Judge Stephen Morgan, Case Number: 22AVCV01063, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen Morgan, Case: 22AVCV01063, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AVCV01063 Hearing Date: October 24, 2023 Dept: A14

Background

This is a Lemon Law action. Plaintiff James Edwards (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on or about September 02, 2018, he entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Ford Motor Company (“FMC”) regarding a 2018 Ford F150, VIN: 1FTEW1E56JFA95094 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured or distributed by FMC. Plaintiff further alleges that the warranty contract contained various warranties, including but not limited to the bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, and emission warranty. Plaintiff presents that the Subject Vehicle contained defects and nonconformities which manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period including but not limited to, transmission defects, engine defects, and electrical system defects; that FMC failed to conform the Subject Vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts; and FMC did not either replace the Subject Vehicle or make restitution as required under the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff also believes that FMC had knowledge of the transmission defect and actively concealed the existence and nature of the defect from Plaintiff at the time of purchase, repair, and thereafter.

As to Defendant Autonation Ford Valencia (“Ford Valencia” and with FMC “Defendants”), Plaintiff alleges: (1) he delivered the Subject Vehicle to Ford Valencia for substantial repair on at least one occasion; (2) Ford Valencia owed a duty to Plaintiff to use ordinary care and skill in storage, preparation, and repair of the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standard; (3) Ford Valencia breached said duty; and (4) Ford Valencia’s breach was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages.

On December 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging six causes of action for: (1) Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d) against FMC; (2) Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(b) against FMC; (3) Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3) against FMC; (4) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5) against FMC; (5) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment against FMC; and (6) Negligent Repair against Ford Valencia.

On February 3, 2023, Ford Valencia filed its Answer.

On February 17, 2023, FMC its Demurrer, subsequently sustained in part as to the Third Cause of Action (Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3)) and Fifth Causes of Action (Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment) with leave to amend and overruled in part as to the Fourth Cause of Action (Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5)).

On May 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement of the Entire Case.

On August 04, 2023, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses.

On October 11, 2023, FMC filed its Opposition.

On October 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Reply.

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Legal Standard

Standard for Attorney’s Fees – A prevailing party in entitled to recover costs, including attorneys’ fees, as a matter of right. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.)

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, n.23.) After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-96.)

The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)

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Discussion

Application – Plaintiff presents that he is the prevailing party as (1) there is a signed Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998 offer to compromise (“998 Offer”) in which FMC agreed to pay Plaintiff $245,200.00 to settle the claims in this litigation and (2) Cal. Civ. Code § 1794 provides:

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

Plaintiff contends: (1) California courts have also consistently “rejected the notion the fee award must be proportionate to the amount of damages recovered[]” (citing Niederer v. Ferreira (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1485; see also Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105; Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 486); (2) Plaintiff’s lodestar fees are reasonable as such lodestar rates have been approved other cases involving counsel’s firm (See Decl. Payam Shahian [generally]); (3) the 1.35 lodestar multiplier enhancement is warranted as Plaintiff’s counsel obtained an excellent outcome, Plaintiff’s counsel took to the case on a contingency basis, and a multiplier can be based on delay alone under Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122; (4) FMC has agreed to pay litigation expenses in the 998 Offer.

FMC presents that Plaintiff’s fees and expenses are excessive and unreasonable as they include block billing and padded billing hours. FMC provides, as an example, that it should not take an attorney, especially one billing $495.00/hr, nine hours to draft a boilerplate opposition to a demurrer. FMC highlights that Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm is also a regular player in Song-Beverly actions and no special knowledge was required in this case as the issues were not novel or out of the ordinary. FMC contends that the judge’s task is to ensure that rates must reflect that which would be charged for similar work actually billed on an hourly basis and paid by clients with a motive and opportunity to negotiate the hourly rate, and to review and challenge any excessive time spent by the attorneys, citing Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 (“Ketchum”). Regarding the lodestar method, FMC presents that Ketchum holds that a reasonable loadstar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting noncontingent litigation of the same type.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1133.) FMC argues that the burden of proof to justify the hourly rates is Plaintiff’s burden and the only support provided are self-serving declarations from Plaintiff’s counsels. FMC next contends that no multiplier should be allowed as there is no basis for one as (1) a multiplier is meant to increase or decrease the fee award; (2) a court looks to see whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market value for such services; and (3) there is no justification presented for a multiplier other than an excellent outcome.

