Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 20STCV19456, Date: 2023-03-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV19456 Hearing Date: March 13, 2023 Dept: F49
Dept.
F-49
Date:
3-13-23
Case
#20STCV19456
Trial
Date: Not Set
FURTHER DEPOSITION
MOVING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Hugo Osoy
RESPONDING
PARTY: Unopposed/Pablo Padron, et al.
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Motion
to Compel Further Deposition Testimony and Document Production
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff Pablo Padron alleges performing construction
remodeling work at 13755 Merchant Ave., Sylmar, when he fell off a ladder and
sustained injuries. Plaintiff was working at the direction of defendant Hugo Osoy,
and alleges Osoy failed to maintain a workers’ compensation policy at the time
of the incident.
On
May 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of statutory obligation,
negligence, and premises liability. Defendants answered the complaint on August
19, 2020. On December 30, 2022, the action was reassigned to Department 49.
RULING: Granted.
Defendant
Hugo Osoy moves to compel the Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) for third party
GRS Funding to appear for further deposition questioning and document
production regarding certain questions on medical liens and payments. The
deposition of the PMK occurred on October 20, 2022, whereby counsel instructed
the deponent not to answer certain questions on grounds of trade
secret/proprietary information. Deponent also objected to questions regarding
employment history and personal involvement, whereby counsel also instructed
the deponent not to answer, as well as questions on information beyond the
knowledge of the PMK.
The
motion was both served on Plaintiff and MedLegal Solutions, Inc. dba GRS
Funding. The court electronic filing system shows no opposition or reply at the
time of the tentative ruling publication cutoff.
If
a deponent fails to answer any question … the party seeking discovery may move
the court for an order compelling that answer…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480,
subd. (a).) A party may also move for production of documents. (Ibid.) A motion to compel answers to a
deposition must be filed within 60 days of the completion of the “deposition
record,” and accompanied by a meet and confer letter. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2025.480, subds. (a-b).) The deposition session occurred on October 20, 2022,
and the stenographer certified the transcript on October 26, 2022. [Declaration
of Emily Zinn.] Sixty days from the second deposition date is December 25,
2022.
The
motion was previously filed in the Personal Injury Hub Court on December 16,
2022, and re-filed following the transfer, on January 6, 2023. The court
accepts the motion as timely, since the instant motion only constitutes a reset
hearing, rather than new relief and potential waiver. The court also finds the
motion supported by a meet and confer effort. [Zinn Decl.]
Deposition
testimony time is limited to seven hours, unless the court allows additional
time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290.) It’s not clear how long the first session
lasted. The deponent otherwise raises no objection to the time limit, and the
court therefore declines further consideration.
During
the session, Defendant inquired into areas, which drew objections and an
instruction not to answer: An inquiry into the deponent’s job history and
personal involvement with any client, questions regarding determining payments for
medical provider services and amounts of payment; associated business practice
determinations for medical lien services and underwriting; and, identification
of potential types of customers, such as law firms and information sought from
customers in making any determinations.
Defendant
also seeks 24 document categories associated with the areas of inquiry. It’s
not clear from the motion whether the documents were refused and on what basis.
The motion itself makes a general demand for production without any specific
distinctions regarding requests for medical records compared to information
potentially falling under the trade secret objection. The foundation begins
with category one, which seeks all medical records, and then follows up with
agreements and correspondence regarding treatments and negotiated payments.
Defendant also seeks profit and loss statements and/or information showing the
amount paid relative to the amount billed, and recoveries from private or government
insurance payment programs.
While
counsel can instruct the client to not answer questions seeking privileged
information, a deponent cannot refuse to answer a question on grounds form of
question or relevance. (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1013-1014.) The
deposition transcript includes the objection regarding the job history
objection, but the separate statement lacks address of it. The court therefore
assumes this question is no longer in issue, and therefore addresses the trade
secret/proprietary information objections. As for
On
the trade secret objection, Civil Code section 3426.1(d) states:
“‘Trade
secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2)
Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.”
The
party asserting the privilege holds the burden of establishing its existence. (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.) Nothing in the simple objection establishes
a trade secret. The opposition however supports the objection. Nevertheless, the
information more specifically addresses medical billing records, which
therefore requires consideration of the collateral source rule relative to the determination
of the value of medical services claimed as a function of medical specials.
