Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCP04235, Date: 2025-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCP04235, Date: 2025-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Department: 82 Los Angeles Unified School District, et al. Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

Petitioner John Doe, Jane Doe, and Ella Doe (“Petitioners”) petition for an order relieving Petitioners from the claim presentation requirements of Government Code section 945.4 with respect to their claim for damages against Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (“Respondent” or “LAUSD”). LAUSD has filed an opposition to the petition.[1] The petition is granted in part and denied in part.

On September 16, 2022, Ella Doe, the daughter of John and Jane Doe, told her parents that she was being bullied and harassed by another student at Canyon Charter Elementary School (“Canyon”). (John Doe Decl. ¶ 2.) On September 17, 2022, John and Jane Doe informed Ella Doe’s teacher and the school principal about the alleged bullying. (Id. ¶ 3.) Thereafter, John and Jane Doe met with the school principal; Ella Doe began seeing a therapist; and the school commenced an investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 3-8.) According to John Doe, “Ella Doe continued to experience taunting and harassing behavior by other students, and we kept her home from school between November 14-16, 2022, for fear of her safety.” (Id. ¶ 8.) In December 2022, John and Jane Doe withdrew Ella Doe from Canyon. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)

During the second semester of the 2022-2023 school year, Ella Doe attended Santa Monica Montessori school. (Id. ¶ 12.) For the 2023-2024 schoolyear Ella Doe attended Wildwood Elementary (“Wildwood”), an expensive private school. (Id. ¶ 13.)

On March 11, 2024, John Doe submitted a Bullying Permit Application to Marquez and Palisades Elementary schools “because we just couldn’t afford private school.” (Id. ¶ 14.) These applications were denied on March 18 and 21, 2024, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) On March 12, 2024, John Doe submitted a Bullying Permit Application to Overland School, which was denied the same day. (Id. ¶ 15.) On March 22, 2024, John Doe filed appeals of the denials of the Bullying Permit Applications for Marquez, Palisades, and Overland. (Id. ¶ 19.) On April 11, 2024, LAUSD denied all three appeals. (Id. ¶ 22.) On April 17, 2024, John and Jane Doe registered Ella Doe to attend Wildwood for the 2024-2025 school year. (Id. ¶ 23.)

On May 20, 2024, John Doe submitted three claims for damages to LAUSD alleging that: (1) LAUSD staff mishandled the bullying complaint related to Ella Doe and “continues to de-prioritize victim;” and (2) “LAUSD denied permit Intra-District Appeal.” (Id. ¶ 25, Exh. L.) The claims alleged financial and emotional damages that occurred “September 2022 to present ongoing.” (Ibid.) On May 24, 2024, LAUSD informed John Doe that it did not take action on the claims because they were untimely. (Id. ¶ 26, Exh. M.) On June 21, 2024, John Doe filed an application to LAUSD for leave to present a late claim. (Id. ¶ 28, Exh. O.) On July 1, 2024, LAUSD denied the application. (Id. ¶ 29, Exh. P.)

With the petition, Petitioners submit a proposed complaint against LAUSD for negligence and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. (Id. Exh. Q.) The complaint alleges, among other things:

Defendants have failed to uphold numerous mandatory duties imposed upon them by law and by written policies and procedures applicable to Defendants including but not limited to the following: 1) duty to use reasonable care to protect students from known or foreseeable dangers; 2) duty to protect students and staff and provide adequate supervision; 3) duty to supervise employees and students and enforce rules and regulations prescribed for schools, exercise reasonable control over students as is reasonably necessary to maintain order, protect property, or protect the health and safety of employees and students or to maintain proper and appropriate conditions conducive to learning; 4) duty to act promptly and diligently and not ignore or minimize problems; 5) duty to warn Plaintiff and other students of potential harm; and 6) duty to refrain from violating Plaintiff’s right to protection from bodily restraint or harm.

(Id. ¶ 12.) The complaint also alleges that the “claim is based on the April 11, 2024, denial by LAUSD of Petitioners’ three intra-district transfer requests.” (Id. ¶ 6.)

