Judge Stephen Morgan, Case Number: 20AVCV00345, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling

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If a matter is also scheduled for a CMC, TSC, OSC, etc., an appearance is still required even if the parties are willing to submit on the tentative ruling.

This¿action arises from an automobile collision.¿ On or about November 14, 2019, at approximately 12:26 p.m.,¿Plaintiff Brenna¿Romines¿(“Plaintiff”) was travelling northbound on 60th Street West in Lancaster, CA in her 2001 Jeep Cherokee (the “Subject Vehicle”), when she entered the intersection with Avenue F (the “Accident Location”).¿ At the same time, non-party Kaitlynn Renee Houghton (“Houghton”) was travelling westbound on Avenue F when she entered the intersection without stopping at her stop sign due to a dangerous condition on the roadway, causing the Subject Vehicle to broadside Houghton’s vehicle.¿ (Complaint, at ¶ 1.)¿ The Subject Vehicle overturned and collided with a wooden electrical pole, causing the pole to collapse, on the northwest corner, before coming to rest on the adjacent dirt field.¿

On May 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging three (3) causes of action for (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property (against Defendants the State of California (the “State”), the County of Los Angeles (“COLA”), and the City of Lancaster (“Lancaster’); (2) Strict Liability (against¿Defendant FCA US, LLC (“FCA”)); and (3) Negligence (against FCA).¿ FCA is the manufacturer of the Subject Vehicle.¿

On October 06, 2020, Plaintiff amended the fictitious name of Doe 1 to Defendant Johnson Controls, Inc., now known as Adient US, LLC (“Johnson Controls”).

The operative pleading is the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), filed on October 27, 2021, alleging three causes of action for: (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property – Gov Code §§ 835 et seq., and 840.2 against Lancaster; (2) Strict Liability against FCA and Johnson Controls; and (3) Negligence against FCA and Johnson Controls.

On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff amended the fictitious name of Doe 2 to Faurecia Automotive Seating, LLC (“Faurecia”). The causes of action alleged against Faurecia are Strict Liability and Negligence.

On January 31, 2023, Lancaster filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, subsequently granted on May 12, 2023.

On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff amended the fictitious names of Doe 3 Valencia Dodge (“Dodge”) to and Doe 4 to AutoNation, Inc. (“AutoNation”). The causes of action alleged against Dodge and AutoNation are Strict Liability and Negligence.

On June 13, 2023, Faurecia filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication.

On June 13, 2023, Johnson Controls filed its Motion for Summary Judgment set for January 02, 2024.

On June 14, 2023, Johnson Controls filed an Ex Parte Application for an Order Advancing the Hearing Date on its Motion for Summary, or in the alternative, an Order Setting the Hearing Date within Thirty Days of Trial.

On June 16, 2023, the Ex Parte Application was granted and Johnson Controls’ Motion for Summary Judgment was Advanced to August 29, 2023.

On July 14, 2023, Auto Company XXIII, Inc. dba Autonation Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Valencia, erroneously sued as AutoNation, Inc. (“Auto Company XXIII”), filed its Answer and a Cross-Complaint.

On July 28, 2023, Autonation Company XXIII joined in the Stipulated Protective Order, amended on July 31, 2023.

On June 05, 2023, the Court entered judgment in favor of Lancaster due to the ruling on Lancaster’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

From June 08, 2023 to July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a petition of writ of mandate to the appellate court regarding Lancaster’s Motion for Summary Judgment, subsequently denied.

On August 02, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal regarding the June 05, 2023 judgment. The appeal is still pending. A trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 916(a).)

On August 04, 2023, Faurecia continued its Motion for Summary Judgment from August 29, 2023 to February 13, 2024

On August 03, 2023, Johnson Controls filed an Ex Parte Application for Order Advancing the Hearing Date and Shortening the Time on The Application of Tracy Gregar Ferak to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice for Johnson Controls. The application was granted as to Johnson Control’s Motion for Summary Judgment.[1]

After the Ex Parte Application, Johnson Controls continued its Motion for Summary Judgment from August 29, 2023 to October 24, 2023.

Standard for Summary Judgment – The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc.¿§437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing¿FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Cal.¿Code Civ.¿Proc.¿§437c(p)(2);¿Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v.¿Paetkau¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿¿¿¿