The
deposition seeks information based on Plaintiff’s identification of outstanding
medical liens at a value of $517,160.39. Although not
specifically addressed, the subject information, as it relates to Plaintiff, arghuably
requires acknowledgment of the collateral source rule. “The Supreme Court of California has long adhered to the doctrine that
if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source
wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from
the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.” (Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970)
2 Cal.3d 1, 6; Hrnjak v. Graymar,
Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 731-732.) The collateral source rule “operates
both as a substantive rule of damages and as a rule of evidence.” (Rotolo Chevrolet v. Sup.Ct. (Staudt)
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 242, 245.) “As a rule of evidence, it precludes the
introduction of evidence of the plaintiff being compensated by a collateral
source unless there is a ‘persuasive showing’ that such evidence is of ‘substantial
probative value’ for purposes other than reducing damages.” (Arambula
v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015.)
Certain categories of
payment are in fact subject to collateral source rule exclusion. Though medical
lien services are not specifically mentioned in any cases reviewed by the
court, an argument can be made for an extension of the rule given the payment
of medical service fees from a source other than the tortfeasor. (Helfend
v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d 1, 13–14; Rotolo Chevrolet v. Superior Court (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 242, 245; See Mize-Kurzman
v. Marin Community College Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 832, 872.)
While such information is inadmissible, a party seeking may compel
discovery of inadmissible information in the process of discovering admissible
evidence. (Cruz
v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653–654.)
Furthermore, the collateral source rule may not apply where a
party seeks to discover the “fair value” of medical services. (Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions,
Inc. (2011)
52 Cal.4th 541, 564 [“We
conclude the negotiated rate differential is not a collateral payment or
benefit subject to the collateral source rule”]; Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 790, 798-800;
Pebley v. Santa Clara Organics,
LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1266, 1275 [“In sum, when a plaintiff is not
insured, medical bills are relevant and admissible to prove both the amount
incurred and the reasonable value of medical services provided”]; Moore v. Mercer (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 424, 442-443.) The court therefore allows discovery into the
specific costs relative to Plaintiff in that Plaintiff placed said costs at
issue, and Plaintiff submits no opposition supporting the block of said
information.
As
addressed above, notwithstanding the lack of opposition, the court finds
threshold support for the proprietary information objection. The subject motion
ostensibly seeks potential trade secret protected information. Nevertheless,
what constitutes actual trade secret information versus simple data provides
some basis of distinction. While the amount claimed in damages versus the
amount actually paid by the lien service provider presumably varies, an
argument can be made that even compelling disclosure of the varying amounts may
lead to the disclosure of margins sought or other indirect information. The
court finds such a distinction lacks both support of actual proprietary
definition in that numerical data without identification of any medical
providers, in no way constitutes commercially valuable information.
Furthermore, as addressed above, the public policy behind the law compels
disclosure of the amounts paid for purposes of determining reasonable value,
rather a blind presentation of the amount sought. Denial of the information
would be unfairly prejudicial to the party seeking the right to challenge the
claim.
The court therefore grants the motion on the ability to compel answers
to basic billing information (e.g. amounts paid), which Defendant can then
compare with evidence provided by Plaintiff in support of the medical specials
claim. The court otherwise declines to grant leave for proactive open-ended,
inquiry. Any questions must be based on data relevant to the case without any
support for actual uniquely proprietary information, as defined. If deponents
maintains certain medical providers or law firms constitute unique customer
lists with value, deponent should be prepared to establish this
objections. A publicly identified
medical provider or law firm is otherwise not a unique entity for purposes of
privileged information. Defendant may assert any and all privacy objections
upon any inquiry beyond the three articulated questions subject to the motion,
including third party privacy if applicable.
The court also orders document production in conformance with the
guidelines. Again, deponent may object on privilege grounds only.
The court otherwise finds no basis limiting the next deposition
session. As addressed above, the court cannot determine the total time spent on
the deposition, and finds no indication of a potential to exceed the seven-hour
limit at this time. The parties may even in fact agree to allow the answering
of the questions in writing. The court allows the parties to determine the
preferred means to comply with the order, and to monitor any potential time
limitations.
Further disputes from the second session and a return to the
court, may lead to the referral to a discovery referee for a supervised
deposition, with the intention of vesting the referee with the authority to answer
any and all inquiries at the time of the deposition. Meanwhile, the court
orders the parties to mutually agree to a second deposition date within the
next 30 days, with completion of the deposition no later than 45 days of this
order.
Sanctions
are mandatory unless the court finds justified action. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2025.480, subd. (j).) The motion lacks a request for sanctions.
Motion
for Summary Adjudication set for June 14, 2023. The action was filed on May 21,
2020. The court will also set a trial date.
Defendant
to provide notice.