Government Code section 911.2(a) states that “a claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” If a claimant fails to make a claim within six months pursuant to Government Code section 911.2, the claimant may make a written application to the board of the public entity for permission to present a late claim within a reasonable time but not to exceed one year from the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code

§ 911.4(a)-(b).) If, pursuant to the provisions of Government Code section 911.6, the board denies the application to present a late claim, the claimant may petition the Court for relief from the requirements of Government Code section 945.4. (Gov. Code § 946.6(a).)

Government Code section 946.6(b) requires that the petition to the court show each of the following: (1) that the late claim application made to the board was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for failure to present the claim within six months of the accrual of the cause of action; and (3) the contents of the claim as required by Government Code section 910. The petition must be filed within six months after the application to present a late claim to the board was denied or deemed to be denied. (Ibid.)

The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the late-claim application was made within a reasonable time and that one of the statutory requirements under Government Code section 946.6(c) was met. (Drummond v. County of Fresno (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1410.) Under section 946.4(e), the trial court must make its determination upon the petition, “relying upon any affidavits in support of, or in opposition to, the petition and any additional evidence received at hearing on the petition.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 431.)

“Section 946.6 is a remedial statue intended to provide relief from technical rules which otherwise provide a trap for the unwary claimant.” (Id. at 435.) “[D]oubts will be resolved in favor of the party attempting to get to trial to the end that wherever possible, cases may be heard on their merits.” (Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529, 537.)

Petitioners’ claim against LAUSD arises, in part, from LAUSD’s alleged failure to protect Ella Doe from bullying and its response to the bullying complaint that Petitioners made in September 2022. (See John Doe Decl. ¶¶ 2-12.) In December 2022, John and Jane Doe withdrew Ella Doe from Canyon. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) “As a general rule, a statute of limitations accrues when the act occurs which gives rise to the claim . . . that is, when the plaintiff sustains actual and appreciable harm. Any manifest and palpable injury will commence the statutory period.” (Costa Serena Owners Coalition v. Costa Serena Architectural Committee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1195-96, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Therefore, this aspect of Plaintiff’s claim accrued no later than December 2022.

Petitioners admittedly did not file a claim for damages within six months of the accrual of these claims. (Id. ¶¶ 25-30.) More important, Petitioners did not file an application for leave to present a late claim within one year of the accrual of these claims, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 911.4(b). Specifically, Petitioners filed their claim on May 20, 2024, and Petitioners filed their application for leave to present a late claim on June 21, 2024. Under these circumstances, the court cannot grant the petition with respect to this aspect of Plaintiff’s claim:

Filing a late-claim application within one year after the accrual of a cause of action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition . . . [and] [w]hen the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of

action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Government Code section 946.6.

(Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779.) Therefore, the petition is denied with respect to claims based upon the LAUSD’s alleged acts or omissions before December 2022.

B. Petitioners’ Claim for Denial of Intra-District Transfer Requests is Timely

Petitioners’ claim against LAUSD for denial of their intra-district transfer requests is timely. LAUSD denied these requests in March 2024; the LAUSD denied Petitioners’ appeals in April 2024; and Petitioners submitted their claims on May 20, 2024. The LAUSD found that the claim was untimely; Petitioners filed an application for leave to present a late claim; and the LAUSD denied the application. Accordingly, the court grants the petition in this respect. Petitioner may file their complaint for damages against LAUSD and allege that the “claim is based on the April 11, 2024, denial by LAUSD of Petitioners’ three intra-district transfer requests.” (John Doe Decl. Exh. Q at ¶ 6; see Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 397 [if the claim was timely, the claimant may “file a complaint alleging that a claim was timely presented to the public entity”].)

1. The petition for relief from the government claims requirements is granted in part and denied in part.

2. The petition is denied with respect to claims for damages against the LAUSD stemming from the bullying between September and December 2022.

3. The petition is granted with respect to claims for damages against the LAUSD stemming from the LAUSD’s denial of three intra-district transfer requests.

4. Plaintiff’s counsel may lodge a proposed order for the court’s signature if necessary.

5. Plaintiff’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

[1] Because Respondent has opposed the petition on the merits, it waived its objection to service of the petition. (Oppo. 6:17-18; see Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697 [“It is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion.”].) Regardless, the court’s deadlines for service of the petition and filing the proof of service are not jurisdictional. The court has discretion to waive them in the interest of matters being resolved on the merits.