Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP03894, Date: 2025-04-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP03894 Hearing Date: April 18, 2025 Dept: 82
Cinema Park LLC Case No. 24STCP03894
v.
Hearing:
April 18, 2025
Location:
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Department:
82
City of Santa Clarita, et al. Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch
[Tentative] Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Cinema Park LLC
(“Petitioner”) filed the instant petition for writ of mandate challenging a
decision by the City of Santa Clarita (the “City”) to approve a proposed
development project by Robert Neman and Harvard 826 Property, LLC (collectively,
the “Real Parties”). Now, the City and
the Real Parties move to dismiss the cause of action under the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) because Petitioners did not request a
hearing within 90 days, as required by the statute. Petitioner opposes the motion, arguing that
the requirement is not jurisdictional; Petitioner delayed only by nine days; and
the court has discretion to waive the requirement under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473. Petitioner has also filed a
motion for relief under section 473(b).
The court denies the City and the Real Parties’ motion to dismiss and
takes Petitioner’s motion for relief under section 473(b) off-calendar as
moot.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
On June 6, 2019, the Real Parties
submitted a “One Stop Review” application to the City. (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) ¶
22.) On April 3, 2021, the Real Parties
submitted applications for “Architectural Design Review” and “Development
Review,” as well as an application for a “Minor Use Permit.” (Pet. ¶ 24.)
The City provided public notice of the project on February 26, 2024, and
Petitioner submitted a request for an administrative hearing on March 1,
2024. (Pet. ¶¶ 25, 26.) The Administrative Hearing Officer approved
the proposed project on April 17, 2024.
(Pet. ¶ 32.) Petitioner appealed
the decision to the Planning Commission on April 29, 2024, and the Planning
Commission denied the appeal on June 18, 2024.
(Pet. ¶¶ 38, 39.) Petitioner
appealed the decision to the City Council on July 1, 2024. (Pet. ¶ 39.)
On October 22, 2024, the City Council found that the proposed project is
exempt from CEQA and denied the appeal.
(Pet. ¶ 50.) Petitioner filed the
instant action on December 2, 2024, and filed a request for a hearing on March
12, 2025.
LEGAL STANDARD
“CEQA sets strict time requirements
to protect the public interest in speedy resolution of CEQA challenges.” (Nacimiento Regional Water Management
Advisory Com. v. Monterey County Water Resources Agency (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 961, 968.) Considering all timing requirements, “[t]he
legislature thus plainly intended that a CEQA challenge be heard within 210
days of commencement, or roughly seven months, absent exceptional
circumstances.” (Ibid.)
As
relevant here, “the petitioner shall request a hearing within 90 days from the
date of filing the petition or shall be subject to dismissal on the court’s own
motion or on the motion of any party interested in the action or
proceeding.” (Pub. Res. Code §
21167.4(a).) “Requesting a hearing
under Public Resources Code section 21167.4 is a
mandatory provision of CEQA.” (Comunidad
en Accion v. Los Angeles City Council (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1116,
1131.) Generally, when a CEQA petitioner
does “not file a written request for a hearing within 90 days of the filing of
its writ petition, its CEQA claims [are] subject to mandatory dismissal upon
the motion filed by” the respondent or real party in interest.
(County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
943, 954.)
However, notwithstanding the
expedited nature of CEQA cases, CEQA does not categorically bar relief
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. (Comunidad, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at
1132.) Specifically, “[c]ourts have
afforded plaintiffs relief for the failure to properly request a hearing
under Public Resources Code section 21167.4, but only when
such failure constituted excusable error.”
(Ibid.)
A party who seeks
relief under section 473 on the basis
of mistake or inadvertence of counsel must demonstrate that such mistake,
inadvertence, or general neglect was excusable because the negligence of the
attorney is imputed to his client and may not be offered by the latter as a
basis for relief. In determining whether the attorney's mistake or inadvertence
was excusable, the court inquires whether a reasonably prudent person under
the same or similar circumstances might have made the same error. In other
words, the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits
relief from attorney error fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes
anyone could have made. Conduct falling below the professional standard of
care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is
not therefore excusable. To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express
statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of
attorney malpractice. The party seeking relief under section 473 must also be
diligent. Thus, an application for relief must be made within a reasonable
time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or
proceeding was taken. Where the mistake is excusable and the party seeking
relief has been diligent, courts have often granted relief pursuant to the
discretionary relief provision of section 473 if no
prejudice to the opposing party will ensue.
