Judge: Stephen Morgan, Case: 22AVCV00106, Date: 2022-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AVCV00106    Hearing Date: August 16, 2022    Dept: A14

Background

 

This is a motor vehicle action. Plaintiff Ruth Abigail Lopez Barahona (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Adriana L. Valdivia, as personal representative for the Estate of Ismael Avila (“Defendant”), were negligent and the legal proximate cause of injuries and damages to Plaintiff for the acts that occurred on December 13, 2020 at Pearblossom Highway 2,890 feet of [sic] 70th Street East in the City of Palmdale, California. Plaintiff further alleges that, at the time of the incident, Topa Insurance Company (“Topa”) and Anchor Claims Services, Inc. (“Anchor”), as authorized representative of Topa, provided liability coverage for the vehicle driven by Defendant and on December 31, 2020 Plaintiff conveyed an offer to Topa to settle Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant which included a policy limit demand that states: “No term is more important than any other term; therefore, this offer cannot be accepted without the unequivocal acceptance and compliance of all the terms[.]” (Attachment to Complaint 5:18-19.) Plaintiff presents that the following occurred:

 

 

(Id., 6:17-27.)

 

Plaintiff contends that an actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties as Plaintiff believes no settlement was created while Defendant contends that Defendant had settled her claims against Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks judicial determination of her rights and duties, and a declaration that no settlement was reached.

 

On February 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging three causes of action for (1) Motor Vehicle (2) General Negligence, and (3) Declaratory Relief. The Court notes that the Complaint only has attachments for the Motor Vehicle and Declaratory Relief causes of action.

 

On June 10, 2022, Defendant filed her Answer.

 

On June 22, 2022, Defendant filed this Motion to Strike.

 

On August 03, 2022 Plaintiff filed her Opposition.

 

On August 09, 2022, Defendant filed her Reply.

 

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Analysis

 

Standard for Motion to Strike – The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)¿¿¿ 

 

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Meet and Confer Requirement¿– Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.¿ (Cal. Code Civ.¿Proc. §430.41 and §435.5.)¿ The Court notes that the requirement has been met. (Decl. Evelyn Levine Solis, ¶¿3.)¿

 

 

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Discussion

 

Application – Defendant urges the Court to strike:

 

  1. Page 3, Paragraph 10, subsection f, Declaratory Relief

  2. Page 3, Paragraph 11, subsection g, Declaratory Relief

  3. Pages 5, 6 and 7, including the entire second cause of action for Declaratory Relief, and the prayer for relief regarding declaration of no settlement.

 

Defendant argues that, under Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1152, 1154, and Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471 (“Zhou”), evidence of a settlement is inadmissible and, therefore, the Complaint contains portions that are irrelevant and improper. Defendant further argues that the Declaratory Relief cause of action constitutes a sham pleading that is not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California.

 

Plaintiff presents that, in ruling on a motion to strike, “ ‘[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.’ ” (Opposition 1:19-21 [citing Clauson v. Sup.Ct. (Pedus Services, Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255].) Plaintiff argues that, based on this holding, his Court must assume as true that a dispute exists between the parties about whether they had settled the case. Plaintiff also presents that Defendant failed to satisfy the legal requirement for a motion to strike – specifically, Defendant did not point to any allegations on the face of the pleading nor did they comply with subdivision (b) of Code Civ. Proc. § 437 which requires them to specify any such judicially noticeable facts in their notice of motion in regard to Defendant’s falsity/sham pleading argument. Further, Plaintiff argues that evidence of a settlement is inadmissible to prevent a jury from using settlement evidence as evidence of fault of a third party not present during a trial, and not applicable in this case because the dispute is whether there is a settlement, evidence of settlement is relevant. Plaintiff believes that this Motion to Strike is “an improper attempt to have this Court step outside the scope of its authority and decide a factual dispute on the merits without any evidence,” (Opposition 3:12-14.)

 

Defendant argues in her Reply that (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint contains superfluous language, which is irrelevant, false, and/or improper; (2) that the Court has grounds to strike any portions of the pleading that are irrelevant, improper, and/or not drawn in conformity with applicable rules or court orders; and (3) any language that is immaterial and not essential to Plaintiff’s Complaint for motor vehicle liability is irrelevant and prejudicial and should be stricken. Further, Defendant argues that a settlement would only become an issue if there was a binding settlement whereas, in this action, there were only settlement negotiations. Defendant believes Plaintiff’s arguments to be “per se bad faith” and “opened policy” which do not have a place in third-party civil litigation.

 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1060 provides the statutory basis for a claim of declaratory relief:

 

Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.

 

Case law provides that a settlement agreement is governed by the principles surrounding contract law:

 

“A settlement agreement is simply a contract.” (Hernandez v. Board of Education (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1176, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (Hernandez).) “A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” (Civ.Code, § 1636.) When interpreting a written contract, we generally ascertain the intention of the parties from the writing alone, if possible. (Civ.Code, § 1639.) A contract, however, “may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates.” (Civ.Code, § 1647.)

 

(Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 118; see also Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 24 [“ ‘An action for declaratory relief is an equitable proceeding and the powers of a court are as broad and extensive as those exercised by such court in any ordinary proceeding in equity [citation]. It is elementary that questions relating to the formation of a contract, its validity, its construction and effect, excuses for nonperformance, and termination are proper subjects for declaratory relief [citation].’ (Fowler v. Ross (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 472, 478 [191 Cal. Rptr. 183] (Fowler).)”].)

 

“[Cal. Evid. Code] Section 1152, subdivision (a), provides that offers of compromise are inadmissible to prove the liability of the offeror for the loss or damage. In insurance litigation, ‘[t]he language of this section does not preclude the introduction of settlement negotiations if offered not to prove liability for the original loss but to prove failure to process the claim fairly and in good faith.’ (White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 870, 887 [221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309].)” (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 915.) Therefore, Defendant’s arguments regarding Cal. Evid. Code 1152 are inapplicable. Zhou focuses on Cal. Evid. Code § 1152 and its use during trial. (See Zhou, supra 157 Cal.App.4th 1471.) Thus, Zhou is not only inapplicable, but also distinguishable from the current action. Finally, Cal. Evid. Code § 1154 reads: “Evidence that a person has accepted or offered or promised to accept a sum of money or any other thing, act, or service in satisfaction of a claim, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove the invalidity of the claim or any part of it.” Here, the issue is not to prove the invalidity of a claim, but rather whether a valid settlement agreement exists. As such, Cal. Evid. Code §1154 is inapplicable as well.

 

Accordingly, the Motion to Strike is DENIED.

 

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Conclusion

 

Defendant Adriana L. Valdivia, as personal representative for the Estate of Ismael Avila’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.