Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 18STCV09799, Date: 2024-01-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 18STCV09799, Date: 2024-01-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18STCV09799 Hearing Date: January 19, 2024 Dept: 68

Dept 68.

Date: 1-19-24

Case: 18STCV09799

Trial Date: N/A

ATTORNEY FEES

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Loretta Perry

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants, Luxury Auto Leasing, et al.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Attorney Fees

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On December 11, 1997, plaintiff Loretta Lindsay-Perry and defendant Luxury Auto Leasing entered into a written lease agreement. The terms of that agreement were that plaintiff was to lease a 1992 Mercedes-Benz for a term of 48 months and a monthly rental of $455.42. Plaintiff listed her address on the lease agreement as 6720 Springpark # 16, Los Angeles, California, 90056. Plaintiff also submitted a reference application to Luxury Auto Leasing wherein she listed her mother, Juanita Bowdre, as a reference. The address plaintiff gave her mother was 6707 Springpark #17, Los Angeles, 90056. A credit application dated February 24, 1998, was executed by plaintiff. On that document the address of Juanita Bowdre is listed as 6770 Springpark #17, Los Angeles, California, 90056.

Plaintiff failed to make all of her scheduled payments on the vehicle and the Mercedes was repossessed on July 13, 2001. The address from which the vehicle was repossessed was 5427 W. Slauson Ave., Los Angeles, CA.

At the time of the repossession, defendant contends that there was an outstanding balance due to defendant under the lease agreement. On April 14, 2003, Luxury Auto Leasing filed Case No. 03CS0696, a complaint in which they sought money damages against Loretta Lindsay-Perry for the outstanding balance, as well as costs, fees and interest. This complaint was allegedly served by way of substituted service upon an individual identified as “Becky Perry, co-resident.” The proof of service filed by the registered process server sets forth that this substitute service occurred on May 15, 2003 at 6770 Springpark Apt. 17, Los Angeles, CA 90056. No response was filed to Luxury Auto Leasing’s complaint in a default judgment was entered against Loretta Lindsay-Perry on August 21, 2003 in the sum of $13,875.35. The declaration of mailing of the request to enter default due to July 14, 2003, is addressed to Loretta Lindsay-Perry at 6770 Springpark Apt. # 17, Los Angeles, CA 90056. This document that was apparently returned by the Postal Service to counsel for Luxury Auto Leasing as “Undeliverable As Addressed, Unable to Forward.”

On July 29, 2013, Luxury Auto Leasing filed an Application for and Renewal of Judgment. This document was mailed to Loretta Lindsay-Perry at 301 No. Belmont Street #207, Glendale, CA 91206. Loretta Lindsay-Perry contends that she was never served with the summons and complaint in the original action against her, nor did she receive notice of the Renewal of Judgment. She claims only to have learned about the outstanding judgment while attempting to refinance her home. She filed this complaint against Luxury Auto Leasing asserting five causes

of action: 1) Equitable Relief Re Void Default Judgment, 2) Breach of Contract, 3) Violation of Vehicle Leasing Act, 4) Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Act, and 5) Declaratory Relief.

The court bifurcated and tried first and fifth causes of action as a bench trial without a jury. The court found in favor of Perry on September 22, 2021. The final statement of decision was issued on November 18, 2021.

On July 11, 2023, the court presented a tentative statement decision for phase two of the trial, whereby the court entered judgment in favor of Perry on the first and fifth causes of action (consistent with phase one of the trial), and found for defendant on the third and fourth causes of action. The second cause of action was dismissed prior to the trial. The final statement of decision was issued on August 10, 2023.

Defendant filed notices of appeal on October 6, and November 1, 2023. Judgment was entered on October 24, 2023. On November 9, 2023, a judgment by default was entered as to Victor Curiel. On December 20, 2023, and January 5, 2024, notices of default was filed by the court regarding the appeal(s).

RULING: Granted.

