Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP03201, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP03201, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Andrea Alarcon (“Petitioner”), an elected member of the Palmdale City Council, seeks a writ of mandate under the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) directing Respondent City of Palmdale (“Respondent” or the “City”) to produce billing records and invoices transmitted to Respondent by attorney William Curley and/or Harper & Burns LLP, which serve as the City Attorney. Petitioner also seeks a judicial declaration stating that she “is entitled to view all or a portion of the billing records and invoices submitted to Respondent by Respondent’s City Attorney seeking payment; that Respondent’s denial of access to those records to Petitioner violates the CPRA; and that Petitioner is entitled to view all Respondent’s documents reasonably related to her duties as an elected member of Respondent’s governing board.” (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”), Prayer.) The petition for writ of mandate and claim for declaratory relief are denied to the extent Petitioner seeks billing narratives of any matter, and billing amounts for ongoing matters. The court continues the hearing on the petition for writ of mandate and claim for declaratory relief to the extent Petitioner seeks the amounts of fees billed between January 1, 2023, and March 22, 2024, for past matters.

Petitioner, an attorney, was elected in 2022 to the Palmdale City Council by the voters of District #5 of the City. (Alarcon Decl. ¶ 6.) The City Council, composed of five members, is the governing board of the City of Palmdale. (See Palmdale Mun. Code § 2.08.020.) The City Council is responsible for setting the policy of the City, including by adopting an annual budget. (See Palmdale Charter § 200.) The City Council is also responsible for hiring and firing the City Manager and City Attorney. (Palmdale Municipal Code §§ 2.04.010; 2.06.020; 2.06.030.) As part of its budgetary duties, the City Council authorizes the compensation of the City Attorney. (Palmdale Municipal Code § 2.06.080 [“The City Attorney … shall receive such compensation as the City Council shall from time to time authorize in the budget….”].)

The City does not currently employ an in-house counsel and, instead, contracts for its City Attorney services through the law firm Harper & Burns LLP. Until approximately April 2025, William Curley of Harper & Burns LLP was designated the City’s lead City Attorney. His responsibilities included attending Council Meetings and advising the City Council. (See Alarcon Decl. ¶ 8; Curley Decl. ¶ 2.) As relevant to this petition, the City Attorney’s contract with the City states:

The [City Attorney] shall maintain adequate records of services provided in sufficient detail to permit an evaluation of services. … [The City Attorney] shall provide free access to the representatives of City and/or its designees at reasonable times to such books and records, shall give City the right to examine and audit said books and records, shall permit City to make transcripts therefrom as necessary, and shall allow inspection of all work, data, documents, proceedings and activities related to this Agreement. Such records, together with supporting documents, shall be maintained for a period of three (3) years after receipt of final payment.

William Curley, who served as lead City Attorney until April 2025, declares that “Petitioner has been the subject of numerous complaints of misconduct from staff and other Council Members.” (Curley Decl. 4.) Curley states:

The complaints began escalating in October and November 2023. In response to the complaints of misconduct, the City Council, as the City of Palmdale’s legislative body, assigned me the task of handling those complaints….. [T]he Palmdale City Council had directed the City Attorney to investigate misconduct on behalf of Petitioner…. As part of the investigation, I spoke with staff members, many of whom provided factual detail regarding the misconduct allegations…. Additionally, some of the other matters being investigated were personal matters to which a City Council Member is not privy.

(Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 18-19.) Neither Petitioner nor Respondent has provided detail about the allegations of misconduct against Petitioner. (See generally Curley Decl., Alarcon Decl., and Reply 8-10 and fn. 5.) However, a letter from the City Attorney dated April 1, 2024, states that the City Council directed Curley to investigate Petitioner “after her latest arrest for driving under the influence.” (Alarcon Decl. Exh. F.)

On November 29, 2023, after complaints were made against her, Petitioner sent an email to Curley requesting “all the billing records from [the City Attorney to] the City of Palmdale.” (Alarcon Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. B.)[1] The City Attorney responded, “I’m sending you nothing, as you have no right to it as an individua [sic]. You can take it up with the Council as a whole. You can file a public records act request if you’d like.” (Ibid.) The following day, Petitioner stated: “I asked to see your billing records because I need to know what the City is paying for. This is part of my job as Mayor Pro Tem.” (Ibid.) Curley did not produce the requested records. (Ibid.)