Application – Johnson Controls moves for summary judgment only as to all claims of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Johnson Controls presents a brief background about the seat: (1) on September 15, 2021, the parties and their experts inspected the Subject Vehicle and its driver’s seat (see Decl. William R. Tighe (“Tighe”) ¶¶ 5, 8); and (2) Johnson Controls’ expert determined e driver’s seat had been unbolted and removed from the vehicle, the seat back frame/recliner sub-assembly had been unbolted from the seat cushion pan, the seat cushion pan had been unbolted from the seat tracks, the cloth seat covers had been removed, the seats had been retrimmed with leather, the seat cushion pan was reassembled to the seat tracks with bolts that were tightened far below torque specifications, the seat back frame/recliner sub-assembly was reassembled to the seat cushion pan with bolts that were finger-tightened only, and the seat was reinstalled in the vehicle floor pan with three bolts that were finger-tightened only and one bolt that was tightened far below FCA’s torque specifications during the reinstallation process, and the seat structure had been modified to include various parts of unknown origin (see id. at ¶¶ 13, 19). The seat modifications included: a setback frame dated August 10, 2001 and August 12, 2001, approx. seven months after the original seat left Johnson Controls’ control (id. at ¶ 14(a) and Exh. C); a seat cushion foam with a manufacture date stamp of August 13, 2001, approximately seven months after the original seat left Johnson Controls’ control (id. at ¶ 14(b) and Exh. D); a leather trim with tags dated July 31, 2001 and August 06, 2001, approximately six to seven months after the original seat left Johnson Controls’ control; the driver’s seat cushion foam was removed (id. at 14(c) and Exh. E), and the suspension wiring related to the driver’s seat was substantially altered (id. at ¶ 15 and Exh. G). Tighe notes that the new wiring was “crooked, bent, and. . .haphazardly twisted, likely bent by hand, to stay on the cushion frame.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Johnson Controls also presents that previous owner Sonia Drake (“Drake”) was deposed and stated that Valencia Dodge offered to reupholster the Subject Vehicle’s seats with leather when she and her husband was about to leave the dealership without a vehicle, she and her husband agreed and purchased the Subject Vehicle, and the seats were leather when she picked up the vehicle. (Decl. Elizabeth C. Christen, Exh. 7 at 6:15-7:8.)

Based on the foregoing, Johnson Controls argues that (1) California law forbids courts from finding defendants strictly liable or negligent for injuries caused by replacement parts made by other parties, citing O’Neil v. Crane (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335 (“O’Niel”); (2) Plaintiff has the burden to produce evidence linking the allegedly injury-producing product with a particular entity in the stream of commerce of that product under Taylor v. Elliot Turbomachinery Co., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 564 (“Taylor”); and (3) Plaintiff cannot meet her burden to link the allegedly defective modified seat to Johnson Controls because of the facts, ante. Alternatively, Johnson Controls argues that even if Plaintiff could meet her burden, it cannot be liable as it is not in the chain of distribution for Plaintiff’s seat. That is, under Taylor, a test was set out and Johnson Control believes it satisfies this test as an unknown third party or parties removed the seat from the Subject Vehicle, replaced the seat’s componentry, modified the cushion suspension wiring, and improperly installed the seat without any involvement from Johnson Controls.

The theory alleged by Plaintiff, as direct to Johnson Controls is (1) strict liability, and (2) negligence. (See TAC Second and Third Causes of Action.) As this is a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must analyze the evidence and arguments presented by Johnson Controls as to both legal standards.

“Strict liability has been invoked for three types of defects – manufacturing defects, design defects, and ‘warning defects,’ i.e., inadequate warnings or failures to warn.” (Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d987, 995.) “Under the Restatement [Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 2], a product is defective if it: ‘(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product; [¶] (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; [¶] (c)is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.’ ” (Brady v. Calsol, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218-1219.) “A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. . . . The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62-63.)

The pleadings delineate that the issues alleged are “the Subject Vehicle, its seats, components and parts were manufactured, designed, distributed, supplied, assembled, installed and/or sold by the Defendants in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition.” (TAC ¶ 41.) Johnson Controls is an automobile seating manufacturer. It also appears that there is a basis for failure to warn as a subdivision of paragraph 41 states: “Defective and inadequate warnings concerning failures of the Subject Vehicle, its seats, components and parts.” (TAC ¶ 41(d).)

The question presented in O’Niel was: “When is a product manufacturer liable for injuries caused by adjacent products or replacement parts that were made by others and used in conjunction with the defendant's product?” (O’Niel, supra, 53 Cal.4th 355, 342.) The O’Niel court discussed gaskets on navy warships in which defendant provided the valves and not asbestos packing or gaskets. (See id. at 344-45.) The O’Niel court held: “. . .[A] product manufacturer generally may not be held strictly liable for harm caused by another manufacturer's product. The only exceptions to this rule arise when the defendant bears some direct responsibility for the harm, either because the defendant's own product contributed substantially to the harm (see Tellez-Cordova, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 585), or because the defendant participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products (see DeLeon, supra, 148 Cal. App. 3d at p. 343).” (Id. at 362.)

Taylor, while focusing on the warning defect prong of strict liability, provides: (1) a manufacturer is not strictly liable when they are not part of the chain of distribution of the injury-causing product (see Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 564, 577-79); (2) there is no duty imposed on a manufacturer to warn about the dangerous propensities of other manufacturers’ products (see id. at 583); and “[u]nder the component parts doctrine, the manufacturer of a product component is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product into which the component is incorporated unless the component itself was defective at the time it left the manufacturer” (id. at 584; see also id. at 584-86.)

