Judge Stephen Morgan, Case Number: 23AVCV00334, Date: 2023-08-22 Tentative Ruling

This is an action related to real property. Plaintiff Jan Williams (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she is the owner of real property commonly known as 37853 Satinwood Lane Palmdale, CA 93551 (“the Property”). Plaintiff presents that on or about 2006, she obtained a loan from American Broker Conduit (“ABC”), recorded on May 19, 2006; on August 2007 ABC was sanctioned by the California Department of Corporations and was ordered to cease and refrain from engaging in any financial activity in California; between 2007 and 2020, Plaintiff received no correspondence from ABC; in 2021, Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Certificate Trustee on Behalf of Bosco Credit II Trust Series (“Defendant”), contacted Plaintiff regarding money owed to ABC; and on November 13, 2019, Defendant foreclosed on the Property and caused to be recorded a Trustee’s Deed upon sale.

On March 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, alleging three causes of action for: (1) Wrongful Foreclosure, (2) Quiet Title, and (3) Declaratory Relief.

On March 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate, seeking to consolidate this action with 22AVUD00660 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS CERTIFICATE TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF BOSCO CREDIT II TRUST SERIES 2010-1 vs JAN WILLIAMS. It appears the Motion to Consolidate was an Ex Parte Application. The Court related, but did not consolidate the cases. The Motion to Consolidate was continued to March 29, 2023.

On March 28, 2023, the Court advised the parties that there was another possibly related case: 21STCV23177 JAN WILLIAMS vs FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, et al. The Court continued the Motion to Consolidate to May 09, 2023, requesting briefs as to whether res judicata precluded this action.

On May 09, 2023, with only a brief filed by Plaintiff, the Court called the matter for hearing. The Court inquired as to why a Notice of Related Case was not filed. The Court continued the Motion to Consolidate to June 16, 2023.

On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Related Case regarding 21STCV23177.

On June 16, 2023, the Court a hearing was held on the Motion to Consolidate, denying the Motion to Consolidate.

On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application For An Order Vacating Denial Of Ex Parte Application For An Order To Consolidate The Pending Unlawful Detainer Action Under C.C.P. 473; Or In The Alternative, For An Order Shortening Time For Hearing On Motion, subsequently denied on July 10, 2023.

Standard for Demurrer – A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn v.¿Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) ¿When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿ (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power¿(2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)¿ In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.¿ (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.30(a).)¿A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.¿ (SKF Farms v. Superior Court¿(1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)¿ Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.¿¿(Ibid.)¿¿The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn,¿supra,¿147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

A general demurrer admits the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading, regardless of possible difficulties of proof.¿¿(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)¿ Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer.¿¿(Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co.¿(1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.)¿ Nevertheless, this rule does not apply to allegations expressing mere conclusions of law, or allegations contradicted by the exhibits to the complaint or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿¿(Vance v. Villa Park¿Mobilehome¿Estates¿(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 698, 709.)¿A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.¿¿(Blank,¿supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿

Pursuant to¿Code Civ. Proc.¿§430.10(e), the party against whom a complaint has been filed may object by demurrer to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.¿ It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment.¿¿(Schifando¿v. City of Los Angeles¿(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1082,¿as modified (Dec. 23, 2003).)¿

Application – As an initial matter, as this case is related to two other cases, the Court takes notice of its records pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d). All references to documents in the cases involving Plaintiff and Defendant are judicially noticeable.

Defendant brings up the issue of res judicata, arguing that the claims against it are barred. Defendant states that “Defendant’s similar demurrer was sustained in its entirety” which led to dismissal of the case “in its entirety with prejudice” (Demurrer 10:4, 12:25-28.) However, this is a misrepresentation. Defendant was never served in 21STCV23177 and the Demurrer was brought by Franklin Credit Management Corporation. Judgment has been entered only as to Franklin Management Corporation. Res judicata is not applicable. Regarding collateral estoppel, which prohibits the re-litigation of any issue which was litigated in the prior case, no litigation has occurred between the parties as Defendant has not appeared in 21STCV23177.

The Court cautions Defendant’s attorney, Bradford E. Klein, against such misrepresentations. California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal requires that a lawyer shall not (1) knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or knowingly misquote to a tribunal the language of a book, statute, decision or other authority; or (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. (See California State Bar, California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3(a).) The Court also notes that California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.3 has been recently approved and requires California attorneys to report any lawyer who commits a criminal act, engages in fraud, misappropriates funds or property, or engages in conduct involving “dishonesty, deceit, and reckless or intentional misrepresentations.” (See Supreme Court of California ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2023-06-21-02 <https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/newsroom/2023-06/S280290%20-%20admin%20order%202023-06-21-02.pdf> [as of Aug. 07, 2023]; See also The State Bar of California, Rule 8.3 Required Reporting page https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Ethics/Rule-83-Required-Reporting#:~:text=Effective%20August%201%2C%202023%2C%20lawyers,conduct%20to%20report%20the%20lawyer. [as of Aug. 07, 2023].)

