Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 25STCV01848, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01848    Hearing Date: March 27, 2025    Dept: 82

Rob Hennig v. Jennifer Rue Kramer, et al.

Case No. 25STCV01848

Order Denying Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order

            Plaintiff Rob Hennig (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against his former law partners and their law firm (collectively, “Defendants”).  Now, Defendants, not Plaintiff, have filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order.  Defendants seek the following: (1) An order requiring Plaintiff to provide Defendants with complete and full administrative access to their law firm’s website/email domain; (2) An order requiring Plaintiff to forward Defendants all correspondence he obtained through an allegedly wrongful mail forward request; (3) An Order requiring Plaintiff to “cease and desist” from future efforts to interfere with Defendants’ correspondence; (4) An order requiring Plaintiff to withdraw his attorney lien in an arbitration case; and (5) An order requiring Defendant to cease and desist from filing any future attorney liens on cases without court authorization. 

In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors, including “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.”  (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.)  The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other.  (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.)  If the balancing of harms strongly favors the moving party, there need only be “some possibility” that the moving party will prevail on the merits.  (Jamison v. Department of Transportation (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 362, citing Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)  A preliminary mandatory injunction is rarely granted.  (See Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 295; see also Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 625.)  “The granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.”  (Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Furlotti (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493.)

            As an initial matter, Defendants’ first, second, and fourth request are mandatory and thus subject to the higher standard.  Regardless, Defendants do not demonstrate any likelihood of success even based on the lower standard.  Simply, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.  (See, e.g., McDowell v. Watson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1159.)  There is nothing that would support this remedy for Defendants.  Defendants did not file a cross-complaint, so they have no causes of action.  Defendants do not identify any claim in Plaintiff’s operative complaint that would entitle Defendants to injunctive relief if they prevail.  Finally, Defendants do not cite any authority in their ex parte application that would support their request for a TRO under these circumstances.

            Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ ex parte application for a TRO is denied.  This order is without prejudice to Defendants filing a noticed motion in the home court (Department 55) if they resolve the deficiencies noted in this order.  Defendants’ counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.