Judge Stephen Morgan, Case 20AVCV00345 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

If parties are satisfied with the tentative ruling, parties may submit by emailing the courtroom at ATPDeptA14@LACOURT.ORG.

If a matter is also scheduled for a CMC, TSC, OSC, etc., an appearance is still required even if the parties are willing to submit on the tentative ruling.

This action arises from an automobile collision. On or about November 14, 2019, at approximately 12:26 p.m., Plaintiff Brenna Romines (“Plaintiff”) was travelling northbound on 60th Street West in Lancaster, CA in her 2001 Jeep Cherokee (the “Subject Vehicle”), when she entered the intersection with Avenue F (the “Accident Location”). At the same time, non-party Kaitlynn Renee Houghton (“Houghton”) was travelling westbound on Avenue F when she entered the intersection without stopping at her stop sign due to a dangerous condition on the roadway, causing the Subject Vehicle to broadside Houghton’s vehicle. (Complaint, at ¶ 1.) The Subject Vehicle overturned and collided with a wooden electrical pole, causing the pole to collapse, on the northwest corner, before coming to rest on the adjacent dirt field.

On May 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging three (3) causes of action for (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property (against Defendants the State of California (the “State”), the County of Los Angeles (“COLA”), and the City of Lancaster (“Lancaster’)); (2) Strict Liability (against Defendant FCA US, LLC (“FCA”)); and (3) Negligence (against FCA). FCA is the manufacturer of the Subject Vehicle.

On October 06, 2020, Plaintiff amended the fictitious name of Doe 1 to Defendant Johnson Controls, Inc. (“JCI”).

The operative pleading is the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), filed on October 27, 2021, alleging three causes of action for: (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property – Gov Code §§ 835 et seq., and 840.2 against Lancaster; (2) Strict Liability against FCA and JCI; and (3) Negligence against FCA and JCI.

On January 31, 2023, Lancaster filed this Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”).

Standard for Summary Judgment – The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc.¿§437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing¿FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Cal.¿Code Civ.¿Proc.¿§437c(p)(2);¿Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v.¿Paetkau¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿¿¿¿

· The Court’s Statement of Decision on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the FAC (Exh. B);

· The Court’s Statement of Decision on Defendant’s Demurrer against Plaintiff’s SAC (Exh. D);

Plaintiff objects to judicial notice for all requested documents, excluding the TAC.

The Court is intimately familiar with this case. The revisions of the pleadings have posed issues in this action. Specifically, the SAC attempted to allege new facts from the FAC and failed align with the claims presented to Lancaster for the claims presentation requirement contained in the Government Tort Claims Act. As such, the Court believes that changes in the pleadings may be relevant to this MSJ.

The trial court shall take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452 if a party requests it and:

(a) Gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request; and

(b) Furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.

Judicial notice is requested by Lancaster for court records in this action (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d) [“Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.”]) and Cal Veh. Code § 22450(a), a statute enacted by the Legislature (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(c) [“Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.”]). Lancaster has provided sufficient notice to Plaintiff through its pleadings and furnished the Court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. Judicial notice shall be taken under Cal. Evid. Code § 453.

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of various documents in support of her Opposition to the MSJ:

· Exh A - Statewide Integrated Traffic Record System (“SWITRS”) report, created and prepared by the Department of California Highway Patrol, for the collisions occurring at or near the intersection of 60th Street West and Avenue F, Avenue D, Avenue G, in the City of Lancaster, in Los Angeles County, from January 1, 2009 through available 2018 and 2019 accidents;

· Exh. B - The City of Lancaster’s Collision Summary Report of reported accidents occurring at the intersection of 60th Street West and Avenue F, Lancaster, California, for accidents occurring between May 30, 2009 through November 11, 2019;

· Exh. C - California Manuel on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“CAMUTCD”) Section 2B.07: Multiway Stop Applications, published by the State of California, Department of Transportation on January 21, 2010;

· Exh. D - The City of Lancaster’s All Way Stop Study File consisting of (1) Department of Public Works Routing Slip, (2) Traffic Investigation & Evaluation Report, and (3) Traffic Control Report;

· Exh. E - City of Lancaster Traffic Engineering Section Work Order consisting of (1) City of Lancaster Traffic Engineering Section Work Order approved August 12, 2019 and (2) City of Lancaster Signing and Striping Plan;

· Exh. F - The Complaint in the matter of Brisa Mahoney et al. v. The City of Lancaster et al., (Los Angeles Superior County Court Case No. 20AVCV00199, Lead Case Number 20STCV02556); and

While the items requested may include judicially noticeable documents, the Court believes that they are irrelevant to the disposition of the motion for matters discussed infra. Judicial notice cannot be taken of any matter that is irrelevant. (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268, fn. 6.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED.

As an initial matter the Court notes that there is an abundance of objections to hearsay directed to the expert declarations. The Court reminds Stephen P. Farkas (“Farkas”), Plaintiff’s counsel, that, under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (“Sanchez”), an expert may rely on hearsay, but “cannot relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818 [summarizing Sanchez].)