(Comunidad,
supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at 1132, quoting Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting
Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258, internal quotation marks and
citations omitted.)
DISCUSSION
It
is undisputed that Petitioner did not file and serve a request for hearing by Monday,
March 3, 2025, which was the statutory deadline under section 22167.4(a). (Ghazaryan Decl.
¶ 14.) Thus, the CEQA cause of action is subject to
dismissal unless Petitioner’s counsel demonstrates that his failure to file the
request was the result of excusable neglect; Petitioner has been otherwise
diligent; and Respondents will not suffer any prejudice. (See Comunidad, supra, 219
Cal.App.4th at 1132.)
Petitioner’s counsel establishes
excusable neglect. In his declaration, Petitioner’s
counsel states: “Due to an input error in my firm’s
calendaring system, this case was inadvertently not coded as a CEQA case and
therefore did not track the very unique procedural requirements and deadlines
of CEQA cases.” (Ghazaryan Decl. ¶ 6.) This is credible because the cover page of the
petition states that this is a “Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief” and does not state “CEQA” or
“California Environmental Quality Act.” Petitioner’s
counsel further states: “On January 10, 2025, the parties attended a settlement
conference, in the midst of the fires that devastated Los Angeles from January
7 through January 31. There appeared to be a mutual understanding of the
challenging circumstances.” (Id. ¶
10.) Petitioner’s counsel states:
Like so many
others in Los Angeles, I and many of my family and friends were impacted by
fires that devastated the city through the month of January. I was lucky enough
to be less impacted than others, but I picked up the extra work to help those
more impacted. Additionally, I spent time volunteering to help the general
public. In addition, I experienced
numerous personal and family challenges during this time, including a death of
a close relative, a pet that had life threatening condition that required spending
over 8 hours at the hospital as well as numerous follows ups, as well as myriad
other personal challenges. During these
challenging times, I worked diligently on all my cases, billing an average of
over 200 hours every month between December 2024 and end of March 2025.
(Id.
¶ 19.) This is sufficient to
demonstrate excusable neglect.
Petitioner demonstrates that he
acted with sufficient diligence. “Moving
Parties did not raise the issue of the Request for Hearing” in their email of
March 4, 2025, and, instead, “waited until 9 days after the deadline to raise
it at the TSC,” which was held on March 12, 2025. (Id. ¶ 14.) The request for hearing was filed that same
date.
Finally,
there is no prejudice. The delay in
seeking relief was only nine days.
Moreover, Respondents could have alleviated any prejudice by raising the
issue on March 4, 2025, instead of waiting until the trial setting conference
on March 12, 2025.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based
upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:
1. The City and the Real Parties’ motion
to dismiss is denied.
2. The court takes the hearing on
Petitioner’s motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b),
which is set for hearing on May 21, 2025, off-calendar as moot.
3. Pursuant to Public Resources Code
section 21167.4, absent good cause, the briefing shall be completed within 90
days from the date that the request for a hearing is filed. Therefore, the court orders as follows:
a. The opening brief shall be filed and
served on or before May 9, 2025.
b. The opposition brief shall be filed and
served on or before June 2, 2025.
c. The reply
brief shall be filed and served on or before June 10, 2025.
d. The administrative record shall be
lodged on a thumb drive on or before June 10, 2025.
4. Pursuant to Public Resources Code
section 21167.4, to the extent feasible, the trial shall be set within 30 days
of the completion of briefing.
Therefore, the court sets trial for July 9, 2025, at 9:30 a.m.
5. Counsel for the Real Parties shall
provide notice and file proof of service with the court.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: April 18,
2025 ______________________
Stephen
I. Goorvitch
Superior
Court Judge