Request for Judicial Notice: Granted in Part/Denied in Part

The court takes judicial notice of all filed pleadings and orders. The court cannot take judicial notice of the content of any items, and only considers the statement of decision, prior orders, judgments, and appellate division opinions for the existence of any rulings impacting the subject motion.

Plaintiff Loretta Perry moves for $104,562.50 in attorney fees as the prevailing party in the action and upon the terms of the underlying lease. Defendant Luxury Auto Leasing in opposition challenges the motion on grounds that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party on any cause of action arising under the contract. Defendant additionally challenges the reasonableness of the fees. Plaintiff in reply reiterates the right to attorney fees as part of the lease contract. Plaintiff also defends the reasonableness of the sought after fees.

A motion for attorney fees must be served and filed within the time for the filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case. (Cal. Rules Ct., rule 3.1702(b)(1).) The time for the filing of a notice of appeal in an unlimited action is 60 days if a “Notice of Entry” of Judgment was served by the court clerk or a party to the action, or within 180 days of entry of judgment. (California Rules of Court rule 8.104.) Judgement was entered on October 24, 203. The motion was filed less than 60 days following entry of judgment on November 13, 2023. The motion is therefore timely under California Rules of Court rule 3.1702(b)(1).

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 provides “[e]xcept as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.” A prevailing party in entitled to recover costs, including attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032, subd. (a)(4); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A).) “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract,

shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract….” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

“‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032.)

“(1) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.” (2) Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b).)

Unlike the motion to tax costs where the court found Plaintiff a prevailing party based on the success of the equity claims and therefore dismissal of the efforts to collect on the deficiency of the balance sought from the lease, with interest, the subject motion depends on a finding of prevailing under the dismissed breach of contract cause of action. Plaintiff relies on case law allowing recovery based on the overall success. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863.)

“[I]n deciding whether there is a ‘party prevailing on the contract,’ the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties' demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources. The prevailing party determination is to be made only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by ‘a comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.’” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 (Hsu); Acree v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (2002) 92 Cal.App.4th 385, 400 [“The Civil Code section 1717 phrase ‘greater relief ... on the contract” does not necessarily mean greater monetary relief’”]; DisputeSuite.com, LLC v. Scoreinc.com (2017) 2 Cal.5th 968, 973; see Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 177-178.) “As one Court of Appeal has explained, “‘[t]ypically, a determination of no prevailing party results when both parties seek relief, but neither prevails, or when the ostensibly prevailing party receives only a part of the relief sought.’” (Hsu v. Abbara, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 875.) “We agree that in determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by “‘equitable considerations.’” (Id. at p. 877.)

The argument relies on a finding that the action relies on the underlying complaint leading to judgment. All claims arose from the lease of the vehicle. The underlying lease incorporated an undisputed attorney fee clause. Defendant however raises a valid counter that Plaintiff in fact only prevailed in the instant action on the equitable claims to set aside the judgment under due process grounds but otherwise found no success in challenging the underlying lease, especially given the dismissed breach of contract cause of action.

California consistently adheres to a standard of mutuality of remedies in that “fees are properly awarded under section 1717 ‘to the extent that the action in fact is an action to enforce—or avoid enforcement of—the specific contract.’” (Turner v. Schultz (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 974, 980.) “‘[O]n a contract’ does not mean only traditional breach of contract causes of action. Rather, California courts liberally construe ‘on a contract’ to extend to any action ‘[a]s long as an action “involves” a contract and one of the parties would be entitled to recover attorney fees under the contract if that party prevails in its lawsuit.’ Where an attorney fee clause provides for an award of fees incurred in enforcing a contract, ‘[i]t is settled that it is irrelevant if the fees were incurred offensively or defensively.’” Yoon v. Cam IX Trust (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 388, 393 [internal quotation marks omitted].) “‘It is now settled that a party is entitled to attorney fees under section 1717 “even when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or nonexistent, if the other party would have been entitled to attorney's fees had it prevailed.” ... To achieve its goal, the statute generally must apply in favor of the party prevailing on a contract claim whenever that party would have been liable under the contract for attorney fees had the other party prevailed.’” (Topanga and Victory Partners v. Toghia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 775, 784.)