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 1 [Para. 8, 3:16-20: “Deputy Jorge Diaz (“Deputy Diaz”) prepared the Traffic Collision Report in connection with the subject accident. Deputy Diaz testified under oath to the validity of the Traffic Collision Report and to his recollection of the scene of the subject accident. The Traffic Collision Report and relevant Images addressed in Deputy Diaz's deposition are attached as exhibits to the deposition transcript of Deputy Diaz.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 2 [Para. 9, 3:23-4:2: “Deputy Peter Schuerger (“Deputy Schuerger”) prepared a Narrative/Supplemental Report in connection with the subject accident and was familiar with the Traffic Collision Report prepared by Deputy Diaz. Deputy Schuerger testified under oath to the validity of the Traffic Collision Report, Narrative/Supplemental Report, and his recollection of the scene of the subject accident. The Traffic Collision Report and his Narrative/Supplemental Report are attached as exhibits to the deposition transcript of Deputy Schuerger.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 3 [Para. 10, 4:6-12: “Sergeant Ryan Michael Bodily (“Sergeant Bodily”) prepared two Narrative/Supplemental Reports in connection with the subject accident — one containing Sergeant Bodily's findings from his work with a FARO laser scanner which took measurements during his investigation of the subject accident, and an additional report to close out the investigation. Sergeant Bodily testified under oath to the validity of both Narrative/Supplemental Reports and his recollection of the scene of the subject accident. The Narrative/Supplemental Reports are attached as exhibits to the deposition transcript of Sergeant Bodily.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 1 [Para. 7, 3:5-9: “Both the placement and height of this stop sign are in compliance with the standards set forth in the California Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (CAMUTCD 2014) applicable to the condition of the roads where the accident happened on November 14, 2019. Exhibit 1 (below) contains Figure 2A-2 of the CAMUTCD, which sets forth the sign installation standards for rural locations.”]: OVERRULED. Expert states how he documented measurements of the roads in the preceding paragraph and provides the basis for his conclusion in subsequent paragraphs.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 2 [Para. 8, 3:18-21: “As seen in Figure 2A-2, there is a 12-foot minimum distance requirement for the lateral placement of stop signs from the edge of the travel lane pavement of the approach lane, and a minimum height of 5 feet from the bottom of sign to the level of pavement of the approach lane at the edge of pavement.”]: OVERRULED. It appears Plaintiff is attempting to object to the image from the California

7 Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (CAMUTCD 2014) (“CAMUTCD”) as Johnson has cut the image from the CAMUTCD to allow ease in viewing/reading the declaration. The Court takes judicial notice that this is the correct image from the CAMUTCD under Cal. Evid. Code § 452(b), (c), and (h). (See CALTRANS, California MUTCD 2014 Edition Part 2 Signs < https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/programs/safety-programs/documents/ca-mutcd/rev6/camutcd2014-part2-rev6.pdf > [as of May 01, 2023].)

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 3 [Para. 9, 3:22-25: “Adjacent to the stop sign on the northeast corner Avenue F is and was a ‘STOP’ pavement marking and a limit line pavement marking applied directly on the roadway as a thermoplastic hot application. The roadway markings size and installation are in compliance with the CAMUTCD.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 4 [Para. 10, 3:26-4:12: “In addition, and at the time of the accident on November 19, 2019, there was a ‘CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP’ warning sign installed directly below the STOP sign, also in compliance with Section 2C.59 of the CAMUTCD ‘Cross Traffic Does Not Stop[’] Plaque (W4-4P), which states: Section 2C.59 CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP Plaque (W4-4P) Option: 01 — The CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP (W4-4P) plaque (see Figure 2C-9) may be used in combination with a STOP sign when engineering judgment indicates that conditions are present that are causing or could cause drivers to misinterpret the intersection as an all-way stop. Standard: 04 — If a W4-4P plaque or a plaque with an alternative message is used, it shall be mounted below the STOP sign. [weblink omitted]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 5 [Para. 11, 4:13-16: “In addition, there is and was a ‘stop ahead’ sign located approximately 500 feet east of the intersection on Avenue F. The ‘stop ahead’ sign sits approximately 20 feet away from the north edge of pavement of Avenue F and is and was approximately 8 feet high to the bottom of the sign (compliant with CAMUTCD as shown in Exhibit 1).”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 6 [Para. 12, 4:17-21, 5:1-11: “Adjacent to the ‘stop ahead’ sign is and was a ‘stop ahead’ pavement marking in thermoplastic applied directly on the roadway and is supplementary to the ‘stop ahead’ sign and used to add emphasis as per CAMUTCD Section 3B.20 Pavement Word, Symbol, and Arrow Markings. The ‘stop ahead’ roadway marking is and was in compliance with the CAMUTCD, located at the same location as the sign. Please see Exhibit 2 below: [Exhibit 2 and the subject image are omitted here due to difficulty of reproducing them, but are also subject to these objections”]: OVERRULED. Same reason for objection as Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 2, ante. The Court takes judicial notice that this is the correct wording from the CAMUTCD under Cal. Evid. Code § 452(b), (c), and (h). (See CALTRANS, California MUTCD 2014 Edition Part 3 Markings < https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/programs/safety-programs/documents/ca-mutcd/rev6/camutcd2014-part3-rev6.pdf > [as of May 01, 2023].)

