Judge: Stephen Morgan, Case: 21AVCV00694, Date: 2022-12-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21AVCV00694    Hearing Date: December 29, 2022    Dept: A14

Background

 

This is a Premises Liability action. Plaintiff Amelia Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Jason Medina (“Defendant”) owned, possessed, leased, maintained, operated, supervised, managed, and otherwise controlled the residence located at 2214 W Ave. K12, Lancaster, CA 93536 (the “Premises”) and that the following occurred on or about May 16, 2020:

 

 

Plaintiff further alleges that she suffered significant physical injuries which result in her incurring the claimed general and specific damages.

 

On September 09, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, alleging one cause of action for Negligence/Premises Liability.

 

On October 25, 2021, Defendant filed his Answer.

 

On October 13, 2022, Defendant filed this Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Opposition.

 

On December 23, 2022, Defendant filed his Reply.

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Legal Standard

 

Standard for Summary Judgment – The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc.¿§437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing¿FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿¿¿ 

¿¿¿¿ 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Cal.¿Code Civ.¿Proc.¿§437c(p)(2);¿Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿¿¿¿ 

¿¿¿¿ 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v.¿Paetkau¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿¿¿ 

 

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Discussion

 

Judicial Notice – Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of Los Angeles County Superior Court – Michael D. Antonovich Antelope Valley Courthouse – records and case summary for case number ATP0AN03786-01. The Court notes that this is a criminal case against Defendant arising from the same incident as this civil action.

 

These documents are proper documents subject to judicial notice under Cal. Evid. Code § 452, subdivs. (c) and (d). The Court notes that in regard to the documents for which the Court grants judicial notice, the Court is not mandated to accept the truth of its their contents or the parties' interpretation of those contents. (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [“ ‘Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.’ [Citation.] While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein. [Citation.] ‘When judicial notice is taken of a document, . . .the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.’ [Citation.]”) That is, the Court cannot judicially notice the truth of another court's factual findings or its view of the record. The Court notes that while the criminal case may have been brought in the same courthouse, it is separate from this civil action and brought before a different judicial officer.

 

Application – Defendant argues that summary judgment should be granted based on the holding that the scope of the issues of material facts to be considered must be framed by the pleadings (see Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253) and the facts of the case do not support Plaintiffs’ claims.

 

Plaintiffs present the following facts:

 

 

(See also Exh. A [Plaintiff’s deposition on which Pl.’s UMFs rely on].)

 

Defendant argues that the facts must be looked at in the context of the pleadings and, due to this, Defendant did not owe or breach a duty of care to Plaintiff for an unforeseeable and allegedly “concealed” condition. Defendant presents several cases in which he believes the holding is that where an injury is not foreseeable, there was no duty. (See Gomez v. Ticor (1993) 145 Cal.App.3d 622, 629-630; Sturgeon v. Curnutt (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 301, 306.)

 

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. Premises liability ‘ “is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises” ’; accordingly, ‘ “mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act.” ’ But the duty arising from possession and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies in negligence cases. In determining whether a premises owner owes a duty to persons on its property, we apply the Rowland [Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561]] factors. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159 [internal citations omitted].)

 

“The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.) The Court also notes that California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others. (See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a) [“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself. . .”].)

 

Here, Defendant invited Plaintiff to his property. Defendant owes Plaintiff a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of the premises. The question presented before the Court is whether that duty was breached.

 

As this is a case in which the pleadings allege trampled by the people that were rushing to leave the Premises, the Court has looked to cases with a similar set of circumstances. Rogers v. Jones (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 346 provides:

 

As operator of the stadium parking lot, defendant Jones owed a general duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of the premises to avoid exposing persons who came upon the property in the course of its operation of the parking lot to the unreasonable risk of harm (Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 118 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal.2d 114, 117 [52 Cal.Rptr. 561, 416 P.2d 793]; Rest.2d Torts, § 334). This general duty arose from the fact that Jones, at the time of the incident complained of, was the occupier of the premises with the right to control and manage the property. The duty was neither dependent upon nor limited by Jones' contract with the City of San Diego (Nevarez v. Thriftimart, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.App.3d 799, 804; Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.) p. 339). This general duty included not only the duty to keep the property free from dangerous and defective conditions and to conduct its own activities with due caution, but also the duty to control the wrongful acts of third persons which threatened others on the property, if it had reasonable cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of injury arising from them (Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., supra, 65 Cal.2d 114, 121).