On November 30, 2023, Petitioner again requested the City Attorney’s invoices. This time the request explicitly referenced the CPRA and was made through Respondent’s public records request online portal. (Alarcon Decl. ¶ 15, Exh. C, D.) Specifically, Petitioner requested “[a]ll invoices, bills, statements, time records, financial accountings, requests for payment, and payment disbursement authorizations for payments made to and services rendered by Harper & Burns, LLC from 1/1/2023 to 11/30/2023….” (Ibid.) On December 11, 2023, Respondent requested an extension to respond. On January 17, 2024, Respondent produced 10 pages of heavily redacted images of checks issued by the City to the City Attorney. (Id. ¶ 15.) Respondent never provided a substantive written response or asserted any exemptions from disclosure under the CPRA. (Ibid.)

On March 22, 2024, Petitioner submitted another request for the City Attorney’s invoices under the CPRA, this time through legal counsel. Specifically, she requested:

All bills and invoices of the City Attorney (William Curley and/or Harper & Burns LLP) seeking payment from the City of Palmdale of attorneys’ fees, expenses and/or sanctions…All communications (including text messages and emails, regardless of whether they are on a personal or city email or phone) between the City Attorney (William Curley and/or Harper & Burns LLP) and City Manager (Ronda Perez) regarding payment of attorneys’ fees, expenses and/or sanctions…and All documents describing the tasks performed by the City Attorney (William Curley and/or Harper & Burns LLP) for which payment has been requested from the City of Palmdale.

(Alarcon Decl. ¶ 16, Exh. E.) As relevant to this writ petition, the third request also asserted:

In determining whether a document (or portion thereof) is exempt from disclosure, please note that assertion of the attorney-client privilege would be inappropriate as Councilmember Alarcon is an officer of the City of Palmdale (the client), and thus disclosure to Councilmember Alarcon would not operate as a waiver of such privilege. To avoid any potential for such a waiver, any requested documents which you contend include privileged content should be provided only to Councilmember Alarcon directly, and identified as such, so she knows not to share such documents with anyone outside of the city government.

On April 1, 2024, the City Attorney denied the third request. (Alarcon Decl. ¶ 17, Exh. F.) The City Attorney justified his refusal to provide the requested invoices based on his contention that Petitioner “has no governmental, legislative, or administrative purpose to obtain these records and so appears to seek them only for a personal reason … to demean, discredit, and create negative attributes about me.” (Id., Exh. F [pp. 2-3, 5].)

Pursuant to the CPRA (Gov. Code § 7921.000, et seq.), individual citizens have a right to access government records.[2] Article 1, Section 3(b) of the Constitution affirms that “[t]he people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business.” The Constitution mandates that the CPRA be “broadly construed,” while any statute “that limits the right of access” must be “narrowly construed.” (See Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 507.) “Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by law.” (Gov. Code § 7922.525(b).) The CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (Gov. Code § 7921.300.)

To establish that an agency has a duty to disclose under the CPRA, the petitioner must show that: (1) The record “qualifies as a public record;” and (2) The record is in the possession of the agency. (Anderson-Barker v Sup.Ct. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 528, 538.) Once that initial burden is met, the agency has the burden to prove “that a particular record is exempt from disclosure.” (Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System v. Superior Court (2013) 195 Cal.App.4th 440, 453.)

“[B]ecause the party opposing disclosure under any CPRA exemption always bears the burden of proving the exemption applies … on the facts, doubtful cases must always be resolved in favor of disclosure.” (Essick v. County of Sonoma (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 941, 950.) While government agencies are generally “entitled to a presumption that they have reasonably and in good faith complied with the obligation to disclose responsive information,” that presumption is not absolute, as there is “a statutory presumption that all governmental records are available to any person.” (ACLU of Northern Cal. v. Sup.Ct. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 83.)

To carry its burden, the [agency] must describe the justification for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail and demonstrate that the information withheld is within the claimed privilege or exemption. This process cannot require an agency to disclose the very information it seeks to protect. Having both the burden of proof and all the evidence, the agency has the difficult task of justifying its withholding the documents without compromising that very act by revealing too much information. However, declarations supporting the agency’s claims of exemption must be specific enough to give the requester a meaningful opportunity to contest the withholding of the documents and the court to determine whether the exemption applies. The agency must describe each document or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the consequences of disclosing the sought-after information.

(Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Sup. Ct. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 790, citations and internal quotations and alterations omitted.)

In camera review of the unredacted records is permitted under the CPRA, but it is not required. (See e.g. Gov. Code § 7923.105(a); see American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Cal. v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 74.) However, the trial court may not order review of documents in camera to determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies. (Evid. Code § 915(a).)

