Judge: Stephen Morgan, Case: 23AVCV00657, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AVCV00657    Hearing Date: October 10, 2023    Dept: A14

Background

This is a wrongful eviction action. Plaintiff Mary Therese Detevis (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she entered into a lease agreement with Defendant Mohill Holdings, LP (“Defendant”), which allowed for Plaintiff to maintain the premises at 38728 5th Street E, Unit 4, Palmdale, CA. 93550 (the “Property”) and, on May 23, 3034, Defendant served a 30-Day Notice to Quit on Plaintiff. Plaintiff presents that Defendant did not imitate an unlawful detainer action and, instead, forwent the judicial eviction process by denying Plaintiff access to the Property. Plaintiff also alleges that during this process, Defendant entered to premises without either Plaintiff’s permission or the proper 24-hr written notice.

On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging two causes of action for: (1) Illegal Lockout of Tenant, and (2) Trespassing.

On July 27, 2023, Defendant filed a declaration regarding an automatic extension under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 430.41, 435.5, or 439.

On August 25, 2023, Defendant filed this Motion to Strike.

On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Opposition.

No Reply has been filed. “[A]ll reply papers [shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party] at least five court days before the hearing.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).) “Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section.” (Ibid.) The hearing is set for October 10, 2023. As such, a Reply was due by October 03, 2023. Should an Reply be filed, it is now untimely.

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Legal Standard

Standard for Motion to Strike –“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to [a motion for the judgment on the pleadings as specified in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §438(i)(1)(A)].” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §435(b)(1).) Such a motion shall specify a hearing date and, if a motion to strike is brought with a demurrer, the hearing on the motion to strike will be held concurrently with the hearing on the demurrer. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §435(b)(2)-(b)(3).) “The filing of a notice of motion to strike an answer or complaint, or portion thereof, shall not extend the time within which to demur.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §435(d).)

The Court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The Court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)

As with a demurrer, the grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matter which the court may judicially notice. (Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 437.) Allegations are assumed to be true. (Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 53.)

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Meet and Confer Requirement – Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike.  (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §430.41 and §435.5.)  The Court notes that this requirement has been met. (Decl. Stephanie C. Goldstein ¶ 3.)

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Discussion

Application – Defendant moves to strike paragraph 3 of the Prayer of Relief of the Complaint on page 4, lines 13 to 14, which states: “Punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the court.”

Defendant argues that, under Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a), punitive damages are only available where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice and the Complaint is devoid of factual support for such a request.

Plaintiff argues that, accepting the factual assertions in the Complaint as true, it can be liberally construed that Defendant acted with malice. Plaintiff further attempts to distinguish this case from those provided by Defendant, emphasizing that Defendant relies on cases involving medical negligence which is not applicable to the case at hand, so there is no requirement that evidentiary support is needed.

Punitive damages in an action for a breach of duty not arising from contract occur only when a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff for the sake of example or by way of punishing the defendant. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 3294(a).)

While there is a contract alleged for tenancy, Plaintiff does not allege a claim for breach of contract and it appears that the basis for punitive damages within the Complaint is based on the alleged lockout. Further, neither party discusses contractual obligations on their papers.

The Court also notes that neither party takes issue with Defendant’s status as a potential corporate entity. That is, all arguments are premised on faults within allegations of the pleading and not as to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 3294’s statutory requirements and Defendant’s status as a limited partnership.

Malice, oppression, and fraud are defined as:

(1)   “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294(c)(1).)

(2)   “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294(c)(2).)

(3)   “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294(c)(3).)

It appears that the request for punitive damages is based on a violation of Cal. Civ. Code §789.3 and trespass. (See Complaint [causes of action and relevant allegations].)

Cal. Civ. Code § 789.3 provides, in relevant part:

Any landlord who violates this section shall be liable to the tenant in a civil action for all of the following:

(1) Actual damages of the tenant.

(2) An amount not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100) for each day or part thereof the landlord remains in violation of this section. In determining the amount of such award, the court shall consider proof of such matters as justice may require; however, in no event shall less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) be awarded for each separate cause of action. Subsequent or repeated violations, which are not committed contemporaneously with the initial violation, shall be treated as separate causes of action and shall be subject to a separate award of damages.

In any action under subdivision (c) the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. . .

(Cal. Civ. Code § 789.3(c)-(d).)  

The claim for punitive damages is adequately supported by the specific factual allegations. To support a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs must allege facts and circumstances showing conduct constituting malice, fraud, or oppression. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) In considering a motion to strike punitive damage allegations, the court considers the complaint as a whole and assumes the allegations are true. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) The Court believes that a liberal reading of the Complaint supports punitive damages as the allegations, accepted as true for the purposes of this Motion to Strike, show knowing conduct on behalf of Defendant.

Further, the standard set out in Pelletti v. Membrilia (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 606, 611 though discussing negligence, appears applicable. To raise negligence to the level of “wilful[sic]” misconduct, the defendant must have: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be apprehended, (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger, and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid the peril. (New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 681, 689-690.) The New court further clarified that willful misconduct may be inferred from the actor’s conduct:

“If conduct is sufficiently lacking in consideration for the rights of others, reckless, heedless to an extreme, and indifferent to the consequences it may impose, then, regardless of the actual state of mind of the actor and his actual concern for the rights of others, we call it wilful[sic] misconduct, and apply to it the consequences and legal rules which we use in the field of intended torts.”

(New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co., supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 690.)

Here, based on the allegations provided, taken as true, Defendant intentionally prevented Plaintiff from returning to the Property knowing that the Property was Plaintiff’s place of residence and injury would likely occur.

The Court notes that Defendant’s motion has an argument that they entered for the purposes of an emergency. However, this argument attempts to argue the allegations of the Complaint and, as such, is more suitable for a Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Court does not address this argument.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

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Conclusion