Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 25STCP00642, Date: 2025-02-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 25STCP00642, Date: 2025-02-24 Tentative Ruling

[Tentative] Order Denying Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order

On January 7, 2025, Governor Gavin Newsom declared a State of Emergency relating to the Palisades Fire. The Governor suspended environmental statutes, rules, regulations, and requirements to the extent necessary to expedite the removal and cleanup of fire debris. Regardless, existing regulations contemplated that certain landfills—including the Calabasas Landfill—could be used for disposal of fire debris. The next day, President Joseph Biden issued a Major Disaster Declaration relating to the fires, and agencies of the federal government have been tasked with removing and disposing of fire debris. As part of the cleanup efforts, the federal government plans to remediate the area by, first, removing potentially hazardous waste, and, second, segregating the hazardous wastes and disposing of these wastes at sites other than the Calabasas Landfill.

The City of Calabasas (“Petitioner” or the “City”) has filed a petition for writ of mandate and seeks a temporary restraining order preventing the disposal of any fire debris at the Calabasas Landfill until the court decides the petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sanitation District No. 2 (collectively, the “County” or “Respondents”) oppose the ex parte application, arguing that no hazardous waste will be deposited at the Calabasas Landfill. While the court understands and sympathizes with the concerns of the City and its residents, the court must deny this ex parte application. Petitioner does not demonstrate that the court has authority to grant relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, in light of the Governor’s executive orders and existing regulations. Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction to do so given the involvement of the federal government in the remediation efforts. In the alternative, even if the court has authority to issue this injunction, Petitioner does not demonstrate that hazardous waste necessarily will be deposited at the Calabasas Landfill.

On January 7, 2025, Governor Gavin Newsom declared “a State of Emergency to exist in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties due to the Palisades Fire and windstorm conditions.” (Respondents’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RRJN”) Exh. 8.) The next day, the Governor issued

State statutes, rules, regulations, and requirements that fall within the jurisdiction of boards, departments, and offices with the California Environmental Protection Agency and the California Natural Resources Agency are hereby suspended to the extent necessary for expediting the removal and cleanup of debris from this emergency or to address other impacts associated with that debris, for implementing any restoration plan

necessary for mitigation of the effects of the emergency, or conducting other fire recovery activities.

(RRJN Exh. 8 at ¶ 5.) Then, on January 15, 2025, the Governor issued Executive Order N-8-25, which states in relevant part:

WHEREAS in response to my request, President Biden quickly issued a Major Disaster Declaration on January 8, 2025 . . . .

WHEREAS rebuilding efforts cannot commence until hazardous debris is removed from affected properties; and

WHEREAS on January 14, 2025, I announced that the Federal Emergency Agency mission-tasked the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) to remove and dispose of hazardous debris from homes and structures impacted by these fires as soon as it is safe to enter the affected areas; . . .

WHEREAS under the provisions of Government Code section 8571, I find that strict compliance with various statutes and regulations specified in this Order would prevent, hinder, or delay the mitigation of the effects of these fires and windstorm conditions. . . .

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: The United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and any other individual or entity performing work at their direction, shall have full power to provide mutual aid to the State of California and any areas affected by the proclaimed state of emergency, and shall have the authority to enter private property in Los Angeles County to remove debris that may contain hazardous substances and to conduct any testing appropriate to ensure the hazards are mitigated. Any state law, regulation, or rule impending provision of this mutual aid is suspended to the extent necessary to provide this mutual aid to impacted areas of Los Angeles. . . .

(Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice (“PRJN”) Exh. 7 [emphasis added].)

