Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 20STCV05877, Date: 2022-10-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV05877    Hearing Date: October 6, 2022    Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 7-21-22 c/f 7-5-22/Submitted

Case # 20STCV05877

Trial Date: 1-30-23 c/f 7-25-22

 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

 

MOVING PARTY: Cross-Defendant, Irene De La Cerda

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Gerald De La Cerda

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the First Amended Cross-Complaint

·         1st Cause of Action: Indemnification

·         2nd Cause of Action: Apportionment of Fault

·         3rd Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief

 

Motion to Strike

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Andrew La Cerda alleges that along with himself, defendants Sara De La Cerda, Gerald De La Cerda were beneficiaries of the Dolores De La Cerda Revocable Family Trust. Plaintiff is 62 years old, suffers from Parkinsons disease, and is considered a “Dependent Adult.” The trust owns/owned certain real property located at 1271 Hunnewell Ave., Sylmar. Plaintiff contends that the trust provided Plaintiff with a life estate to occupy the property, rather than placed in an off-site care facility. If Plaintiff was unable to pay expenses for the home, the beneficiaries would be responsible. Any beneficiary refusing to contribute will receive no residual distribution benefit.

 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Sara and Gerald conspired to remove funds from the trust through forged documents representing Defendants as co-trustees. Plaintiff also specifically alleges that Sara took personal funds ($44,0000 + $6,000) from Plaintiff.

 

The complaint also alleges two incidents on February 16, 2018. The first is where both Sara and Gerald entered into the premises with the assistance of a locksmith. Gerald then grabbed Plaintiff from behind in a “tight bear hug” until Plaintiff “slid down to the floor in pain.”

 

Defendant James Morris, an attorney, drafted amendments to the trust regarding the life estate and residual distribution.

 

On February 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Dependent Adult Abuse (first and second causes of action), Battery, Trespass, and Conversion of Real Property. On October 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for Dependent Adult Abuse (first and second causes of action), Battery, Trespass, Conversion of Real Property, Negligence, and False Imprisonment.

 

On November 9, 2020, James Morris filed a general denial. On February 17, 2021, Defendant Gerald De La Cerda answered and filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, apportionment, and declaratory relief against Irene De La Cerda aka Irene Sullivan. On February 26, 2021, Defendant Sara De La Cerda answered and filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief against Irene De La Cerda aka Irene Sullivan.

 

On June 22, 2021, the action was transferred from Department 32 to Department 49.

 

On March 8, 2022, the court granted the motion for summary judgment by Irene De La Cerda on the Cross-Complaint of Sara De La Cerda. On April 25, 2022, the court granted the motion of Irene De La Cerda to the cross-complaint of Gerald De La Cerda. Gerald De La Cerda filed a first amended cross-complaint on May 25, 2022. On July 21, 2022, the court overruled the demurrer to the first amended cross-complaint and denied the motion to strike. Irene De La Cerda answered the cross-complaint on August 8, 2022.

 

RULING: Denied.

 

Request for Judicial Notice: Granted in Part/Denied in Part.

The court takes judicial notice of filed pleadings in the probate department proceeding, but declines to take judicial notice of the content of the pleading for purposes of the truth of the matter asserted. (Barri v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 428, 437; Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.) The court can take judicial notice of orders and judgments for purposes of determining findings of fact previously made and prior adjudication in case of an argument for res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. (Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 147; Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.) The court also takes judicial notice of its prior orders. The court otherwise takes no judicial notice of any other documents.

 

The court also declines to consider the sufficiency of the meet and confer efforts of the parties. The sufficiency of any meet and confer is not dispositive in ruling on the demurrer and motion to strike, and the court declines to continue the hearing a second time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41.)

 

Cross-Defendant Irene de la Cerda (Irene) challenges the first amended cross-complaint of Gerald de la Cerda via a motion for judgment on the pleadings on grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Irene contends the prior probate court judgment bars any claims within the first amended cross-complaint based on any finding of fault as to Irene, thereby excluding claims for indemnity, apportionment or declaratory relief. While similar arguments have been presented in prior motions, Irene now emphasizes the distinction between claims related to the family trust in the probate action, and claims raised in the action filed by Andrew seeking personal injury damages. Irene cites to the claims for attorney fees and punitive damages in the underlying complaint as examples of items exclusive to the personal injury action, and therefore irrelevant to the claims arising from trust administration.  Irene also relies on the probate court judgment finding Gerald liable for the $39,000 in funds belonging to Andrew, which in no way renders Irene liable. Irene concludes with the argument that the cross-complaint only serves as a means of gathering information from Irene in order to challenge Andrew’s special damages claim.