 

When the owner or occupier of land himself creates a dangerous condition on the property or fails to conduct his own activities with reasonable caution (misfeasance), the question of foreseeability of harm to others is generally more easily assessed (see Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.3d 40, 47; Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.) pp. 339-340). When, as in this case, responsibility for the misconduct of third persons is involved (nonfeasance), the issue of foreseeability frequently becomes so nebulous that courts determine it adversely to the plaintiff as a matter of law (Richards v. Stanley, supra, 43 Cal.2d 60, 67).

 

While the proprietor of a business or the occupier of land has a general duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of persons who come upon the property, he is not an insurer of their safety (Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., supra, 65 Cal.2d 114, 121), and the duty does not extend to controlling the misconduct of third persons which he has no reason to anticipate and no reasonable opportunity or means to prevent.

 

"Where . . . it is the conduct of a third party on the premises which directly causes the injury, liability may attach only where the possessor of the premises has reasonable cause to anticipate such conduct and the probability of resulting injury, and fails to take affirmative steps to control the wrongful conduct. (Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., . . . 65 Cal.2d 114, 121 . . . ; Hunter v. Mohawk Petroleum Corp. . . . 51 Cal.2d 439 . . .; Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen . . . 27 Cal.2d 802, 809-810 . . . ; Young v. Desert View Management Corp. . . . 275 Cal.App.2d 294 . . .; Richter v. Adobe Creek Lodge . . . 143 Cal.App.2d 514 . . .; Porter v. California Jockey Club, Inc. . . . 134 Cal.App.2d 158 . . .; Baley v. J. F. Hink & Son . . . 133 Cal.App.2d 102, 110-112 . . . ; Worcester v. Theatrical etc. Corp. . . . 28 Cal.App.2d 116 . . . . )" (Nevarez v. Thriftimart, Inc., 7 Cal.App.3d 799, 804-805 [87 Cal.Rptr. 50].)

 

There is a risk of harm peculiarly inherent in the large crowds which attend stadium-held sporting events, and that risk is not dissipated when the thousands of spectators abruptly descend upon the parking area when the event is over. Because of the sheer number of people involved, anticipating and preventing harm to some member of the public by those in charge is difficult under the best of circumstances. When the harm results from a sudden, intentional, malicious and criminal act of a third party, anticipation of harm as well as a reasonable opportunity to prevent its occurrence may approach the impossible.

 

(Rogers v. Jones (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 346, 350-51 [emphasis added].)

 

To elaborate on the issue of when the owner or occupier of the creates a dangerous condition on the property or fails to conduct his own activities with reasonable caution (misfeasance), the Court cites Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 204 (“Brown”):

 

The “general rule” governing duty is set forth in Civil Code section 1714 (section 1714). (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 771 [122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170] (Cabral).) First enacted in 1872, section 1714 provides: “Everyone is responsible … for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person … .” (Id., subd. (a).) This statute establishes the default rule that each person has a duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.”  (Cabral, at p. 768.)

 

Section 1714 states a broad rule, but it has limits. We have explained that the law imposes a general duty of care on a defendant only when it is the defendant who has “‘created a risk’” of harm to the plaintiff, including when “‘the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse.’” (Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 716 [110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 28 P.3d 249], quoting Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36]; see Lugtu, at p. 716 [“Under general negligence principles, … a person ordinarily is obligated to exercise due care in his or her own actions so as not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others … .” (Citing § 1714)].) The law does not impose the same duty on a defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the plaintiff would suffer the harm alleged. Generally, the “person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another” from that peril. (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23 [192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137] (Williams); accord, Weirum, at p. 49; see Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2012) § 37 (hereafter Restatement Third of Torts) [Generally, “[a]n actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical or emotional harm to another has no duty of care to the other.”].) For example, a person who stumbles upon someone drowning generally has no legal duty to help the victim. The same rule applies to a person who stumbles upon a mugging, for “as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145, 113 P.3d 1159] (Delgado); see also Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 [Generally, “‘one owes no duty control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.’”].)