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 7 [Para. 13, 5:12-6:2: The CAMUTCD states the following about advance warning pavement markings such as ‘stop ahead.’ Section 3B.20 Pavement Word, Symbol, and Arrow Markings Guidance: 05 — Letters and numerals should be 6 feet or more in height. 06 — Word and symbol markings should not exceed three lines of information. 07 — If a pavement marking word message consists of more than one line of information, it should read in the direction of travel. The first word of the message should be nearest to the road user. 08 — . . .the longitudinal space between word or symbol message markings, including arrow markings, should be at least four times the height of the characters for low-speed roads, but not more than ten times the height of the characters under any conditions. [weblink omitted] Applying the guidance statements above, the actual installed pavement markings on Avenue F are at least 6 feet or more in height, and the distance between ‘stop’ and ‘ahead’ markings is 55 feet, which is less than the maximum of 60 feet. Meaning, the ‘stop ahead’ markings comply and complied with CAMUTCD.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 8 [Para. 14, 6:3-11: “On 60th Street West, there was at the time of the accident a ‘crossroad’ Waring [sic] sign located approximately 550 feet south of the intersection as shown in Exhibit 3 below: [Exhibit 3 and the subject image are omitted here due to difficulty of reproducing them, but are also subject to these objections]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 9 [Para 15, 6:12-19: “The photograph above is Google Street View historic views from May of 2019, just six (6) months before the accident in November of 2019. The crossroad warning sign sat approximately 550 feet south from the intersection on 60th Street West. The crossroad warning sign was approximately 16 feet from the roadway edge, which is more than the 12-foot minimum requirement per CAMUTCD and was approximately 5 feet in height as measured from the bottom of the warning sign. The crossroad warning sign was in compliance with the CAMUTCD at the time of the accident and visible to drivers traveling north on 60th Street West, approaching the intersection.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 10 [Para. 16, 6:21-26: “During the course of my scene inspections and personal observations in the field, the line-of-sight visibility between drivers approaching the intersection from 60th Street West and Avenue F was such that they would be able to see one another approaching the intersection. The conditions including dirt berms and shrubbery did not play a factor in corner sight distance visibility as a driver's eye-to-eye view was clear, nor would affect a driver's view of a vehicle approaching the intersection from a perpendicular roadway”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 11 [Para. 17, 7:1-7: “Since both vehicles collided at the intersection and the estimated speed of travel of both the driver of the Jeep and the driver of the Lexus was approximately 55 mph, then their line of sight towards each other would be at approximately a 45-degree angle from their travel direction. It is possible and easy to see over the undeveloped land at a 45-degree angle as I personally observed in the field. Both drivers had warning signs that could have helped to inform each driver of the approaching intersection and at a sufficient distance before the intersection to allow either driver to have completely stopped in time.”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 12 [Para. 20, 7:23-25: “The intersection of 60th Street W and W Avenue F was compliant with the CAMUTCD at the time of the accident. All noted signs, striping, and pavement markings were in place and were installed properly.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 13 [Para. 21, 7:26-27: “It is my opinion that there was nothing located around the two roadways that would have obstructed a driver's sight line of the traffic control devices in place at the time of the accident.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 14 [Para. 22, 8:1-6: In addition, there were no sight distance issues (horizontal or vertical) where it was not possible at any time during the course of the subject accident unfolding that these two involved drivers were unable to see each other's vehicles when approaching the intersection. The corner sight line available to drivers on either of the two roadways was adequate and in compliance with traffic engineering standards. It is my opinion that the driver of the Lexus failed to stop a the posted stop sign located on Avenue F and proceeded into the intersection without first ensuring it was safe.”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 1 [Para. 10, 4:9-13: “After collecting the data from the scene inspection, we processed this data using FARO Scene and Reality Capture to generate a scaled mesh model, a process that is generally accepted and published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. Based upon my review of the materials and data addressed above, my scene inspection, measurements, laser scans, photographs and video taken, and my experience as a human factors expert, I have formed the following opinions.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 2 [Para. 11, 4:14-19: “There is no line-of-sight obstruction for more than 500 feet for both northbound and westbound traffic approaching the subject intersection. In other words, the driver of a vehicle traveling north on 60th Street West would be able to see a vehicle traveling west on Avenue F when both vehicles are more than 500 feet from the subject intersection. Similarly, the driver of a vehicle traveling west on Avenue F would be able to see a vehicle traveling north on 60th Street West when both vehicles are more than 500 feet from the subject intersection.”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 3 [Para. 12, 4:20-5:6: The Dirt Berms and Vegetation Do Not Obscure the Subject Intersection for Motorists Approaching the Intersection. The dirt berm and vegetation are to the sides of the roadway. Similarly, the dirt berms and vegetation did not obscure the stop sign, stop sign ahead signs or the stop bar and "STOP" painted on the pavement. This is based on our scene inspection and the FARO 3D laser scan data that the investigating officers took immediately after the subject accident and our FARO 3D laser scan data. At the time of our inspection, the dirt berm was either even with the subject roadway surface or slightly lower in elevation than the subject roadway surface. At the time of the subject accident, the dirt berm was between 0.075 and 0.2 feet above the roadway surface. This means that the dirt berm does not limit a driver's visibility of traffic or the subject intersection. At the time of our inspection, the natural vegetation was between 2.5 and 2.75 feet above the subject roadway surface. As a driver's eye will be higher than 2.75 feet above the roadway surface and on-coming traffic is taller than 2.75 feet above the roadway surface as well, the natural vegetation does not limit a driver's visibility of traffic or the subject intersection. At the time of the subject accident, the natural vegetation was between 0.8 and 2.2 feet above the roadway surface. This is lower than the natural vegetation at the time of our inspection. Again, this is based on the FARO 3D laser scan data.”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 4 [Para. 13, 5:7-21: The Dirt Berms and Vegetation Do Not Obscure Motorists' Perception of Other Motorists Approaching the Subject Intersection. At the time of our inspection, the dirt berm was either even with the subject roadway surface or slightly lower in elevation than the subject roadway surface. This means that the dirt berm does not limit a driver's visibility of traffic or the subject intersection. This is based on the FARO 3D laser scan data that the investigating officers took immediately after the subject accident and our FARO 3D laser scan data. At the time of our inspection, the vegetation was between 2.5 and 2.75 feet above the subject roadway surface. As a driver's eye will be higher than 2.75 feet above the roadway surface and on-coming traffic is taller than 2.75 feet above the roadway surface as well, the vegetation does not limit a driver's visibility of on-coming traffic or the subject intersection at all. At the time of the subject accident, the vegetation was between 0.8 and 2.2 feet above the roadway surface. This is lower than the vegetation at the time of our inspection. At the time of the subject accident, the dirt berm was between 0.075 and 0.2 feet above the roadway surface. Similarly, a driver's eye will be higher than 0.2 feet above the roadway surface and the dirt berm does not limit a driver's visibility of traffic or the subject intersection. Again, this is based on the FARO 3D laser scan data.”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 5 [Para. 14, 5:22-26: “Exhibit ‘A’ attached shows an image of what a driver of a 2001 Jeep Grand Cherokee would be able to see from approximately 500 feet away from the subject intersection. The vehicle in red in the image is a 2001 Lexus IS300 approximately 500 feet from the subject intersection as well. This is based on our FARO 3D laser scan data and 3D models of a 2001 Jeep Grand Cherokee and a 2001 Lexus IS300.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 6 [Para. 15, 5:27-6:7: “Based on a review of historic Google Streetview Images, our scene inspection, above noted deposition testimony and exhibits from same, and the FARO 3D laser scan data that the investigating officers took immediately after the subject accident, the subject scene, including the dirt berm and vegetation, appear to be substantially similar around the time of the subject accident and our inspection. The vegetation was higher at the time of our inspection than during the subject accident. This makes our exhibits and analysis conservative from a visibility and line-of-sight analysis. The dirt berm was slightly higher at the time of the subject accident, with a maximum height of 0.2 feet above the roadway surface versus being even with the roadway. Again, this is substantially similar and the visibility and line-of-sight for the on-coming drivers would be substantially similar.”]: OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 7 [Para. 16, 6:8-11: “Based on the FARO 3D laser scan data and my professional experience, it is my opinion that a driver traveling north on 60th Street and approaching the intersection would be able to perceive and appreciate a vehicle traveling west on Avenue F towards the intersection for at least 500 feet.”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 8 [Para. 17, 6:12-151: “Based on the FARO 3D laser scan data and my professional experience, it is my opinion that a driver traveling north on 60th Street and approaching the intersection would be able to perceive and appreciate a vehicle traveling west on Avenue F towards the intersection for at least 500 feet.”]: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 8 [Exhibit A to Declaration]: OVERRULED.

