Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP03183, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP03183, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling

Housing Authority of the Department: 82 City of Los Angeles, et al. Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

Petitioner Eva Oceguera (“Petitioner”) petitions for a writ of ordinary mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 directing Respondents Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles and its Chief Executive Officer (“Respondents” or “HACLA”) to do the following: (1) exclude In-Home Supportive Services (“IHSS”) payments when determining annual income in all federally subsidized programs administered by Respondents, and (2) reimburse participants of those federally subsidized housing programs “for any excessive payments made by participants as a result of HACLA’s improper determination of annual income and use of such income to compute inaccurate rent portions.” (First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate (“FAP”) Prayer, ¶ a.) The court grants the petition to the extent Petitioner seeks prospective relief. The court denies the petition to the extent Petitioner seeks retroactive relief.

HACLA, a public housing authority (“PHA”), administers several federally subsidized housing programs operated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), including Section 8 housing voucher programs. (See 24 Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) § 982.1(a), (b).) As part of the program requirements, HACLA “must conduct a reexamination of family income and composition at least annually.” (24 CFR § 982.516(a)(1).) The applicable federal regulations define “annual income,” in relevant part, as “[a]ll amounts, not specifically excluded in paragraph (b) of this section, received from all sources by each member of the family who is 18 years of age or older or is the head of household or spouse of the head of household ….” (24 CFR § 5.609(a)(1).) As relevant to this case, section 5.609(b)(19) excludes the following from annual income:

Payments made by or authorized by a State Medicaid agency (including through a managed care entity) or other State or Federal agency to a family to enable a family member who has a disability to reside in the family’s assisted unit. Authorized payments may include payments to a member of the assisted family through the State Medicaid agency (including through a managed care entity) or other State or Federal agency for caregiving services the family member provides to enable a family member who has a disability to reside in the family's assisted unit.

(24 CFR § 5.609(b)(19).) In California, the Legislature has enacted an In-Home Supportive Services (“IHSS”) program to “enable aged, blind or disabled poor to avoid institutionalization by remaining in their homes with proper supportive services.” (Miller v. Woods (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 867.) The exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19) (hereafter the “IHSS exclusion”) applies to compensation received by a parent under the IHSS program to provide care to keep a disabled child at home. (See Oppo. 8:3-17; Park Decl. Exh. A at 3-4; Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority (2020) 10 Cal.5th 583, 603.)

Previously, the IHSS exclusion applied only to “[a]mounts paid by a State agency to a family with a member who has a developmental disability and is living at home to offset the cost of services and equipment needed to keep the developmentally disabled family member at home.” (24 CFR § 5.609(b)(16) [effective April 7, 2016 to December 31, 2023; emphasis added].) In 2023, HUD expanded the scope of the IHSS exclusion from families of developmentally disabled members to families of all disabled members living at home. (See 88 Fed. Reg. 9600, 9605 (Feb. 14, 2023); Pet. RJN Exh. 1.) This expansion became effective as of January 1, 2024. (Id. at 9600.) However, in February 2024, and December 2024, HUD issued Public and Indian Housing Notices (“PIH Notices”) stating, respectively, that PHAs, such as HACLA, must comply with the new income exclusions “no later than January 1, 2025” and “no later than July 1, 2025.” (Resp. RJN Exh. 2 at 7; Resp. RJN Exh. 1 at 3.)

Petitioner lives in a Section 8 housing unit with her two sons. (Oceguera Decl. ¶ 1.) One of Petitioner’s sons has a chronic disability, and Petitioner receives IHSS payments to care for him at home. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4.) On June 5, 2024, as part of the annual reexamination of Petitioner’s family income and composition required by HUD’s regulations (see 24 CFR § 982.516(a)(1)), HACLA sent Petitioner a Notice of Change in Rent and Housing Assistance Payment Subsidy, which increased Petitioner’s rent from $173.00 to $716.00, effective August 1, 2024. (Mendoza Decl. Exh. C.) The increase was due to HACLA’s inclusion of Petitioner’s IHSS payments in its calculation of her annual income. (Opening Brief (“OB”) 4:23-25; Park Decl. Exh. B and D.)