On January 27, 2025, the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Sanitation District No. 2 (collectively, the “County” or “Respondents”) announced that the disposal of fire debris would be permitted at the Class III Calabasas Landfill. (Petition for Writ of Mandate (“Pet.”) ¶ 1.) In response, the City of Calabasas (the “City” or “Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 seeking an order prohibiting the disposal of fire debris at the Calabasas Landfill. The “Solid Waste Facility Permit” for the landfill prohibits disposal of “hazardous” waste or “other wastes requiring special treatment or handling.” (Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice (“PRJN”) Exh. 1 at ¶ 14.) Petitioner alleges that a writ is necessary to ensure compliance with “the existing Title V permit issued by the AQMD for this facility no. 42514 and Rule 3200” because “[t]he law specifically enjoins the deposit of hazardous waste at a Class III landfill . . . .” (Pet. ¶¶ 36, 37.) Petitioner alleges in the alternative that Respondents are accepting certificates of compliance by third-party sources without independent verification of quality assurance measures. (Pet. ¶ 37.) Now, Petitioner seeks a temporary restraining order (and preliminary injunction) to prevent the County from accepting any fire debris waste at the Calabasas Landfill pending trial in this matter.

In deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the court considers two factors: (1) The likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) The relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief. (See White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.) The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other. (See Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.) If the balancing of harms strongly favors the moving party, there need only be “some possibility” that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (Jamison v. Department of Transportation (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 362, citing Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)

In considering the likelihood of success on the merits, the court must consider the limits of its authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. There are two essential requirements to the issuance of an ordinary writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085: (1) A clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and

(2) A clear, present, and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where … the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at 705.)

“Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency’s performance or to correct an agency’s abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is ministerial.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 700.) “A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.” (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.)

Petitioner requests judicial notice of ten exhibits. There is no objection to the request. The court grants the request with respect to Exhibits 1, 4, 6, 7, and 10 under Evidence Code section 452(c). The court need not role on the remaining requests in order to resolve the ex parte application. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).)

Respondents request judicial notice of eight exhibits. There is no objection to the request. The court grants the request under Evidence Code section 452(c).

Petitioner does not demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits because Petitioner does not demonstrate that the court has authority to issue the requested injunction. As discussed, the court only has authority to enforce a “clear, present, and ministerial duty” by the County. In this case, Petitioner argues that the County must comply with the “Solid Waste Facility Permit” for the Calabasas Landfill and related environmental regulations. Under normal circumstances, that would provide a sufficient basis to proceed on an ex parte basis, but these are not normal circumstances for three reasons.

First, Petitioner does not sufficiently address the impact of the Governor’s executive orders. The Governor ordered: “State statutes, rules, regulations, and requirements that fall within the jurisdiction of . . . the California Environmental Protection Agency . . . are hereby suspended to the extent necessary for expediting the removal and cleanup for debris from this emergency . . . .” (RRJN Exh. 8 at ¶ 5.) The Governor announced that the US EPA has authority to “remove and dispose of” hazardous debris. (PRJN Exh. 7.) Finally, the Governor ordered that the US EPA and FEMA “shall have full power to provide mutual aid to the State of California” and “[a]ny state law, regulation, or rule impending provision of this mutual aid is suspended to the extent necessary to provide this mutual aid to impacted areas of Los Angeles.” (Ibid.)

The Governor has authority to do so under various provisions of law. Government Code section 8567 states: “The Governor may make, amend, and rescind orders and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter” and “shall have the force and effect of law.” (Gov. Code § 8567(a).) Government Code section 8571 states:

During . . . a state of emergency the Governor may suspend any regulatory statute . . . or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency . . . where the Governor determines and declares that strict compliance . . . would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay the mitigation of the effects of the emergency.

During a state of emergency the Governor shall, to the extent he deems necessary, have complete authority over all agencies of the state government . . . . In exercise thereof, he

shall promulgate, issue, and enforce such orders and regulations as he deems necessary, in accordance with the provisions of Section 8567.

Petitioner does not dispute the Governor’s authority to do so. Rather, Petitioner argues only as follows:

Finally, nothing in the Governor’s recent emergency declaration overrides the Respondents’ mandatory duties. The Governor’s emergency declaration allows federal agencies including FEMA, the EPA, and other entities to have “the authority to enter private property in Los Angeles County to remove debris that may contain hazardous substances and to conduct any testing appropriate to ensure the hazards are mitigated. It does not describe the process of waste debris disposal to landfills by those agencies.

