Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case 21STCV09278 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

In 1981-1982, Plaintiff R.W. was a 14-15 year old member of the Greek Orthodox Church, when was allegedly sexually assaulted by Father Stanley Adamakis, an ordained priest assigned to a location in Northridge. Plaintiff alleges the church organization was aware of Father Adamakis’s pedophile activities.

On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Negligence (three causes of action) and Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and/or Retention (three causes of action). On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint Negligence (three causes of action against three different entities within the Greek Orthodox organization) and Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and/or Retention (three causes of action against three different entities within the Greek Orthodox organization). On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint Negligence (three causes of action against three different entities within the Greek Orthodox organization) and three causes of action for Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and Retention.

On June 22, 2021, the action was transferred from Department 31 to Department 47. On July 2, 2021, Defendants filed a 170.6 challenge to Department 47, thereby leading to reassignment to Department 49. On September 27, 2021, the court overruled the demurrer to the complaint and denied the motion to strike.[1] Defendants answered on October 6, 2021.

On July 27, 2022, the court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the statute of limitations, but granted the motion for summary adjudication as to the recovery of treble damages.

The court takes judicial notice of the filing of the pleadings, but not the content of the pleadings for the truth of the matter asserted.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Blake Woodhall Declaration: Overruled (Nos. 1-7).

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Timothy Mullen Declaration: Overruled (Nos. 1-8).

Defendant Saint Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church moves for summary judgment, and alternatively summary adjudication, on grounds that Plaintiff cannot state a basis of duty against the church: Father Adamakis was never an employee of the church; even if he was an employee, said conduct was outside the course and scope of employment; and, Plaintiff lacks evidence of any “special relationship” establishing a basis for a duty of care.

Plaintiff in opposition challenges Defendant’s showing of sufficient grounds to shift the burden. Plaintiff next contends that triable issues of material fact exist on grounds of agency, thereby rendering the church defendant liable for the action of its ordained priest. Plaintiff maintains that a special relationship was in fact created through the invitation of Father Adamakis to the classroom on church premises where Father Adamakis undertook a duty of care for the welfare of Plaintiff on behalf of the church. Plaintiff alternatively asks for leave to amend in order to conduct further discovery.

Defendant in reply reiterates the arguments in its moving papers. However, Defendant adds that a continuance is inappropriate where the delay in discovery was the result of Plaintiff failing to develop its case and not due to Defendant’s delay.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence. It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

In support of the lack of employment argument, Defendant acknowledges Father Adamakis was previously employed by the greater church organization before the relevant time period, but was never specifically “assigned” to the Northridge parish. Defendant relies on a letter, whereby Father Adamakis represents new employment in an “executive administrative position” with a free clinic, then a subsequent position as “Project Director” for a senior citizen program in Santa Monica. The bishop of the church, Bishop Spyridon of Amastris, separately and additionally confirms that he was the only assigned priest at the church during the relevant period, with two other assistants not including Father Adamakis.

Even assuming Father Adamakis was an employee, Defendant frames the conduct of the priest as outside the scope of conduct of a priest, and therefore not rendering the church liable. Additionally, Defendant denies any “ratification” of said conduct, even if sexual misfeasance was occurring.

Finally, no special relationship existed between Plaintiff and the church. Plaintiff admits to never enrolling or participating in any church organized activities, such as Sunday school or other educational programs, altar boy duties, or youth programs. Defendant preemptively challenges the anticipated argument that Plaintiff and Father Adamakis met at “Teen Dance Club,” whereby Father Adamakis subsequently arranged and organized offsite prurient encounters. Said conduct constitutes conduct outside the establishment of any special custodial arrangement sanctioned by the church.

Plaintiff opens the opposition with the challenge to the burden shift. In challenging the burden shift, Plaintiff characterizes Defendant’s evidence as “objectionable,” but submits no actual evidentiary objections. The court finds the evidence as presented, without valid objection, admissible. The motion sufficiently shifts the burden regarding the lack of a basis of liability.

In the alternative request for a continuance, Plaintiff first challenges the motion for summary judgment as premature given the lack of completed discovery. The court finds the timing of the motion acceptable given the December 5, 202 trial date. Nevertheless, the court considers the substantive request for the basis of the continuance.

