Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCV05010, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV05010 Hearing Date: March 5, 2025 Dept: 82
Regina Fair, as Trustee of the Case No. 24STCV05010
Frank R. Fair, Jr. Living Trust
U/A dated May 21, 2022,
Hearing: March 3,
2025
v. Location:
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Department:
82 Glenis Cardona, et al. Judge: Stephen I.
Goorvitch
[Tentative] Order Granting Applications
for Writ of Attachment
NOTICE
The
court posts this tentative order on Friday, February 28, 2025. The court provides notice: If Defendants do
not request a hearing on or before Monday, March 3, 2025, at 9:30 a.m., the court
will take the hearing off-calendar and will adopt this tentative order. Defendants may request a hearing by emailing
the court’s clerk at WRDept82@LACourt.org (and copying Plaintiff’s counsel).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Regina Fair (“Plaintiff”), as Trustee of the Frank R. Fair, Jr.
Living Trust U/A dated May 21, 2022 (the “Trust”), moves for writs of
attachment against Defendants Glenis Cardona (“Defendant Cardona”) and Debbie
Leary (“Defendant Leary”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants filed no oppositions to the
applications. The court grants the
applications and issues writs of attachment in the amount of $724,182.90.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Upon the filing
of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to
this article for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment by filing an
application for the order and writ with the court in which the action is
brought.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
484.010.) “Except as otherwise provided by
statute, an attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for
money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the
total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount
not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and
attorney's fees.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
483.010.)
The court shall issue a right to attach order if the court
finds all of the following:
(1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon
which an attachment may be issued.
(2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the
claim upon which the attachment is based.
(3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the
recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based.
(4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than
zero.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 484.090.)
A claim has “probable
validity” where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a
judgment against the defendant on that claim.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 481.190.) “The
application shall be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on
the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the
attachment is based.” ¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 484.030.)¿ “In contested applications,
the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective
parties and make a determination of¿the probable outcome of the litigation.” (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
76, 80.)
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Plaintiff
requests judicial notice of two grant deeds.
There is no opposition to the request.
The request is granted under Evidence Code section 452(c).
DISCUSSION
A. Notice
On
January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed proof of service of the applications for writ
of attachment, notices of hearing, and supporting papers. The proof of service states that the papers
were served electronically both on attorney Donna Bullock, for Defendant
Cardona, and also on Defendant Leary, who is self-represented. Electronic service on Defendant Cardona, who
is represented by counsel, is proper. (See
Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6(b).) A
self-represented party must consent to electronic service. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6(c).) However, Defendant Leary appears to have
consented to electronic service because she included her email address on her
answer, which was filed on December 17, 2024.
(See
§ 1010.6(c)(3)(i).) More important,
Defendant Leary has not objected to the application due to lack of personal
service. Therefore, the court finds that
notice was proper.
B. Probable
Validity of Plaintiff’s Claim
The application is based on Plaintiff’s cause of action for
breach of contract. To establish a
claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a
contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3)
defendant’s breach of the contract; and (4) damages incurred by plaintiff as a
result of the breach. (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367.)
Here, Plaintiff,
as trustee, entered an agreement to sell real property owned by the Trust.
Pursuant to written escrow instructions, Plaintiff and the buyers
selected Golden Escrow to provide the escrow services. Defendant Cardona is the owner and operator
of Golden Escrow and is listed as the “escrow officer” in the escrow
instructions. Defendant Leary, an
employee of Golden Escrow, handled the subject escrow transaction.
An escrow holder must comply strictly with the
instructions of the parties. Upon the
escrow holder’s breach of an instruction that it has contracted to perform or
of an implied promise arising out of the agreement with the buyer or seller,
the injured party acquires a cause of action for breach of contract.
