Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 25STCP00371, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCP00371    Hearing Date: February 26, 2025    Dept: 82

John Doe v. Monique Allard, et al.

Case No. 25STCP00371

Order Issuing Preliminary Injunction

Petitioner John Doe, a student at the University of California (“USC”), sought an ex parte application for an order staying operation of an emergency removal order.  Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend (“Jane Roe”) alleges that when she and Petitioner were a couple, they went on a trip to Cabo San Lucas, and he sexually assaulted her on March 13, 2024. 

Petitioner alleges that he broke up with Jane Roe, after which she reported the alleged sexual assault to others, including members of his fraternity, resulting in Petitioner’s expulsion from the fraternity.  (Petitioner’s Decl. ¶ 5.)  Petitioner states that he has had no contact with Jane Roe since March 2024.  (Id. ¶ 6.)  

In or about January 2025, Jane Roe reported the assault to the university.  On January 16, 2025, USC issued a Notice of Emergency Removal Order based upon the following allegations: (1) Petitioner sexually assaulted Jane Roe in March 2024; (2) Petitioner threated to kill himself in March 2024; and (3) Petitioner stood over Jane Roe “screaming and gesticulating in a way that caused her to fear that he was going to strike her” in March 2024.  (Petitioner’s Decl., Exh. 4.)  Petitioner asked to attend his classes remotely, as he graduates this Spring, but his request was rejected.   

Petitioner filed an ex parte application for an order staying this removal order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction shall not issue.  The purpose of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits.  (Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 618, 623.)  In deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors, including “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.”  (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.) The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other.  (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.)  However, the party seeking an injunction must demonstrate at least a reasonable probability of success on the merits.  (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73-74.)  The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of demonstrating both a likelihood of success on the merits and the occurrence of irreparable harm.  (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571.)  Irreparable harm may exist if the plaintiff can show an inadequate remedy at law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a).)

The court issued a temporary restraining order with conditions.  Petitioner demonstrated that the balancing of harms favors him.  The evidence suggests that Jane Roe reported the alleged assault to others, including Petitioner’s fraternity, in March 2024, but did not report the alleged assault to USC for ten months.  Delay is a factor to be considered in deciding whether there is irreparable harm.  (See, e.g., Nutro Products, Inc. v. Cole Grain Co. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 860, 866.)  Moreover, there are conditions that can be imposed to safeguard Jane Roe and address her concerns.  Conversely, Petitioner has already started his last semester at USC, so this expulsion order would disrupt his educational career.  Because USC did not proceed until after the semester started, Petitioner lost an opportunity to finish his last semester at another university.  The court also found that Petitioner had advanced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.  Conversely, USC did not present any evidence to rebut Petitioner’s showing, though the court agreed to revisit this issue at the hearing on the order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

USC does not rebut Petitioner’s showing that the balancing of harms favors him or Petitioner’s evidence demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits.  Instead, USC argues: “Because Petitioner is now taking remote classes and is in compliance with the original Emergency Removal decision, he cannot demonstrate that he will suffer any harm without a preliminary injunction.”  (Respondent’s Statement Regarding Order to Show Cause at 2:25-27.)  However, initially, USC was unwilling to make remote options available to Petitioner.  If USC removes the remote option before the end of the semester, absent a preliminary injunction, Petitioner would not be able to complete his classes.

USC also argues: “[A] preliminary injunction would undermine USC’s ability to enforce interim measures designed to protect campus safety.”  (Id. at 3:4-5.)  The court’s temporary restraining order did not permit Petitioner to be on campus unless remote options are available.  Simply, USC can keep Plaintiff off-campus by ensuring that remote options remain available. 

Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

1.         The court issues a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the temporary restraining order:

            a.         Petitioner is not required to change his class schedule or take different classes than those for which he is currently registered.  However, if there is a remote option, Petitioner must attend his classes remotely.

            b.         If there is no remote option, Petitioner may attend classes on campus, but he may only be on campus to go to and from classes.

            2.         The court authorizes USC to provide a copy of Petitioner’s class schedule to Jane Roe so she knows when Petitioner will be on campus and generally where he will be so she can avoid him.

            3.         The parties may lodge a proposed order for the court’s signature if necessary.

            4.         The court’s clerk shall provide notice.