Johnson Controls has shown that the seats’ parts were changed from those it had manufactured. That is, Johnson control has put out a product and the product that caused Plaintiff’s injury was not the one they put out due to the alterations. O’Niel, read liberally, appears to support Johnson Control’s argument. Further support is found in Green v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 819, 838 in which it was held that a party that makes extensive modifications to a product is tantamount to a manufacturer. (See also Ortiz v. HPM Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 178, 189 [“A seller of used goods who makes extensive modifications to a product prior to sale has been considered ‘tantamount to a manufacturer’ subject to strict liability. (Green v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 40 Cal. App. 3d 819, 838 [115 Cal. Rptr. 685].)”].)

“ ‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)

This Cause of Action is directed not only to Johnson Controls, but also to FCA, Faurecia, and Dodge. The Court understands that each defendant performs different functions related to the Subject Vehicle. Johnson Controls is attacking the causation element of a negligence claim.

Johnson Controls’ argument is the same as previously stated. As applied to negligence, Johnson Controls’ is arguing that the seat is substantially different from the originally supplied seat, so it had no duty to Plaintiff. For the same reasons, ante, this appears to be an affirmative defense.

Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show the existence of a material fact or a defense thereto.

Plaintiff presents that Tighe has (1) testified that Johnson Controls was the seat cushion pan’s original manufacturer whether it was an original part of the Subject Vehicle or purchased as an after-market product (Pl.’s Compendium of Evidence, Exh. 2 88:13-86:6); and (2) this cushion pan frame, which includes the mounting bracket, is the defective product as it fractured during the subject incident (Opp. 8:14-15); and (3) the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has logged complaints of driver’s seat “mounts” and “brackets” breaking, and seats coming loose from 2001 Jeep Cherokees, the same model as the Subject Vehicle (Decl. Naresh J. Kar ¶ 13.) Plaintiff also emphasizes that Tighe, despite now stating the origin of the parts put in the seat are unknown, identified them as Johnson Controls parts and, as such, arguments regarding unknown origins and quality of the seats’ parts should be discarded. Plaintiff argues that, considering these facts, O’Niel is inapplicable as Johnson Controls was part of the chain of distribution, and an analysis under Taylor would also lead to liability for the seat cushion pan. Plaintiff further argues that Johnson Controls failed to warn consumers about the dangers of not adhering to the torque specifications and argues that no theory is presented that there is no argument presented as to who failed to tighten the bolts to specification and, under California law, opinion testimony of any kind must be supported by facts. Plaintiff presents that her expert has opined that there could be many causes for the improperly installed bolts, including improper installation. (Decl. Naresh J. Kar ¶ 12.)

As Johnson Controls’ own expert has admitted that the cushion pan frame is the one that Johnson Controls installed, Johnson Controls’ cited cases are no longer applicable. The case is sufficiently distinguished from O’Niel as Plaintiff produced the cushion seat frame that remained a part of the seat and caused issues during the incident. Likewise, Plaintiff’s burden under Taylor is satisfied as the seat cushion pan frame is alleged to be the injury causing component. Accordingly, a triable issue of one or more material facts exists.

The Court need not address the failure to warn arguments as Plaintiff has already met her burden to show a triable issue of one or more material facts exists.

Johnson Controls emphasizes that whether the components in the modified seat came from them is irrelevant as the components were not original parts assembled into Plaintiff’s seat prior to the Subject Vehicle’s January 18, 2001 manufacture date. Because of this, Johnson Controls argues that only two conclusions can be drawn: (1) the seat involved in the incident was not the same seat structure designed, assembled, tested, and supplied by Johnson Controls; and (2) the seat in Plaintiff’s vehicle was assembled and installed into the vehicle by a third party. Johnson Controls argues that the undisputed material facts show that at some time during the Subject Vehicle’s history a third party unbolted the seat cushion from the seat track, disassembled the seat cushion pan, seat tracks, recliners, and seat frame, replaced all or some of the component parts with different parts from different manufacture dates, reattached and rebolted the components together, and reassembled the seat. Johnson Controls argues that this shows that its original seat assembly was undone. Johnson Controls emphasizes that it did not design, assemble, or install the bolts in the altered seat. Johnson Controls argues that Plaintiff misapplies O’Niel and that it had no duty to warn of the alleged risks of loose and/or under torqued bolts. Johnson Controls presents that once it distributed the seat to FCA, it had no control over the seat and FCA had the duty to warn Plaintiff of the potential dangers.

The evidence provided by Johnson Controls did not refute that the seat cushion pan was the original pan supplied by Johnson Controls nor did it deny that the alleged fracture of the seat cushion pan was the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

[1] Various Pro Hac Vice motions have been filed by separate parties. The Court does not include them in the Background for the purposes of this motion to keep the focus on the Motion for Summary Judgment at hand.