Judge: Stephen Morgan, Case: 21AVCV00876, Date: 2023-07-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21AVCV00876 Hearing Date: October 24, 2023 Dept: A14
Background
This is a premises liability action. Plaintiff
Isabelle Hill (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendants Best
Western International, Inc. (“Best Western”) and Bains Hospitality, LLC –
erroneously sued and served as Best Western Plus Desert Poppy Inn – (“Bains”
and collectively “Defendants”) alleging personal injury and monetary damages
resulting from alleged Cimex lectularius (commonly known as bedbug) bites
during Plaintiff’s stay at Defendants’ hotel on November 03, 2019.
Plaintiff checked in to the hotel on
November 02, 2019. On November 03, 2019, Plaintiff states that she awoke at 2
a.m. with an “intense itching sensation.” (Compl. ¶ 15.) She alleges that when she
pulled back the covers, she discovered bedbugs which she reported to hotel staff.
Plaintiff contends that cleaning staff then came to inspect the room at which
time she presented a dead bedbug to them. Plaintiff checked out early – on or
about November 3, 2019 – due to her alleged injuries from the bedbugs. She states
that she called the manager to inform them of the issue and they apologized and
refunded her stay. When searching online, Plaintiff states that she found that there
had been a previous a bedbug problem.
On November 4, 2019, Plaintiff sought
treatment at Antelope Valley Hospital Emergency Room due to worsening of
symptoms. There, she was diagnosed as having “bedbug bites and was prescribed
medication for her injuries.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff later sought further
medical attention due to the persistent itching and pain. Plaintiff alleges that
she suffered emotional scarring and incurred costs associated with medical
treatment, the hotel room, and replacing her belongings that had been exposed
to infestation at the hotel.
On November 02, 2021, Plaintiff filed their
Complaint against Defendants alleging the following causes of action: (1) Battery,
(2) Negligence, (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”), (4) Fraudulent
Concealment, (5) Private Nuisance, (6) Public Nuisance, and (7) Breach of Contract.
The operative pleading is the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), filed
August 10, 2023, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Negligence, (2)
IIED, (3) Fraudulent Concealment, (4) Public Nuisance, and (5) Breach of
Contract.
On September 11, 2023, Defendants filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike
to the SAC.
No Opposition has been filed. “All papers
opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on
each party at least nine court days. . .before the hearing.” (Cal. Code Civ.
Proc.§ 1005(b).) “Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may
be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion,
papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section.” (Ibid.)
The hearing is set for October 24, 2023. Accordingly, an Opposition was due by October
11, 2023. Should an Opposition be filed, it is now untimely.
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Legal Standard
Standard for Demurrer – A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn v.¿Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.
App. 4th 740, 747.) ¿When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context.¿ (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power¿(2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)¿ In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial
notice.¿ (CCP § 430.30(a).)¿A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the
evidence or other extrinsic matters.¿ (SKF Farms v. Superior Court¿(1984)
153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)¿ Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear
on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.¿¿(Id.)¿¿The only
issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn,¿supra,¿147
Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
A general demurrer admits the truth of all
factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading,
regardless of possible difficulties of proof.¿¿(Blank,¿supra, 39
Cal.3d at p. 318.)¿ Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff’s
allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the
demurrer.¿¿(Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co.¿(1981) 123
Cal.App.3d 593, 604.)¿ Nevertheless, this rule does not apply to allegations
expressing mere conclusions of law, or allegations contradicted by the exhibits
to the complaint or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿¿(Vance
v. Villa Park¿Mobilehome¿Estates¿(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 698, 709.)¿ Stated
otherwise, a general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law;
or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.¿¿(Blank,¿supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
Pursuant to¿Code Civ. Proc.¿§430.10(e), the
party against whom a complaint has been filed may object by demurrer to the
pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.¿ It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a
demurrer if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by
amendment.¿¿(Schifando¿v. City of Los Angeles¿(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074,
1082,¿as modified (Dec. 23, 2003).)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿
¿¿
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¿¿
Standard for
Motion to Strike – The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may
also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity
with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id.,
§ 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has
irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in
conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must
appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. §
437.)
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Meet and Confer Requirement
– Before filing a demurrer or a
motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer
with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is
subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an
agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would
resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and
435.5.) The Court notes that the Moving
Party has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (Decl. of Tiffanie Q. Spivey ¶ 3.)
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Discussion
a.
Demurrer
Defendants demur to all the Second Cause of
Action (IIED), Third Cause of Action (Fraudulent Concealment), Fourth Cause of
Action (Public Nuisance), and Fifth Cause of Action (Breach of Contract).
i. Second
Cause of Action (IIED)
As an initial matter, the difference between
this cause of action in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and the SAC is one paragraph
that reads:
Plaintiff sustained extreme emotional
distress as a result of the injuries the sustained from the infestation of
bedbugs, including inability to sleep, fear of bedbugs and fear being exposed
to bedbugs, severe anxiety and stress from fear of constantly and continuously being
exposed to and bitten by bedbugs, anxiety when traveling due to extreme fear of
being exposed to bedbugs in any public accommodations.
