

[T]he propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the agency and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. In reviewing the penalty imposed by an administrative body which is duly constituted to announce and enforce such penalties, neither a trial court nor an appellate court is free to substitute its own discretion as to the matter; nor can the reviewing court interfere with the imposition of a penalty by an administrative tribunal because in the court’s own evaluation of the circumstances the penalty appears to be too harsh. Such interference, in the light of the foregoing authorities, will only be sanctioned when there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion.

(Cadilla v. Board of Medical Examiners (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 961, 966, internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted.) Here, the Commission found that Petitioner had a “consensual sexual relationship on June 6, 2021, with a subordinate female Ocean Lifeguard Recurrent, while on duty and in a Department facility.” (AR 77, 99 ¶ 1.) The Commission found that Petitioner “entered the subordinate’s dormitory bedroom without asking permission and read her prescription medication bottle and asked her why she was taking the medications” and “entered the subordinate’s dormitory bedroom and without asking permission opened her private journal, read several sentences, and then proceeded to write in the journal.” (AR 99.) The Commission found that Petitioner “violated the Department’s Policy of Equity and that [his] poor judgment brought discredit upon himself or the Department,” and that Petitioner “violated the Department Policy of Equity . . . by having a consensual sexual relationship with the Complainant and then proceeding to send unwanted text and telephone messages.” (Ibid.) The Commission also found:

After reading the labels on the Complainant’s prescription medical bottles, the Appellant was informed by the Complainant that the medications were for depression and anxiety. While reading the self-deprecating materials in the private journal, the Appellant should have realized that the Complainant was emotionally unstable. When the Appellant became aware of the Complainant’s emotional and/or psychological issues, he should have realized that she was vulnerable. He should not have engaged in a sexual relationship with her. By engaging in a sexual relationship with the Complainant, the Appellant violated the Department Policy of Equity, section Policy 812, section 5 – Inappropriate Conduct Toward Others.

The Appellant was aware that the Department’s core value is to support and care for the community and the Department services, including the Department employees. The Appellant was aware that having a sexual relationship with a subordinate violated the established core value. On the evening of June 6, 2021, the Appellant was on duty when he had a consensual sexual relationship with the Complainant in her dormitory room that is a County owed property.

(AR 92-93.) Although the Commission did not sustain every charge against Petitioner, the charges that were sustained are serious and carry a penalty up to discharge. (See AR 94, 447-449.) Notably, the County Equity Oversight Panel and the Fire Advisory Board both recommended termination. (AR 795-796.) They considered how it was inappropriate for a supervisor to have sex with a subordinate on County property while on duty and that it was unbecoming for someone in a supervisory role to engage in that conduct. (AR 797.)

In its decision, the Commission considered mitigating factors. Petitioner “had no work performance issues and had received good to outstanding job performance evaluations during his tenure with the Department.” (AR 97.) Petitioner “had no disciplinary history during his tenure with the Department.” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, the Commission found that discharge was the appropriate penalty.

Petitioner has not shown a manifest abuse of discretion in the penalty. As the Commission found, Petitioner entered L.R.’s dorm room, read her medical prescriptions, and read and wrote in her private diary without permission. Petitioner learned that L.R. was suffering from depression and anxiety. Nonetheless, Petitioner then had sex with L.R., a subordinate, while on-duty, and on County property.[3] Clearly, this conduct harmed the public service, demonstrated extremely poor judgment for a supervisory employee, and exposed the County to potential liability. “The public is entitled to protection from unprofessional employees whose conduct places people at risk of injury and the government at risk incurring liability.” (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 880.) Even if a lesser penalty was possible, discharge was not unreasonable and well within the Commission’s discretion. “If reasonable minds may differ with regard to the appropriate disciplinary action, there is no abuse of discretion.” (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Commission (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 620, 634.) Therefore, the petition for writ of mandate is denied on this basis.

[1] The FFBOR issue is also briefly raised in the first cause of action for administrative mandate. (Pet. ¶ 14.D.)

[2] Petitioner argues that a vacation does not render a witness sufficiently unavailable to justify a trial continuance, citing Jensen v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 266, 273-274. That case did not consider legal unavailability. Rather, in that criminal case, the arresting officer went on vacation, and the Court of Appeal considered whether there was good cause to continue the trial over the defendant’s Speedy Trial Act objection.

[3] Petitioner argues that “the encounter occurred in the privacy of a dormitory bedroom assigned to L.R., and not, for example, in an office, vehicle, or on the beach, or where the public could have access. . . . [S]ome expectation of privacy is expected in a dormitory room.” (OB at 20:4-8.) Petitioner was not terminated solely because the encounter occurred on County property. There were various other reasons, as discussed.