While Plaintiff prevailed on the equitable first phase bench trial, thereby relieving Plaintiff from the judgment, Plaintiff dismissed the breach of contract claim, and defendant successfully prevailed on the third and fourth causes of action regarding relief from any holdover lease damages, and improper debt collection practices. Plaintiff is therefore not a prevailing party on the dismissed contract action and third and fourth causes of action seeking statutory imposition of attorney fees. Nevertheless, consistent with the concurrent motion to tax costs, the court specifically finds that the relief accorded from the dual trial phases and judgment effectively precludes any future efforts to collect any deficiencies potentially due under the lease agreement.

The relied upon section of the lease states: “I also agree to pay you upon your demand for all collection and legal costs including reasonable attorneys’ fee and court costs, you incur, to the extent permitted by law.” Plaintiff categorically thwarted the judgment based, which specifically arose from enforcement/collection on the lease agreement. While direct relief under the lease was not part of the relief achieved, the defensive blockade of enforcement effectively invokes the mutuality rules consistently followed by California courts. The claim is not strictly limited to the dismissed breach of contract cause of action or third and fourth causes of action for Violation of Vehicle Leasing Act, and Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Act. (Orien v. Lutz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 957, 965; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 709.) The court therefore finds Plaintiff is the prevailing party on the action for purposes of recovering attorney fees.

The court therefore considers the requested $104,562.50 in fees. “‘[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.’” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)

The reasonableness of attorney fees lies within the discretion of the trial court. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.) The court makes it determination based on the consideration of a number of factors, including, “the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Ibid.) The court should apply an objective standard of reasonableness. (Id. at p. 1098.) “A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.) The court adheres to the “market rate” approach for contingency cases, and finds the “Laffey” charts general and only suggestive. (Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1057; Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619-620.)

Counsel requests billable rates of $850 and $500 per hour for a total of $79,562.50 ($78,287.50 + $1,275 presumably for the instant motion) plus $25,000 for co-counsel. Total hours of Simons, with intermixed paralegal time as well is listed as 114.10, with co-counsel billing at $500/hour for a total of 50 hours or $25,000. [Declarations of Steven Simons and Robert Sempler.]

Defendant in opposition cites the previously relied upon and upheld hourly rate of $500 per hour utilized for determining the award of fees on November 9, 2023, when the court entered its order awarding Plaintiff $10,000 in attorney fees on the underlying equity claims as part of Phase 1 of the bifurcated bench trial. [Req. Jud. Not., Ex. 9.] Plaintiff in reply reiterates the current market rate fees for experienced counsel, distinguishes the work on the instant case, and cites to two other courtrooms awarding the requested hourly rate or close to it.

The court finds the subject action in no way presents unusual or remarkably difficult legal issues supporting a unique skill set for counsel. While a recent case found a rate of $350 per hour reasonable for “lemon law” work, the court appreciates the subject case presented more than a statutory claim for a defective vehicle. The core of the case arises in consumer rights advocacy, and fundamental contract law. While the court is in no way bound to the prior finding of the court of $500/hour, the court finds in its own discretion that the prior established amount within the subject action constitutes a reasonable rate for a highly experienced trial attorney prosecuting consumer advocacy cases in Los Angeles County. [Declaration of Steven Simons.] The amount also conforms to the represented amount of attorney Robert Stempler, a well experienced consumer rights trial lawyer as well, thereby further supporting the determined rate. [Declaration of Robert Stempler.] (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247, 256; Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 619-620; see Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (3d Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 161, 167.) The court also finds the billable rate for the paralegals between $175 to $225 both unchallenged and reasonable, though it appears that all paralegal billing occurred at a rate of $175/hour. [Simons Decl., ¶ 15, Ex. A.]