The notice, dated June 5, 2024, stated: “You have the right to a hearing if you wish to dispute this action. If you wish to request a hearing, you must do so by contacting us at (833) HACLA-4-U or (833) 422-5248 no later than 30 days from the date of this notice.” (Mendoza Decl. Exh. C.) On August 22, 2024, 78 days after the notice, the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles (“LAFLA”) sent a letter to HACLA requesting a recalculation of Petitioner’s total household income to exclude her IHSS payments. (Id. Exh. D.) There is no evidence in the record that an administrative hearing was held or completed during which Petitioner challenged the notice.

On October 3, 2024, Petitioner filed her original petition for writ of mandate in this action, and on December 6, 2024, Petitioner filed the operative first amended petition (“FAP”). In the FAP, Petitioner alleges, on information and belief, that Respondents “have a pattern and practice of incorrectly calculating a participant’s annual income by systematically failing to exclude IHSS payments as required by 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(19).” (FAP ¶ 40.) Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate “ordering Respondents to (1) comply with 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(19) by excluding IHSS payments when determining annual income, and (2) to reimburse participants of federally subsidized housing programs for any excessive payments made by participants as a result of HACLA’s improper determination of annual income and use of such income to compute inaccurate rent portions.” (Id. ¶ 45.)

On December 20, 2024, while this action was pending, LAFLA sent a second letter to HACLA stating:

First, as reflected in the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles’ (LAFLA) prior communications with your office as well as the filings in the pending legal action before the superior court, it is still LAFLA’s position that the Housing Opportunity Through Modernization Act (“HOTMA”), 114 P.L. 201, 130 Stat. 782, has been in effect since January 2024 and is controlling in Ms. Oceguera’s case.

However, even if HACLA maintains that the agency has the option of not complying with HOTMA, HACLA would still be required to exclude Ms. Oceguera’s IHSS income under the former regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16). The former regulation… requires housing authorities to exclude IHSS income paid to a family member to keep a developmentally disabled family member at home. Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority, 472 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2020). And Ms. Oceguera’s case is exactly so: the IHSS income is paid to Ms. Oceguera to keep her developmentally disabled son at home.

Ms. Oceguera’s son has a developmental disability. He has a severe, chronic disability that is attributable to a combination of mental physical impairments that manifested when he was 18 years old (i.e., before age 22) and that will continue indefinitely. His severe, chronic disability results in substantial functional limitations in the following areas of major life activity: [Self-care; Receptive and expressive language; Mobility; Self-direction; Capacity for independent living; and Economic self-sufficiency.] Due to these limitations, Ms. Oceguera’s son needs individually planned and coordinated supports and other assistance for the rest of his life. To this day, these services are provided by his IHSS worker, Ms. Oceguera.

On March 18, 2025, Petitioner filed her opening brief in support of the petition. Shortly thereafter, on March 25, 2025, Petitioner provided medical records for her son Castulo Oceguera to HACLA to substantiate her claim that he is disabled. (Daskas Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.)

The petition is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. There are two essential requirements to the issuance of an ordinary writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085: (1) a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency's performance or to correct an agency's abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is ministerial.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 700.) “While, of course, it is the general rule that mandamus will not lie to control the discretion of a court or officer, meaning by that it will not lie to force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner ... [it] will lie to correct abuses of discretion, and will lie to force a particular action by the inferior tribunal or officer, when the law clearly establishes the petitioner’s right to such action.” (Bollengier v. Doctors Medical Center (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1124, quoting Thelander v. City of El Monte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 736, 748.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) Petitioner “bears the burden of proof in a mandate proceeding brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.” (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.) “On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’” (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.)

1. The court grants Petitioner’s request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 2.

2. The court grants Respondents’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 4.

3. The court grants Respondents’ application to seal Exhibit A to the Declaration of Alyssa Daskas in Support of Respondents’ Opposition to Petitioner’s Opening Brief, which consists of Castulo Oceguera’s confidential medical records, is granted. The court finds:

(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record, viz., the privacy of Petitioner’s child; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record;

(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed because private medical information would be disclosed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored because it is limited to the medical records and the remaining pleadings preserve the public’s ability and right to understand the proceedings; and (5) There are no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (California Rules of Court, Rule 2.550(d).)