Lancaster provides approximately 122 pages of objections to Plaintiff’s Compendium of Evidence and the declarations of Farkas; Dale R. Dulap, PE; and Kenneth Solomon, PH. The Court need only rule on those objections to evidence that were material in the disposition of the MSJ. See CCP § 437c(q). For reasons mentioned, infra, the Court does not believe these objections to be relevant to the disposition of the MSJ and does not rule on them.

Application – Lancaster moves for summary judgment as to the First Cause of Action (Dangerous Condition of Public Property). First, Lancaster highlights that Under the Government Tort Claims Act, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,” so Plaintiff must establish that the intersection was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, and that the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of her injury in order to prevail. (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815(a), 835, and 840.2.) Lancaster argues that Plaintiff cannot meet these elements. Specifically, Lancaster believes:

· The subject intersection does not constitute a dangerous condition of public property as a matter of law;

· The evidence does not support that the claimed condition was the proximate cause of or substantial factor to Plaintiff’s injuries; and

Lancaster believes that the subject intersection does not constitute a dangerous condition of public property as a matter of law because (1) a reasonable driver exercising due care will observe the posted warning signs and stop in compliance with them at an intersection (citing Sun v. City of Oakland (2008) 16 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1185 and 1193-94; Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1196); (2) the intersection was controlled by a two-way stop; (3) at least one motorist in this action failed to obey the traffic laws; and (4) the risk posed was from the motorist. Lancaster further presents that any claim of obstruction is without evidentiary support as Plaintiff could not confirm any factual evidence to support her claims as pled and a visual inspection by Human Factors Expert Suway and Traffic Engineering Expert Johnson have provided declarations.

Regarding causation, Lancaster highlights that the allegations of dirt berms and natural vegetation arose only on the TAC. That aside, Lancaster reiterates that Kaitlynn Houghton (“Houghton”), the driver with the stop sign at the two-way stop, did not yield despite the posted warnings. Thus, the collision was caused by Houghton rather than the alleged dirt berms and natural vegetation. Lancaster provides the testimony from both Plaintiff and a witness to the incident as support.

Finally, Lancaster argues that, even if the Court is inclined to question whether a dangerous condition did exist, Cal. Gov. Code §§ 831.2, 830.4, and 830.8 provide immunity. That is, Cal. Gov. Code § 831.2 provides immunity for natural conditions of any unimproved public property, “ ‘even where the public entity had knowledge of a dangerous condition which amounted to a hidden trap’ ” (Motion 20:3-4 [citing Fuller v. State of California (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 926, 938]), Cal. Gov. Code § 830.4 provides immunity for a dangerous condition that arises from the failure to provide regulatory signs, and Cal. Gov. Code § 830.8 provides conditional immunity for failure to post any other kind of traffic sign or marking which “applies to all warning signs and devices which conform to the standards promogulated by the Department of Transportation” (Motion 22:9-10 [citing Kessler v. State of California (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 317, 321].)

A dangerous condition is “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Cal. Gov. Code § 830.) “Public property is in a dangerous condition within the meaning of section 835 if it ‘is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself.’ ” (Cordova v. City of L.A. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1099, 1105 (“Cordova”) [internal citations omitted].) Cordova further summarizes the Government Tort Claims Act:

The Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.; the Act) “is a comprehensive statutory scheme that sets forth the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” (Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 145 [279 Cal. Rptr. 318, 806 P.2d 1353], italics & fn. omitted.) Section 835, the provision of the Act at issue in this case, prescribes the conditions under which a public entity may be held liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. (See Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829 [15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 843 P.2d 624].) Section 835 provides that a public entity may be held liable for such injuries “if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, [and] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred.” In addition, the plaintiff must establish that either: (a) “[a] negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition … ,” or (b) “[t]he public entity had … notice of the dangerous condition … a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Ibid.)

[. . .] A condition is not dangerous “if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial, or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (§ 830.2.)