On the number of hours in total, Simons admits to serving as co-counsel to Law Office of Robert Stempler. The Stempler firm as lead counsel represents total billing of 289.09 hours for a fee of $173,454, yet voluntarily reduced the sought after recoverable amount of time to 50 total hours. [Stempler Decl.] Simons fails to parse out the difference in times between counsel and the paralegals, thereby requiring the court to manually calculate the difference. The court determines paralegal time totals 27.7 hours, thereby leaving Simons with a net of 86.4 hours.

On the paralegal hours, the court finds certain entries unreasonable. The 6.4 hour entry described as “memorandum of costs exhibits,” which consists of 66 pages of mostly court reservation hearing pages, some invoices, and one receipt excessive. Among one of said exhibits includes an invoice for substituted service of process, which the court approves of in the motion to tax costs, but the entry draws attention to the 7-16-21 entry for service of subpoenas by paralegal Alyssa Gunn “AG” at a rate of $175/hour for 2.1 hours, rather than utilizing a lower cost process serving firm, American Legal Support Services, Inc. or C.A. Process Service, both indicated service providers in the memorandum of costs exhibits. The court therefore finds the costs excessive and/or somewhat unnecessarily incurred and reduces the 8.5 hours to three hours. The court also deducts the 7-3-19 and 7-8-19 items relating to Curiel and ALISSI for an additional 0.9 hours. Total paralegal fees are therefore 21.3 hours at a rate of $175/hour for a total of $3,727.50.

On the Stempler award fee, the court agrees with the challenges to the billing entries as to Curiel and ALISSI, but given the reduction from 289.09 hours to 50 hours, the court finds the voluntary reduction subsumes any number of potentially questionable entries, including those entries in August and September 2023 regarding the defaults against the process server and Curiel. The court also notes the entries beginning in November 2018 actually list a billable rate of $600/hour and the voluntary reduction of the requested fee to $500. In reviewing the bill, the court otherwise finds no other unreasonable entries and therefore awards the $25,000 portion of the bill.

On Simons, Defendant maintains two highly experienced attorneys trying a case of this nature was unnecessary and therefore improperly drove up costs. The court considers the individual contributions of each attorney rather engage in a categorical determination of entitlement. (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 280-281; Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1329.)

On the actual entries, the court again agrees that the entries unrelated to the instant parties, including the 2003 action, which was addressed in the prior motion for attorney fees and the court reporter fees, should be excluded. The court therefore excludes the costs related to the motion to dismiss Curiel and ALISSI for a total of 8.8 hours. The court also deducts the one hour listed as a court reporter fee.

The court therefore deducts a total of 9.8 hours from the 86.40 hours sought for a net of 66.60 hours. Plaintiff otherwise concedes to the validity of the remaining balance and offers no challenge to the reasonableness of the claim. The court therefore awards $38,300 in attorney fees to Simons, which includes fees for the instant motion.

Total fees therefore add up as follows: $38,300 plus $25,000 plus $3,727.50 totaling $67,027.50.

Because the amount of fees exceeds $5,000, the order is immediately appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (a)(12); Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 146.) The court will set an OSC re: Status of Appeal(s) at the time of the hearing.

Plaintiff to give notice.

TAX COSTS

MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Luxury Auto Leasing, et al.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Loretta Perry

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion to Tax Costs

SUMMARY OF ACTION

of action: 1) Equitable Relief Re Void Default Judgment, 2) Breach of Contract, 3) Violation of Vehicle Leasing Act, 4) Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Act, and 5) Declaratory Relief.

RULING: Granted in Part/Denied in Part.

Request for Judicial Notice: Granted in Part/Denied in Part

The court takes judicial notice of all filed pleadings, except for “Plaintiff’s Brief re...” The court cannot take judicial notice of the content of any items, and only considers the statement of decision as part of the determination of a prevailing party.

Evidentiary Objections: Overruled/Not Relied Upon in Ruling on the Motion.

Defendant Luxury Auto Leasing move to tax the memorandum of costs submitted by plaintiff Loretta Perry on grounds that Perry is not a prevailing party in the action. Defendant alternatively submits individual challenges to the separate items based on lack of support or lack of entitlement to certain categories.