Petitioner contends that HACLA has a policy of including IHSS income when calculating annual income of participants in federal subsidized housing programs, unless the IHSS income is paid to a family with a member who has a developmental disability. Petitioner contends that this policy violates the current IHSS exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19), which became effective January 1, 2024. (OB 5.)

Section 5.609(b)(19) excludes from annual income “[p]ayments made … to a family to enable a family member who has a disability to reside in the family’s assisted unit.” (24 CFR § 5.609(b)(19).) The exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19) applies to compensation received by a parent under the IHSS program to provide care to keep a disabled child at home. (See Oppo. 8:3-17; Park Decl. Exh. A at 3-4; Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority (2020) 10 Cal.5th 583, 603.) Although the exclusion was previously limited to families with a member who has a developmental disability, the exclusion was expanded to include families with a member who has any disability. This expansion of the IHSS exclusion became effective as of January 1, 2024. (See 88 Fed. Reg. 9600, 9600 (Feb. 14, 2023); Pet. RJN Exh. 1.)

In this writ action, Petitioner served requests for admissions on Respondents asking them to admit that “HACLA has not implemented 24 C.F.R. §5.609(b)(19)(2024)” and that “because HACLA has not implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(l9) (2024) it includes In-Home Supportive Services income in calculating ANNUAL INCOME of PARTICIPANTS of FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAMS unless the In-Home Supportive Services income falls within a different income exclusion category.” (Park Decl. Exh. A.) In responses dated March 3, 2025, Respondents admitted both requests, stating in pertinent part:

Admit to not implementing 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(19)(2024) to the extent that compliance is not required until July 1, 2025, as public housing agencies are not required to comply with this section until that date, as per the Housing Authority Through Modernization Act (HOTMA) Sections 102 and 104. These sections do not mandate compliance with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Notice PIH 2024-38 until July 1 2025, which includes 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(19). Deny in part, as HACLA does implement 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(16) in regard to excluding In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) income for a family with a member who has a developmental disability.

Admit. HACLA implements 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(16) in regard to excluding IHSS income for a family with a member who has a developmental disability, otherwise IHSS income is included in calculating annual income of participants of federally subsidized housing programs.

(Park Decl. Exh. A.) Similarly, at a deposition held on March 10, 2025, HACLA’s person most knowledgeable, Manuel Canela, testified that HACLA’s current Annual Income Handbook—the guidebook that HACLA references for policies and practices related to the calculation of annual income—informs staff that IHSS payments count as income unless they are paid to a family caring for a family member with a developmental disability. (Park Decl. Exh. C at 29-31.)

Based on the foregoing, the evidence shows that, as a matter of policy and practice, HACLA did not implement the amended IHSS exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19) when it became effective on January 1, 2024, and HACLA does not intend to implement that exclusion until July 1, 2025, at the earliest.

The IHSS exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19) is a legislative rule that carries the force and effect of law. Legislative rules of a federal administrative agency “create rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law pursuant to authority delegated by Congress.” (Hemp Industries Ass’n v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003).) “Legislative rules have the ‘force and effect of law’ and may be promulgated only after public notice and comment.” (National Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy (D.C. Cir. 2014) 758 F.3d 243, 250.) In February 2023, after public notice and comment, HUD promulgated a final rule that included the amended IHSS exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19). The final rule states an effective date of January 1, 2024. (See 88 Fed. Reg. 9600, 9600 (Feb. 14, 2023); Pet. RJN Exh. 1.) This final rule compels HACLA to exclude IHSS payments from annual income for families with any disabled members effective January 1, 2024. (See 24 CFR § 982.52(a) [“The PHA must comply with HUD regulations . . . .”].)