Petitioner requests judicial notice of: (1) This court’s records in Smith et al. vs. City of Palmdale, Case No. 22STCV18219 “demonstrating that case concluded more than a year ago, and that the City of Palmdale was represented by Harper & Burns LLP”; and (2) The transcription of a portion of the January 22, 2025 meeting of the Palmdale City Council, attached as Exhibit H. There is no objection. The court grants the request.

Respondent requests judicial notice of City Clerk’s Certification, Authentication and Attest of the Charter of the City of Palmdale, California 2009 attached as Exhibit I. There is no objection. The court grants the request.

As an initial matter, Petitioner takes the position that her membership on the City Council entitles her to access to the records. The City may—or may not—have a ministerial duty to provide the records to the City Council pursuant to the City Attorney’s contract, the City’s charter, the Palmdale Municipal Code, or some other contract, rule, or statute. But those issues are not before the court. This is a petition to enforce the CPRA, which is the only issue the court will address in this proceeding.

The CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (Gov. Code § 7921.300.) Furthermore, “an elected member or officer of any state or local agency is entitled to access to public records of that agency on the same basis as any other person.” (Gov. Code § 7921.305 [emphasis added].) There is a reason for this: “[O]nce a public record is disclosed to the requesting party, it must be made available for inspection by the public in general.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018; see also Edais v. Superior Court (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 530, 542 [“Records released to one requestor under the CPRA generally must be made available to other members of the public.”].)

Petitioner cites Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 759, 764 (“LAUSD”) for the proposition that the City must produce records to “an elected official who is attempting to carry out his duties as a representative of the City Council.” (Opening Brief (“OB”) at 9:10-12.) Petitioner misinterprets the case. In that case, the City of Long Beach and its elected City Attorney, Robert E. Shannon, sought access to public records from the Los Angeles Unified School District (the “LAUSD”). The petitioners sought several reasons for seeking the records, one of which was because he was “an elected official who is attempting to carry out his duties as a representative of the City Council, City Management, and citizens of the City. . . .” (LAUSD, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 764.) However, the Court of Appeal did not grant the CPRA request on that basis, so the case does not stand for the proposition advanced by Petitioner. Rather, the issue before the Court was narrow: “The only issue before us is whether the City and City Attorney Shannon have standing to request public records from the LAUSD,” i.e., “whether a public agency is authorized to . . . seek disclosure of public records in the possession of another public agency.” (Id. at 762, 764.) “An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-55 [citations omitted].)

Petitioner contends that “certain exemptions enumerated in the CPRA, which might otherwise warrant nondisclosure to other members of the public, cannot justify nondisclosure to an elected official of the agency’s governing board.” (OB 10:5-8.) Petitioner fails to support this position. Petitioner cites Government Code sections 7930.125 and 7930.165, which simply state that certain materials disclosed in a closed session before a legislative body may be exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. Petitioner cites to cases discussing the rights of corporate directors to inspect corporate records. (OB 10-11, citing Tritek Telecom, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1387 and Fowler v. Golden Pac. Bancorp, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 205, 221.) Those cases are inapposite and did not consider the CPRA.

Petitioner argues that she is a third-party beneficiary of the City’s contract with the City Attorney and is therefore entitled to review the requested records pursuant to that contract. As discussed, Petitioner raises a narrow issue: This is a petition for writ of mandate to enforce the CPRA. Therefore, this issue is not before the court in this proceeding.

In sum, the only issue before this court is whether Petitioner, like any member of the general public, has a right to access the records at issue under the CPRA. The court does not reach the issues whether Petitioner has a right to access these records pursuant to the City Attorney’s contract, the City’s charter, the Palmdale Municipal Code, or any other contract, rule, or statute. The court notes that Petitioner likely has a conflict of interest in requesting certain records because she is the subject of an ongoing investigation by the City Attorney.