Plaintiff in opposition maintains Plaintiff is the prevailing party in the action in that two of the four claims presented for trial were found in favor of Plaintiff. On the individual items, Plaintiff maintains both the fees are properly supported, but the motion itself insufficiently supports the basis to tax all items in terms of a lack of entitlement to recover or lack of necessity.

Defendant in reply reiterates the lack of any basis for the determination of a prevailing party, including new argument based on a prior unsuccessful motion for attorney fees arising from the 2003 filed action. Defendant also reiterates the arguments regarding the individual items.

California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1700 requires that “Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended” to 20 days. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) Additionally, “[T]he court may extend the times for serving and filing the cost memorandum or the notice of motion or tax costs for a period not to exceed 30 days. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(3).)

On November 13, 2023, Perry filed the memorandum of costs listing a total of $3,961.60. The motion was timely filed and served on November 28, 2023.

Defendant emphasizes the lack of any monetary recovery, but the argument disregards the plain language of the statute regarding relief other than monetary. The parties agree the decision lies within the court’s discretion. “In these situations, ‘the trial court in its discretion determines the prevailing party, comparing the relief sought with that obtained, along with the parties’ litigation objectives as disclosed by their pleadings, briefs, and other such sources.’ (Citation.) Thus, the trial court determines whether the party succeeded at a practical level by realizing its litigation objectives (Citation) and the action yielded the primary relief sought in the case (Citation).” (Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104 accord Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264 [“the trial court should simply take a pragmatic approach to determine which party has prevailed [:] ... the trial court ... determine[s] which party succeeded on a practical level, by considering the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives].)

The underlying complaint essentially sought both relief from the judgment and statutory damages as a result of the collection efforts. Plaintiff prevailed on the first phase bench trial upon the finding in favor of Plaintiff on the first and fifth causes of action, thereby relieving Plaintiff from the judgment. Plaintiff dismissed the breach of contract claim, and defendant successfully prevailed on the third and fourth causes of action regarding relief from any holdover lease damages, and improper debt collection practices. Plaintiff therefore achieved a limited sought after result, but was found categorically blocked pursuant to any remedies under the Vehicle Leasing Act or the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The court in its discretion finds Plaintiff obtained a significant practical objective in finding relief from the prior judgment. The court also finds that while Plaintiff unsuccessfully succeeded in obtaining any damages as a result of the underlying lease transaction and debt collection efforts, the decision denying damages under the statutes in no way constitutes a victory for Defendant. Nothing in the decision in any way indicates any remaining liability for the pre-existing lease, thereby relieving of Plaintiff from any potential liability over the prior transactions. The court therefore finds the practical effect constitutes a substantial victory over the prior transaction. Plaintiff is therefore deemed the prevailing party.

The court therefore considers the individual challenges to the items. Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 sets forth the costs recoverable by the prevailing party. To recover a cost, it must be reasonably necessary to the litigation and reasonable in amount. (Perko’s Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (l992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244.) If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th

761, 773-74.) On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Id.)

Costs not expressly permitted under CCP § 1033.5(a), but not expressly denied under CCP § 1033.5(b), may be recovered in a court’s discretion. (Science Applications International Corporation v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) In reviewing a motion to tax costs, a guiding principle is that all costs must be “reasonably necessary to the litigation” and “reasonable in need and amount.” (Acosta v. SI Corporation (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.) If an item of cost is expressly allowed by statute and if items appear on their face to be proper, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, shifting the burden of proof to the objecting party to show that the items were unnecessary or unreasonable. (Ibid.; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131-132.) “Only after such costs are challenged by a motion to tax do the parties need to justify their claims by submitting documentation of the costs they have incurred.” (Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 308.)

Courts have discretion to disallow costs that were unreasonably incurred. (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201.) Cost awards are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. (El Dorado Meat Co. v. Yosemite Meat and Locker Service, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Gibson v. Bobroff (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.)

Defendants challenge all items: filing and motion fees, jury fees, deposition costs, service of process costs, attachment expenses, court reporter fees, electronic filing fees, and “other” miscellaneous section for total sought costs listed as $3,951.60, but actually totaling $4,101.60.