(SAC ¶ 66.)
Defendants present that the claims are based
on unsupported and conclusory facts and highlights that they attempted to
remedy the situation. Defendant cites to the SAC in which Plaintiff admits that
she received a refund once she complained to the manager. Defendant further
highlights that an allegation that the acts of Defendants caused Plaintiff’s
emotional distress is not sufficient to prove intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Defendants argue that, as alleged, the allegations concern
conduct that appears negligent, not intentional and, as such, Plaintiff has
failed to allege sufficient facts for IIED.
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering
severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s
conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be
‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will
result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035,1050-1051.)
The Court previously held, in relevant part:
Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant had the intent to cause serious
emotional damage. Instead, Plaintiff only alleges that Defendants failed to
disclose the bed bug infestation, and placed Plaintiff in a certain room so
Plaintiff would get bitten by bed bugs. (FAC ¶ 66.) Here, there’s no
allegations regarding intent nor are there any allegations regarding what
damages Plaintiff suffered. Plaintiff states broadly “Plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress that has caused Plaintiff to sustain severe, serious and
permanent injuries to her person” (FAC ¶ 74.) Plaintiff failed to allege intent
and damages suffered, which are fundamental elements to prove IIED cause of
action. (Hughes v. Pair 1050-1051) Nor does the allegation prove that
the Defendants aimed for Plaintiff to get injured in the room or that
Defendants were aware that Plaintiff would get harmed. (Christensen v.
Superior Court , 903-904.)
(07/11/2023 SOD, p. 4.)
Plaintiff’s attempt to rectify the previous deficiency is insufficient.
It rectifies only the damages that Plaintiff has suffered. As to intent, the
issue remains. The conduct of Defendants is not shown to be outrageous or
exceeding that of what is tolerated in a civilized community. There is no
evidence proffered that would allow a reasonable inference that Defendants were
aware of any alleged infestation or demonstrated any conscious disregard for
Plaintiff’s well-being. Rather, Plaintiff alleges (1) she found evidence online
after the fact of alleged previous infestations (SAC ¶ 21), and (2) a cleaning
staff member knew that there were bedbugs at some undisclosed point in time previously
(SAC ¶ 17). That is, the allegations regarding intent and knowledge are
conclusory. A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law;
or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.
(See legal standard, ante.)
For the purposes of clarity, the Court notes that Defendants provide a
further argument that the allegations Plaintiff alleges to have suffered are
not sever under California law. This, too, has been previously addressed by the
Court:
Defendants rely upon various cases in order to argue that Plaintiff’s
alleged emotional injuries are not enough for an IIED claim. Defendants quote:
“In order to establish that element [“severe” distress], California law
requires that plaintiff prove that he suffered objective symptoms of distress.
‘Headaches, insomnia, anxiety, irritability [are] not ‘severe’ under California
law.’ ” (Paulson v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1994) 867 F. Supp.
911, 920 [discussing California law and citing Standard Wire & Cable Co.
v. Ameritrust Corp. (1988) 697 F. Supp. 368, 372] (“Paulson”).
However, Paulson’s validity has now been questioned:
Paulson cited as
lone authority for its erroneous declaration of California law another district
court case, Standard Wire & Cable Co. v. AmeriTrust Corp. (C.D.Cal.
1988) 697 F. Supp. 368, 372 (Standard Wire). Standard Wire, however,
made no mention of the “objective symptoms” standard, and our own review of
California law reveals no authority requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate
“objective symptoms” to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, Standard
Wire did not determine that headaches, insomnia, anxiety, and irritability
could never be “severe” under California law, but ruled that “[t]he plaintiffs'
distress—headaches, insomnia, anxiety, irritability—is not ‘severe’ under
California law.” (Id. at p. 372, italics added.) In other words, Standard
Wire should be read as simply making a factual finding that the plaintiffs'
symptoms in that case were insufficiently severe to support their emotional
distress claim. Indeed, Standard Wire cites Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of
America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 909 [215 Cal. Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826], in
which the California Supreme Court held that evidence of “alcoholism, severe
headaches, insomnia, tension and anxiety” constituted substantial evidence
supporting a verdict in favor of plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. (Id. at p. 909, italics added.) In sum, neither Paulson
nor Standard Wire correctly states California law concerning the extent
of emotional distress sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
(Hailey v. California Physicians' Service (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th
452, 477.)
(03/28/2023 Statement of Decision pp. 7-8.)
