Judge Stephen Morgan, Case Number: 22AVCV00770, Date: 2023-12-12 Tentative Ruling

This is a sexual abuse action. Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) alleges that (1) she began attending Cole Middle School, operated by Defendant Eastside Union (“EUSD”), during the 2001-2002 school year; (2) Defendant Arthur Gomez (“Gomez” and collectively “Defendants”) was a security guard at Cole Middle School; and (3) during the 2001-2002 and into the 2002-2003 school years, Gomez would regularly pull Plaintiff out of her classes, take her tohis office on campus, and sexually abuse her.

On October 04, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging eight (8) causes of action for: (1) Sexual Abuse of a Minor against Gomez; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against Gomez; (3) Sexual Harassment (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51.9 and 52); (4) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention of an Unfit Employee against EUSD; (5) Breach of Mandatory Duty: Failure to Report a Suspected Child Abuse (Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6) against EUSD; (6) Negligent Failure to Warn, Train, or Educate against EUSD; (7) Negligent Supervision of a Minor against EUSD; and (8) Negligence against Does 41-50.

On July 27, 2023, EUSD filed its Cross-Complaint against Gomez, California State Soccer Association-South (“CSSAS”), and Palmdale Soccer Club (“PSC”), alleging four causes of action for: (1) Implied Indemnity; (2) Equitable Indemnity; (3) Declaratory Relief; and (4) Contribution.

On October 11, 2023, EUSD filed this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“MJOP”).

On November 14, 2023, CSSAS, PSC, and Gomez were placed in to default as to the Cross-Complaint.

Standard for Judgment on the Pleadings – A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings only when: a motion for judgment on the pleadings may only be made on one of the following grounds: (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint; or (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1).)¿¿

A motion for judgment on the pleadings challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading’s allegations, not their veracity. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) Thus, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer. (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198; see also Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”].)¿¿

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 [citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216].)¿Any defects must either appear on the face of the pleading, or else be taken by judicial notice. (Id. at 321-22.) The parties’ ability to prove their respective claims is of no concern. (Cloud, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 995 at 999.) Though the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint and answer as true (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515), it will not do so for “conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or [judicially noticed] facts. . .” (Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219–20.)¿¿

EUSD presents that in 2019, the Legislature passed AB 219, signed into law by Governor Newsom on October 13, 2019 and effective January 01, 2020, which opened a three-year window for plaintiffs to file suit for childhood sexual abuse regardless of how long ago the abuse allegedly occurred and amended Cal. Gov. Code § 905 by eliminating language stating that an exemption to a claim requirement for childhood sexual abuse claims applied only to claims in which the conduct occurred on or after January 1, 2009. EUSD next argues (1) the Legislature cannot pass a law attempting to impose liability on a public entity for a past occurrence where there is no enforceable claim (i.e., portions of AB 219 are unconstitutional), and (2) Plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim as Plaintiff never presented a claim to EUSD regarding the misconduct.

Plaintiff attacks the arguments, arguing that EUSD (1) fails to show clear invalidity of AB 218[1]; (2) the gift clause is distinct from any claims presentation deadline as the cases cited by Plaintiff discuss “gifts” in the form of public monies; and (3) the Legislature is free to enact such laws for a public purpose.

EUSD, in reply, argues that (1) AB 218 creates liability where none had previously existed, (2) legislative intent does not override constitutional restraints, highlighting the use of state funds/public money; (3) that Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, cited by Plaintiff, is misplaced and inapplicable as the case was filed prior to the passing of AB 218 and did not raise constitutional issues; and (4) the constitutionality of AB 218 is only challenged as it applies to public entities.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff concedes in the Complaint that she is 32 years old. Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. , Plaintiff’s claim is timely as “[i]n an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later” for actions against any person for committing an act of sexual assault; actions for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff; and actions for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(a).)

Ordinarily, a governmental claim must be presented to the local public entity within six months after accrual of the cause of action (Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2(a)), and that accrual date is not postponed or tolled during the claimant's minority. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a)). Thus, e.g., an 11-year-old child injured on a school playground due to the negligent supervision of a school employee must present her governmental claim within six months of the accident notwithstanding her status as a minor. However, Cal. Gov. Code § 905 designates 13 classes of claims against local public entities that are not subject to the claims procedures of the Government Claims Act, Gov Code §§ 810-996.6. Among these exceptions are “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.” (Cal. Gov. Code § 905(m).) Significantly, the present and applicable iteration of Gov. Code § 905(m) makes Cal. Gov. Code § 905(m) retroactive. (See Cal. Gov. Code § 905(p).) Plaintiff did not present a governmental claim under prior to filing suit, nor was she required to do so.

Recognizing that Plaintiff’s Complaint is timely for purposes of the statute of limitations unless Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1 and Cal. Gov. Code § 905(m) are found to be unenforceable against it, EUSD claims that those provisions, as applied to it here, are unconstitutional. There are, however, a plethora of California cases holding that a legislature may constitutionally adopt a new statute of limitations that effectively revives a civil claim previously barred by the former statute of limitations. (See, e.g., Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 425 [“Legislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate constitutional principles.”]; Deutsch v. Mosonic Homes of California, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 748, 760-762 [statute reviving certain claims of childhood sexual abuse otherwise barred by statutes of limitations is not unconstitutional on its face under the due process clause]; 20th Century Insurance Company v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1247 [application of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.9 (special earthquake statute) to revive plaintiff's action did not impermissibly impair defendant's right of contract or deny it substantive due process by the destruction of vested contract rights]; Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1061 [revival aspect of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.9 is not unconstitutional; “It has been established law for over a century that a legislature may revive a civil claim that is barred by the statute of limitations. The reason is that, in a civil case, there is no constitutional right of repose.”]; Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court (2020) 128 Cal.App.4th 1155 [statute reviving statute of limitations did not violate ex post facto principles by reviving punitive damages claim].) The former January 1, 2009 limitation was selected by the Legislature, itself, in its 2009 version of Gov. Code § 905(m). (See 2009 version of Cal. Gov. Code § 905(m).)

Notably, EUSD cites no case that has held that the Legislature's enactment of the present version of Government Code § 905(m), eliminating the claim presentation requirement for all claims for childhood sexual assaults, including those occurring prior to pre-January 1, 2009, is unconstitutional, and this Court is unwilling to make new law in this area. Should EUSD wish to change the law in this area, it needs to address that concern to the Legislature.

[1] Plaintiff addresses AB 218 as “AB 219” in her Opposition. As the Opposition discusses the bill in the context of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, the Court interprets the use of “AB 219” as a scrivener’s error.