Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 25STCP00162, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCP00162    Hearing Date: April 30, 2025    Dept: 82

Sergio Guzman                                                        Case No. 25STCP00162

v.                                                                     Hearing: April 30, 2025

                                                                        Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

                                                                                    Department: 82                                         Director of the California                                            Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

Department of Motor Vehicles                   

[Tentative] Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

INTRODUCTION  

             Petitioner Sergio Guzman (“Petitioner”) filed this petition for a writ of mandate directing Respondent Department of Motor Vehicles (“Respondent” or the “DMV”) to set aside the suspension of his driver’s license.  The DMV mailed its final decision on October 15, 2024.  This petition was filed on January 17, 2025.  Therefore, the petition is untimely, and the court grants Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by the same rules that apply to demurrers.  A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.  (Code Civil Proc.

§ 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court “assumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts, as well as those that are judicially noticeable, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”  (Van de Kamps Coalition v. Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1045.)  The allegations in the petition must be liberally construed in favor of Petitioner on demurrer.  (See Mobil Oil Corp. v Exxon Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 942, 947.)  “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”  (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)  “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.”  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

            Respondent seeks judicial notice of three exhibits.  First, Respondent seeks judicial notice of the administrative decision, which is Exhibit 1.  Second, Respondent seeks judicial notice of the contents of the court’s file, specifically, the petition for purposes of the filing date, which is Exhibit 2.  Third, Respondent seeks judicial notice of the fact that November 18, 2024 was a Monday.  There is no objection to the request for judicial notice.  The court takes judicial notice of Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, per Evidence Code section 452(c).  The court takes judicial notice of Exhibit 3, per Evidence Code section 451(f). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner was pulled over on June 30, 2024, and allegedly refused to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol content.  (Pet. ¶¶ 3-6; RJN Exh. 1.)  The DMV stayed the suspension pending the administrative hearing.  (RJN Exh. 1.)  After the hearing officer ruled against Petitioner, the DMV re-suspended Petitioner’s driving privilege effective October 24, 2024.  (RJN Exh. 1.)  The decision suspending Petitioner’s driving privilege was served on Petitioner by regular mail on October 15, 2024.  (RJN Exh. 1.) 

            The Vehicle Code provides for two different statutes of limitations for a petition seeking review of the DMV’s order of suspension because “the statutory scheme establishes two independent procedures for review of the hearing officer's determination, one judicial, the other administrative.”  (Johanson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1215.)  A driver may petition the court for review of the DMV’s decision upholding the suspension.  (See id. at 1214-1215.)  Per Vehicle Code section 13559, the petition must be filed “within 30 days of the issuance of the notice of determination of the department sustaining an order of suspension or revocation of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle after the hearing . . . .”  (Veh. Code § 13559(a).)  This was communicated to Petitioner: 

You may request a court review of this action by filing a petition for review of the order in the court of competent jurisdiction in your county of residence within 34 days from the date shown below if service of this notice was by mail, or within 30 days if service of this notice was made personally or electronically.

(RJN Exh. 1.) 

In the alternative, a driver may pursue an administrative appeal before filing a petition for writ of mandate.  (Johanson, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at 1214-1215.)  The request for an independent departmental review must be made within 15 days of the effective decision.  (Ibid., citing Veh. Code § 14105.5(a).)  If so, the driver has 90 days from the date of the final decision to file a petition for writ of mandate.  (Id. at 1215, citing Veh. Code § 14401(a).) 

            Petitioner does not allege that he pursued an administrative appeal before filing the instant petition for writ of mandate.  To the contrary, the petition alleges that he proceeded exclusively by way of a petition for writ of mandate.  (See Petition ¶¶ 17, 18 & Exh. A.)  The decision was mailed to Petitioner on October 15, 2024.  Therefore, the deadline to file the instant petition for writ of mandate was Monday, November 18, 2024.  Petitioner filed this petition on January 17, 2025, which means it is untimely. 

            Petitioner attempts to distinguish this case by arguing that he is seeking a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, not section 1094.5, and therefore the statute of limitations under Vehicle Code section 14401 does not apply to this case.  Section 14401 is clear on its face:

Any action brought in a court of competent jurisdiction to review any order of the department refusing, canceling, placing on probation, suspending, or revoking the privilege of a person to operate a motor vehicle shall be commenced within 90 days from the date the order is noticed. 

(Veh. Code § 14401(a), emphasis added.)  In fact, Petitioner is seeking a “review” of the DMV’s order.  In order to resolve this petition, the court must review the underlying record and determine whether the hearing officer improperly acted as an advocate, in violation of California DUI Lawyers Association v. California Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517 (“DUI Lawyers”), or whether the hearing officer “merely collected and developed evidence and then rendered a decision without actually engaging in advocacy or acting as an advocate.”  (Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 207 (“Knudsen”).)  Therefore, Petitioner is, in fact, seeking a writ under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. 

The appropriate type of mandate is determined by the nature of the administrative action or decision under review.  In general, “quasi-judicial” or “adjudicative acts,” that is, acts that involve the actual application no far ule to a specific set of existing facts are reviewed by administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.  More specifically, a petition for administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is appropriate when the party seeks review of a final “determination, finding, or decision of a public agency, made as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in a public agency.

(California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1482, citations omitted.) 

Regardless, Petitioner cites no authority in support of his argument that petitions for writ of mandate under section 1085 are not governed by the statute of limitations under Vehicle Code section 14401.  Nor does Petitioner’s argument make sense, as anyone could circumvent this statute of limitations merely by characterizing their petition as arising under section 1085, not 1094.5. 

Finally, even if the court construes this petition as one arising under section 1085, it necessarily would be predicated exclusively on the fact that the DMV had only a hearing officer, and not a prosecutor, without any consideration of the underlying record.  That issue has already been resolved.  The Court of Appeal has declined to hold that the use of a hearing officer without a prosecutor is a per se violation of due process.  (See, e.g., Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1277; Knudsen, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at 207.)  Rather, it depends on the role of the hearing officer.    

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

            Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

            1.         Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

            2.         The court denies leave to amend because Petitioner does not articulate any basis for a successful amendment, i.e., Petitioner does not argue that he pursued an administrative appeal first and this action is governed by the longer statute of limitations.

            3.         The parties shall meet-and-confer and lodge a proposed judgment forthwith.

            4.         The court’s clerk shall provide notice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: April 30, 2025                                                 ______________________

                                                                                    Stephen I. Goorvitch

                                                                                    Superior Court Judge