Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCV08288, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08288    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: 82

Mike Tehrani, et al.                                                  Case No. 24STCV08288

v.                                                                     Hearing: June 11, 2025

                                                                        Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

                                                                                    Department: 82                                                  Mehrdad Ajdari                                                   Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

[Tentative] Order Granting Application for Writ of Attachment

INTRODUCTION

            Plaintiffs Mike Tehrani and Eskan Builders Corp. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek a writ of attachment against Defendant Mehrdad Ajdari (“Defendant”) in the amount of $600,000.  Defendant opposes the application, which is granted.  Plaintiffs filed a supplemental reply brief without leave of the court, so the court did not consider this brief in ruling on the application.      

LEGAL STANDARD

“Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this article for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment by filing an application for the order and writ with the court in which the action is brought.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.010.)  “Except as otherwise provided by statute, an attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney's fees.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 483.010.) 

The court shall issue a right to attach order if the court finds all of the following: 

(1)   The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued. 

(2)   The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based. 

(3)   The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based. 

(4)   The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.  

(Code Civ. Proc. § 484.090.) 

“A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 481.190.)    “The application shall be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.030.)¿ “In contested applications, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a determination of¿the probable outcome of the litigation.”¿  (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 76, 80.)  Specifically: 

The facts stated in each affidavit filed pursuant to this title shall be set forth with particularity. Except where matters are specifically permitted by this title to be shown by information and belief, each affidavit shall show affirmatively that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently to the facts stated therein. As to matters shown by information and belief, the affidavit shall state the facts on which the affiant's belief is based, showing the nature of his information and the reliability of his informant. The affiant may be any person, whether or not a party to the action, who has knowledge of the facts.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 482.040.) 

DISCUSSION

A.        Probable Validity of Plaintiff’s Claim

The application is based on Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of contract.  To establish a claim for breach of contract or breach of guaranty, a plaintiff must prove: (1) There was a valid contract; (2) The plaintiff performed under the contract or had a valid excuse for non-performance; (3) The defendant breached the contract; and (4) The plaintiff incurred damages as a result of the breach.  (See Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367.) 

Here, on April 14, 2022, the parties executed a loan agreement under which Plaintiffs agreed to make a $600,000 bridge loan to Defendant to fund a construction project at 1248 Laurel Terrace Drive, Studio City, California 91604 (the “Loan Agreement”).  (See Tehrani Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 & Exh. 1.)  Plaintiffs funded the loan by delivering three checks totaling $600,000, which Defendant deposited, and Defendant failed to pay the balance by the loan due date of October 12, 2022, as required.  (See Tehrani Decl. ¶¶ 10-24, Exhs. 2-5.)  This establishes that Plaintiffs probably have a valid claim for breach of the Loan Agreement.

Defendant opposes this application, but his opposition is based upon an unsigned declaration, which has no evidentiary value.  Putting that aside, even if the court considered Defendant’s unsigned declaration, it does not call into question Plaintiff’s claim.  Although Defendant contends that he “made payments to [Plaintiffs] both before and after the alleged loan agreement was signed,” the checks total only $146,765.05, not $600,000.  (See Ajdari Decl. ¶ 8.)  Defendant appears to refer to interest payments on the Loan Agreement or payments made on a separate construction contract.  (See Ajdari Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Exh. 2; Reply Tehrani Decl. ¶ 32; Reply 6.)  Defendant does not provide sufficient information to verify that the canceled checks relate to Loan Agreement’s principal.  For example, although the checks reference invoice numbers, Defendant does not provide copies of the invoices.  In fact, Defendant admits in his responses to requests for admissions that he borrowed $600,000 under the Loan Agreement and has not repaid the loan’s principal balance.  (Tehrani Decl. ¶ 20, Exh. 5, RFA No. 12.)  Accordingly, having assessed the relative merits of the parties’ positions, the court concludes that Defendant has not rebutted Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract in the amount of $600,000.

B.        Basis for Attachment

“[A]n attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 483.010(a).)  “An attachment may not be issued on a claim which is secured by any interest in real property arising from agreement . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 483.010(b).)  “[A]n attachment will lie upon a cause of action for damages for a breach of contract where the damages are readily ascertainable by reference to the contract and the basis of the computation of damages appears to be reasonable and definite.” (CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App. 4th 537, 541.)  “If the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued only on a claim which arises out of the conduct by the defendant of a trade, business, or profession.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 483.010(c); see Advance Transformer Co. v. Superior Court (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 127, 143-144.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ application for writ of attachment is based on a contract claim for which the total amount allegedly due is in excess of $500.  Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, Plaintiffs’ alleged damages are fixed and readily ascertainable from the terms of the Loan Agreement and Plaintiff’s declaration.  (See Oppo. 7-9.)  Specifically, Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the Loan Agreement involves a straightforward computation of the balance due based on the terms of that agreement.  The dispute concerning the amount due on the related construction contract does not create sufficient ambiguity in the amount due on the Loan Agreement.  (See ibid.)