Defendant also provides an argument that “NDSC was a Named Defendant in the Prior Suits.” (See Demurrer 14 at A.) NDSC is not Defendant nor is NDSC a party to this action. Therefore, the Court disregards such an argument.

The Court notes that Plaintiff argument regarding res judicata presents that Defendant is a different entity from Deutsche Bank Trust in 21STCV23177. The Court is not convinced. Both cases concerning renditions of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company are regarding the Property, both Defendant and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company are alleged to be the foreclosing entity who sold the Property, both Defendant and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company are alleged to be doing business in Los Angeles County, and Plaintiff has provided no evidence that they are separate entities (i.e., Secretary of State filings, Articles of Incorporation, etc.).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to prove any of the required elements as Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale, she does not allege that she tendered the amount of her debt, or that she has suffered actual harm. Defendant further argues that a showing of prejudice is needed and Plaintiff has not, and cannot, allege that the trustee’s sale was illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive.

Plaintiff rebuts Defendants argument, presenting that she has alleged that the foreclosure was based on fraud, that Plaintiff was harmed, and Plaintiff alleges the assignment of the Deed of Trust was void, thus excusing the tendering requirement. Plaintiff emphasizes her pleadings: that she had no communication with ABC for over 10 years, that Defendant insisted they had an assignment and produced a copy of an assignment purporting to be executed by ABC in 2006 that (1) was not recorded for 13 years and (2) contains alterations atypical of recorded documents, and that Defendant has never produced a copy of the original assignment.

“The elements of the tort of wrongful foreclosure are: ‘ “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering” ’; and (4) ‘ “no breach of condition or failure of performance existed on the mortgagor’s or trustor’s part which would have authorized the foreclosure or exercise of the power of sale.” ’ ” (Majd v. v. Bank of America, N.A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1306-1307.) However, there is a split in authority as to the fourth element. Various appellate courts have limited the elements to the first three. (See Reeder v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 795 [Second Appellate District]; Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516 [Third Appellate District]; Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150 [Sixth Appellate District; overruled in part]; Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal App.4th 1052 [Fourth Appellate District].)

When appellate decisions are in conflict on a point, the court exercising inferior jurisdiction must choose between the conflicting decisions. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.) “As a practical matter, a superior court ordinarily will follow an appellate opinion emanating from its own district even though it is not bound to do so. Superior courts in other appellate districts may pick and choose between conflicting lines of authority. This dilemma will endure until the Supreme Court resolves the conflict, or the Legislature clears up the uncertainty by legislation.”¿(McCallum v. McCallum (1987) 190 Cal.3d 309, 315.) As such, this Court follows the Second Appellate District and uses only three elements to analyze the wrongful foreclosure claim.

Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporate [sic] the allegations in all prior paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

A home loan borrower does have standing to claim that a nonjudicial foreclosure that has already occurred was because of void assignment. The void assignment deprives the foreclosing party of the authority to order a trustee’s sale. See Yvanova v. New Century Mort.[ ]Corp., (2016) 62 Ca.4[th] 919, 929-943.

Defendant Deutsche Bank purported assignment executed by ABC in 2006, and apparently before ABC received the cease and refrain order from the California Department of Corporations, was not recorded until May 3, 2019. Furthermore, the alleged assignment appears to be altered.

This section incorporates the previous allegations which provide more detail as to the alleged alteration. Specifically, it is alleged that the assignment contains alterations atypical of recorded documents and that Defendant never produced the original assignment after repeated requests. (Complaint ¶ 11.) The paragraph directs the parties and the Court to Exhibit 3, the purported assignment. Exh. 3 has it handwritten in that it was recorded on May 18, 2006. It appears everything handwritten occurred after Notary Public Jodi Lynch from the State of New York executed the document. Further, Syngro has provided the 2019 changes under Cal. Gov. Code § 27361.7, which reads:

Whenever the text of a document presented for record may be made out but is not sufficiently legible to reproduce a readable photographic record, the recorder may require the person presenting it for record to substitute a legible original document or to prepare a legible copy of the first document by handwriting or typewriting and attach the same to the original as a part of the document for making the permanent photographic record. The handwritten or typewritten legible copy shall be certified by the party creating the copy under penalty of perjury as being a true copy of the original. As used in this section, the word “text” includes the notary seal, certificates, and other appendages thereto.

