Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch, Case: 25STCV05179, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV05179 Hearing Date: March 20, 2025 Dept: 82
Esmerelda Castillo Case No. 25STCV05179
v.
Hearing:
March 20, 2025
Location:
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Department:
82
City of Huntington Park, et al. Judge:
Stephen I. Goorvitch
[Tentative] Order Denying Ex Parte
Application for Temporary Restraining Order
Petitioner
Esmerelda Castillo (“Plaintiff”), who served on the City Council for the City
of Huntington Park, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the City of Huntington Park (the “City”), the City Manager, and three
City Council members (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that she was improperly
removed as a councilmember:
Plaintiff
ESMERALDA CASTILLO, a duly elected Councilmember of the City of Huntington Park
(“Councilmember Castillo” or “Plaintiff Castillo”), files this Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to challenge and rectify Councilmember
Castillo’s unlawful removal from public office to which Councilmember Castillo
was duly elected to by the citizens of the City of Huntington Park, and to
prevent the impending action to fill Councilmember Castillo’s illegally
declared vacated seat on the City of Huntington City Council. This illegal
politically motivated action was devised, orchestrated, enabled or aided,
and/or executed by City of Huntington Park Councilmembers Arturo Flores,
Eduardo Martinez, and Jonathan Sanabria, and also City o Huntington Park City
Manager Ricardo Reyes ( collectively, “Defendants”). The actions by Defendants,
inter alia, (i) deprive Councilmember Castillo of guaranteed civil rights under
the California Constitution, (ii) violate California statutes prescribing the
legal process for lawfully removing a duly elected official from public office,
and (iii) also misinterprets the City of Huntington Park Municipal Code. An
adjudication from this Court is needed to undo this politically motivated
action, and to stop Defendants brazen abuse of power as Defendants' actions
were illegal on Tuesday, February 18, 2024, remain illegal now, and will result
in irreparable harm to not only Plaintiff Castillo, but also to the citizens of
the City of Huntington who voted for Councilmember Castillo. This blatant abuse
of power must not go unchecked.
(Complaint
¶ 1.) Now, Plaintiff seeks a temporary
restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction
should not issue. Plaintiff seeks two
forms of relief. First, Plaintiff seeks
an order to “further restrain Defendants from preventing or obstructing
Plaintiff Castillo from serving and fulfilling the duties of public office as
Councilmember in Huntington Park . . . .”
(Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application at 2:12-14.) Second, Plaintiff seeks an order preventing
the City Council from filling the vacancy before the court rules on the
complaint.
In deciding whether to grant a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors,
including “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits,
and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the
granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White
v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.)
The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a
lesser showing on the other. (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc.
v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.) If the balancing of harms strongly favors the
moving party, there need only be “some possibility” that the moving party will
prevail on the merits. (Jamison v.
Department of Transportation (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 362, citing Butt
v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)
Although styled as a prohibitory injunction,
Plaintiff effectively seeks to be restored to her position, which is a
mandatory injunction. A preliminary
mandatory injunction is rarely granted. (See Board of
Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 295; see also Shoemaker
v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 625.) “The
granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except
in extreme cases where the right thereto
is clearly established.” (Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Furlotti (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493.) Plaintiff’s request
for an order preventing Defendants from filling her seat is a prohibitory
injunction, which is subject to a lower standard.
Regardless, Plaintiff does not demonstrate a
sufficient likelihood of success on either remedy. There is a genuine question whether this
court has jurisdiction to grant the relief
sought by Petitioner because she did not sue in quo warranto.
Quo warranto is the specific
action by which one challenges “any person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises any public office.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 803.) It is the exclusive remedy in cases where it is available…. Title to an
office cannot be tried by mandamus, injunction, writ of certiorari, or petition
for declaratory relief.
(Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1225-26, citing Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70
Cal.2d 627, 633, emphasis added.) Quo
warranto actions are filed by the Attorney General’s Office or by private
parties who obtain the consent of the Attorney General to sue in quo
warranto. (Ibid.) Leave to sue is a jurisdictional requirement
for private parties. (See Cooper,
supra, 70 Cal.2d at 633.) Plaintiff does
not establish that she received leave to sue quo warranto from the Attorney
General. Therefore, it is not clear the
court has jurisdiction over this matter.
Nor does Plaintiff demonstrate sufficient
irreparable harm. Plaintiff does not
allege the City Council lacks a quorum in her absence. Assuming the court has jurisdiction and
Plaintiff prevails, she could be returned to the City Council in place of any
member appointed in her place.
Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as
follows:
1. The
court denies Plaintiff’s ex parte application for a temporary
restraining order. Plaintiff does not
demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits because she does
not establish that she received leave to sue quo warranto from the
Attorney General, so it is not clear the court has jurisdiction over this
matter. Nor does Plaintiff demonstrate
sufficient irreparable harm. The City
Council has a quorum in her absence, and assuming she prevails, Plaintiff could
be returned to the City Council in place of any member appointed in her place.
2. This
order is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a noticed motion for a
preliminary injunction in the home court provided that she receives leave to
sue quo warranto.
3. Plaintiff’s
counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: August 5,
2024 ______________________
Stephen
I. Goorvitch
Superior
Court Judge