(Amen v. Merced
County Title Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 528, 531-532, citations omitted.) “[E]scrow instructions may be oral, even when
some are in writing … and … some escrow
instructions may be implicit in the express instructions given.” (Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co. (1990)
220 Cal.App.3d 785, 807; accord Zang v. Northwestern Title Co. (1982)
135 Cal.App.3d 159, 167-168 [holding that the Financial Code does not require
escrow instructions to be in writing].)
Escrow closed on or
about February 13, 2024, and the property was transferred to the buyers by
recordation of a grant deed. After
deducting broker fees, the escrow held net proceeds from the sale in the amount
of $724,182.90. Plaintiff gave
instructions to Golden Escrow to transfer the sale proceeds to IPX 1031 as part
of a section 1031 tax exchange. As of
January 17, 2025, Defendants have not complied with Plaintiff’s instructions. There is also evidence from Golden Escrow’s
bank records that Defendants used part of the sale proceeds to pay for expenses
unrelated to the sale of the Trust’s property. (Fair Decl. ¶¶ 3-10, Exh. 1-7; see also Snyder
Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) This evidence is
sufficient to establish the probable validity of Plaintiff’s claim for breach
of contract in the amount of $724,182.90.
Defendants have not filed an opposition and have not rebutted this
evidence.
Plaintiff also
requests attachment of $200,000 in attorney’s fees. (Snyder Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has not identified the contractual
or statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees against Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown the
probable validity of this part of her claim.
(See Code Civ. Proc. § 482.110(b) [“the amount to be secured by
the attachment may include … allowable attorney’s fees”].)
Finally, Plaintiff
requests attachment of $218,025 for capital gains taxes that the Trust will
allegedly need to pay because “the 1031 exchange was not timely
completed.” (Fair Decl. ¶ 9.) These capital gains taxes are consequential
damages and are not fixed and readily ascertainable by reference to the
contract at issue. Stated differently,
neither the written escrow instructions nor the instructions to distribute the
sales proceeds to IPX 1031 furnish a standard by which the Trust’s consequential
damages, such as increased tax liability, can be determined by proof. (See Friar Decl. Exh. 2, 5; see
also CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 541.) Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to
attachment for these alleged damages.[1]
C. Basis for
Attachment – Plaintiff satisfies the statutory requirements.
D. Purpose and
Amount of Attachment – Plaintiff satisfies the statutory requirement.
E. Reduction of
Amount to be Secured – Defendants
have not argued, or shown, that the amount of attachment should be reduced
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 483.015(b).
F. Exemptions –
Defendants have not claimed any exemptions.
G. Subject Property – Plaintiff requests
attachment against Defendants, natural persons, of items listed in Code of
Civil Procedure section 487.010(c) and (d), including real property. (Application ¶ 9c and Attachment 9(c).) That request is proper. (See Bank of America v. Salinas
Nissan, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 260, 267-268 [“all-inclusive”
application satisfies Code of Civil Procedure section 484.020(e)].) Attachment
is limited to those items specifically listed in section 487.010(c) and (d).
H. Undertaking –
Code of Civil Procedure section
489.210 requires the plaintiff to file an undertaking before issuance of a writ
of attachment. Section 489.220 provides,
with exceptions, for an undertaking in the amount of $10,000. Neither party has argued for a different
amount of undertaking.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the court orders as follows:
1. The applications for writs of
attachment are granted in the reduced amount of $724,182.90.
This amount shall be joint and several amongst Defendants.
2. Plaintiff
shall post an undertaking of $10,000 for Defendant Cardona, and a separate
undertaking of $10,000 for Defenant Leary.
3. The court limits attachment to the
items, including interests in real property, listed in Code of Civil Procedure section
487.010(c) and (d).
4. Plaintiff’s counsel shall provide
notice and file proof of service with the court.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: March 3,
2025 ______________________
Stephen
I. Goorvitch
Superior
Court Judge
[1]
Alternatively,
Plaintiff does not show that the Trust has actually paid the capital gains taxes. (See Ibid.) Thus, on this record, Plaintiff does not
establish the probable validity of its claim for $218,025.