A prevailing party in entitled to recover costs, including attorneys’ fees, as a matter of right. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.) Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(10), attorney’s fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, and/or law. Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a) provides that “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.”

The Court reminds both Shahian and Breita Linnell (“Linnell”), Plaintiff’s counsels, that what another trial court does is not binding on this Court. Likewise, federal opinions, generally, are persuasive and not binding authority. That is, whether another trial or district court approved Shahian and Linnell’s rates has no bearing on whether this Court will approve or disapprove of the rates presented in the context of this specific action. However, the Court will take notice of the court records of which Plaintiff requests judicial notice of only as to determining the fair market rate of for counsels’ services. (See Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d).) FMC’s objections to Shahian are OVERRULED. FMC’s objections focus on hearsay or recitations of fellow firm member’s experiences and rates or customs and practices of Shahian’s firm. Such matters are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for justification of the attorneys’ fees and fair market value. FMC’s objections to Linnell’s declaration are SUSTAINED in part as to objections one through four as these are recitations of the allegations of the Complaint and not facts of which Linnell has personal knowledge of. As to the mis-numbered objections 23 and 24, the objections are OVERRULED as the lines in question discuss the 998 Offer, which Linnell has personal knowledge of.

The Court notes that both Plaintiff and FMC agree that Ketchum is a case that sets the standard for lodestar fees. Ketchum states, in relevant part:

Under Serrano III, a court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the "careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case." (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal. 3d at p. 48.) We expressly approved the use of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar, noting that anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method " 'is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " (Id. at p. 48, fn. 23.) In referring to "reasonable" compensation, we indicated that trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; "padding" in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (See id. at p. 48.)

Under Serrano III, the lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal. 3d at p. 49.) The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. The " 'experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.' " (Ibid.)

As we explained in Rader v. Thrasher (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 244, 253 [18 Cal. Rptr. 736, 368 P.2d 360]: " '[a] contingent fee contract, since it involves a gamble on the result, may properly provide for a larger compensation than would otherwise be reasonable.' " The purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for contingent risk is to bring the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional rights, such as those protected under the anti-SLAPP provision, into line with incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-services basis.

The economic rationale for fee enhancement in contingency cases has been explained as follows: "A contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is higher because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of conventional loans." (Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed. 1992) pp. 534, 567.) "A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases." (Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 473, 480; see also Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 4-200(B)(9) [recognizing the contingent nature of attorney representation as an appropriate component in considering whether a fee is reasonable]; ABA Model Code Prof. Responsibility, DR 2-106(B)(8) [same]; ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.5(a)(8).)

Such fee enhancements are intended to compensate for the risk of loss generally in contingency cases as a class. (Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1419 [1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459].) In cases involving enforcement of constitutional rights, but little or no damages, such fee enhancements may make such cases economically feasible to competent private attorneys. (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 1128, 1172 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510].) "[M]ost lawyers of this quality do seem to consider the prospects of success and the fee recoverable before adding to their crowded calendars a case in which payment is contingent." (Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, supra, 90 Yale L.J., at p. 501.)

We held in Serrano IV that, absent circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee. (Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at pp. 624, 639.). . .

Subsequently, in Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 311, 322 [193 Cal. Rptr. 900, 667 P.2d 704], we underscored the importance of the "proper determination and use of the lodestar figure" in calculating awards of statutory attorney fees. We acknowledged the discretion of the trial court in setting attorney fees, but emphasized that because the determination of the lodestar figures is so fundamental to arriving at an objectively reasonable amount, "the exercise of that discretion must be based on the lodestar adjustment method." (Ibid.) We also reiterated that the lodestar figure may be increased by application of a fee enhancement, or reduced as appropriate, after the trial court has considered other factors concerning the lawsuit, including the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)

Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1281, 1294-1295 [240 Cal. Rptr. 872, 743 P.2d 932], reaffirmed the use of the lodestar adjustment method first announced in Serrano III. We again explained that the lodestar figure may be increased or decreased depending on a variety of factors, including the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)

More recently, in PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 [95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 997 P.2d 511], we instructed: "[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the 'lodestar,' i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano [III], supra, 20 Cal. 3d at p. 49.) Such an approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary."

