Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP03938, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP03938 Hearing Date: April 11, 2025 Dept: 82
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Case No. 24STCP03938
Department
v.
Hearing:
April 11, 2025
Location:
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Los
Angeles County Civil Service Department:
82
Commission Judge:
Stephen I. Goorvitch
[Tentative] Order Denying Motion to Stay
Final Decision of the Civil Service Commission
The real party in interest, Margie
Cobarrubio (the “Real Party” or “Cobarrubio”), was a civilian security
assistant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“Petitioner” or the
“Department”). Because Cobarrubio was
absent from work on an ongoing basis, the Department eventually deemed her to
have resigned from her position. Cobarrubio
filed an appeal with the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (the
“Commission”). The Commission ordered
the Department to reinstate Cobarrubio. The
Department filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085—not section 1094.5—arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction
over the Real Party’s administrative appeal.
Now, the Department moves to stay
the decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(g). However, this petition is brought pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and asserts that the Commission lacked
jurisdiction over Cobarrubio’s administrative appeal. “A stay of an agency decision in a traditional mandamus case is governed
by principles for injunctive relief.”
(Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 3.231(e).) Accordingly, the court interprets the motion
as seeking a preliminary injunction staying the Commission’s decision. The purpose
of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a decision on
the merits. (Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 618,
623.) In deciding whether or not to
grant a preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors, including “(1)
the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the
relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial
of interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528,
553-54.) The factors are interrelated,
with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other. (Dodge,
Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
1414, 1420.)
The
Department does not demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success on the
merits. The Department argues that Cobarrubio effectively
resigned under Los Angeles County Code section 5.12.020.A.2. The Department argues that an employee can
request a hearing for a resignation only on the ground that the resignation was
obtained by fraud, duress, or undue influence, per Los Angeles County Code
section 5.12.040. For purposes of the
instant motion, the court is not persuaded that the County’s interpretation is necessarily
correct. Section 5.12.020.A.2 defines a
“resignation,” and section 5.12.020 states in full:
Nothing in Section
5.12.020 precludes any officer or employee from filing with the civil service
commission, pursuant to its rules, a request for a hearing on the ground that
his resignation made pursuant to Section 5.12.020 was obtained by fraud, duress,
or undue influence of the county.
(Los
Angeles County Code § 5.12.040.) Essentially,
the County interprets section 5.12.040 as implicitly prohibiting requests for
hearing for other types of resignations.
But nothing in the Los Angeles County Code expressly states that an
employee who is deemed to have resigned based upon absenteeism is precluded
from requesting a hearing before the Commission. More important, there is a genuine question
whether this was a “resignation” or a disciplinary matter. The hearing officer identified this threshold
issue:
A foundational question which might be helpful for the
Commission and the question of jurisdiction was whether the action taken by the
Department was disciplinary in nature. There was a fair amount of
disagreement and the record was somewhat inconsistent on this point. There were
a number of documents and explanations presented during the process supporting
the Appellant’s position it should have been referred to as to a disciplinary
matter. Others were more along the line of it moving forward
under the L. A. Code provisions cited in the November 15, 2021 “Notice of
Intent to Deem Employee Resigned from County Employment” (Dept. 1). The
Department took this latter position despite the fact one of their witnesses
initially characterized the move as disciplinary before reversing himself later
in his testimony. Even though the notice letter included much of what was
normally included in a pre-disciplinary notice, the “Notice of Imposition” did
not follow that pattern (Dept. 2). The Department did not characterize the
language contained in the first transmittal as a Skelly notice, but went on to
do so later in documents presented to the Hearing Officer.
(RJN Exh. H at 4 [emphasis added].) Petitioner has not lodged the administrative
record or submitted any record evidence from which the court could assess the hearing
officer’s findings that Cobarrubio did not “resign” but was “disciplined” for
excessive absenteeism. If the hearing officer
correctly found that this was a disciplinary matter, and not a resignation,
then the Department would not have a sufficiently likelihood of success on its jurisdictional
claim.
Nor does
the Department demonstrate sufficient irreparable harm. The court
must consider “the interim harm that the plaintiff would be likely to sustain
if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant would be
likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” (Smith
v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749.) “Irreparable harm” generally means that the
defendant’s act constitutes an actual or threatened injury to the personal or
property rights of the plaintiff that cannot be compensated by a damages
award. (See Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d
405, 410.)
Where, as here, the
defendants are public agencies and the plaintiff seeks to restrain them in the
performance of their duties, public policy considerations also come into play.
There is a general rule against enjoining public officers or agencies from performing
their duties…. This rule would not preclude a court from enjoining
unconstitutional or void
acts, but to support a
request for such relief the plaintiff must make a significant showing of
irreparable injury.
(Tahoe Keys
Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.) The Department
fails to address this issue in the motion and the court finds none. The reinstatement would be for a limited
period of time, i.e., the court will decide the petition for writ of
mandate in the near future, and the reinstatement can be rescinded if the
County prevails on the petition. There
was no award of back pay for Cobarrubio, so the County need not recover any
funds in the event it prevails on the petition.
Conversely, it appears that Cobarrubio may suffer irreparable harm if
the preliminary injunction is granted, viz., her loss of employment for
the time it will take to decide the petition.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based
upon the foregoing, the Department’s motion for a stay of the Commission’s
decision to reinstate Cobarrubio. Counsel
for the Department shall provide notice and file proof of service with the
court.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: April 11,
2025 ______________________
Stephen
I. Goorvitch
Superior
Court Judge