Judge: Stephen Morgan, Case: BS138580, Date: 2023-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BS138580    Hearing Date: October 17, 2023    Dept: A14

Background

This is a California Environmental Qualities Act (“CEQA”) action. The basis of this action is the 2012 Hollywood Community Plan Update (“2012 HCPU”) and its environmental impact report (“EIR”). Because both the 2012 HCPU and its EIR are interrelated, the Court will address these two items together as the 2012 Hollywood Plan. The 2012 Hollywood Plan is a comprehensive, visionary, and voluminous planning document which thoughtfully analyzes the potential for the geographic area commonly referred to as Hollywood.

This action, and its related actions, began with the filing of a petition by Fix the City, Inc. (“Fix the City”) on July 13, 2012. Subsequently, the following petitions were filed: (1) a petition by La Mirada Ave Neighborhood Association (“LMANA”) on July 18, 2012, challenging the 2012 Hollywood Plan; (2) a petition by Save Hollywood.Org, Fix the City, and Hollywoodians Encouraging Logical Planning on July 18, 2012, challenging the 2012 Hollywood Plan.

On February 11, 2014, the Court issued a Writ of Mandate (“February 2014 Writ of Mandate”), applicable to all aforementioned cases. Respondents City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles City Council, and Los Angeles Department of City Planning (collectively the “City”) did not appeal.

After the February 2014 Writ of Mandate: (1) the City filed two initial returns, (2) Fix the City filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition for Writ of Mandate, (3) the City filed a Motion to Strike Fix the City’s Supplemental Petition, (4) LMANA filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Orders: Maintaining Writ of Mandate in Full Force Until Fully Complied With, Compelling the City to Reconsider Its Return to the Writ Issued and to File an Additional Return to the Writ, To Make Further Orders Necessary to the Writ, and For the Court to Impose a Fine of up to $1,000.00 against the City of Los Angles per Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1096.

On July 14, 2014, the Court ruled as follows: (1) Fix the City's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition for Writ of Mandate was determined to be early and its request to file nunc pro tunc is unnecessary, so Fix the City was ordered to determine whether and how it wishes to proceed on its motion and give appropriate notice by August 15, 2014; (2) the City’s Motion to Strike Fix the City’s Supplemental Petition was granted without prejudice, though the Court notes that Fix the City’s documents constituted notice to the Court of certain issues requiring consideration at the appropriate times to aid in determining the City’s compliance with the Writ of Mandate and Judgment; and (3) LMANA’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Orders Maintaining Writ of Mandate in Full Force Until Fully Complied With was granted, Compelling the City to Reconsider Its Return to the Writ Issued and to File an Additional Return to the Writ was granted, To Make Further Orders Necessary to the Writ was denied without prejudice, and For the Court to Impose a Fine of up to $1,000.00 against the City of Los Angles per Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1096 was denied without prejudice.

On July 14, 2014, the Court also issued an Amended Writ of Mandate (“July 2014 Writ of Mandate”).

On June 06, 2023, the following documents were filed: (1) a petition by Voters for a Superior Hollywood Plan (“VSHP”) challenging a new 2023 Hollywood Community Plan Update (“2012 HCPU”) and its EIR (collectively “2023 Hollywood Plan”); (2) a petition by Laurel Canyon Association (“LCA”), challenging the 2023 Hollywood Plan; and (3) a petition by Fix the City, challenging the 2023 Hollywood Plan.

On July 19, 2023, all cases mentioned were deemed related.

On July 25, 2023, the City filed a Motion for Order Discharging Writ of Mandate.

On July 26, 2023, the City filed its Final Return to Writ of Mandate.

On July 26, 2023, VSHP filed an Objection to the Motion for Order Discharging Writ of Mandate, and LCA filed an Objection to the Motion for Order Discharging Writ of Mandate.

On August 15, 2023, the City filed a Notice of New and Relevant Authority.

On October 10, 2023, in non-lead cases BS138369 and BS138370, the City filed a Notice Of Non-Receipt Of (1) Opposition To Respondent’s Motion To Discharge Writ Or (2) Objections To Respondent’s Final Return To Writ Of Mandate, indicating that LMANA and Save Hollywood.Org did not file an Opposition or Objection to the City’s Motion for Order Discharging Writ of Mandate.