A public entity is not, without more, liable under section 835 for the harmful conduct of third parties on its property. (Hayes v. State of California (1974) 11 Cal.3d 469, 472 [113 Cal. Rptr. 599, 521 P.2d 855].) But if a condition of public property “creates a substantial risk of injury even when the property is used with due care” (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 718 [159 Cal. Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755] (Ducey)), a public entity “gains no immunity from liability simply because, in a particular case, the dangerous condition of its property combines with a third party's negligent conduct to inflict injury.” (Id. at pp. 718–719.)

Cordova reiterates the holding in Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139 (“Bonanno”) where the California Supreme Court held that “a public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property even when the immediate cause of a plaintiff's injury is a third party's negligent or illegal act (such as a motorist's negligent driving), if some physical characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence or criminality.” (Castro v. City of Thousand Oaks (2015) 239 Cal. App.4th 1451, 1457-58 (“Castro”) [citing Bonanno].) Stated another way:

Public entity liability lies under section 835 when some feature of the property increased or intensified the danger to users from third party conduct. (Bonanno, at p. 155.) The existence of a dangerous condition is ordinarily a question of fact but can be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion. (Id., at p. 148.) Section 835 does not require the plaintiff to show that the allegedly dangerous condition caused the third party conduct (here the motorist's failure to stop for pedestrians) that precipitated the accident. (Cordova v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th 1099.)

(Id. at 1458 [citing Bonanno and Cordova to summarize liability for dangerous condition of public property].)

At the time of the injury on November 14, 2019, and at all times prior thereto, a dangerous condition existed at the SUBJECT INTERSECTION. Said dangerous conditions include, but are not limited to, the following factors which combine to create a dangerous condition:

a. The SUBJECT INTERSECTION was so negligently, recklessly and improperly planned, designed, constructed, controlled, inspected, serviced, repaired and maintained by Defendants CITY and DOES 26 through 50, their employees and agents, inclusive and each of them, that The SUBJECT INTERSECTION was rendered a dangerous condition by, among other defects, the physical characteristics of the roadway, which include the varying heights of the dirt berms along the shoulders immediately adjacent to the roadways leading to the SUBJECT INTERSECTION as well as the development of natural vegetation and other features on top and around the dirt berms which concealed from drivers the approaching intersection and created substantial risk that a careful driver would not perceive the roads approaching the SUBJECT INTERSECTION, and would not perceive the point of intersection with a vehicle approaching the Subject Intersection and thus would be unable to stop for and/or avoid careful drivers approaching the intersection, and conceal from drivers approaching the SUBJECT INTERSECTION the very fact that the SUBJECT INTERSECTION existed until the driver is committed to the intersection

b. The combination of these physical conditions then and there existing on the adjacent shoulders and the placement of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION constituted a trap that a driver exercising due care would not perceive the point of intersection between 60th Street and Avenue F until after entering the zone of danger by having committed to the SUBJECT INTERSECTION.

c. The inability of one driver to see the point of intersection with the other for some period of time or space after such driver is committed to the intersection created a dangerous condition of public property which proximately caused the injury to plaintiff and which created a reasonably foreseeable risk of such injury.

d. The SUBJECT INTERSECTION was improperly monitored, signaled, and controlled by Defendants’ employees, and failed to adequately warn motorists of the dangerous condition, thereby interfering with the safe operation of motor vehicles at the SUBJECT INTERSECTION when used by foreseeable users with due care because a driver using the roadway with due care could not judge how far ahead the intersection was and had no way to know whether there was cross-traffic and whether said cross-traffic was going to stop.

e. Because of the dangerous condition of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION, the posted signage existing through the SUBJECT INTERSECTION is insufficient when used by foreseeable users with due care because the combination of the surrounding physical conditions and location of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION obscure the presence of approach roads and conceal the point of intersection between 60th Street and Avenue F, thereby failing to provide the required emergency stopping distance until after foreseeable users had entered the zone of danger and committed to the intersection.

f. At the aforementioned time and place, PLAINTIFF was operating the Subject Vehicle and/or using the SUBJECT INTERSECTION in a reasonable, foreseeable manner, when, as a result of the combination of the aforementioned defects and existence of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION’S dangerous condition, as well as the negligence of the Defendants CITY and DOES 26 through 50, and each of them, Houghton encountered the dangerous condition(s) of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION and neither driver was able to identify that the SUBJECT INTERSECTION existed for some period of time or space until after such time as they were committed to the SUBJECT INTERSECTION resulting in the subject accident. As a direct and legal result of said accident, PLAINTIFF sustained severe personal injuries.

g. The aforementioned factors combined to render the SUBJECT INTERSECTION a dangerous condition which was known to Defendants CITY and DOES 26 through 50, inclusive and each of them, and had existed over a significant period of time predating the subject accident, so that Defendants CITY and DOES 26 through 50, inclusive and each of them knew or should have known, of the dangerous condition of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION.

The alleged dangerous condition of public property is the combination of dirt berms, natural vegetation, and lack of signage.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the land immediately adjacent to 60th Street West and the land immediately adjacent to Avenue F, which is topped with the dirt berms, is owned by the County of Los Angeles. The SUBJECT INTERSECTION is owned, controlled, and maintained by the City of Lancaster. The dangerous condition of City property at issue is not the adjacent dirt berms, but the SUBJECT INTERSECTION rendered dangerous by the adjacent dirt berms topped with vegetation which obscured the presence of the approach roads, obstructed a driver’s perception of the upcoming intersection, and which exposed those using the SUBJECT INTERSECTION with due care to a substantial risk of injury.

The dirt berms and vegetation are on adjacent land owned by the County of Los Angeles. Cal. Gov. Code § 830 provides, in relevant part:

“Dangerous condition” means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.

“Adjacent property” as used in the definition of “dangerous condition” refers to the area that is exposed to the risk created by a dangerous condition of the public property. For example, the hazard created by a condition of public property may not be a hazard to persons using the public property itself, but may be a hazard to other property or to those using other property. A tree located on public property may have a decayed limb overhanging private property and creating a hazard to that property and the persons on it. Explosives on public property may create a hazard to a wide area of private property adjacent to the public property.