In opposition, Respondents contend that HACLA was authorized by “[m]ultiple HUD rules published in the Federal Register” and “HUD’s Public and Indian Housing Notices” to delay implementation of section 5.609(b)(19) until July 1, 2025. (Oppo. 10-12.) Respondents rely on section 982.52(a) of Title 24 of the federal regulations, which states: “[T]he PHA must comply with HUD regulations and other HUD requirements for the program. HUD requirements are issued by HUD headquarters, as regulations, Federal Register notices or other binding program directives.”

Respondents do not show that any federal regulations or Federal Register notices authorized HACLA to delay implementation of section 5.609(b)(19) until July 1, 2025. Respondents allege that that the rule at 89 Fed. Reg. 106998 and the notice at 88 Fed. Reg. 85648, “extended compliance with HOTMA Implementation of Sections 102, 103, and 104.” (Oppo. 10:20-26.) However, this rule only “extends the compliance date for HUD's final rule entitled ‘Housing Opportunity Through Modernization Act of 2016: Implementation of Sections 102, 103, and 104’ (HOTMA final rule) for Community Planning and Development (CPD) programs.” (Oppo. 10, fn. 2; see 89 Fed. Reg. 106998 [emphasis added].) The programs at issue in this case, such as Public Housing and Section 8 programs, are not Community Planning and Development programs. (Cf. 24 CFR Chapter V and 24 CFR Chapter IX.) Respondents concede this but argue that “HUD’s explanation for delaying implementation applies equally to PHAs.” (Oppo. 10-11, fn. 2.) This argument is unpersuasive. The plain language of the cited Federal Register documents limits their scope to Community Planning and Development programs. “To interpret a regulation, we look first to its plain language…. If the regulation is unambiguous, its plain meaning controls….” (U.S. v. Bucher, 375 F3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2004).)

Respondents also do not show that HUD’s Public and Indian Housing Notices (“PIH Notices”) authorized HACLA to delay implementation of section 5.609(b)(19) until July 1, 2025. The PIH Notices are neither “regulations” nor “Federal Register notices.” Although the argument is not fully developed, Respondents seem to contend that PIH Notices are “other binding program directives” within the meaning of section 982.52(a) of HUD’s regulations. (Oppo. 10-11.) Respondents do not cite any authority that supports that position.

As Petitioner argued in the opening brief, HUD would have needed to promulgate a new rule after notice and comment to make a binding change to the effective date of section 5.609(b)(19). (OB 7-8.) “The suspension or delayed implementation of a final regulation normally constitutes substantive rulemaking under APA § 553.” (Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1983).) “In general, an effective date is ‘part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and of future effect.’ It is an essential part of any rule: without an effective date, the ‘agency statement’ could have no ‘future effect.’” (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 683 F.2d 752, 761-762 (3rd Cir. 1982).) “[A]ltering the effective date of a duly promulgated standard could be, in substance, tantamount to an amendment or rescission of the standards.” (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2004).) As a result, the PIH Notices cannot be interpreted as binding changes to the effective date of section 5.609(b)(19). Notably, Respondents failed to respond to this argument in their opposition brief and, thereby, they conceded it. (Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].)

Finally, Respondents do not accurately characterize the contents of the PIH Notices upon which they rely. Respondents assert that the PIH Notices “specifically instruct PHAs not to implement the HOTMA Sections 102 and 104 provisions before July 1, 2025.” (Oppo. 10-11, fn. 2 [emphasis added].) Nothing in the PIH Notices prevents HACLA from complying with the regulation by January 1, 2024. In fact, HUD has acknowledged that “[t]he final rule’s effective date is January 1, 2024” and that “[e]ach PHA will set its own compliance date as early as January 1, 2024.” (PIH Notice 2023-27 at 2, 7; Resp. RJN Exh. 2.) Further, since the PIH Notices were not promulgated as binding regulations and did not change the effective date of the IHSS Exclusion, they are reasonably interpreted as providing guidance only with respect to when HUD will enforce full compliance with the revised HOTMA regulations. This intent is made clear in PIH Notice 2024-38, which explicitly explains that “HUD Enforcement” for “Income Exclusions” will begin on July 1, 2025. (Resp. RJN Exh. 1 at 3.) Thus, by their own terms, the PIH Notices do not purport to prevent a court from compelling compliance with the income exclusions or to provide a safe harbor from litigation that seeks to enforce the income exclusions.