On October 10, 2023, the City filed their Reply.

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Discussion

Judicial Notice – The City seeks judicial notice as to (1) documents from this case, and (2) documents regarding actions taken by the City. Judicial notice is GRANTED under Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d) and (c).

Application – At the heart of the matter is whether the Court retains jurisdiction to consider whether the 2023 Hollywood Plan conforms to the policies and objectives of the General Plan of the City of Los Angeles and the requirement of the CEQA. 

Fix the City, VSHP, and LCA filed objections to the Final Return. The objections filed by Fix the City, VSHP, and LCA assert that the City did not comply with the Writ of Mandates (the “Writs”) issued by this Court and directs the Court to the June 06, 2023 Petitions. Regarding VSHP and LCA, as these objections are not brought by a party to this action, the Court does not consider them. (See County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1; County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82; County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185; County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 91; County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973), 32 Cal.App.3d 795 [all evidencing that it is the right of any party to such a proceeding concerning returns to raise issues of compliance in that context].)

The City has provided argument regarding this in its Motion for Order Discharging Writ of Mandate. Specifically, the City asserts that it has complied with the Writs issued by the Court, that judicial relief is limited to only those claims raised and litigated, and Court can adjudicate claims challenging the 2023 Hollywood Plan only after it reviews a fully prepared and certified administrative record relating to the City’s separate administrative and public proceedings from 2016 to 2023 (i.e., preapproval of the 2023 Hollywood Plan not needed), and the Court would violate the separation of powers doctrine should it exercise jurisdiction over the 2023 Hollywood Plan regarding approval.

The Court summarizes the Writs. The February 2014 Writ provide: (1) the City is to rescind, vacate, and set aside all actions approving and certifying the 2012 Hollywood Plan adopted in connection therewith and all related approvals issued in the furtherance of the 2012 HCPU, including but not limited to the text and maps associated with the 2012 HCPU, the Resolution amending the 2012 HCPU, the adopting of rezoning actions taken to reflect zoning changes contained in the 2012 HCPU, all amendments to the General Plan Transportation and Framework Elements made to reflect changes in the 2012 HCPU, adopting the Statement of Overriding Considerations, adopting the Statement of Overriding Considerations, adopting the Mitigation and Monitoring Program, and adopting Findings in support of the foregoing limited to only the quasi-legislative actions necessary to carry out the 2012 HCPU and the related CEQA documents; (2) should City exercise its discretion to amend the HCP, City is to do so in a manner that conforms to the policies and objectives of the General Plan and the requirements of CEQA; (3) an injunction was instituted whereby the City and their officers, employees, agents, boards, commissions and other subdivisions shall not grant any authority, permits or entitlements which derive from the 2012 Hollywood Plan until an adequate and valid EIR is prepared, circulated and certified as complete and is consistent with CEQA, CEQA Guidelines, and all other applicable laws, and until legally adequate findings of consistence are made as required pursuant to the Charter of the City of Los Angeles and other applicable laws, (4) the City was to make an initial return no later than 90 days of the February 2014 Writ and objections were to be filed within 40 days after the date of service of the initial return; (5) the City was to file a supplemental return after taking all actions to comply with the February 2014 Writ; and (6) the Court reserved jurisdiction in this action until there has been full compliance with the February 2014 Writ as provided in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1097. The July 2014 Writ kept the language regarding the order for the city to rescind, vacate, and set aside all actions approving and certifying the 2012 Hollywood Plan; the language associated with the City’s election of its discretion to amend the 2012 Hollywood Plan, and the language associated with the City and its agents enjoining them from granting any authority, permits, or entitlements which derive from the 2012 Hollywood Plan. The July 2014 Writ amended the orders regarding the returns: (1) the City was ordered to make an initial return no later than 90 days of the July 2014 Writ and objections were to be filed within 40 days of the initial return; (2) the City was ordered to file a Final Return after taking all actions that complied with the writ and objections were to be filed within 60 days of the Final Return; (3) any petitioner may apply for an extension of time by which to file objections to the Final Return via Ex Parte Application, (4) the City was ordered to seek leave of court via Ex Parte Application if multiple Final Returns were needed, and (5) the Court reserved jurisdiction in this action until there has been full compliance with the July 2014 Writ as provided in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1097.