(Gov. Code, § 830 [Deering, Lexis Advance through the 2023 Extra Session Ch 1, 2023 Regular Session Ch. 2, Law Revision Commission Comments].)

“. . .In its comment to section 830 the Law Revision Commission states in pertinent part: ‘Under the definition as it is used in subsequent sections, a public entity cannot be held liable for dangerous conditions of “adjacent property.” A public entity may be liable only for dangerous conditions of its own property. But its own property may be considered dangerous if it creates a substantial risk of injury to adjacent property or to persons on adjacent property; and its own property may be considered dangerous if a condition on the adjacent property exposes those using the public property to a substantial risk of injury.’ [Italics added.]”

As a matter of law, Lancaster is not liable for injury caused by these dirt berms or vegetation. The proper entity liable for any damage related to the dirt berms and vegetation is Los Angeles County, according to the allegations in the TAC.

As mentioned, ante, Plaintiff must establish that (1) the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and (4) that either: (a) “[a] negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition … ,” or (b) “[t]he public entity had … notice of the dangerous condition … a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Ibid.)

The remaining element of the alleged dangerous condition that exists on Lancaster’s land is the alleged lack of signage.

Lancaster provides that Cal. Gov. Code §§ 830.4 and 830.8 provide immunity for signage.

A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right–of–way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings as described in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code.

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices described in the Vehicle Code. Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or device (other than one described in Section 830.4) was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.

It is undisputed that Houghton’s path to the intersection contained a visible “stop” roadway marking, a stop sign, and a sign that says “cross-traffic does not stop.” (See Plaintiff’s SS Nos. 6-8 [dispute is that a 4-way stop was approved].) Lancaster provides the several depositions which show:

· Plaintiff states that Houghton’s vehicle “impacted” her vehicle (Exh. F 77:13-14); and

· Witness Rose Dubose states that she saw Houghton run the stop sign (Exh. K 25:1-11, 32: 5-8.)

From the evidence provided, it appears that Houghton’s failure to stop caused the incident.

Lancaster has negated essential elements of Plaintiff’s claim – that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition and that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred.

The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.

Plaintiff provides that the intersection is a dangerous condition due to a significant dip in elevation, man-made dirt berms, and vegetation. The allegation that the incident was a dangerous condition due to a significant dip in elevation is not an allegation pled in the TAC. “[T]he pleadings delimit issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Defendants moving for summary judgment need address only the issues raised by the complaint, and plaintiffs may not bring up new issues in their opposing papers. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253 [78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372].)” (Kanovsky v. At Your Door Self Storage (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 594, 601.) The pleadings specifically outline that the inability of a driver to see the intersection was due to dirt berms and vegetation. (See TAC ¶¶ 3-8.) The Court need not address the new allegation regarding a dip. Regarding the dirt berms and vegetation, the Court has already addressed them, ante, and no liability can be imposed on Lancaster for dangerous conditions of adjacent land owned by Los Angeles County.

Plaintiff presents that the design of the intersection on the date of the incident did not comply with the Lancaster’s approved design that was in effect on the date of the incident as Lancaster conducted an internal study that determined the intersection meets the criteria for a four-way stop sign and a recommendation to convert the two-way stop sign into a four-way stop sign was approved by reviewing officials. Plaintiff next argues that Lancaster fails to provide supporting evidence that Plaintiff’s injury was not caused by the dangerous condition. Specifically, Plaintiff believes that Lancaster misstates deposition testimony. Lancaster argues that the Court should only take into consideration evidence provided in the Separate Statement. Plaintiff then argues that (1) Lancaster’s own records concede that the intersection created a trap for drivers approaching from all compass points and (2) Plaintiff’s testimony shows that she didn’t see Houghton’s vehicle until she was too close to the intersection to take evasive action. Plaintiff further argues that the intersection met the CAMUTCD’s crash problem criteria due to the number of accidents at the intersection; that Cal. Gov. Code § 831.2 does not apply as the intersection is the dangerous condition because of a dop in the road and man-made dirt berms; and that immunity under Cal. Gov. Code §§ 830.4 and 830.8 do not apply because Plaintiff is alleging more than a failure to install signs. Plaintiff states that she alleges the elements that caused the intersection to be a dangerous condition included all of the following: (1) a dip in elevation as drivers approach the Subject Intersection, (2) the presence of man-made dirt berms bordering the roadway in all four directions, (3) the presence of vegetation on top of the man-made dirt berms, and (4) the Lancaster’s failure to exercise due care and correct the confusing signage pursuant to its own High Priority Work Order once it was determined to be inadequate. Discarding information that cannot be addressed for reasons mentioned, ante, Plaintiff has stated that she alleges the following elements that make the intersection a dangerous condition: Lancaster’s failure to exercise due care and correct the confusing signage pursuant to its own High Priority Work Order once it was determined to be inadequate. Plaintiff also argues that Lancaster failed to warn of a trap, Lancaster’s inadequate signage precludes immunity, and there is a question of fact as to whether the delay in implementing the four-way stop sign was reasonable.