The Loan Agreement states that Plaintiffs have “a right to place a lien against the property address above by 10/12/22 for any unpaid payments.”  (See Tehrani Decl. Exh. 1.)  However, the parties agree that this provision refers to a mechanic’s lien, which Plaintiffs recorded on May 17, 2024.  (See Oppo. 9-10; see First Amended Complaint ¶ 24, Exh. B.)  Defendant does not contend that Plaintiffs have any security in the real property at issue other than the mechanic’s lien.  Pursuant to statute, the holder of a mechanic’s lien is permitted to also obtain a writ of attachment against the property upon which the lien is recorded.  (Civ. Code § 8468(a)(2) [“The claimant’s recording of a claim of lien does not affect the right to a writ of attachment.”]; San Diego Wholesale Credit Men’s Assn. v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 458, 462 [“the ancillary remedy of attachment is available to a creditor entitled to recover under a contract with the owner of property against which the creditor might also have claimed a mechanic’s lien, but did not”].)  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the Loan Agreement is not secured by real property within the meaning of the attachment laws. 

Finally, having assessed the relative merits of the parties’ positions, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claim arises from Defendant’s conduct of a trade, business, or profession.  (See Tehrani Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.)  Plaintiff Tehrani declares:

In or about early January 2021, I initially met Ajdari. During that conversation and follow up conversations, Ajdari said he is in the business of developing real estate. Ajdari said he owned a vacant land with architectural plans in place, and he was looking for someone to build the project. The land was located at 12428 Laurel Terrace Drive, Studio City, California 91604 (“Studio City Property”), and Ajdari was interested in developing the Studio City Property for sale. He also mentioned that he some larger piece of land in the Valley area which he intends to subdivide and develop to be used as income property.

(Tehrani Decl. ¶ 8.)  The Loan Agreement was intended to fund “ongoing construction costs” of the project on the Studio City Property.  (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)  Defendant contradicts Tehrani’s declaration stating:

I never told Tehrani that I was in the business of developing real estate or that he had a property in the valley to subdivide and develop.  I am not, nor have I ever been, in the business of developing real estate.  I am retired. At all times, I was constructing 12428 Laurel Terrace Drive, Studio City, CA 91604 … to reside in and be my primary residence.

(Ajdari Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.)  However, Plaintiffs submit evidence that Defendant has been the owner of at least three residential properties in Los Angeles County during the relevant time period.  (See Tehrani Decl. ¶ 25, Exh. 6-12.)  This corroborates Tehrani’s testimony that Defendant said he “is in the business of developing real estate.”  Defendant does not explain these other properties in his declaration.  Further, Defendant added an accessory dwelling unit to the Studio City Property, which he could use (and apparently is using) for purposes of renting it out.  (Reply Tehrani Decl. ¶ 34, Exh. 13.)  There is evidence that Defendant has rented out some of his real properties, including at least part of the Studio City Property.  (Id. ¶¶ 35-38.)  Having assessed the relative merits of the parties’ positions, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claim arises from Defendant’s conduct of a trade, business, or profession, specifically the investment in residential real properties for purposes of generating income.  

C.        Purpose and Amount of Attachment

Code of Civil Procedure section 484.090 states that the Court shall issue a right to attach order if “the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based . . . [and] the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.”  Plaintiff has satisfied these requirements.    

D.        Reduction of Amount to be Secured

Defendant has not argued, or shown, that the amount of attachment should be reduced pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 483.015(b).  Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to any reduction. 

E.         Exemptions

Defendant has not claimed any exemptions, including a homestead exemption.  Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to any exemption. 

F.         Subject Property

Plaintiffs request attachment against Defendant, a natural person, of items listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 487.010(c) and (d), including real property.  (Application ¶ 9c and Attachment 9(c).)  That request is proper.  (See Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 267-268 [“all-inclusive” application satisfies Code of Civil Procedure section 484.020(e)].)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are seeking the full writ amount on two properties, as well as bank accounts, which would result in writs in excess of the requested $600,000.  Of course, Plaintiffs are limited to attachment of $600,000, but Plaintiffs are free to decide which asset(s) to attach.  Defendant may pursue any rights and remedies if Plaintiffs attach assets in excess of $600,000.  (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc. § 489.220(b).)    

G.        Undertaking

Code of Civil Procedure section 489.210 requires Plaintiffs to file an undertaking before issuance of a writ of attachment.  Section 489.220 provides, with exceptions, for an undertaking in the amount of $10,000. 

Defendant contends that the undertaking should be increased to $100,000 to account for potential damages from wrongful attachment and “the attorneys’ fees and costs that will be incurred to defeat this attachment.”  (Oppo. 10-11.)  Code of Civil Procedure section 489.220(b) provides:

If, upon objection to the undertaking, the court determines that the probable recovery for wrongful attachment exceeds the amount of the undertaking, it shall order the amount of the undertaking increased to the amount it determines to be the probable recovery for wrongful attachment if it is ultimately determined that the attachment was wrongful.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 489.220(b).)  On this record, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have the stronger probability of prevailing on the claim.  (See North Hollywood Marble Co., Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 683, 690–691 [defendant’s request to increase $7,500 bond to $225,000 properly denied because evidence indicated plaintiff would prevail].)  Furthermore, Defendant has not submitted any evidence of the amount of damages he could suffer from wrongful attachment or the amount of attorney’s fees he has or will incur related to the attachment.  Accordingly, the court finds that the $10,000 undertaking is appropriate.  This order is without prejudice to Defendant filing a motion to increase the amount of the undertaking if appropriate. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

            1.         Plaintiffs’ application for a writ of attachment in the amount of $600,000 is granted.

            2.         Plaintiffs shall post an undertaking of $10,000.

            3.         Plaintiffs shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED 

Dated: June 11, 2025                                                  ______________________

                                                                                    Stephen I. Goorvitch

                                                                                    Superior Court Judge