Based on the foregoing, Respondents have not provided a valid legal justification for HACLA’s refusal to implement the IHSS exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19).

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directing Respondents to “exclude IHSS payments when determining annual income in all federally subsidized programs administered by Respondents.” (FAP Prayer a.) Petitioner is entitled to this relief on a prospective basis. As discussed above, the evidence shows that, as a policy, HACLA did not implement the amended IHSS exclusion in section 5.609(b)(19) when it became effective on January 1, 2024, and HACLA does not intend to implement that exclusion until July 1, 2025, at the earliest. (Park Decl. Exh. A; Exh. C at 29-31.) However, HACLA has a clear, present, and ministerial duty to exclude IHSS payments from annual income for families with disabled members effective January 1, 2024. (See 24 CFR § 982.52(a) [“The PHA must comply with HUD regulations ….”].) Accordingly, HACLA’s policy is invalid and a clear abuse of discretion. “Traditional mandamus is available when a local agency has clearly abused its discretion.” (Thelander v. City of El Monte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 736, 748.) “Where a petition challenges an agency's failure to perform an act required by law … , the remedy is by ordinary mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.” (Conlan v. Bonta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 745, 752.)

To the extent Respondents challenges Petitioner’s right to prospective relief, its arguments are not persuasive. (Oppo. 12-16.) Petitioner has standing, and a ripe claim, to challenge HACLA’s ongoing policy both individually and for similarly situated persons. “Where the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” (Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144.) Further, Respondents do not show, with evidence, that HACLA has already reexamined Petitioner’s annual income in 2025. (See Oppo. 13:10-24.) Respondents also concede that, at least until July 1, 2025, it will not apply section 5.609(b)(19). (Park Decl. Exh. A.) Thus, at present time, Petitioner’s claim for prospective relief is not moot.[1]

Petitioner also seeks a writ of mandate directing HACLA “to reimburse participants of those federally subsidized housing programs for any excessive payments made by participants as a result of HACLA’s improper determination of annual income and use of such income to compute inaccurate rent portions.” (FAP Prayer ¶ a.) Thus, Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate that would require HACLA, on a retroactive basis, to recalculate the federally subsidized housing benefits both of Petitioner, individually, and of all other participants in federally subsidized housing programs. Petitioner has not shown that she is entitled to this relief.

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s individual claim for retroactive relief “is procedurally barred due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” (Oppo. 13.) The court agrees.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is “a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review.” (Cal. Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1489.) “The exhaustion requirement applies whether relief is sought by traditional (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) or administrative (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) mandamus.” (Eight Unnamed Physicians v. Medical Executive Com. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 503, 511.) “Before seeking judicial review a party must show that he has made a full presentation to the administrative agency upon all issues of the case and at all prescribed stages of the administrative proceedings.” (Edgren v. Regents of University of California (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 515, 520.) “The rule has important benefits: (1) it serves the salutary function of mitigating damages; (2) it recognizes the quasi-judicial tribunal's expertise; and (3) it promotes judicial economy by unearthing the relevant evidence and by providing a record should there be a review of the case.” (Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 322.) “[T]he administrative remedies exhaustion rule has several exceptions, including … (1) when the administrative agency cannot provide an adequate remedy, and (2) when the subject of controversy lies outside the agency's jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) “The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the issues raised in the judicial proceeding were first raised at the administrative level.” (Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536.)

Here, on June 5, 2024, HACLA sent Petitioner a Notice of Change in Rent and Housing Assistance Payment Subsidy, which increased Petitioner’s rent from $173.00 to $716.00 effective August 1, 2024. (Mendoza Decl. Exh. C.) Petitioner concedes that the increase was due to HACLA’s inclusion of Petitioner’s IHSS payments in its calculation of her annual income. (OB 4:23-25; Park Decl. Exh. B and D.) The notice stated: “You have the right to a hearing if you wish to dispute this action. If you wish to request a hearing, you must do so by contacting us at (833) HACLA-4-U or (833) 422-5248 no later than 30 days from the date of this notice.” (Mendoza Decl. Exh. C.) On August 22, 2024, which was 78 days after the notice of June 5, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel sent a letter to HACLA requesting a recalculation of Petitioner’s total household income to exclude her IHSS payments. (Id. Exh. D.) There is no evidence in the record that an administrative hearing was held or completed during which Petitioner challenged the notice of June 5, 2024. HACLA’s recertification of Petitioner’s income in June 2024 was an adjudicatory decision. This decision appears to have been the last certification of Petitioner’s income. Petitioner had an administrative remedy to challenge that adjudicatory decision and she failed to exhaust that remedy. Petitioner does not argue that any excuse from the exhaustion requirement applies. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenge to HACLA’s recertification of Petitioner’s income in June 2024.