· “The SUBJECT INTERSECTION was rendered a dangerous condition by, among other defects, the physical characteristics of the roadway, which include the varying heights of the dirt berms along the shoulders immediately adjacent to the roadways leading to the SUBJECT INTERSECTION as well as the development of natural vegetation and other features on top and around the dirt berms which concealed from drivers the approaching intersection and created and substantial risk that a careful driver would not perceive the roads approaching the SUBJECT INTERSECTION, and would not perceive the point of intersection with a vehicle approaching the Subject Intersection and thus would be unable to stop for and/or avoid careful drivers approaching the intersection, and conceal from drivers approaching the SUBJECT INTERSECTION the very fact that the SUBJECT INTERSECTION existed until the driver is committed to the intersection” (TAC ¶ 27(a));

· “The combination of these physical conditions then and there existing on the adjacent shoulders and the placement of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION constituted a trap that a driver exercising due care would not perceive the point of intersection between 60th Street and Avenue F until after entering the zone of danger by having committed to the SUBJECT INTERSECTION” (TAC ¶ 27(b)); and

· “As a driver travels westbound on Avenue F with due care, similar dirt berms of varying heights, which are topped with vegetation, are immediately adjacent to the roadway on both the north and south sides of Avenue F. The adjacent dirt berms not only conceal the approach roads, but conceal from drivers approaching from the east the very fact the SUBJECT INTERSECTION existed until the westbound driver was committed to the intersection. [¶] As a result, the SUBJECT INTERSECTION became a trap for both parties (TAC ¶¶ 4-5.)

Thus, as pled, the alleged trap resulted from dirt berms and vegetation. Lancaster is not liable for the danger posed by the dirt berms and vegetation. (See ante.)

A reading of the TAC shows that the alleged dangerous condition is the dirt berms and vegetation. (See TAC 3-8, 27(a)-(c).) The TAC contains allegations directed to Lancaster which contend that Lancaster’s failure to install proper regulatory and warning signals exacerbated the dangerous condition:

· The dangerous condition of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION was exacerbated by a combination of factors in the City’s control, including the failure to install proper traffic regulatory signals, signs or controls, including a four way stop sign, and the City’s failure to properly warn motorists of the dangerous condition. (TAC ¶ 10).

· The SUBJECT INTERSECTION was improperly monitored, signaled, and controlled by Defendants’ employees, and failed to adequately warn motorists of the dangerous condition, thereby interfering with the safe operation of motor vehicles at the SUBJECT INTERSECTION when used by foreseeable users with due care because a driver using the roadway with due care could not judge how far ahead the intersection was and had no way to know whether there was cross-traffic and whether said cross-traffic was going to stop. (TAC ¶ 27(d).)

· Because of the dangerous condition of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION, the posted signage existing through the SUBJECT INTERSECTION is insufficient when used by foreseeable users with due care because the combination of the surrounding physical conditions and location of the SUBJECT INTERSECTION obscure the presence of approach roads and conceal the point of intersection between 60th Street and Avenue F, thereby failing to provide the required emergency stopping distance until after foreseeable users had entered the zone of danger and committed to the intersection. (TAC ¶ 27(e).)

Regarding the necessity of a four-way stop sign, Cal. Gov. Code § 830.4 provides immunity. (See Cal. Gov. Code § 830.4 [“A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right–of–way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings as described in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code.”].)

Plaintiff argues this statute is inapplicable because Plaintiff has alleged a trap composed of different elements as well as the following:

· “Although sections 830.4 and 830.8 of the Government Code, …provide that a public entity may not be held liable for failure to install traffic signs or signals, when it does so in such a manner as to constitute a trap, liability may be imposed for the maintenance of a dangerous condition.” (Bakity v. Cnty. of Riverside (1970) 12 Cal. App. 3d 24, 31; accord City of South Lake Tahoe v. Superior Court (Markham) (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 971, 976.)

· When a City undertakes the responsibility of installing traffic signs or signals and invites public reliance upon them, it may be held liable for creating a dangerous condition in so doing. (See De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 739, 746.)

o see Bakity, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at pp. 30–31 [section 830.4 immunity unavailable where sign was deceptive because it was located far from where stop was required];

o De La Rosa, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 739 [stop sign was positioned in such a way that it was obscured from view by trees and shrubbery];

· The South Lake Tahoe court explained that “Bakity and De La Rosa demonstrate the principle that while a public entity has no obligation to provide stop signs, if it does so in such a way that the sign itself creates or becomes a dangerous condition, liability may ensue.” (South Lake Tahoe, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 977; see Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1195.)

The Court notes that it appears from the case law cited that Plaintiff is now arguing that the stop signs at the intersection in the day of the incident themselves are dangerous and/or from the Opposition that the construction of the intersection itself is dangerous (see Opp. 15:15-19, 23:15, evidence submitted). This, again, is not encompassed by Plaintiff’s pleadings.

As pled, the “trap” is the obstruction of visual cues caused by the dirt berms and vegetation, exacerbated by the lack of a signage (i.e., four-way stop) and warnings. Lancaster is not liable for the dangerous condition posed by Los Angeles County’s property. The pleadings address Lancaster’s investigations, approval of a four-way stop, and traffic control reports in the context of actual or constructive notice. (See TAC ¶¶ 28-30.) As such, it appears that Plaintiff is arguing that warning signs were necessary to warn of a dangerous condition (i.e., dirt berms and vegetation on Los Angeles County’s land) which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.

Perry v. Santa Monica (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 370 (“Perry”) addresses this exact issue. In Perry, the plaintiff alleged that it was reasonably necessary to place stop signs at the intersection at issue as a vehicle traveling northerly on Euclid could not see traffic approaching from the west on Michigan without first entering the intersection and placing itself in a hazardous position and a vehicle traveling westerly on Michigan could not see traffic approaching in a northerly direction on Euclid without first entering the intersection and the complaint alleged that the city waited an unreasonable length of time to do so. The Perry court held, under the former Public Liability Act[1], that the city was not liable for its failure to install a stop sign at the intersection because there was no evidence of a defective or dangerous condition in the public property. That is, the injured parties had not alleged that irregularities, defects, or obstructions existed in the streets themselves. Specifically, the Perry court states:

The injuries must result from the dangerous or defective condition of public property. What is included in the term "property" was exhaustively considered by this court in Bady v. Detwiler, 127 Cal.App.2d 321 [273 P.2d 941]. In all of the cases cited relative to the question, the property was in existence at the time of the accident or had been in existence, and liability was incurred by the local agency because either the property was in a dangerous or defective condition or it was not maintained or replaced after it once had been in existence.