Item 1: Filing and Motion Fees, 1,075

Defendant challenges the $20 filing fee for the stipulation. Defendant maintains the fee is not recoverable, due to the lack of any proof of payment. The court electronic filing system shows no filed stipulation dated February 27, 2019. The motion to tax is therefore granted as to this item.

Item 2: Jury Fees, $150

Defendant challenges the lack of any jury trial, and therefore no right to recovery. The payment of fees and lack of any jury trial remains undisputed. Plaintiff presents no proof of any effort to seek reimbursement of the fees from the clerk. The court declines to allow fees not actually necessarily incurred and outstanding due to failure to seek reimbursement. The motion is granted.

Item 4, Deposition Costs, $578.50

Defendant acknowledges the required deposition but challenges the necessity of the deposition. Plaintiff maintains the deposition transcript was in fact cited during the trial and therefore necessary. The existence of the actual costs and citation to the deposition remain undisputed regardless of the ultimate determined “usefulness” of said deposition. The motion is denied.

Item 5: Service of Process Fees, $169.19

Defendants challenges service on dismissed defendant American Legal Support Services, Inc. Defendant also challenges the charges for service of process on both Interstate Automobile Network, Inc. as both an individual defendant and under its dba name. Finally, defendant challenges two unidentified items identified as checks for $14.19 and $50.

Plaintiff maintains valid service on both Luxury Auto ($45) and Interstate Auto ($50); Plaintiff concedes to the taxing of the costs on the remaining items.

The court finds the service on the two defendants valid given the potential separate status of the identified entities, and otherwise grants the motion to strike the agreed upon portions.

Item 11: Court Reporter Fees, $1,417.75

Defendant maintains it already paid one-half court reporter fees, the fees were not ordered by the court, and both sides utilized the court reporter. Plaintiff in opposition contends that the motion lacks a basis for Plaintiff to pay one-half of the fee.

The payment of court reporter fees by Defendant remains undisputed. Court reporter fees are only recoverable by statute. The memorandum of costs and opposition to the motion lacks any citation to a statutory basis for recovery of fees. The court cannot otherwise determine the basis of the listed items, and finds no court ordered support. The motion to tax is granted as to one-half of fees sought.

Item 14, Electronic Filing Fees, $98.72

Defendant maintains the receipts only total $89.66, rather than the $98.72 listed, and Plaintiff improperly seeks $16.20 in copying costs. Plaintiff offers no opposition to the receipt adjustment, but counters the $16.20 in copies was necessary to obtain a conformed copy of the document.

The court grants the motion to tax, thereby adjusting the total to $89.66, less the $16.20 in copying costs. The provision of a conformed copy constitutes an unnecessary fee separate and apart from any actual electronic filing fees. Plaintiff presumably maintained access to the electronically filed conformed copy, and therefore lacks justification for the extra copying charge.

Item 16: Other, $402

The subject items include a courtesy copy delivery of the rial notebook for $95, certified copies of documents in order to complete a household refinance project that led to the origination of the instant case, and parking costs. Defendant maintains the expenses are unnecessary. Plaintiff maintains all challenged costs were reasonable and necessary.

Travel and parking expenses for anything other than a deposition are barred. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 775.) The court finds the courtesy copy deliveries unnecessary and therefore strikes this item too. As for the certified copies, while the resulting judgment provided the necessity for the certified copies, the court finds the subsequent benefit beyond the scope of the actual adjudication of the claims, and therefore extrinsic as well. The motion to tax is granted as to this item.

The motion to tax is therefore granted as to the following: item 1 for $20; item 2 for $150; item 5 for $64.19; item 11 for $1,417.75; item 14 for $16.20 and also reducing the base to $89.66; item 16 for $402. Plaintiff to recover the remainder of the unchallenged fees listed in the memorandum of costs as addressed in the instant order.

The court will set an OSC re: Status of Appeal(s) at the time of the hearing.

Defendant to give notice.