The Court notes that each Writ had a corresponding Statement of Decision.

In the Statement of Decision corresponding to the July 2014 Writ, the Court stated:

The Court of Appeal, quoting from a leading treatise on the subject, describes the purpose and function of the return as follows:

"CEQA" requires that, after issuing a writ, the trial court must retain jurisdiction over the matter until it has determined that the agency has adequately complied with CEQA." (Remy et al., Guide to the Cal. Environmental Quality Act, supra, Jud. Review, p. 428, col. a, citations omitted .) The treatise points out that the best-known example of such continuing jurisdiction is the trial court's efforts (concluded in 1997) to obtain compliance (from parties including some of these same Respondents) with a 1973 writ controlling Owens Valley groundwater. "A peremptory writ of mandate does not necessarily exhaust the court's authority; where it does not provide complete relief, the court may continue the lawsuit and make such interim orders as the case may require. [Citation.] In the absence of a final judgment we retain jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, as well as ancillary jurisdiction to award costs." (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82, 85 [144 Cal.Rptr. 71]; see also Bass et al., CEQA Deskbook (1996) CEQA Litigation, p. 129.) A writ of mandate is a piece of paper. If its purpose is to declare the rights of parties, its existence suffices. If its purpose is to compel someone to do something, its existence does not suffice. The proper way to ensure compliance is to require a return on the writ, which commands a party to do something and report to the court that the act has been done. (See Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 1989) Procedures After Trial,§§ 13.10-13.11, pp. 411-414 [providing form for this purpose].) Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1997) 63 Cal.App.4th 227, 243-244. [Italics added.]

(July 14, 2014 Statement of Decision (“SOD”) pp. 4-5, fn. 3.)

The Court also discussed review of the interim returns in light of a Final Return:

Until the entirety of the elements of compliance with the Writs and Judgments in these cases are prepared, and are submitted, and are reviewed, the Court will not know the full scope of the issues which it will review and adjudicate or have the full context in which to evaluate compliance with the Writs. It is a misallocation of judicial -- and party -- resources to make decisions piecemeal. Indeed, in cases as complex as these, doing so may result in errors -- or the objectionable micro-management referred to above. Therefore, the Court defers any comment or action on the "Zls" until it considers the Final Return.

(Id. at p. 7 fn. 6.)

The Court’s citations remain sound. That is, a majority of the cases are distinguished from subsequent case law. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82 was questioned, but only in relation to assessing a litigant’s nonpecuniary interest when evaluating Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5 (attorney fees in cases resulting in public benefit)'s financial burden criterion. (See City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 435 [“Whitley has since clarified that a litigant's nonpecuniary interests are not relevant in evaluating section 1021.5's financial burden criterion. Therefore, when assessing this factor in the context of a public entity's legal victory, the trial court may only consider the public entity's pecuniary interests and the pecuniary interests of its constituents. To the extent County of Inyo, Hawaiian Gardens and Tehama County suggest otherwise, that suggestion does not survive Whitley.”].)

The Court believes that the July 2014 Statement of Decision has adequately laid out the basis for continuing jurisdiction over the matter. That is, the previous Statement of Decision addresses and provides legal support as to a court’s jurisdiction over the Final Return and its compliance with the Writs.

The City’s Motion for Order Discharging Writ of Mandate provides case law in which it seeks to distinguish the Court’s previously cited cases and argue that the Court cannot review the 2023 Hollywood Plan to ensure it complied with the Court’s issued Writs. The Court will go through each case for clarity.

