Judge: Stephen Morgan, Case: 20AVCV00870, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling

                                                                           Department A14 Tentative Rulings 

If parties are satisfied with the tentative ruling, parties may submit by emailing the courtroom at ATPDeptA14@LACOURT.ORG. 

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Case Number: 20AVCV00870    Hearing Date: August 15, 2023    Dept: A14

Background

This is a negligence action. Plaintiffs Taj Flemmings ("Plaintiff") and Adarian Flemmings ("Minor Plaintiff" and collectively "Plaintiffs") allege that on October 01, 2019, in Defendant John and Jacquelyn Miller Elementary School's third grade classroom ("the Premises"), Minor Plaintiff was dragged out of his chair and thrown against a wall for 20 to 30 seconds by Defendant Dwight Young ("Young"), a teacher at the Premises. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lancaster School District ("Defendant") negligently hired, supervised, and screened Young. Plaintiffs allege damages in the form of medical expenses, general damages, and future damages.

On September 29, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging two causes of action for General Negligence and Intentional Tort. Plaintiff's claim for Intentional Tort is composed of two claims ­­­: (1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED") as to Minor Plaintiff and (2) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress ("NIED") as to Plaintiff.

On February 19, 2021, Defendant filed its Answer.

On April 16, 2021, Plaintiffs dismissed Defendant John and Jacquelyn Miller Elementary School with prejudice.

On May 30, 2023, Defendant filed this Motion for Summary Adjudication (the "motion").

No Opposition has been filed by Plaintiffs as to the motion. “An opposition to the motion shall be served and filed not less than 14 days preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(2).) Here, the hearing is scheduled for August 15, 2023. As such, an Opposition was due by August 01, 2023. Should an Opposition be filed, it is now untimely.

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Legal Standard

Standard for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication – The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(d) allows the trial court to grant summary judgement or adjudication when the opposing party fails to file any opposition so long as the trial court first determines that the moving party has met its initial burden of proof. (Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1086.)

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Discussion

Application – The Complaint includes three claims: (1) Negligence brought by Plaintiffs, (2) NIED brought by Plaintiff, and (3) IIED brought by Minor Plaintiff. The motion is directed to all causes of action except Minor Plaintiff's cause of action for IIED.

            A. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision

"Under California law, an employer may be held directly liable for the behavior of an unfit employee where the employer was negligent in the hiring, training, supervising, or retaining of that employee. Negligence liability will be imposed upon the employer if it knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm then materializes. As such, California follows the rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 213, which provides in pertinent part: 'A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless ... in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others.' Liability may be imposed 'either on the basis of ... action—for example, the negligent hiring of an agent—or ... inaction—for example, the failure to provide adequate supervision of the agent's work.'" (Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2016) 184 F.Supp.3d 774) [discussing California law].)

Defendant argues that the undisputed material facts establish that Defendant did not know or should not have known that Young created a particular risk or hazard to his students. Defendant presents that it investigated Young's background and credentials prior to hiring him as a teacher, Young had been employed by Defendant for 22 years without incident, and Young had not been disciplined prior to the incident. (SSUMF, Nos. 18, 19, 20, 44, 45, 46.) Defendant presents it provided training to Young prior to the incident and Defendant was not aware Young had any anger management issues prior to the incident. (SSUMF, Nos. 22, 23, 48, 49.) Furthermore, Defendant presents there is no evidence it negligently handled Young's investigation after the incident. For example, Defendant presents it placed Young on administrative leave pending investigation of the incident and Young was immediately removed from the Premises. (SSUMF, Nos. 11, 15, 37, 41.)

"One who employs another to act for him is not liable … merely because the one employed is incompetent, vicious, or careless. If liability results it is because, under the circumstances, the employer has not taken the care which a prudent man would take in selecting the person for the business in hand…. [¶] Liability results … not because of the relation of the parties but because the employer antecedently had reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment." Federico v. Superior Court (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213-14. Based on the facts presented by Defendant, the Negligence cause of action fails because it did not know or should not have known hiring Young created a particular risk or hazard.

Thus, Defendant has met its burden by presenting facts to negate an essential element required for negligent hiring, training, and supervision. The burden now shifts to Plaintiffs to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. However, Plaintiffs have not filed an Opposition. As Defendant has met their initial burden, summary adjudication is proper (Thatcher, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at 1086.)

            B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The "negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but rather the tort of negligence." (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) Negligence has the "elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages." (Id.­) The duty for Negligence using NIED is brought under two different theories: the bystander theory and the direct victim theory. (Id.) The distinction is found in the source of duty between the two. (Id.)

Under the bystander theory, "damages for emotional distress should be recoverable only if the plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim and, (3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness." (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1989,

Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot recover for NIED because Plaintiff was not present or aware of the incident at the time it was occurring.

Next, under the direct victim theory, a defendant whose negligent conduct breaches some other legal duty is liable to plaintiff for proximately caused serious emotional distress. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 985.) In "Supreme Court cases which have allowed relatives to as direct victims [citations omitted] each involved negligence which was 'directed at' the relative as well as the injured party." (Steven F. v. Anaheim Union High School Dist. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 904; see Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 590 [mother of minor had standing to assert claim for NIED since "counselling was not directed simply at each mother and son as individuals, but to both in the context of the family relationship."]; Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 1076 [mother of fetus entitled to recovery where "physician-patient relationship with [the defendant] was directed not to her, but also to her fetus".].)

Here, Defendant presents there is no triable issue of material fact as whether Plaintiff can recover for NIED as a third party relative because Young's conduct was not directed at him. In support, Defendant presents that Plaintiff had only met and spoke to Young for the first time after the incident and Plaintiff admitted at deposition that Young has never done anything personally to him. (SSUMF, Nos. 6, 7, 32, 33.)

Based on the facts provided by Defendant, the Negligence cause of action fails because Plaintiff was not present or aware of the incident at the time it was occurring nor was Young's conduct directed at him.

Defendant has met its burden by presenting facts to negate an essential element required for negligence liability to be imputed onto them. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. However, Plaintiffs have not filed an Opposition. As Defendant has met their initial burden, summary adjudication is proper (Thatcher, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at 1086.)

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Adjudication.

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Conclusion