Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 24STCV09279, Date: 2024-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 24STCV09279, Date: 2024-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV09279 Hearing Date: May 23, 2024 Dept: 82

Artuozo Neihule, et al. v. Bianca Hillier

Case No. 24STCV09279

Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiffs Artuozo Neihuele Yvonne Neihule (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Bianca Hillier (“Defendant”) seeking damages and injunctive relief for breach of an easement agreement and nuisance. The parties are neighbors, and there is an easement permitting Plaintiffs to build a new driveway to connect their house to the existing driveway. Plaintiffs showed Defendant the plans in advance, and she signed next to a line stating “Agreed be.” (See Artuozo Neihule, ¶ 5 & Exh. 2.) Defendant observed the concrete work and indicated her satisfaction with the work, sending a text: “LOOKING soo goooood.” (See id., ¶ 16 & Exh. 7.) Then, after the work was completed, Defendant raised a concern that some of the new driveway fell onto approximately 485 square feet of her land, which was located outside the easement area. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not properly survey the land and did not provide a surveyor’s map when she agreed to the project. Defendant then placed four poles with “No Parking” signs with a rope fence on the disputed land, which has narrowed the usable driveway so much that Plaintiffs cannot access their house by car. Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to remove the signs and not install anything that prevents vehicles from using the driveway. The ex parte application is granted in part and denied in part.

The purpose of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. (Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 618, 623.) In deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors, including “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.) The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other. (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.) However, the party seeking an injunction must demonstrate at least a reasonable probability of success on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73-74.) The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of demonstrating both a likelihood of success on the merits and the occurrence of irreparable harm. (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571.) Irreparable harm may exist if the plaintiff can show an inadequate remedy at law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a).)

The court finds a reasonable probability of success on the merits. It is undisputed that Defendant signed the plans and observed the exact location of the driveway, raising an objection only after the project was completed. Defendant states: “I informed [Plaintiffs] that the Driveway documents do not show any of the information that I needed to reasonable evaluate the new driveway Plaintiffs desired to construct on my property pursuant to the Easement, including, but not limited to, the exact location of where the new driveway would be build . . . .” (Declaration of Bianca Hillier, ¶ 6.) If so, Defendant should not have signed the plans next to an “Agreed by” line; Defendant should not have sent an approving text during the construction; and Defendant should have raised an objection before the project was built. For purposes of provisional relief, Plaintiffs have made the requisite showing.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient irreparable harm and that the balancing of hardships favors them. Plaintiffs cannot effectively access their house by car without use of the driveway. (See Declaration of Artuozo Neihule, ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs also note that at least one person has been injured attempting to navigate the signs and fence between them. (Id., ¶ 13.) By contrast, Defendant demonstrates no harm in allowing vehicles to traverse the disputed land. Indeed, the driveway has been completed, and the concrete will not be removed until after the case, assuming Defendant prevails. Thus, the balancing of harms favors Plaintiffs.

Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ ex parte application is granted in part and denied in part.

2. The court orders Defendant to remove the signs and fence and not to block any part of the driveway during the pendency of this litigation.

3. The court orders that Plaintiffs may use the driveway to access their house.

4. The court denies the ex parte application insofar as Plaintiffs are not permitted to park their vehicles on the disputed land.

5. The court issues an Order to Show Cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue on these terms. Plaintiffs may file any supplemental pleadings on or before _________, 2024. Defendant may file any supplemental opposition on or before __________, 2024. Plaintiffs may file a reply brief on or before ________, 2024. The hearing shall be held on ________, 2024, at 9:30 a.m.

6. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.