 

This general rule, we have explained, “derives from the common law's distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose liability for the latter.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435, fn. 5 [131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334].) That distinction has deep roots in the law. (See, e.g., Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (1908) 56 U.Pa. L.Rev. 217, 219 [“There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive in action, a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the defendant.”].) And although it may sometimes produce outcomes that appear “[m]orally questionable” (Tarasoff, at p. 435, fn. 5), there are several reasons the no-duty-to-protect rule has endured. The most commonly cited reason for the rule is rooted in “the liberal tradition of individual freedom and autonomy” —the idea that a person should be able to freely choose whether to come to the aid of a stranger, without fear of incurring legal liability for the choice. (Rest.3d Torts, supra, § 37, com. e, p. 5.) But our cases have recognized other reasons as well, including “‘the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow men,’” and the challenge of “‘making any workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty people might fail to rescue.’” (Tarasoff, at p. 435, fn. 5, quoting Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 56, p. 341.)

 

(Brown, supra, 11 Cal. 5th 204, 213-15.)

 

Unlike Rogers, it is alleged that Defendant created the situation. To address this, Defendant highlights that the purported conduct of Defendant that led to Plaintiff’s fall was a group of people who were purportedly in the process of being pushed out the front door. (See Pl.’s UMF No. 17; Exh. A 91:2-13 and 92:10-22.) Defendant’s timeline is more limited in scope, focusing only on what happened when Plaintiff was at the door. Because of this, Defendant neglects to address: (1) the allegation that he created a situation that caused people at the Premises to uncontrollably rush to leave the Premises (Complaint ¶ 11); (2) that Defendant breached his duty of care by failing to act prudently under the circumstances, without due care, and negligently created an unreasonable risk of harm (Complaint ¶ 18); and (3) the evidence presented indicating that Defendant created the situation (see Exh. A 73:7-10 [yelling begins], 78:2-6 [Defendant slaps wife], 78:12-23 [fist fighting occurred], 81:11-16 [commotion, fighting, arguing]; 90:1-15 [getting loud; people were being pushed out of the door]; 91:13-18 [Plaintiff believes Defendant and Marissa were pushing people out the door]; 103:1-1 [Defendant was out of control and at the front door at the time Plaintiff fell]; Exh. B Special Interrogatory No. 32 [“Plaintiff asked him to stop the arguing and his behavior.”], Special Interrogatory No. 47 response [cut off; “among other things, throwing objects, frightening people, and creating a panicked state to those around him such that those people rushed to leave the subject premises.”], Special Interrogatory No. 48 [“The trap condition that Defendant created was, among other things, acting dangerously, failing to act prudently, creating an unreasonable risk of harm, and otherwise acting negligently by, among other things, throwing objects, frightening people, and creating a panicked state to those around him such that those people rushed to leave the subject premises.”].)

 

The Court does not feel that this argument adequately addresses Defendant’s alleged conduct. That is, the conduct alleged by the Complaint is that Defendant acted negligently in creating a situation that caused individuals to rush out of the Premises, the evidence addresses that Defendant was indeed arguing or creating a situation in which guests were uncomfortable, Plaintiff has stated that the guests were being pushed out of the door, not, as Defendant presents, solely the occurrence of third parties alone.

 

Without an argument addressing Defendant’s actions, it appears that the injury to Plaintiff occurred due to Defendant’s malfeasance.