(Ex Parte Application, p. 14:5-12.) Petitioner does not address the suspension of all environmental statutes, rules, and regulations relating to remediation of the Palisades fire. Petitioner does not address the Governor’s decision to “mission-task[]” the US EPA with “dispos[ing] of hazardous debris.” Petitioner does not address the Governor’s decision to give the federal government “full power to provide mutual aid” to the affected areas and suspending any state law, regulation, or rule that would prevent the federal government from doing so. Petitioner does not address the California Constitution, Article XI, section 7, which provides that a county may not enforce ordinances and regulations that conflict with state law, i.e., the Governor’s executive orders during a time of emergency that “shall have the force and effect of law,” per Government Code section 8567(a). In sum, Petitioner does not demonstrate that the County has a “clear, present, and ministerial duty” to enforce the terms of the “Solid Waste Facility Permit” under these circumstances.

B. Existing Regulations Authorize Disposal of Fire Debris at the Calabasas Landfill

Second, putting aside the Governor’s executive orders, California’s regulatory agencies permit disposal of ash and fire debris at the Calabasas Landfill. In 2020, the State Water Resources Control Board issued waste discharge requirements (“WDRs”) for natural disasters. The WDRs state that “[w]aste materials resulting from [] catastrophic events may be mixed such that individual components are not practicably separable for purposes of waste management.” (RRJN Exh. 1 at p.1, ¶ 1.) These catastrophic events include “fires” which produce “burn ash.” (Ibid.) The Calabasas Landfill is specifically listed as such a facility. (RRJN Exh. 1 at p. 22.) Petitioner does not demonstrate that the County has a “clear, present, and ministerial duty” to enforce the permit requirements in light of the State’s WDRs.

Finally, Petitioner does not address whether this court has jurisdiction to issue the requested injunction. There is no dispute that the President of the United States declared a state of emergency relating to the fire. There is no dispute that federal agencies—US EPA, FEMA, and the Army Corps of Engineers—are responsible for the removal and disposal of fire debris. Accordingly, Petitioner effectively asks this court to enjoin the federal government’s remediation efforts, viz., by ordering the County to refuse to accept fire debris from these federal agencies. As a general matter, states and their political subdivisions may not interfere with the activities of the federal government. Similarly, state courts have no authority over federal agencies absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. Petitioner does not address this issue.[1]

D. Petitioner Does Not Demonstrate that Hazardous Waste Necessarily Will Be Deposited at the Calabasas Landfill

In the alternative, even if the court has authority to issue an injunction under these circumstances, Petitioner does not demonstrate that hazardous waste necessarily will be deposited at the Calabasas Landfill. During Phase One, the US EPA will remove hazardous waste from burned properties, including paints, cleaners, oils, pesticides, aerosols, and asbestos. (RRJN Exhs. 3 & 4.) These hazardous materials will not be deposited at the Calabasas Landfill. (RRJN Exh. 4.) Then, during Phase Two, the Army Corps of Engineers will sort the debris into metals, concrete, soil, and ash. (RRJN Exh. 6.) Metal and concrete will not be deposited at the Calabasas Landfill. (Ibid.) The soil and ash will be wrapped in plastic and wetted and segregated within the Calabasas Landfill. (Ibid.) Petitioner does not demonstrate that this process necessarily will violate the prohibitions under the Solid Waste Facility Permit.

While the court understands and sympathizes with the concerns of the City and its residents, the court must deny this ex parte application. Petitioner does not demonstrate that the court has authority to grant relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, in light of the Governor’s executive orders and existing regulations. Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction to do so given the involvement of the federal government in the remediation efforts. In the alternative, even if the court has authority to issue this injunction, Petitioner does not demonstrate that hazardous waste necessarily will be deposited at the Calabasas Landfill. Therefore, the court orders as follows: (1) The court denies Petitioner’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining order; (2) The court sets a case management conference for April 10, 2025, at 9:30 a.m.; and (3) Petitioner’s counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

[1] Because the court does not necessarily have jurisdiction over the federal agencies, they may not be indispensable parties, as argued by Respondents. The court need not resolve that issue at this stage.