The attorney-client privilege allows the client or the client’s attorney “to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer . . . .” (Evid. Code § 954.) In Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282 (“ACLU”), our Supreme Court considered a CPRA request for “invoices specifying the amounts that the County had been billed by any law firm in connection with nine different lawsuits alleging excessive force against jail inmates.” (Id. at 288.) The Court held that “the attorney-client privilege does not categorically shield everything in a billing invoice from [CPRA] disclosure,” but that “invoices for work in pending and active legal matters

are so closely related to attorney-client communications that they implicate the heartland of the privilege.” (Ibid.) The Court explained:

To the extent that billing information is conveyed for the purpose of legal representation—perhaps to inform the client of the nature or amount of work occurring in connection with a pending legal issue—such information lies in the heartland of the attorney-client privilege. And even if the information is more general, such as aggregate figures describing the total amount spent on continuing litigation during a given quarter or year, it may come close enough to this heartland to threaten the confidentiality of information directly relevant to the attorney's distinctive professional role. The attorney-client privilege protects the confidentiality of information in both those categories, even if the information happens to be transmitted in a document that is not itself categorically privileged. When a legal matter remains pending and active, the privilege encompasses everything in an invoice, including the amount of aggregate fees. This is because, even though the amount of money paid for legal services is generally not privileged, an invoice that shows a sudden uptick in spending might very well reveal much of a government agency’s investigative efforts and trial strategy.

The same may not be true for fee totals in legal matters that concluded long ago. In contrast to information involving a pending case, a cumulative fee total for a long-completed matter does not always reveal the substance of legal consultation. The fact that the amounts in both cases were communicated in an invoice transmitted confidentially from lawyer to client does not automatically make this information privileged. Instead, the privilege turns on whether those amounts reveal anything about legal consultation. Asking an agency to disclose the cumulative amount it spent on long-concluded litigation—with no ongoing litigation to shed light on the context from which such records are arising—may communicate little or nothing about the substance of legal consultation. But when those same cumulative totals are communicated during ongoing litigation, this real-time disclosure of ongoing spending amounts can indirectly reveal clues about legal strategy, especially when multiple amounts over time are compared.

In sum, ACLU provides that: (1) The billing narrative on attorney invoices is privileged and remains so regardless of whether a matter has concluded; (2) The amounts of fees billed for active matters, as shown on the invoices, are privileged; and (3) The amounts of fees billed for concluded matters may, or may not, be privileged depending on “whether those amounts reveal anything about legal consultation.”

Petitioner argues that any CPRA exemptions were waived because “Respondent did not identify any exemptions in response to any of Councilmember Alarcon’s request.” (OB 7.)

The CPRA requires the City to respond in writing to any written request for a copy of public records within 10 days of receiving the request, with certain exceptions. (§§ 7922.535, 7922.540.) If the public entity claims the record is exempt from disclosure, it must justify its claim as part of the response. (§§ 7922.000, 7922.540.) In other words, upon receiving a request for public records, any agency subject to the CPRA must make the records available or respond to the request within the time frames described in the statute.

(Di Lauro v. City of Burbank (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 969, 199.) However, Petitioner has not cited any statute or case law stating that a CPRA exemption is automatically waived if the agency fails to assert the exemption in a written response to the CPRA request. In fact, the California Supreme Court has held that failure to comply with the CPRA’s timing requirements does not result in the waiver of an exemption. (Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal. 4th 1065, 1072 [“we believe that requiring disclosure of otherwise exempt records as a penalty for delay in complying with the Act's timing requirements is unduly harsh. Certainly, the Act does not expressly provide such a remedy.”) Rather, the agency’s failure to respond is simply evidence that may be submitted at trial to establish that the agency has failed to justify its withholding of the records. (See Di Lauro, supra 110 Cal.App.5th at 199 [in a ruling on demurrer, the City’s alleged failure to respond in a timely manner was sufficient to state an individual claim for relief under the CPRA].) Here, as discussed above, the evidence shows that at least some of the withheld billing records and invoices are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. (See Curley Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 14-20; ACLU, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 297-298.) Accordingly, Respondent did not waive the privilege simply because it failed to provide a written response identifying the applicable CPRA exemptions.

Petitioner has not shown that Respondent waived the privilege on any other basis. (See OB 7-8.) Generally, waiver of the attorney-client privilege “occurs when the holder of the privilege has voluntarily disclosed a significant portion of the privileged communications.” (Lohman v. Sup.Ct. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 90, 95.) Petitioner does not argue, or show with evidence, that this occurred here. Furthermore, Respondent asserted the attorney-client privilege in its answer and opposition papers and, therefore, no waiver occurred for failure to assert the privilege in this litigation. (OB 7:26-8:11, citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 272-274; see also Answer, Fifth Affirmative Defense.)

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to any billing narratives. The court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to records concerning the amounts of fees billed for active matters, as reflected on the invoices. Petitioner requests billing records and invoices of the City Attorney seeking payment from the City for the period of January 1, 2023, through March 22, 2024. (Alarcon Decl. ¶¶ 14-17, Exh. B-E.) The billing invoices that pertain to matters that are still pending, including any ongoing investigation into complaints against Petitioner, fall within the attorney-client privilege. (ACLU, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 297-298; see Curley Decl. ¶¶ 18-19 [summarizing the pending investigation into Petitioner].) Petitioner does not argue that the investigation of her has been completed. Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to billing narratives of any matter, and invoices concerning ongoing matters.

