Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case Number: 25STCP00745, Date: 2025-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 25STCP00745, Date: 2025-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCP00745 Hearing Date: April 14, 2025 Dept: 82

John Doe Case No. 25STCP00745

v. Hearing: February 27, 2025

Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Regents of the University Department: 82

of California Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch

Order Dissolving Temporary Restraining Order and

Discharging Order to Show Cause why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner John Doe (“Petitioner”) filed a “reverse CPRA” petition for writ of mandate seeking to prevent his former employer, the Regents of the University of California, from releasing certain personnel records that were requested by a reporter at the Los Angeles Times pursuant to the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”). Petitioner filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order. Respondent took no position on the request. Respondent stated that “certain records are responsive and non-exempt [under the CPRA].” (Respondent’s Response at 2:9-10.) At the hearing, Respondent’s counsel represented that his client intends to produce the records, because it believes it is required under law, not based upon any voluntary decision to do so. The CPRA requestor, the Los Angeles Times, which is the real party in interest (the “Real Party”) opposed the ex parte application. Following a hearing, the court granted the ex parte application and issued a temporary restraining order. The court issued an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue and ordered an in camera review of the documents at issue. Now, the court dissolves the temporary restraining order and discharges the OSC re: preliminary injunction.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Application for Preliminary Injunction

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. (Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 618, 623.) In deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors, including “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.) The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other. (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.) However, the party seeking an injunction must demonstrate at least a reasonable probability of success on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73-74.) The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of demonstrating both a likelihood of success on the merits and the occurrence of irreparable harm. (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571.) Irreparable harm may exist if the plaintiff can show an inadequate remedy at law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a).)

B. “Reverse-CPRA” Writ Petition

“A public agency may not initiate an action for declaratory relief to determine its own obligation to disclose documents to a member of the public.” (See Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1264.) However, an interested third party may bring a “reverse-CPRA lawsuit” to review an agency’s decision to release confidential documents exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. (See Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1266-1271.) “Mandamus should be available to prevent a public agency from acting in an unlawful manner by releasing information the disclosure of which is prohibited by law.” (Id. at 1266.) “Because mandamus cannot be used ‘to control an exercise of discretion’ …, a party bringing a reverse-CPRA action must show disclosure is ‘otherwise prohibited by law,’ that is, that the government agency lacks discretion to disclose.” (Amgen, Inc. v. Health Care Services (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 733.)

In enacting the CPRA, Government Code sections 7921.000, et seq., the California Legislature declared that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” (Gov. Code, § 7921.000; see also California Constitution, Article 1, Section 3(b).) CPRA exemptions must be narrowly construed and the agency bears the burden of showing that a specific exemption applies. (Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System v. Superior Court (2013) 195 Cal.App.4th 440, 453.) The petitioner “bears the burden of proof in a mandate proceeding brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.” (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.)

C. Government Code section 6254

Per Government Code section 6254, the following documents are exempt from disclosure under the California Public Records Act: “Personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” As discussed, the California Constitution guarantees an individual’s right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) However, the California Constitution also recognizes the public right to access information. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3.) Therefore, the CPRA exemption does not apply to complaints against public employees if the complaint “is of a substantial nature and there is reasonable cause to believe the complaint or charge of misconduct is well-founded.” (Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1275, citing Bakersfield City School District v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1044.) The Court of Appeal has applied these CPRA exemptions to requests for disciplinary records of public employees, including complaints in the personnel files of school district employees. (See Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 530, 539-543 [summarizing case law]; see also Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1275-76 [affirming denial of preliminary injunction with respect to disclosure of school district records concerning investigation and finding that public high school teacher violated the district’s policy prohibiting sexual harassment of students].)

DISCUSSION

The court previously reviewed a broad set of documents (the “original document production”). The court had been concerned because the proposed document production contained records concerning allegations that were not well-founded. (See Court’s Minute Order, dated March 24, 2025.) Then, at the prior hearing, Respondent’s counsel indicated that the University of California erred in preparing the document production and provided a narrower set of documents (the “revised document production”). (See ibid.) The court conducted another in camera review. The revised document production omits and redacts documents relating to the following issues: (1) The issues referenced in Petitioner’s sealed brief—Page 2, Paragraph A—or UCI0491 to UCI0499; and (2) The issues referenced in Petitioner’s sealed brief—Page 2, Paragraph B—or UCI0591 to UCI0592. For example, certain documents have red boxes around certain information, and certain pages are stamped with the following notation: “Page Redacted by UCI.”

At the hearing, Respondent’s counsel confirmed that his client has decided not to produce these documents because they are exempt from disclosure under Government Code section 6254 and the above-referenced exception does not apply. Therefore, the court need not issue a preliminary injunction relating to these documents.

The court dissolves the temporary restraining order and discharges the OSC re: preliminary injunction with respect to the issues referenced in Petitioner’s sealed brief—Page 3, Paragraph C—or UCI00891 to UCI00893. These allegations are of a substantial nature and there is reasonable cause to believe they are well-founded. (See Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1275.) Neither the imposition of discipline nor a finding that the charge is true is a prerequisite to disclosure. (See id. at 1274, citing Bakersfield School Dist., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at 1044.) Nevertheless, Respondent found that a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that Petitioner engaged in misconduct Having reviewed the documents, the court agrees that the allegations are of a substantial nature, and there is reasonable cause to believe they are well-founded.

In sum, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his petition. To the contrary, the records at issue fall outside the personnel records exception and are subject to disclosure under the CPRA. Petitioner does not show that the District “lacks discretion to disclose” the records. (Amgen, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at 733.) Because Petitioner does not have any reasonable likelihood of success, the court need not reach the balance of harms. “A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)

Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows:

1. The court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure of the non-redacted documents in the revised document production. Therefore, the court dissolves the temporary restraining order and discharges the order to show cause why a preliminary injunction shall not issue.

2. This order is without prejudice to Petitioner seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction if Respondent decides to produce documents relating to Issues One and Two.

3. The court stays this order for 30 days (plus notice) and orders that these documents shall not be disclosed until May 19, 2025, absent further order of this court or the District Court of Appeal.

4. The court sets a case management conference for May 9, 2025, at 9:30 a.m.

5. The court’s clerk shall provide notice by mail.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: April 14, 2025 _________________________

Stephen I. Goorvitch

Superior Court Judge