(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.th 1122, 1131-35.)

The California Supreme Court noted that the lodestar method has been applied to a broad range of statutes authorizing attorney’s fees, but emphasized that every “fee-shifting statute must be construed on its own merits.” (Id. at 1134-36.)

Plaintiff requests (1) $18,523.00 in attorney’s fees for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (“SLP”); (2) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement on the attorney fees (or $6,483.05); (4) $1,993.28 in costs and expenses for SLP and (5) an additional $3,500.00 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply, and attend the hearing on this motion.

First, the Court looks at the rates:

· Shahian has provided court records from 2010 showing approval of his fees from $445.00 in 2010 as an associate and increasing to $710/hr in 2019 as partner.

· Tionna Dolin (“Dolin’s) is billing at a rate of $570/hr for this action and she is a partner. Court records provided indicate billing at rates for Dolin from $395.00 as an associate to $550.00 as partner. It is unclear why there is a $20.00 increase from all other cases provided. The Court lowers Dolin’s amount to $550.00/hr as the evidence shows that $550.00/hr is the fair market value of an attorney with Dolin’s standing in similar cases.

· Mark Gibson (“Gibson”) is an attorney and billed at two different rates for this case: $485.00/hr and $495.00/hr. The evidence provided shows approval of rates in 2019 at $435.00 and various cases in 2023 approving a rate of $475.00. There has been no presentation or showing for why Gibson’s rate has increased, generally, and specifically as to the difference between 2022 and 2023. The Court lowers Gibson’s rate to $475.00/hr as that the evidence shows that $475.00/hr is the fair market value of an attorney with Gibson’s standing in similar cases.

· Elizabeth Larocque (“Larocque”) bills at $595.00 in this action. Larocque is presented to be an attorney. It is unclear why a non-partner is billing more than Dolin, a partner. The Court believes this may be due to the years of experience. Larocque has been practicing for 21 years. The court records Plaintiff submitted in conjunction with Shahian’s declaration, show that Larocque and another attorney who was admitted in 2002 had the rate of $595.00/hr approved in various courts. Thus, $595.00/hr appears to be the fair market value of an attorney with Larocque’s standing in similar cases.

· Daniel Law (“Law”) is an attorney who is billing at $475.00/hr for this case. The records show that he has previously been approved at a rate of $425.00/hr in similar cases in 2022. The declaration presents that a 2023 case, Francisco Rodriguez, et al, v. Hyundai Motor America (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. 21STCV01655) (July 6, 2023), approved a rate of $425.00/hr; however, the Court has looked at the exhibit and it is a Notice of Judgment or Order with a tentative decision attached. (See Decl. Shahian Exh. 15.) The tentative does not address each attorney individually, but states broadly: “Plaintiffs’ counsel requests hourly rates ranging from $595 to $250.” (Ibid.) The Court will take Shahian at his word that Law was approved at a rate of $425.00/hr. There is no reasoning for a $50.00 increase between the fair market value of an attorney with Law’s standing in similar cases in July 2023 and October 2023. The Court lowers Law’s rate to $425.00/hr as that the evidence shows that $425.00/hr is the fair market value of an attorney with Law’s standing in similar cases.

· Jacob Lister (“Lister”) is an attorney who is billing $495.00/hrin this case. The Court has looked for the cases, Guzman v. FCA (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. 20STCV1506) and Vogel, et al. v. FCA (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct., Civil Case No. 19 STCV35024) provided as support in the Request for Judicial Notice filing. However, there does not appear to be a request for the cases. Taking Shahian’s declaration into consideration Lister has more experience than the attorney whose rate was approved in the cases. Accordingly, the Court approves the $495.00/hr rate as that is what appears to be the fair market value of an attorney with Lister’s standing in similar cases.

· Rebecca Neubauer (“Neubauer”) is an attorney who is billing $495.00/hr in this action. The support for Neubauer’s rate is the same two cases for Lister’s. As mentioned ante, these cases are not in the Request for Judicial Notice. Unlike Lister’s rate, Shahian declares that Neubaurer has only been approved at a rate of $435.00/hr. There is no explanation given for the $60.00 increase nor is there a showing that other attorneys in a similar standing in the field have increased their rates. The Court lowers Neubauer’s rate to $435.00/hr as that the evidence shows that $435.00/hr is the fair market value of an attorney with Neubauer’s standing in similar cases.

