Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 19STCV10725, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV10725    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 1-30-24 a/f 2-8-24 (via 1-19-24 ex parte order)

Case: 19STCV10725

Trial Date: 2-2-24 c/f 8-28-23 c/f 8-7-23

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Esther Chao

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Michelle Santopietro

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On February 1, 2010, plaintiff Jane Doe entered into a month-to-month rental agreement for unit 309 at 1321 N. Las Palmas Ave., Los Angeles, for a monthly rate of $975/month. The unit is on the top floor. On November 21, 2013, a roof leak appeared, thereby causing water intrusion into the unit. Upon reporting the leak, Plaintiff maintains the leak was not correctly repaired, which led to several years of leaking into the unit and mold development.

On July 25, 2017, Defendant served a 60-Day Notice to Quit, and filed a subsequent unlawful detainer action on September 28, 2017. Pending the unlawful detainer action, Plaintiff maintains an employee violently and sexually threatened Plaintiff as a means of forcing Plaintiff from the unit. Judgment on the UD was entered in favor of Defendant, but during the course of the UD action, Plaintiff alleges continuing threats and stolen property.

On March 26, 2019, Jane Doe filed a complaint for Breach of Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, Nuisance, Retaliatory Eviction, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4. On July 18, 2019, Jane Doe filed a first amended complaint for Breach of Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, Nuisance, Retaliatory Eviction, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4, Negligent Hiring Supervision and/or Retention, Negligence, and Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. On August 29, 2023, the court granted Jane Doe leave to file a second amended complaint, which led to the filing of a 14 cause of action 149 paragraph complaint for Breach of Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, Nuisance, Retaliatory Eviction, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Violation of California Civil Code section 1942.4, Negligent Hiring Supervision and/or Retention, Negligence, Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, Breach of Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation, Premises Liability, Constructive Eviction, and Fraud/Concealment. Defendant answered the second amended complaint on October 30, 2023.

RULING: Denied.

Defendant Esther Chao moves move for judgment on the pleadings to the second amended complaint on grounds that the entire action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The subject defenses are alleged as the eighth affirmative defense in the answer. Plaintiff in opposition challenges the arguments as mischaracterization of the underlying unlawful detainer proceeding. Nothing in the unlawful detainer action addressed the substance of the subject action, including the cross-complaint itself which raised personal injury claims. Defendant in reply contends the habitability defenses raised in the answer were properly part of the subject matter for the unlawful detainer action.

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint… [¶] The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.” (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4^th 1056, 1061.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether the factual allegations, assumed true, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452-453.)

“No motion may be made pursuant to this section if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (e).) The motion was untimely filed under the first portion of the statute. “[S]ection 438, subdivision (e) ‘authorizes the trial court to permit late filings of such motions and does not specify any grounds which might serve to limit its power to do so.’” (Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1054.) While the court specially set the motion for hearing, nothing in the ex parte order determined the motion was timely filed or required hearing before trial. Nevertheless, given the potential impact to the impending trial, and the five year trial limit, the court considers the merits of the motion.

On the sufficiency of the meet and confer effort, the court declines to deny the motion on grounds of an insufficient effort. “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).) Furthermore, “This section does not apply to any of the following: ... (4) A motion brought less than 30 days before trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (d)(4).)

On the merits, Defendant specifically contends claim preclusion of issues due to the prior submission of said issues before the unlawful detainer action court as affirmative defenses (175STUD02735). [Declaration of Christina Newell.] “Claim preclusion applies when ‘(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.’” (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 226.)

The doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.  It seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration.  Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit. All claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date. Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897.) “Res Judicata is not a bar to claims arising after the filing of the initial complaint.” A party may assert new claims in an amended pleading, “but if no such pleading is filed, a plaintiff is not foreclosed. [Citation.] The general rule that a judgment is conclusive as to matters that could have been litigated ‘does not apply to new rights acquired pending the action which might have been, but which were not, required to be litigated [Citation]’.” (Allied Fire Protection v. Diede Const., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 150, 155; Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at 227.)

“In general, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues litigated and decided in a prior proceeding.  (Citations.) ‘Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. (Citation.)’” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 848–849.)

In considering the basis for claim preclusion based on the unlawful detainer affirmative defenses, the court also considers the nature of the underlying proceeding. “[I]t is sufficient to note that the proceeding is summary in character; that, ordinarily, only claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession are cognizable” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255; See Mehr v. Superior Court (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1049; Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159.)

A review of the October 3, 2017, in pro per filed form answer shows affirmative defense boxes checked for habitability, retaliation, and discrimination. A handwritten addition reiterates the retaliation and habitability claims, as well as employee intimidation claims. [Newell Dec., Ex. B.] In an amended answer filed by counsel, the answer again checks boxes for habitability, with new defenses for improper service, estoppel and waiver based on the acceptance of rent, retaliation, and discrimination. Lacking are any of the prior written allegations of employee harassment and threats. [Id., Ex. C.] The judgment itself constitutes a preexisting form document indicating restitution of the premises and damages of $3,399.99. [Id., Ex. G.]

The court accepts the motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the potential for a subsequent improper challenge to the habitability conditions, retaliation and constructive eviction claims raised in the prior affirmative defenses. (Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d  257.) Nevertheless, “the record herein fails to disclose that [Plainiff] had the fair adversary hearing contemplated” by the parties in the underlying unlawful detainer action. (Ibid.)

The motion itself consists of blanket conclusions of preclusion based on a comparison of pleadings and exhibits between the prior action and the subject action. The exhibits purportedly intended for presentation at the instant trial, with the argument that the “majority” of said items were previously considered in the underlying unlawful detainer action, are summarily incorporated without discussion of the impacts to any possession or damages award determination by the unlawful detainer court. [Id., Ex. H-J.] In other words, the court cannot determine as a matter of law from the complaint, answer and judicially noticeable exhibits (notwithstanding the lack of any specific request for judicial notice) that the unlawful detainer court considered the validity of any and all of the defenses, including dismissal of any damages claims.

The court therefore finds that Defendant fails to meet the burden of res judicata and collateral estoppel for purposes of a motion for summary judgment on the eve of trial. (Id. at pp. 257-258; Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 761.) The court otherwise declines to specifically parse out potentially barred individual causes of action on behalf of Defendant, and instead defers to the parties at the time of trial. The motion is denied.

Trial remains set for February 13, 2024.

Moving Defendant to give notice.