The governmental immunity which a city enjoys as a state agency can be taken away only by legislative enactment. ( Whiting v. City of National City, 9 Cal.2d 163, 165 [69 P.2d 990]; Van Dorn v. City & County of San Francisco, 103 Cal.App.2d 714, 716 [230 P.2d 393]; 19 Cal.Jur. 126, § 461.) The Public Liability Act was not enacted for the purpose of protecting those who come upon city streets, but only those who sustain injuries by reason of a "dangerous or defective" condition. ( Shipley v. City of Arroyo Grande, 92 Cal.App.2d 748, 750 [208 P.2d 51].) It has been repeatedly held that a city is not an insurer of the safety of travelers; it is required only to exercise ordinary care to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition for those using them. ( George v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal.2d 303, 308 [79 P.2d 723].)

There is no allegation that irregularities, defects, or obstructions existed in the streets themselves. In Belcher v. City & County of San Francisco, 69 Cal.App.2d 457 [158 P.2d 996], it was held that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action against the city for personal injuries when she was blown over by a strong wind as she was descending steps cut by the city into the sidewalk, since she did not allege that there was anything dangerous or defective in the construction or design of the steps themselves or that there were any irregularities or defects such as holes, ridges, or upraises upon which a pedestrian might trip or by which one might be entrapped but merely alleged that the city was negligent in failing to provide a handrail and in not posting a warning sign.

Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal.2d 486 [240 P.2d 980], was an action against the city for damages sustained as a result of a fire on the plaintiffs' property. The water lines leading to the fire hydrant adjacent to the plaintiffs' property and the fire hydrant had become clogged and were incapable of providing sufficient water for effective fire control. The court observed (p. 489):

"The ordinary case coming within the terms of this act involves a situation where the injured person is using some type of city property that is dangerous or defective, and which he had a legal right to use, such as public streets [citation], highways [citation], buildings [citation], bridges [citation], school grounds [citation], or other similar property [citation]. Likewise the act sustains the imposition of liability in the situation where the city is using the dangerous or defective property and injury was proximately caused thereby: [citations], where the city negligently allowed a fire to spread from a city dump; [citation], where the city used defective sewer pipes, resulting in the flooding of plaintiffs' property; [citation], where the city negligently installed and maintained street drainage facilities, causing an overflow on plaintiffs' property with damage to the improvements thereon. But here the city did not create the fire causing the damage to plaintiffs' property; rather the claimed fault lies in defendants' failure to provide the means for remedying a condition otherwise created -- a different set of circumstances to which plaintiffs seek to apply the act in support of their action. Upon analysis, it clearly appears that the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is the failure of a governmental function. Such failure involves the denial of a benefit owing to the community as a whole, but it does not constitute a wrong or injury to a member thereof so as to give rise to a right of individual redress (Restatement of Torts, § 288), which right must be predicated upon the violation of a duty of care owed to the injured party."

Bradshaw v. City of Seattle, 43 Wn.2d 766 [264 P.2d 265], is analogous. A Washington statute was substantially identical with subdivision (b) of section 465 of the Vehicle Code. Construing the statute the Supreme Court of Washington said (264 P.2d 270, 271):

"Where a street itself is reasonably safe for public travel it is not rendered inherently dangerous solely because a municipality fails to cut down natural vegetation which tends to obstruct the view at an intersection. . . . In the absence of an express statute, a municipality cannot be held liable for failure to erect warning signs or barriers to apprise travelers of extraordinary or unusual conditions unless the danger existed in the highway itself."

A local authority is not liable under the Public Liability Act of 1923 for failure to install a stop sign at an intersection in the absence of a defective or dangerous condition in public property. We are not to be understood as holding that once having installed a stop sign a city may not be liable for failing to maintain it. (See Rose v. County of Orange, 94 Cal.App.2d 688 [211 P.2d 45].)

Here, as in Perry, there is no defect alleged in the streets themselves. The defect alleged belongs to Los Angeles County. Under Perry, a local authority is not liable under current Cal. Gov. Code § 385 for failure to install a traffic signal (i.e., stop sign) at an intersection in the absence of a defective or dangerous condition in the public property. Plaintiff essentially seeks to hold Lancaster liable for a dangerous condition of Los Angeles County property. To construe the Government Torts Claim Act to extend liability to Lancaster for the dangerous condition of another entity will not only go too far towards establishing Lancaster as an insurer of the safety of its travelers.

Lancaster’s Reply expresses concerns with the scope of what is argued and the TAC. The Court believes that its analysis adequately addresses these concerns.

· Plaintiff’s references to previous accidents at the intersection are inadmissible as “before evidence of previous accidents may be admitted to prove the existence of a dangerous condition, it must first be shown that the conditions under which the alleged previous accidents occurred were the same or substantially similar to the one in questions” (Mixon v. State of California (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 124, 131);

· Plaintiff does not make the required causal connection remotely clear in her Opposition (i.e., elements not explained in detail);

· Multiple immunities apply – (1) natural conditions immunity as no evidence is provided that the dirt berms are man-made, and (2) immunity for no traffic signs for traffic control signs.

Lancaster’s Reply does not change the Court’s analysis. Accordingly, the Court’s opinion remains the same.

[1] The previous Public Liability Act, Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 53050, 5305, is substantially similar to current Cal. Gov. Code § 835(b). It reads:

“A local agency is liable for injuries to persons and property resulting from the dangerous or defective condition of public property if the legislative body, board, or person authorized to remedy the condition: (a) Had knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition. (b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge or receiving notice, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition.”

(Perry, supra, 130 Cal.App.2d at 372.)