Petitioner argues that she is entitled to the City Attorney’s billing records and invoices under the CPRA because Respondent made those records available to two Councilmembers on a subcommittee that was required to evaluate the performance and billing of the City Attorney. (OB 11-12.) Specifically, at the City Council meeting on January 22, 2025, Petitioner stated:

For the past year and a half or so, I’ve been trying to access City Attorney billing records. I think everybody is aware of my time and time again efforts to get those records. I’m asked to vote on the City budget, and the City Attorney’s budget appropriation, but I have not been able to see any of those invoices. So, unfortunately, I had to pursue litigation under the California Public Records Act in order to try to get those. Still, there is pushback in releasing those records.

(Pet. RJN Exh. H.) Notably, Petitioner acknowledged that she had a conflict of interest in reviewing the billing records and invoices of Harper & Burns:

I find it a little concerning that the firm Harper & Burns is defending the City in the action to defend not disclosing the Harper & Burns invoices. I think that that’s an inherent conflict. But that’s for the Council to discern….

The Council can do what it wants in terms of moving forward, because I obviously can’t participate in some of those decisions, but I just think that the public should know that these things are happening…. So, you guys can do with that what you will, but I think it’s quite concerning.

(Ibid. [emphasis added].) In response to Petitioner’s statement, Councilmember Ohlsen stated: “When you originally brought up the billing issue, a Council subcommittee was formed and looked into the matter and it’s been resolved. You weren’t on the subcommittee.” (Ibid.)

In arguing that there was discrimination, Petitioner relies on Government Code section 7921.310, of the CPRA, which provides:

Notwithstanding Section 7921.305 or any other provision of law, when the members of a legislative body of a local agency are authorized to access a writing of the body or of the agency as permitted by law in the administration of their duties, the local agency, as defined in Section 54951, shall not discriminate between or among any of those members as to which writing or portion thereof is made available or when it is made available.

Generally, the CPRA governs the disclosure of public records to “a member of the public.” (See Gov. Code § 7922.600.) However, section 7921.305(a) states:

Notwithstanding the definition of “member of the public” in Section 7920.515, an elected member or officer of any state or local agency is entitled to access to public records of that agency on the same basis as any other person. Nothing in this section shall limit the ability of elected members or officers to access public records permitted by law in the administration of their duties.

Neither party has cited a case interpreting sections 7921.305 and 7921.310. Nor have the parties provided a comprehensive discussion of these statutes, their purposes, or their legislative history. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the predecessor to section 7921.310 (section 6252.7) states, in pertinent part:

(2) The California Public Records Act requires state and local agencies to make their records available for public inspection and to make copies available upon request and payment of a fee unless they are exempt from disclosure. The Ralph M. Brown Act provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, agendas of public meetings and any other writings, when distributed to all, or a majority of all, of the members of a legislative body of a local agency by any person in connection with a matter subject to discussion or consideration at a public meeting of the body, are disclosable public records under the California Public Records Act unless exempt from disclosure under that act. The Ralph M. Brown Act requires that these writings be made available for public inspection at the meeting if prepared by the local agency or a member of its legislative body, or after the meeting if prepared by some other person.

This bill would provide that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the members of a legislative body of a local agency are authorized to access a writing of the body or of the agency as permitted by law in the administration of their duties, the local agency shall not discriminate between or among any of those members as to which writing or portion thereof is made available or when it is made available.

(2008 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63 (S.B. 1732) (WEST) [emphasis added].) As discussed, the records at issue are privileged and therefore exempt from disclosure. Regardless, even if section 7921.310 applies to this case, Petitioner has not shown that it was violated on these facts.

On March 20, 2024, the City Council considered Petitioner’s allegations and her CPRA requests for attorney-client protected City Attorney invoices. The City Council, in its oversight role, conducted a closed session evaluation of the City Attorney without the City Attorney present. The Council formed a review subcommittee to look at the invoices. T he subcommittee consisted of Mayor Pro Tempore (now Mayor) Richard Loa, Esq. (California attorney), Council Member Eric Ohlsen (a legislative aide to Assemblyman Juan Carrillo), and City Manager Ronda Perez. The subcommittee found no improprieties.