State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Ct. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 467: Petitioners, the State Board of Equalization (board), the State Personnel Board (personnel board), and the State Controller (controller), sought annulment of a contempt order entered by respondent, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), for an alleged violation of a writ of mandate issued upon a judgment in a mandamus proceeding regarding reinstatement of civil service employees to their positions. The court annulled the contempt order entered against petitioners for violation of a judgment from a mandamus proceeding regarding reinstatement of the employees. The City directs the Court to page 477. Page 477 of the opinion states that “[w] hile it is proper as will hereafter appear to require an enforcement of the mandamus judgment that the reinstated employee receive the compensation of the position to which he was reinstated including any blanket increases in that compensation, there should not be included therein any promotions to a higher position[]” as any subsequent promotions to a higher level is a separate and distinct matter that the mandamus judgment did not embrace. It is clear that this is not a CEQA case. This case provides no insight as to a court’s continuing jurisdiction regarding review of an action taken as a direct result of a court-issued peremptory writ of mandate where a court provided instruction in said writ for such an action.

Ione Valley Land, Air, & Water Defense Alliance, LLC v. Cnty. of Amador (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 165 (“IVLAWDA Case”): This is a case in which the trial court entered its order granting the first petition in part and denying it in part. The trial court found two traffic-related deficiencies in the EIR, one having to do with surface street traffic impacts and the other with rail traffic impacts. The trial court issued a written ruling along with its order, requiring the County to (1) vacate certification of the EIR, (2) vacate approval of the Project, (3) “recirculate for public comment the revised [draft EIR] pertaining to traffic issues,” (4) decide anew whether to certify the EIR, (5) decide anew whether to approve the Project, and (6) notify the trial court that it had complied with the peremptory writ. In all other respects, the trial court denied the petition. The respondents filed an initial return, certifying compliance with the peremptory writ and requesting the trial court discharge the peremptory writ. The trial court discharged the peremptory writ based on the compliance. Petitioner then filed a new petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court discussed res judicata in light of the discharged peremptory writ. The City summarizes this case as “petitioner filed second lawsuit to challenge county’s recertification of EIR after court issued writ in first lawsuit, and trial court held a full writ hearing on second lawsuit challenging recertification of EIR.” (Motion for Order Discharging Writ of Mandate 16:17-19.) This case does not support their argument that the Court does not have continuing jurisdiction over the 2023 Hollywood Plan. Specifically, the action at hand is distinguished as the Court’s Writs were never discharged. If one were to follow the sequence of events in the IVLAWDA Case and compare it to the action at hand, one would see that the case at hand is at the stage where the Court must determine compliance with the Writ. That is, this case involves the scope of the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction in the same proceeding, not a prior one. There is no discussion as to whether a plan created specifically due to a preemptory writ can be reviewed by the court issuing the said writ for compliance in the IVLAWDA Case.

Fed'n of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180: Plaintiff citizen groups filed a petition for writ of mandate, challenging defendant city's approval of a revised general plan framework and the city's findings and statement of overriding considerations under CEQA in connection with that approval. This was the second petition filed among the groups. The trial court denied the citizen groups’ petition and the citizen groups appealed. There was a prior litigation between the parties that encompassed a challenge to the EIR and the city's failure to recirculate the draft EIR after releasing the TIMP. The appellate court concluded that the new general plan was not inconsistent or noncorrelative, the EIR was supported and the adequacy of analysis in EIR was not challenged, the previous determination that range of alternatives discussed in EIR was reasonable, and the material facts and primary right had not changed so res judicata applies challenges to the previous findings. Again, this is a case where the issue is related to prior litigation and it does not address a court’s continuing jurisdiction in the same proceeding. The Court notes that this case evidences usage of the phrase  “comply with the California Environmental Quality Act” which is similar to the language used in this Court’s Writs. (See Fed'n of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at 1191.)

Carey v. Board of Medical Examiners (1977) 66 Cal. App. 3d 538: This case centers around a doctor that was convicted of two counts of making false statements to a federal agency which resulting in respondent medical licensing board concluding that the doctor had committed crimes of moral turpitude in violation of Cal. Bus & Prof. Code. §§ 2361(e) and 2411. The doctor sought review of a decision by the trial court, which denied his writ of mandamus seeking an order annulling respondent medical licensing board's decision that he had been convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, as he believed it to be erroneous because he had not been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the doctor’s writ of mandate because it found that the term moral turpitude included fraud and a crime in which an intent to defraud was an essential element; thus, the doctor was committed of a crime that included the element of intent to defraud. The City directs the Court to page 540. Page 540 discusses the history of the civil case alongside the criminal case. It is unclear to the Court how this case fits into the City’s argument.

Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455 (“Ballona”): This case involved two petitions, consolidated by the trial court, in which the trial court issued a statement of decision and entered a judgment denying the petitions, an appeal occurred, and the appellate court reversed the judgment with directions to the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City to vacate its certification of the EIR and its project approvals and revise the EIR to remedy these deficiencies, and the trial court entered a judgment in May 2008 granting the petitions in part and denying them in part, and issued a peremptory writ of mandate consistent with our directions. Following this, the respondent revised sections of the EIR and its executive summary and, after hearings, the trial court discharged the peremptory writ. The revised EIR was analyzed in detail. The appellate court provided the following legal standard:

The standard of review of an agency's decision under CEQA is abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion means the agency failed to proceed in a manner required by law or there was no substantial evidence to support its decision. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21168, 21168.5; County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 945 [91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66] (County of Amador).)

Whether the agency failed to proceed in a manner required by law is a question of law. A court determines de novo whether the agency complied with CEQA's procedural requirements, “ ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements’ (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors[, supra,] 52 Cal.3d 553, 564 …).” (Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) The failure to provide information required by CEQA in an EIR is a failure to proceed in a manner required by law. (Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 118 [104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326].) The failure to comply with CEQA's procedural or information disclosure requirements is a prejudicial abuse of discretion if the decision makers or the public is deprived of information necessary to make a meaningful assessment of the environmental impacts. (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1236–1237 [32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 876 P.2d 505]; County of Amador, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 946; see Pub. Resources Code, § 21005.)

Findings of fact made by the agency and factual conclusions stated in an EIR are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 435; Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 392–393, 407.) Under the substantial evidence standard, the court does not determine whether the agency's factual determinations were correct, but only determines whether they were supported by substantial evidence. (Laurel Heights I, supra, at pp. 392–393.) On appeal, we independently review the agency's decision under the same standard of review that governs the trial court. (Vineyard Area Citizens, supra, at p. 427.)

“[S]ubstantial evidence” under CEQA “includes fact, a reasonable assumption predicated upon fact, or expert opinion supported by fact.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (e)(1); see also Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (b).) Guidelines section 15384, subdivision (a) defines HN11 “substantial evidence” as “enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached.” “Substantial evidence is not argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, evidence that is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, or evidence of social or economic impacts that do not contribute to, or are not caused by, physical impacts on the environment.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (e)(2); see also Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a).)

(Ballona, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 467-68.)

The appellate court also stated: “We conclude that the trial court's retained jurisdiction under Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (b) is limited to ensuring compliance with the peremptory writ of mandate. After considering the petitioner's challenges to an EIR or other agency action and rendering a final judgment and peremptory writ of mandate, a trial court evaluating a return to the writ may not consider any newly asserted challenges arising from the same material facts in existence at the time of the judgment. To do so would undermine the finality of the judgment.” (Id. at 480.) I

County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185: In this case, a peremptory writ was issued directing the City of Los Angeles to prepare an EIR covering their extraction of subsurface water in an area located within petitioner county, City of Los Angeles filed its final EIR and petitioner county objected to the return and the EIR under the basis that the City of Los Angeles failed to comply with CEQA, the appellate court sustained petitioner county's objection to City of Los Angeles’ return to the writ of mandate because the final EIR omitted reasonable alternatives to the proposed extraction of subsurface water, failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act. The court continued enforcement of the peremptory writ of mandate until respondent prepared, certified, and filed a valid EIR. This case is distinguished as the peremptory writ issued by the trial court specifically ordered the City of Los Angeles to prepare an EIR.

While the Court agrees that the enforcement of the Writs does not encompass issues never challenged or litigated, no case cited by the City reflects that the Court does not have continuing jurisdiction over the 2023 Hollywood Plan, which was addressed in the Writs as an alternative the City could take.