Plaintiff concedes that Father Adamakis was not assigned to the Northridge parish. It remains undisputed, however, that Father Adamakis was present on the premises. Plaintiffs cites to the operative complaint that Father Adamakis remained within the church organization but was no longer assigned to any specific location due to prior documentation of Father Adamakis’ pedophilic activities in California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff moves for leave to conduct further discovery into why Father Adamakis was still granted access to the premises following the alleged prior reports. The deposition of Father Peter Salmas is currently scheduled for October 19, 2022, where Plaintiff intends to inquire on the permitted presence of Father Adamakis. Plaintiff contends the deposition could lead to information regarding employment, agency, and/or the circumstances for establishing a special relationship. Plaintiff represents that at least one instance of sexual abuse occurred on Church premises, which was made possible due to the Father Adamakis’ access to otherwise locked off areas on church premises. [Declaration of Blake Woodhall, Ex. 1: Declaration of R.W.] Plaintiff also intends to take the deposition of fellow parishioner Timothy Mullen, who will testify on watching Father Adamakis performing the liturgy, thereby challenging any arguments denying assignment to the subject venue. [Woodhall Decl., Ex. 2: Declaration of Timothy Mullen.]

The challenge to any basis of duty relies on the lack of any specific assigned position for Father Adamakis, and therefore denial of any knowing sanctioning of conduct placing Father Adamakis in the unattended presence with minor parishioners. Defendant’s argument depends at least in part on a presumed lack of knowledge of any prior reports of sexual encounters with minors though, again, it remains undisputed that Father Adamakis was on the premises of the Northridge property at varying times.

Knowledge is key to arguments both under agency as well as the finding of a special relationship. “A principal is responsible for no other wrongs committed by his agent … unless he has authorized or ratified them, even though they are committed while the agent is engaged in his service.” (Civ. Code, § 2339.) “[A]n employer may be liable for an employee's act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort. (Citations.) The failure to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of ratification. (Citation.) The theory of ratification is generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort, such as assault or battery. (Citations.) Whether an employer has ratified an employee's conduct is generally a factual question. (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 169–170; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 810.) “[R]atification [generally] relates back to the time the tortious act occurred.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1111.)

“A defendant cannot be held liable in negligence for harms it did not cause unless there are special circumstances — such as a special relationship to the parties — that give the defendant a special obligation to offer protection or assistance. This rule reflects a long-standing balance between several competing interests. It avoids difficult questions about how to measure the legal liability of the stranger who fails to take affirmative steps to prevent foreseeable harm, instead leaving the stranger to make his or her own choices about what assistance to offer. (Citation.) At the same time, it extends a right of recovery to individuals in relationships involving dependence or control, and who by virtue of those relationships have reason to expect the defendant's protection. (Citation.) Where such a special relationship exists between the defendant and a minor, the obligation to provide such protection and assistance may include a duty to protect the minor from third party abuse.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 220.)

The proposed discovery and depositions may yield relevant information. As addressed above, when dealing with an employer, the court must examine the post-incident response as a means of determining acceptance of said conduct barring a showing of pre-conduct approval. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111 [“A principal may be liable when it ratifies an originally unauthorized tort”].) The court also finds the further discovery may lead to information regarding the creation of a special duty of care and failure to act. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 220–221.)

As stated above, the court finds no fault with the timing of the motion given the trial date, but the court finds the basis for further discovery entirely valid and compelling. The court finds the representations regarding the lack of any documentation responsive to requests for production of documents seeking any personnel or information in any way relating to Father Adamakis presence at the Northridge location, yet sudden presentation of Father Adamakis alleged outside employment information placed in support of the motion as indicative of a lack of any employment relationship during the relevant time frame, at a minimum suggests withheld information. [Woodhall Decl., Ex. 3.] Plaintiff may use this opportunity to also seek supplemental discovery responses. The depositions also present a valid opportunity to seek information from persons with knowledge and potential responsibility for the provision of even minimal access for Father Adamakis the premises during the relevant period of time.

The motion is therefore continued for further discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).) Given the two additional pending motions for summary judgment, and presumed discovery required for opposing the other motions as well, the court will discuss new hearing dates for the instant motion, the two upcoming motions, and a continued trial date, if necessary.

[1]Plaintiff represents Defendant filed a writ of mandate on the order, which was denied by the Second Appellate District. [Declaration of Blake Woodhall, ¶¶ 10-11.] The court electronic filing system shows no record of the writ.