However, the changes are not to provide a legible copy, but rather add in things that occurred in 2019. Further, Cal. Rev. Tax Code § 480 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Whenever there occurs any change in ownership of real property, a manufactured home, or a floating home that is subject to local property taxation and is assessed by the county assessor, the transferee shall file a signed change in ownership statement in the county where the real property, manufactured home, or a floating home is located, as provided for in subdivision (c). In the case of a change in ownership where the transferee is not locally assessed, no change in ownership statement is required.

(c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), the change in ownership statement as required pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be declared to be true under penalty of perjury and shall give that information relative to the real property, manufactured home, or a floating home acquisition transaction as the board shall prescribe after consultation with the California Assessors’ Association. The information shall include, but not be limited to, a description of the property, the parties to the transaction, the date of acquisition, the amount, if any, of the consideration paid for the property, whether paid in money or otherwise, and the terms of the transaction. The change in ownership statement shall not include any question that is not germane to the assessment function. The statement shall contain a notice informing the transferee of the property tax relief available under Section 69.5. The statement shall contain a notice that is printed, with the title in at least 12-point boldface type and the body in at least 8-point boldface type, in the following form:

“The law requires any transferee acquiring an interest in real property, manufactured home, or floating home subject to local property taxation, and that is assessed by the county assessor, to file a change in ownership statement with the county recorder or assessor. The change in ownership statement must be filed at the time of recording or, if the transfer is not recorded, within 90 days of the date of the change in ownership, except that where the change in ownership has occurred by reason of death the statement shall be filed within 150 days after the date of death or, if the estate is probated, shall be filed at the time the inventory and appraisal is filed. The failure to file a change in ownership statement within 90 days from the date a written request is mailed by the assessor results in a penalty of either: (1) one hundred dollars ($100), or (2) 10 percent of the taxes applicable to the new base year value reflecting the change in ownership of the real property, manufactured home, or floating home, whichever is greater, but not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) if the property is eligible for the homeowners’ exemption or twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) if the property is not eligible for the homeowners’ exemption if that failure to file was not willful. This penalty will be added to the assessment roll and shall be collected like any other delinquent property taxes, and be subject to the same penalties for nonpayment.”

Further, Plaintiff incorporates Cal. Civ. Code § 882.020 into the Complaint (see Complaint ¶ 8), which reads, in relevant part:

(a) Unless the lien of a mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument that creates a security interest of record in real property to secure a debt or other obligation has earlier expired pursuant to Section 2911, the lien expires at, and is not enforceable by action for foreclosure commenced, power of sale exercised, or any other means asserted after, the later of the following times:

(1) If the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation is ascertainable from the recorded evidence of indebtedness, 10 years after that date.

(2) If the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation is not ascertainable from the recorded evidence of indebtedness, or if there is no final maturity date or last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation, 60 years after the date the instrument that created the security interest was recorded.

(3) If a notice of intent to preserve the security interest is recorded within the time prescribed in paragraph (1) or (2), 10 years after the date the notice is recorded.

The statutes cited by the Court are subject to judicial notice under Cal. Evid. Code § 452(a) and (h).

The period of time between the assignment signed by Jodi Lynch, May 24, 2006, and the date on the leadsheet with the California seal, May 03, 2019 is 12 years, 11 months, and 9 days.[1]

Thus, from the Complaint and judicially noticeable laws, it appears that Defendant did not record the purported assignment within the time required and attempted to modify the assignment in 2019 through handwritten means, including that the document was recorded on May 19, 2006. Thus, a reasonable inference can be made that Defendant’s security interest in the Property have expired and Defendant’s still pursued foreclosure. Thus, the first element is satisfied.

Regarding the second element, Plaintiff’s Complaint is rife with allegations that a foreclosure occurred. Plaintiff provides the specific date of the foreclosure: November 13, 2019. A reasonable inference can be made that Plaintiff was harmed as her property has already been foreclosed on.

Finally, the third element states: “in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering” (See Majd, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1306-1307.) Cal. Civ. Code § 882.020 provides the basis for the inference that Plaintiff may have been excused from tendering the amount of secured indebtedness.

Accordingly, the First Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure is properly pled.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s quiet title fails as Plaintiff has failed to tender the amount of secured indebtedness to Defendant and Plaintiff does not qualify for any exceptions to the tender rule.[2]

Plaintiff emphasizes that, based on her alleged allegations, she did not hear anything from ABC or Defendant for almost 13 years, and as such, the Deed of Trust recorded on May 19, 2006 should be canceled.

A claim for quiet title should state (1) the legal description of the property and its street address or common designation, (2) the title of the plaintiff and the basis of the title, (3) the adverse claims to plaintiff's title, (4) the date as of which the determination is sought, and (5) a prayer for determination of plaintiff against adverse claims. (Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020)

Plaintiff has included the legal description of the property and its street address or common designation through her Complaints and its attached exhibits.