Defendants’ argument regarding whether Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms are
severe does not address Plaintiff’s new paragraph which details Plaintiff’s
symptoms of emotional distress.
ii.
Third Cause of Action (Fraudulent Concealment)
As with the Second Cause of Action, there have been additions to this
SAC in the Thid Cause of Action:
As evidenced by prior similar incidents and reviews posted on various
online platforms by prior guests and invitees, Defendants and DOES 1 through 20
had or should have had knowledge of the existence and presence of the bedbug
infestation occurring in various rooms of the Subject Hotel.
(SAC ¶ 80)
Hotel management’s actions of concealing bed
bug infestations in the Subject Hotel are within the knowledge, purview, and
ratification by corporate decision makers, officers, directors, or managing
agents, at the Subject Hotel.
(SAC ¶ 88.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed
to plead allegations with factual particularity and specific to support the
elements of fraud as there are no specific facts to support Plaintiff’s claims
that there was a current infestation in the hotel or that Defendants knew of a
current infestation and concealed this information from Plaintiff.
“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on a
concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material
fact; (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the
plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed
the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff must have
been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of
the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or
suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Boschma
v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248.)
As with the cleaning staff, the allegation that various
incidents and review posted online, alleged in paragraph 80, alone does not
show Defendants had knowledge of the bedbug infestation. For example, a review
posted many years ago will not suffice to show notice for the current
situation.
This brings the Court to a unique situation.
The facts alleged are such that they do not amount to a reasonable inference
that Defendants knew about the bedbug infestation; however, the standard for
fraud is relaxed when it is alleged that a defendant possesses full information
concerning the facts. That is, regarding specificity, “[l]ess specificity is
required when it ‘appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant
must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.’
” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983)
35 Cal.3d 197, 216 [quoting Bradley v. Hartford Acc.& Indem. Co.
(1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 825].) The specificity requirement is greatly relaxed
or eliminated under circumstances where the defendant must necessarily possess
superior information of the fraud. (Id., at 216-217; see also Silberg
v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212-213.)
Taking into consideration the arguments
presented by the parties and the relaxed standard, ante, the Court is
inclined to allow this claim to proceed forward as pled.
iii.
Fourth Cause of Action (Public Nuisance)
There has been no change between this cause
of action from the FAC to the SAC.
Defendants present the same argument as in
the previously filed Demurrer – Plaintiff does not plead any instances where
the alleged bedbug issue affected a considerable amount of people. The Court
incorporates its previous analysis as applied to this cause of action in the
SAC:
"A public nuisance is one which affects
at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted
upon individuals may be unequal." (Civ. Code, § 3480.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not
plead any instances where the alleged bedbug issue affected a considerable
amount of people, thus, affecting the community at large. Therefore, as
alleged, Defendants believe that the FAC fails to state a cause of action for
Public Nuisance. (Demurrer, Page 10, lines 23-25.)
Plaintiff alleges that the unsanitary and
uninhabitable conditions of bed bugs infestation caused injuries both to her
health and safety, and interfered substantially with Plaintiff’s comfortable
enjoyment of the room she rented. (FAC ¶¶101-102.) Plaintiff states that bed
bug infestation can spread from the Hotel room to the public and into their
residence which can affect the community at large (FAC ¶ 103). However, the FAC
does not allege that anyone other than Plaintiff was injured, and so fails to meet
the statutory requirements (Civ. Code, § 3480) for a public nuisance claim.
However, Plaintiff’s FAC does not prove how
the bed bugs affected the community at large since it does not state any facts
on how the bed bugs affected other individuals besides Plaintiff.
(07/11/2023 Statement of Decision at p. 6.)
iv.
Fifth Cause of Action (Breach of Contract)
The Fifth Cause of Action includes the
following addition from the FAC to the SAC:
Plaintiff rented out a room at the Subject
Hotel with the expectation that Defendants, and Does 1 through 20, inclusive,
would uphold their duty in maintaining the Subject Hotel in a safe and
habitable condition. Instead, Plaintiff was bitten by bedbugs and as a result
was subject to harm, among other things.
(SAC ¶ 113.)
Defendants’ argument remains the same as in
the previous Demurrer – Plaintiff has neither attached a copy of the contract,
incorporated by reference, or recite it verbatim in the Complaint and that
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that she was damaged from
any breach of the contract alleged because she received a refund for her
night’s stay.
“To
prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove
(1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the
plaintiff.” (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.)
The addition in the SAC appears to be an
attempt to plead facts demonstrating that Plaintiff was damaged from a breach
of contract. However, the deficiency with regards to the allegations related to
the contract remains. That is, (a) “[t]o prevail on a cause of action for
breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the
plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the
defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff[]” (Richman
v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186); and (b) Plaintiff did not
attach the contract or recite the terms of the contract and “[o]rdinarily a
written contract is sufficiently pleaded if it is set out in full or its terms
alleged according to their legal effect . . . . But if the instrument is
ambiguous, the pleader must allege the meaning he ascribes to it[]” (Beck v.