The Court turns next to the Notice of New and Relevant Authority. The case cited is McCann v. City of San Diego (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 284 (“McCann”). McCann concerns a second appeal arising from the City of San Diego (“San Diego”)’s environmental review process of a project to convert overhead utility wires to an underground system in several neighborhoods. McCann had a previous case in which the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the mitigated negative declaration (“MND”) Projects and affirmed the judgment in all other respects, directing the trial court to enter a new judgment granting the petition as to the second cause of action challenging the MND Projects and to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the City to set aside its March 5 and March 7, 2019, resolutions adopting the mitigated negative declaration, the mitigation monitoring and reporting program, and establishing the relevant utility undergrounding districts. On remand, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate (1) ordering San Diego to set aside the resolutions that approved the MND Projects, (2) ordering San Diego to suspend all activity related to the projects that may result in any change to the physical environment until San Diego reconsidered the rescinded resolutions and brought them into compliance with the requirements of CEQA, and (3) providing that the trial court retained jurisdiction over the matter until it determined the City complied with the relevant provisions of CEQA. Upon the filing of the return, McCann objected, and San Diego appealed. McCann provides, in relevant part: “Once a peremptory writ of mandate has been issued, the court “should order the agency to file a return by a date certain informing the court of the agency's actions in compliance with the writ. [Citations.] [Section] 21168.9, subdivision (b) states, in relevant part, ‘The trial court shall retain jurisdiction over the public agency's proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ until the court has determined that the public agency has complied with this division.’ This statutory provision for the retention of jurisdiction reflects the rule that a court issuing a peremptory writ of mandate retains jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of the return and ensure full compliance with the writ.” (Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455, 479 [134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194] (Ballona), citing City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 964, 971 [187 Cal. Rptr. 379].)” (McCann, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at 292.) The appellate court highlighted that: “The trial court complied with our order and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the City to ‘set aside’ the resolutions approving the disputed MND undergrounding Projects. The writ did not direct the City to perform any other remedial action aside from rescinding the resolutions approving the MND projects and halting any further activity on the projects that may alter the environment—nor did we direct the trial court to order any further remedial action in McCann I.” Based on this, the appellate court found that San Diego had complied with the trial court’s writ and, because the writ was satisfied, it must be discharged. The appellate court emphasized that “the statute simply confers continuing jurisdiction on the trial court to enforce the writ until the agency has complied with its mandates.” (Id. at 295.) Here, McCann is distinguished as the Court’s Writs included directions regarding an amended project. It does not appear from the opinion of McCann that the trial court took such actions.

Regarding the separation of powers doctrine, this argument was brought previously and the Court noted:

At this stage the Court need not address the argument that the April 2, 2014 resolution discussed in the text violates the separation of powers. The underlying matter will be resolved without the need for analysis of constitutional issues. However, the context in which the resolution was adopted -- its expressly stated intent to "overrule and supercede" this Court's decision in this case -- is remarkable and will be noted below as that stated intent gives context to the meaning of the paragraph added to the Framework Element of the General Plan, and it ignores the consequences of Respondents' failure to appeal from the Judgment issued in this case.

(July 14, 2014 SOD p. 10, fn. 10.)

Ballona holds that, under Cal. Pub. Resources Code § 21168.9, a trial court’s retained jurisdiction is limited to ensuring compliance with the peremptory writ (see Ballona, supra, at 201 Cal.App.4th 480). This precedent was relied upon in McCann. The Court has the jurisdiction to review whether the City complied with its Writs.

Fix the City’s objection is centered upon the belief that the 2023 Hollywood plan is subject to the Writs. Specifically, Fix the City highlights that the Writs provide language regarding the new plan. Fix the City directs the parties and the Court to the July 2014 Statement of Decision and presents that the 2023 Draft EIR (“2023 DEIR”) admits that the EIR in the 2023 Hollywood Plan was taken as a response to the Writs. Fix the City argues that (1) Cal. Pub. Resources Code § 21168.9(b) states that the trial court retains jurisdiction to

enforce a writ until it has determined that the agency has complied with CEQA and that the cases related to the legal dispute between the City and Inyo County show that a Court may retain jurisdiction over the 2023 Hollywood Plan. Fix the City further presents that: (1) the Final Return does not contain a record that would permit the Court to evaluate the 2023 EIR’s compliance with the Writs, (2) Discharging the Writs would prejudice consideration of claims in Petitioner and LCA and VSHP’s new petitions because the litigation, while focusing on matters related to the new plans, concerns the same topics, and the Framework Element incorporated into the 2023 Hollywood Plan had no substantial changes made, including language regarding superseding the Court’s Writs.

