Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21CHCV00658, Date: 2022-07-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21CHCV00658    Hearing Date: July 25, 2022    Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 7-25-22 c/f 6-20-22

Case #21CHCV00658

Trial Date: 2-21-23

 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Edwin George

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Richard Valles

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Summary Judgment

·         1st Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

·         2nd Cause of Action: Money Had and Received

·         3rd Cause of Action: Account Stated

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On an unspecified date, Plaintiff Edwin George alleges entering into an oral contract with Defendant Richard Valles for the restoration and sale of a 1959 El Camino vehicle in exchange for $55,000. Plaintiff alleges making payments in various installments from December 29, 2017 through December 31, 2018, but the vehicle was not restored or delivered.

 

On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint for Breach of Contract (sales), and common counts. On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed Unique Twist Auto Body and Paint.

 

RULING: Denied.

Evidentiary Objections: Overruled.

 

Plaintiff Edwin George moves for summary judgment on the complaint for breach of contract, money had and received and account stated. Plaintiff contends an agreement exists between the parties whereby Defendant Richard Valles agreed to restore and sell a 1959 El Camino vehicle to Plaintiff in exchange for payment of $55,000. After paying Defendant $55,000 by the end of 2018, the car was never delivered, thereby leading to a demand for reimbursement of the paid funds. Plaintiff alternative argues for a $50,000 finding of damages, in anticipation of an argument for Defendant only admitting to receipt of $50,000, not $55,000.

 

Defendant in opposition admits to only receiving $50,000 in payment. Defendant also contends other restoration work was done from the payment balance, thereby further reducing any alleged balance. Defendant also challenges Plaintiff’s showing of breach of contract or common counts.

 

Plaintiff in reply reiterates the time frame of the restoration, and challenges the reasonableness of Defendant’s actions. Plaintiff contends Defendant fails to raise any triable issues of material fact in each and every cause of action.

 

The court electronic filing system shows no reply at the time of the tentative ruling publication cutoff. The court reserves the right to take the matter under submission in order to consider any timely submitted reply arguments in case of electronic filing delay caused impediments.

 

The law of summary judgment provides courts “a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)  In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts employ a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

 

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)”  (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD., v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Plaintiff need not disprove all defenses, if the elements of a cause of action are made. (Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554, 564; WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 525, 532.) “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence.  It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.”  (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).) 

 

“The essential elements of a breach of contract claim are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.’” (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1614.)

 

Plaintiff alleges the entry into an oral contract with Defendant for the purchase of a 1959 El Camino vehicle for $55,000. [Declaration of Edwin George, ¶ 2.] Defendant admits to the existence of the agreement for the vehicle as well, but describes the agreement as $25,000 for the purchase of the vehicle and $30,000 for customization work performed by Defendant. [Declaration of Richie Valles, ¶ 3; Declaration of James Mellein, Ex. 1: Deposition of Richie Valles, 8:7-25.]

 

On performance, the parties again agree that Plaintiff paid at least $50,000 to Defendant. [Edwin George Decl., ¶ 3; Valles Decl., ¶ 4; see Declaration of Psychie George, ¶ 3.]

 

On the third element, the parties somewhat disagree. The parties both agree that no time frame for completion of the contract apparently exists though Plaintiff represents a claim of a “few months” for the restoration, while Valles maintains the vehicle would take longer due to other customers ahead of Plaintiff and business operations. [Edwin George Decl., ¶ 2; Valles Depo, 16:6-10.] Valles also represents a lower price on the total labor due to the longer time frame. [Valles Depo, 16:10-11.]

 

In support, Plaintiff maintains that all parts required for the restoration and customization work were in possession of Defendant no later than 2019, therefore rendering the subject dispute a matter of diligence in the performance of the required labor. [Edwin George Decl., ¶ 4.] Defendant represents the completion of “much of the work…including ALL body work and paint.” [Valles Decl., ¶ 4.] Defendant states that delays on the labor occurred due to a heart attack in September 2019, relocation of the business in 2020, and delays with outside contracted work, such as the upholstery and chrome, due to Covid impacts with suppliers and workers. [Valles Decl., ¶ 5; see Valles Depo, 21:6-22:18.] Defendant additionally denies representing all parts being delivered in 2019, and clarifies it was only “chrome parts.” [Valles Depo, 20:12-19, 21:4-4; Valles Decl., ¶ 6.] Defendant now admits that all parts for the vehicle are now in his possession, the body work and paint is now complete, and the vehicle requires either an additional “couple of months” or four to five months of labor for completion. [Valles Depo,  20:10-11, 29:15-16; Valles Decl., ¶ 7.] The $5,000 balance remains outstanding due upon delivery of the vehicle. [Valles Depo., 23:11-24, 32:14-24; Valles Decl., ¶ 7.]

 

Defendant in no way disputes the contractual obligations, and contrary to the argument of Plaintiff apparently resumed work on the vehicle, even if only to coordinate work contracted out to other shops. The issue of reasonable time for said performance therefore constitutes the crux of the dispute. “If no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed. If the act is in its nature capable of being done instantly--as, for example, if it consists in the payment of money only--it must be performed immediately upon the thing to be done being exactly ascertained.” (Civ. Code 1657.)

 

Nevertheless, because the contract constitutes one for labor, Plaintiff lacks support for the argument regarding a basis for breach of contract arising from non-performance of personal services. “The following obligations cannot be specifically enforced: (a) An obligation to render personal service. (b) An obligation to employ another in personal service.” (Civ. Code, § 3390.) To the extent Plaintiff claims breach on a potentially unenforceable term of the agreement, the court finds a basis for denial of the motion. (Adams v. Williams Resorts, Inc. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 456, 463; Lyon v. Goss (1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 674; see Restatement (First) of Contracts § 379 (1932).)

 

While Plaintiff may still argue that the object of the contract, delivery of a customized 1959 El Camino vehicle remains the object of the agreement (see Lyon v. Goss, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 675) the court declines to consider said argument as presented in the motion. It remains undisputed that all required parts are now in the possession of Defendant, and all bodywork and paint is completed as well. Thus, it appears that certain unspecified installation work remains outstanding, which is a function of labor. The court therefore finds triable issues of material fact on the issue of both reasonableness of performance, and enforceability of the contract to the extent Plaintiff contends Defendant violated an agreement for the provision of personal services. Nothing in the motion or extensive reply presents a basis for enforcement of a labor services contract.

 

On damages, Plaintiff continues to emphasize the delivery of $55,000, rather than the claimed $50,000 by Defendant. Plaintiff alternatively concedes that even if only $50,000 was delivered, his performance is complete. As addressed above, Plaintiff may make an argument for breach based on loss of outlaid funds, but the court declines to find a basis of damages given the triable issues on Defendant’s performance obligations in the breach of contract cause of action.

 

Since Plaintiff only moves for summary judgment, and not alternatively summary adjudication, the court need not consider the common count claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f), (p)(1).)

 

Motion to compel further responses reserved for September 28, 2022. Trial remains set for February 21, 2023.

 

Plaintiff to give notice.