American Health Group Internat., Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1555, 1561; see
also Otworth v. S. Oac.
Transp. Co. (1985) 166
Cal.App.3d 452, 459 [“[I]f the action is based on an alleged breach of a
written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the
complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated
by reference.”]). Here, no contract is attached nor are terms
provided. Plaintiff alleges only that a written contract was entered into “for
the rent of Plaintiff’s room in compliance with California Health & Safety
Code.” (SAC ¶ 112.) Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled each element of a
breach of contract claim.
b. Motion to Strike
Defendants move to strike all references to
punitive damages and:
· Page 14, ¿ 63: “Plaintiff is informed and
believes, and thereon alleges, that the aforesaid conduct of Defendants, DOES 2
through 20, was carried out with a willful and conscious disregard of
Plaintiff's right to be free from tortious behavior, such as to constitute disregard of Plaintiff's right
to be from such tortious behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or
malice pursuant to California Civil Code Section 3294, and that an officer,
director, or managing agent of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20, authorized or
ratified the wrongful acts of the employees of Defendants, and DOES 2 through
20, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish
and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20.”
· Page
17, ¿ 77: “Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the
aforesaid conduct of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20, was carried out with a
willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from tortious
behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to
California Civil Code Section 3294, and that an officer, director, or managing
agent of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20, authorized or ratified the wrongful
acts of the employees of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20, entitling Plaintiff
to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of
Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20.”
· Page
22, ¿ 100: “Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the
aforesaid conduct of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20, was carried out with a
willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from tortious
behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to
California Civil Code Section 3294, and that an officer, director, or managing
agent of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20, authorized or ratified the wrongful
acts of the employees of Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20, entitling Plaintiff
to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of
Defendants, and DOES 2 through 20.”
· Page 25, Prayer for Relief: “For punitive
damages to be determined at trial;”
Defendants argue that specific facts of
malice and oppression must be pled to support punitive damages. While
Defendants law that discusses punitive damages in light of oppression, fraud,
or malice, Defendants focus on malice and oppression.
At this time, the Court has analyzed the
Breach of Contract Claim, ante, and found it insufficient. Punitive
damages in an action for a breach of duty not arising from contract occur only
when a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff
for the sake of example or by way of punishing the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc §
3294(a).) They are defined as:
(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended
by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which
is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294(c)(1).)
(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct
that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of
that person’s rights. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294(c)(2).)
(3) “Fraud” means an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 3294(c)(3).)
The Court has allowed the claim for fraud to
continue based on how it was pled (i.e., knowledge is alleged to be within the
purview of corporate decision makers (SAC ¶ 88) and, because of this, there is
a relaxed standard for fraud. Because of this, there appears to be a basis for
punitive damages (i.e., fraud).
The Court DENIES the Motion to Strike with
the understanding that such language is directed to the Fraudulent Concealment
cause of action.
Leave to Amend
Leave to amend
must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy¿(1976), 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) While under
California law leave to amend is liberally granted, “leave to amend should not
be granted where, in all
probability, amendment would be futile.” (Vaillette v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. (1993), 18 Cal. App. 4th 680, 685).¿ “A trial court does not abuse its
discretion when it sustains a demurrer without¿leave to amend¿if either (a) the
facts and the nature of the claims are clear and no liability exists, or (b) it
is probable from the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts
to plead that the plaintiff cannot state a claim.” (Cantu v. Resolution
Trust Corp.¿(1992)¿4 Cal.App.4th 857, 889.)¿¿
Here, the claims are such that the Court
believes that Plaintiff may be able to rectify the deficiencies with an
amendment. The Court notes, however, that this will be the third attempt at
remedying the deficiencies in the pleadings, some of which have been present
since the original Complaint. The Court directs Plaintiff to the various
Statements of Decision for insight.
The Court emphasizes that, if upon filing of
the Third Amended Complaint, the deficiencies remain, the Court will find it
probable that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for the various causes of action
at issue.
Leave to amend is GRANTED.
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Conclusion
Defendants Best Western
International, Inc. and Bains Hospitality, LLC (erroneously sued and served as
Best Western Plus Desert Poppy Inn) Demurrer is OVERRULED in part as to the Third Cause of Action (Fraudulent
Concealment) and SUSTAINED in part as to the Second Cause of Action (IIED),
Fourth Cause of Action (Public Nuisance), and Fifth Cause of Action (Breach of
Contract) with Leave to Amend.
Defendants Best Western
International, Inc. and Bains Hospitality, LLC (erroneously sued and served as
Best Western Plus Desert Poppy Inn) Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Plaintiff Isabelle Hill is to
file an amended pleading within 30 days of this Court Order.