Plaintiff has included the Deed of Trust from May 11, 2006 as Exh. 1. The Deed of Trust shows that she is the trustor to the Property and ABC is a beneficiary as she borrowed finances from ABC. (See Exh. 1.)

As to the third element, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020 provides: “The complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following: . . .The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.” The Complaint does not include this element.

The Complaint continues to include a prayer for determination of quiet title and cancelation of the Deed of Trust recorded on May 19, 2006 (i.e., a determination of plaintiff against adverse claims).

Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action has not been sufficiently pled under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged any actual controversy between herself and Defendant. Defendant argues Plaintiff “asks the Court to impermissibly redress past wrongs relating to the alleged origination of [her] Loans, which fail for all the reasons set forth herein.” (Demurrer 18:5-7.)

Plaintiff presents that she has alleged that an actual controversy exists between herself and Defendant concerning respective rights and duties as well as liabilities and obligations, and she seeks a judicial determination of the parties’ rights, responsibilities, and obligations.

For reasons, ante, Defendant’s argument fails and Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief is properly pled.

Accordingly, the Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the First Cause of Action (Wrongful Foreclosure) and Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) and SUSTAINED as to the Second Cause of Action (Quiet Title).

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy¿(1976), 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) While under California law leave to amend is liberally granted, “leave to amend should not be granted where, in all probability, amendment would be futile.” (Vaillette v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1993), 18 Cal. App. 4th 680, 685).¿ “A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it sustains a demurrer without¿leave to amend¿if either (a) the facts and the nature of the claims are clear and no liability exists, or (b) it is probable from the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead that the plaintiff cannot state a claim.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.¿(1992)¿4 Cal.App.4th 857, 889.)¿¿¿

Here, the sole claim in which the Demurrer is sustained is the Second Cause of Action for Quiet Title.

As the Court analyzed, ante, Plaintiff is missing one element – the date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020.)

There is no doubt that an amendment will successfully address the deficiencies in this Complaint.

Defendant argues that res judiciata and collateral estoppel apply even though the related action, 21STCV23177, is still pending. Defendant presents that the lawsuits are “identical” and Plaintiff is not “permitted to file multiple suits arising from the same facts and transactions involving the same parties.” (Reply 1:28, 2:1-2.)

It appears Defendant does not believe that the lack of a final judgment or litigation between the parties acts as a bar to the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are well established. Jackson v. City of Sacramento (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 596, 601-02 provides a succinct summary as to both res judicata and collateral estoppel:

Res judicata and collateral estoppel give conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 147, p. 3292.) In a new action on the same cause of action a prior judgment for the defendant acts as a complete bar to further litigation, and a prior judgment for the plaintiff precludes litigation because it results in a merger, superseding plaintiff's claim by a right of action on the judgment. (Id., § 148, at p. 3293.) In a new action on a different cause, the former judgment is not a complete merger or bar, but is effective as a collateral estoppel, being conclusive on issues actually litigated in the former action. (Ibid.)

However, there are three requirements which must be shown before collateral estoppel applies in this context. First, the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical with the one presented in the action in question. Second, there must be a final judgment on the merits. Third, the party against whom the plea is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. (Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 812-813.)

(See also Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 321 [“Collateral estoppel applies only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. [Citations.]”].)

As the Court mentioned, ante, there has been no final judgment or even litigation between Plaintiff and Defendant in 21STCV23177. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply.

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s causes of actions fail because Plaintiff does not dispute the existence and validity of the loan, Plaintiff cannot tender and restore titled to her name, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to constitute claims from Wrongful Foreclosure and Quiet Title, and Plaintiff cannot overcome the tender rule. Thus, Defendant presents that the Demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend.

The Court believes it has adequately addressed each point Defendant has raised in its Reply, ante.

Defendant Deustche Bank National Trust Company, as Certificate Trustee on Behalf of Bosco Credit II Trust Series’ Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the First Cause of Action (Wrongful Foreclosure) and Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) and SUSTAINED as to the Second Cause of Action (Quiet Title) with leave to amend.

Following a ruling on a demurrer, unless otherwise ordered, leave to answer or amend within 10 days is deemed granted, except for actions in forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer in which case 5 calendar days is deemed granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1320(g).)

[1] The Court notes that Plaintiff has included this in her Complaint. The paragraph states: “Plaintiff explained to Plaintiff that there had been no communication with ABC for over 10 years, but [Defendant] insisted they had an assignment from ABC.” (Complaint ¶ 10.) The Court understands the second use of “Plaintiff” to be a scrivener’s error.

[2] The Court notes that, at this section, Defendants switch from addressing Plaintiff with feminine pronouns (i.e., her, she) to masculine pronouns (i.e., he, him). Plaintiff’s filed documents addresses herself with feminine pronouns. Out of respect, the Court does the same. The Court cautions Defendant against misgendering individuals.