· Nino Sanaia (“Sanaia”) is an attorney who is billing at $425.00/hr in this case. Shahian declares that there have been two cases approving (1) Sanaia’s rate of $385.00/hr and (2) the rate of another attorney with similar experience at $365.00. However, one case, Guzman v. FCA (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. 20STCV1506), is not in the Request for Judicial Notice. The other case, Mo Rahman v. FCA US LLC, __F. Supp.3d, ___2022 WL 1013433 (March 29, 2022) depicts Aaina Duggal (“Duggal”)’s rate at $365.00/hr. Shahian presents that Sanaia now has the same experience as Duggal. Accordingly, the Court lowers Sanaia’s rate to $365.00/hr as that the evidence shows that $365.00/hr is the fair market value of an attorney with Sanaia’s standing in similar cases.

· Yenok Tantanyan (“Tantanyan”) is a law clerk that is billing $325.00/hr in this case. The first case the Court is directed to is Klingenberg v. KMA (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct., Civil Case No. BC709888), simply states a gross amount of attorneys’ fees, rather than the rate of each attorney and/or law clerk. The next case, Ruiz et al. v. Kia (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Case No. BC710527), is not in the Request for Judicial Notice. The Court notes that it is not directed to Mo Rahman v. FCA US LLC, __F. Supp.3d, ___2022 WL 1013433 (March 29, 2022) which clearly states that a law clerk who has not been admitted to the California State Bar was approved at a rate of $285.00. Accordingly, the Court lowers Sanaia’s rate to $285.00/hr as that the evidence shows that $285.00/hr is the fair market value of law clerk (i.e., Tantanyan’s standing) in similar cases.

To summarize, the Court approves the individuals and the rates as follows:

Name	Rate
Tionna Dolin	$550.00/hr
Mark Gibson	$475.00/hr
Elizabeth Larocque	$595.00/hr
Daniel Law	$425.00/hr
Jacob Lister	$495.00/hr
Rebecca Neubauer	$435.00/hr
Nino Sanaia	$365.00/hr
Yenok Tantanyan (Law Clerk)	$285.00/hr

Using the quantities provided in Shahian’s Declaration Exh. 17, the computerized billing records, the Court calculates a total of $17,414.00 [2,517.50 (5.30 hrs @ $475.00/hr for Gibson) + $2,701.00 (7.4 hrs @ $365.00/hr for Nino) + $4,455.00 (9 hrs @ $495.00/hr for Lister) + $2,499.00 (4.20 hrs @ $595/hr for Larocque) + $304.50 (0.70 hrs @ $435.00/hr for Neubauer) + $1,100.00 (2 hrs @ $550.00/hr for Dolin) + $1,785.00 (4.2 hrs @ $425.00/hr for Law) + $2,052.00 (7.2 hrs @ 285.00/hr for Tatanyan)].

FMC challenges these costs for several reasons. The first is that several are excessive; however, based on what has been presented the Court has lowered the rates to what has been shown as the fair market value of each individual attorney or law clerk in a similar position in like cases. As to the other challenges:

· FMC presents that Law’s charge labelled “Prepare for and attempt to attend hearing on D's Demurrer; hearing continued due to technical difficulties/lack of opportunity” is duplicative. It is unclear how this cost is duplicative. Law expended two hours to attended a hearing on FMC’s Demurrer which was continued. The next charge from Law is: “Prepare for and attend hearing on P's MTQ and continued hearing on D's Demurrer; draft hearing outcome memo.” This is not necessarily duplicative. Some level of preparation is required prior to a hearing. Law had to prepare for the Motion to Quash. It is impossible for the Court to determine how much time Law spent on each motion preparing. The time expended is 0.2 hours more than the charge that FMC believes to be duplicative. A reasonable inference is that the extra 0.2 hours was due to the continued Demurrer.

· FMC challenges two charges by Dolin and contends that they should not be charged at Dolin’s rate because they paraprofessional or administrative tasks. FMC provides no authority for allowing a Court to lower either an attorney’s rate or the fair market value of an attorney’s work because they are performing administerial work.