 

Regarding foreseeability, one of the Rowland [Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (“Rowland”)] factors that is hotly contested in this motion, the Court is not swayed by Defendant’s arguments. First:

 

Foreseeability of harm, though not determinative, has become the chief factor in duty analysis. Confusion has arisen over the concept of foreseeability and the variety of roles it plays in tort law. Foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury in many contexts. However, in defining the boundaries of duty, foreseeability is a question of law for the court. The question of foreseeability in a "duty" context is a limited one for the court and is readily contrasted with the fact-specific foreseeability questions bearing on negligence (breach of duty) and causation posed to the jury or trier of fact. (Scott v. Chevron U.S.A., supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 510, 515-516; Lopez v. McDonald's Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 495, 506-509 [238 Cal.Rptr. 436].)

 

(Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1686.)

 

Particularly, the Court believes that (1) in this contest, foreseeability is a question for the jury as the questions related to it are “fact-specific foreseeability questions bearing on negligence” (ibid.)  and (2) a jury may find it foreseeable that, when an argument occurs, including throwing objects frightening people, and creating a panicked state, that some people would rush to leave the premises. (See Exh. B Special Interrogatory No. 48.)

 

The Court notes that Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10(a)(1) requires complaint to contain a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language” in order to “ ‘to give fair notice of their claims to opposing parties so they can defend’ (Ameron Internat. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1370, 1384 [118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 95, 242 P.3d 1020]) and to  ‘ “ ‘set forth the essential facts of [the] case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the] cause of action’ ” ’ (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099 [34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 157]).” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 1225, 1238-39.) Though the characterization of trampling in the Complaint may not ultimately have played out, the Complaint shows that Plaintiff was injured due to people rushing out the door. From the evidence presented, it is clear that Plaintiff stepped back in avoidance of the aforementioned people. The Complaint adequately gives notice of the following: Plaintiff was injured, the injury stemmed from Defendant’s actions, Defendant had a duty, and the alleged breach of that duty constitutes a claim for Negligence/Premises liability. This provides fair notice for Defendant to defend.

 

Defendant has not met his burden burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

 

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Opposition and Reply

 

Plaintiff’s Reply has a section presenting that Defendant was charged with two crimes in relation to his conduct at the Premises. As judicial notice does not allow a Court to accept the truthfulness of the documents, the Court does not address these representations.

 

Additionally, Plaintiff has attached the Sheriff’s incident report (Exh. 5) includes a declaration of the custodian records pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 1400. (See also Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (2020) 55 Cal. App. 5th 323, 2020 Cal. App. LEXIS 918, transferred, (Cal. 2020), 268 Cal. Rptr. 3d 690, 472 P.3d 1064, 2020 Cal. LEXIS 6769.)

 

As to the legal argument, Plaintiff argues:

 

 

Defendant’s Reply argues that the facts raised by Plaintiff in Opposition to the Motion are not material to the issues framed by the pleadings or the manner in which the subject incident occurred (i.e., the presenting facts are immaterial as there is no evidence that Plaintiff was in a trap condition, trampled, or in a special relationship with Defendant), that the matter for which judicial notice is requested is improper, that there was no special relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, that the manner in which Plaintiff claims to be injured was unforeseeable, and that no conduct on the part of Defendant was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries.

 

The Court is not swayed by Defendant’s argument that all facts presented in Plaintiff’s Opposition are immaterial. Specifically, it is alleged that Defendant’s actions are what caused people to rush to the door. That is, Defendant’s physical actions such as slapping, physical shoving, throwing, etc. are what caused individuals to rush to the door. These actions are within the scope of the Complaint and indicate that Defendant’s malfeasance created the situation which ultimately led to Plaintiff’s injuries. As to foreseeability, the Court has addressed this in its analysis of Defendant’s burden. To highlight Defendant’s argument citing Sturgeon v. Curnutt (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 301, 306 [to support a finding of duty, the foreseeability must be reasonable], a jury may be able to find that it reasonable that (1) Defendant created a panicked state, causing some people to rush to leave the premises, and (2) someone attempting to avoid people rushing out of the Premises would exercise less caution.

 

As the Court analyzed, ante, Defendant did not meet his burden. Plaintiff’s Opposition and Defendant’s Reply do not impact the Court’s analysis. The Court’s opinion remains unchanged.

 

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Conclusion

 

Defendant Jason Medina’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.