The court concludes that Petitioner’s arguments regarding the exhaustion requirement are not persuasive. (Reply 8-9.) Thelander v. City of El Monte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 736, 748, upon which Petitioner relies, did not consider a defense based on failure to exhaust of administrative remedies. “An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.’” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-55.) Bollengier v. Doctors Medical Center (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1115 is similarly inapplicable in that the Court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies barred the petitioner’s writ petition. Petitioner has not cited any published decision holding that a petitioner who failed to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge an adjudicatory decision may nonetheless obtain the same relief in a petition for traditional mandate. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, it is well established that the exhaustion requirement applies whether relief is sought by traditional or administrative mandamus. (Cal. Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1485.) In the court’s view, granting retroactive relief to Petitioner under the circumstances of this case would severely undermine the exhaustion rule. Petitioner is not entitled to a writ directing HACLA to recalculate her benefits on a retroactive basis.

To have standing to seek a writ of mandate, a party must be “beneficially interested.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086.) “A petitioner is beneficially interested if he or she has some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.” (Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 899, 913.) Petitioner does not have any beneficial interest in a writ directing HACLA to recalculate the housing benefit for other persons.

Petitioner relies on public interest standing and argues that she “is an interested citizen challenging HACLA’s ongoing illegal policy.” (Reply 7.)

A petitioner who is not beneficially interested in a writ may nevertheless have “citizen standing” or “public interest standing” to bring the writ petition under the “public interest exception” to the beneficial interest requirement. The public interest exception applies where the question is one of public right and the object of the action is to enforce a public duty—in which case it is sufficient that the plaintiff be interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the public duty enforced.

(Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 913-914, internal quotations and citations omitted.) As discussed above, Petitioner has public interest standing to challenge HACLA’s ongoing policy on a prospective basis. However, Petitioner seeks individualized, retroactive monetary relief for unidentified third parties who have not been joined to this action. (FAP Prayer ¶ a.) Whether each of those third parties is entitled to reimbursement for “excessive payments” depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Petitioner has not shown that she has public interest standing to seek such retroactive monetary relief for third parties. Nor has Petitioner shown that this court can adjudicate these claims and grant effectual relief without joining the third parties or certifying a class action.

1. The first amended petition for writ of mandate is granted in part and denied in part.

2. As discussed above, pursuant to section 5.609(b)(19) of HUD’s regulations, HACLA has a clear, present, and ministerial duty to exclude IHSS payments from annual income for families with disabled members effective January 1, 2024. Accordingly, HACLA’s current policy of not implementing section 5.609(b)(19) is invalid. The court will issue a writ directing HACLA, on a prospective basis, to exclude IHSS payments when determining annual income in all federally subsidized programs administered by Respondents. (FAP Prayer ¶ a.) However, this issue may be moot by the time the writ is issued.

3. The court denies the petition to the extent it seeks retroactive relief, including a writ directing HACLA “to reimburse participants of those federally subsidized housing programs for any excessive payments made by participants as a result of HACLA’s improper determination of annual income and use of such income to compute inaccurate rent portions.” (FAP Prayer ¶ a.)

[1] While not raised by Respondents, the court notes that Respondents suggested in its responses to the requests for admissions that HACLA may begin implementing section 5.609(b)(19) on July 1, 2025, less than two months from the hearing on this petition. (Park Decl. Exh. A.) Thus, depending on when the writ is issued, it could be made moot by upcoming changes to HACLA’s policy.