As to costs, FMC has only one challenge – the expense paid to Veritext for hearing attendance on April 18, 2023. This is connected to the continued Demurrer. The Court does not see this as a duplicative cost. Law had to attend the hearing on the Demurrer on April 18, 2023 to represent Plaintiff. The charge is related to Law’s attendance. The Court will not cut such a cost when counsel was adhering to the standard of the legal profession.

Next, the Court addresses the multiplier. The Court reiterates the standard set out in Ketchum:

(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.)

Here, the only justification for a multiplier is that the case was taken on a contingency fee basis. There is no indication that this case was complex or presented challenging legal issues, that counsel was precluded from taking other cases because of the nature of this case, or that the success achieved by counsel was exceptional. Further, there is no showing that FMC did anything to delay the resolution of this case. If anything, the Demurrer FMC filed was necessary to facilitate this settlement. Further, while Plaintiff relies on the section in Ketchum that reads:

Nor is it true that applying a fee enhancement will inevitably result in unfair double counting or a windfall to attorneys representing SLAPP defendants. Under our precedents, the unadorned lodestar reflects the general local hourly rate for a fee-bearing case; it does not include any compensation for contingent risk, extraordinary skill, or any other factors a trial court may consider under Serrano III. The adjustment to the lodestar figure, e.g., to provide a fee enhancement reflecting the risk that the attorney will not receive payment if the suit does not succeed, constitutes earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather, it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services, which typically includes a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney fees. In this case, for example, the lodestar was expressly based on the general local rate for legal services in a noncontingent matter, where a payment is certain regardless of outcome.

(Id. at 1138.)

Plaintiff fails to address the following paragraph:

Of course, the trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof. In each case, the trial court should consider whether, and to what extent, the attorney and client have been able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment, e.g., because the client has agreed to pay some portion of the lodestar amount regardless of outcome. It should also consider the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors under Serrano III. We emphasize that when determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar. The factor of extraordinary skill, in particular, appears susceptible to improper double counting; for the most part, the difficulty of a legal question and the quality of representation are already encompassed in the lodestar. A more difficult legal question typically requires more attorney hours, and a more skillful and experienced attorney will command a higher hourly rate. (See Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1004 [185 Cal. Rptr. 145].) Indeed, the " 'reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product of a multiplicity of factors . . . the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney's reputation, and the undesirability of the case.' " (Ibid.) Thus, a trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable. Nor should a fee enhancement be imposed for the purpose of punishing the losing party.

(Id. at 1138-39 [emphasis added].)

Further, appellate courts have held where the court determines that the lodestar itself constitutes a reasonable fee for the action at issue, no enhancement is warranted. (See Holguin v. Dish Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310.) The Court believes the lodestar is sufficient to provide a reasonable fee for the attorneys and law clerk for the action at issue as the quality of representation and the degree of skill exercised by each counsel and law clerk is already factored into the lodestar. Thus, it would be unreasonable to award an enhancement.

The Court, therefore, declines to apply a multiplier to the lodestar amount.

Accordingly, the Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED as analyzed, ante. Attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $19,407.28 [$17,414.00 (attorneys’ fees) + $1,993.28 (costs)].

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I. Reply

Plaintiff’s Reply emphasizes the importance of Shahian’s declaration in determining the fair market value of each counsel and law clerk’s rates. Plaintiff presents that FMC has not identified any entry as improper block-billing. Plaintiff then argues that the Court should apply a lodestar-based analysis as: (1) Plaintiff’s counsels’ rates are reasonable based upon Shahian’s declaration, (2) the time spent by counsel was reasonably incurred, and (3) that Plaintiff’s costs and expenses are reasonable. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the requested 1.35 multiplier is reasonable as other courts have allowed it.

As the Court stated, ante, whether another court has approved a multiplier has no bearing on this Court’s decision. Further, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that several of the cases in the Request for Judicial Notice have declined to award multipliers.

Plaintiff’s Reply does not impact the Court’s analysis. The Court’s opinion remains unchanged.

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II. Conclusion

Jose F. Castro, Jr.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses is GRANTED as analyzed herein.

Attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $19,407.28 are awarded.