(Curley Decl. ¶ 14; see also Pet. RJN Exh. H.) It is undisputed that Petitioner was not a member of this subcommittee and, therefore, the administration of her duties as a City Councilperson did not require her to review the City Attorney’s billing records and invoices. Nor could she do so because, as Petitioner acknowledged, she had a conflict of interest. Petitioner advances no evidence that members of the City Council who did not serve on the subcommittee received access to the records. Thus, Petitioner has not proven discrimination within the meaning of section 7921.310.

The court does not have sufficient information to determine whether the amounts of fees billed between January 1, 2023, and March 22, 2024, for past matters are privileged. This resolution will depend on “whether those amounts reveal anything about the legal consultation.” (ACLU, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 298.) Harper & Burns LLP has served as the City Attorney since July 27, 2022. (Curley Decl. ¶ 2.) Respondent has the burden of proving that all the records were properly withheld pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or some other CPRA exemption.

Petitioner identifies one case handled by the City Attorney—Smith et al. v. City of Palmdale, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 22STCV18219 (Smith)—that concluded before she made her final CPRA request. (OB 15:10-12; Pet. RJN.) Specifically, an Order of Dismissal of the entire action was filed in Smith on March 18, 2024, four days before Petitioner made her final CPRA request. (See Curley Decl. ¶ 17 and Court File in Smith.) As discussed, the amounts of fees billed for concluded matters may, or may not, be privileged depending on “whether those amounts reveal anything about legal consultation.” (ACLU, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 297-298.) Respondent’s evidence—the Curley declaration—does not provide sufficient information for the court to adjudicate this issue. (See Curley Decl. ¶ 20.) The court cannot determine, on this record, whether the attorney-client privilege applies to all or any parts of the City Attorney’s billing invoices for Smith. Furthermore, it seems possible that the City Attorney handled other cases that concluded before March 22, 2024. Curley also does not sufficiently address that issue.

Based upon the foregoing, the court orders Respondent to prepare and produce a privilege log and/or supplemental declarations identifying billing records/invoices for completed matters in which there were billings between January 1, 2023, through March 22, 2024.

[The] declarations supporting the agency’s claims of exemption must be specific enough to give the requester a meaningful opportunity to contest the withholding of the documents and the court to determine whether the exemption applies. The agency must describe each document or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the consequences of disclosing the sought-after information.

(Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 790.) If the agency’s declarations are not sufficiently detailed to support a determination of exemption under the CPRA, the agency “should be afforded an opportunity to file supplemental declaration(s) in the superior court containing information from which the court may make an informed decision on privilege and exemption claims.” (Id. at 790.) To the extent Respondent contends that exemptions other than the attorney-client privilege apply, Respondent must identify those exemptions in the privilege log and supplemental declarations. (See Oppo. 13:7-28.)

Respondent has not demonstrated to the court’s satisfaction that preparing a privilege log would be unduly burdensome. The request relates only to completed matters in which there was billing between January 1, 2023, and March 22, 2024. Respondent also argues that “learned colleagues and professionals reviewed the invoices, determined they were proper, and the only remaining interest of Petitioner is to disrupt and impugn the City Attorney’s investigation and disrupt City operations and the direction of the City Council.” (Oppo. 13:25-28.) The CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (Gov. Code

§ 7921.300.) Thus, Petitioner’s alleged purpose in requesting the records is not relevant. As discussed, the court cannot conduct the public interest balancing for any specific record based on the evidence submitted by Respondent.

1. The petition for writ of mandate and claim for declaratory relief are denied to the extent Petitioner seeks billing narratives of any matter, and invoices concerning ongoing matters.

2. The court continues the hearing on the petition for writ of mandate and claim for declaratory relief to the extent Petitioner seeks the amounts of fees billed between January 1, 2023, and March 22, 2024, for past matters.

3. The court orders Respondent to prepare a privilege log relating to the outstanding items.

4. The court orders the parties to meet-and-confer concerning the privilege log and to file a joint status report on _______, 2025, discussing whether this case has been resolved and, if not, what aspects of the petition the court must resolve.

5. If the parties cannot resolve the outstanding issue, Respondent shall file a supplemental opposition on or before ___________, 2025.

[1] Petitioner also requested “to see all your emails, texts, and notes from meetings and conversations with staff or other council members.” (Ibid.) Petitioner does not seek to enforce that request in this writ action, which concerns the City Attorney’s billing records and invoices.

[2] The CPRA statutes were re-numbered effective January 1, 2023. Unless otherwise stated, statutory references are to the Government Code.