 

Irene also denies any factual claims of fault for the injuries claimed by Andrew, thereby undermining any indemnity or declaratory relief based action.

 

Gerald de la Cerda in opposition first challenges the lack of a sufficient meet and confer effort. Gerald next emphasizes the operative first amended complaint of Andrew arises, at least in part, due to the ongoing expense claims of the trust.

 

Irene in reply notes Gerald’s verified answer to Andrew’s first amended complaint admitting to the trust claims as support of the argument that Irene is protected from any claims involving the wrongful conduct against Andrew.

 

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint… [¶] The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.” (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether the factual allegations, assumed true, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452-453.)

 

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

 

The first amended cross-complaint relies on incorporating certain key paragraphs of the operative first amended complaint, including all incorporated causes of action, plus paragraphs 5, 6, 73, 77, 90 and 91. The specifically cited sections allege a claim seeking contribution and payment from the co-beneficiaries of the trust to meet necessary expenses for Andrew as determined by the Trustee (e.g. Irene) [First Amend. Cross-Comp., ¶ 6.] Said expenses include the $44,000 removed from the premises.

 

While not explicitly stated, the crux of the first amended cross-complaint relies on the discovery of information regarding Andrew’s ongoing claim for continuing contributions from the principal trust, as administered by Irene. Gerald essentially seeks a means for challenging Andrew’s damages claims in the administration of the trust. [First Amend. Cross-Comp., ¶¶ 6-8.]

 

“Claim preclusion applies when ‘(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.’” (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 226.) The doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy. It seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration.  Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit. All claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date. Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897.) “Res Judicata is not a bar to claims arising after the filing of the initial complaint.” A party may assert new claims in an amended pleading, “but if no such pleading is filed, a plaintiff is not foreclosed. [Citation.] The general rule that a judgment is conclusive as to matters that could have been litigated ‘does not apply to new rights acquired pending the action which might have been, but which were not, required to be litigated [Citation]’.” (Allied Fire Protection v. Diede Const., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 150, 155; Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at 227.)

 

“In general, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues litigated and decided in a prior proceeding.  (Citations.) ‘Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. (Citation.)’”

 

(Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 848–849.)

In its prior ruling on the demurrer to the first amended cross-complaint, the court specifically found Irene’s reliance on the prior probate court findings in the judgment proper for purposes of determining claim preclusion. (Kilroy v. State of California, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 147; Day v. Sharp, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 914.) The court continues to find the bar on any claims arising from the probate court judgment, including any claims brought against Gerald arising from the imposition of the $44,000 judgment, disqualification from any trustee related activities and appointment of Irene as trustee.

 

Nevertheless, and again consistent with prior ruling, while the past conduct remains barred, the court also once again finds no basis for a proactive bar against Gerald for stating a post-judgment claim for indemnity, apportionment and declaratory relief. The law of claim preclusion categorically allows Gerald can state a claim as it relates to the post probate court judgment relative to the operative complaint of Andrew. (Allied Fire Protection v. Diede Const., Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 155; Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at 227.)

 

In ruling on the subject motion, the court also continues to adhere to the requirement that the subject motion remain limited to the operative allegations of the challenged pleading and reasonable inferences. (Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1605-1606.) The court accepts that the operative first amended cross-complaint improperly seeks indemnity on the $44,000 judgment, which is barred. Nevertheless, no motion to strike was brought on this specific item.

 

The first amended cross-complaint while vaguely written, still leaves open the possibility for alleging an indemnity claim based on trust administration expenses arising post-probate judgment. [See First Amended Cross-Comp. and First Amended Comp., ¶ 6.] Under claim preclusion law, the subject claim constitutes a potential new claim, separate and apart from the probate court judgment for purposes of the challenge to the pleadings.

 

The court previously addressed whether such a claim involving trustee administration was actually part of any proper consideration for the subject motion, but Irene provides no new arguments on subject matter jurisdiction, and instead continues to seek factual distinctions as to unknown claims. (Prob. Code, § 1700, subd. (a); Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1345.) While the factual basis for the unarticulated claims remain in hypothetical legal ether, the court by law cannot dismiss this action given the possibility of the existence of potential fact based claims.

 

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore denied.

 

Three motions to compel further responses currently reserved for October 17-19, 2022. Order to Show Cause re: Long Cause Trial and Trial remain set for January 9 and 30, 2023, respectively.

 

Irene De La Cerda to give notice to all parties.