At the time of the Writs, the Court determined: (1) there was an error in preparation of the EIR at issue due to use of the 2005 overstatement of population by Southern California Association of Governments (“SCAG”) rather than the actual number available from the 2010 Census; (2) the alternatives analysis in the EIR were insufficient and inaccurate; (3) the analysis regarding public services in EIR, especially in regards to the estimation of the impact of fire and police services, is flawed; (3) there was a failure to recirculate the draft EIR (“DEIR”); (4) the 2012 Hollywood Plan did not discuss the inter-plan/area impacts created by the 2012 HCPU and there is an inconsistency between the 2012 HCPU and the general plan due to the population estimate used. (See February 2014 Statement of Decision).

The Court notes that, while there are corresponding Statements of Decisions, they are separate documents from the Writs issued.

From this, the Writs issued required the City to rescind, vacate, and set aside all actions approving and certifying the 2012 Hollywood Plan adopted in connection therewith and all related approvals issued in the furtherance of the 2012 HCPU, including but not limited to the text and maps associated with the 2012 HCPU, the Resolution amending the 2012 HCPU, the adopting of rezoning actions taken to reflect zoning changes contained in the 2012 HCPU, all amendments to the General Plan Transportation and Framework Elements made to reflect changes in the 2012 HCPU, adopting the Statement of Overriding Considerations, adopting the Statement of Overriding Considerations, adopting the Mitigation and Monitoring Program, and adopting Findings in support of the foregoing limited to only the quasi-legislative actions necessary to carry out the 2012 HCPU and the related CEQA documents. (See February 2014 and July 2014 Writ.)

The Court stated in the writ: “In the event that the RESPONDENT CITY OF LOS ANGELES exercises its discretion to amend the Hollywood Community Plan, its shall do so in a manner that conforms to the policies and objectives of the General Plan of the City of Los Angeles and the requirements of CEQA.” (February 2014 and July 2014 Writ). The Court interprets this language as an understanding that the City has discretion to amend the 2012 HCPU. The City has elected to do so.

Regarding the injunction, the City and its agents were enjoined from granting any authority, permits or entitlements which derive from the· HCPU or its EIR until an adequate and valid EIR is prepared, circulated, and certified as complete and such EIR is consistent with CEQA, applicable CEQA Guidelines, and other applicable laws, and until legally adequate findings of consistency are made as required pursuant to the Charter of the City of Los Angeles and other applicable laws.

The Final Return shows that the (1) City’s Zoning Information (“ZI”) Directive No. 2433, effective February 18, 2014, directed all the City’s permitting agency to ensure compliance with the Court’s injunction (Final Return, Exh. 3, pp. 59-65); (2) the second initial return filing evidenced that a resolution and ordinance was adopted on April 02, 2014 which rescinded, vacated, and set aside all of the City’s actions approving the 2012 HCPU and certifying the corresponding HCPU. The City did not certify, revise or prepare a supplement to the 2012 EIR. Rather, it prepared a new EIR.

It appears that the City has complied with the specified directives within the Writs.

The Court makes no ruling or holding as to the 2023 Hollywood Plan. New petitions regarding this plan have been filed and any CEQA issues pertaining to the 2023 Hollywood Plan will be analyzed in those petitions.

Because the Court declines to review the 2023 Hollywood Plan, the City’s separation of powers doctrine argument need not be discussed. Issues related to the new plan may be addressed in Fix the City’s new petition which is directed at the 2023 Plan.

The City’s Reply discusses: (1) that res judicata will not apply to the 2023 plan as the legal and factual issues alleged and litigated in this case (and BS138369 and BS138370) only involved the 2012 HCPU; and (2) the challenges to the 2014 Framework Element are outside of the scope of the writ as the plain language of the Writ simply does not support Fix the City’s claim the Court’s jurisdiction here extends to the FE Amendment (i.e., language in the Writ did not prohibit or require the City to adopt the FE Amendment). The City’s Reply does not change the Court’s analysis.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Discharge Writ of Mandate is GRANTED.

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Conclusion