Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21STCV09278, Date: 2024-01-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV09278    Hearing Date: January 3, 2024    Dept: F49

Dept.
F-49

Date:
1-3-24

Case
# 21STCV09278

Trial
Date: 3-18-24

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING
PARTY: Defendants, Saint Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church

RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff, R.W.

RELIEF
REQUESTED

Motion
for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication

SUMMARY
OF ACTION

In
1981-1982, Plaintiff R.W. was a 14-15 year old member of the Greek Orthodox
Church, when was allegedly sexually assaulted by Father Stanley Adamakis, an
ordained priest assigned to a location in Northridge. Plaintiff alleges the
church organization was aware of Father Adamakis’s pedophile activities.

On
March 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Negligence (three causes of
action) and Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and/or Retention (three
causes of action). On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint
Negligence (three causes of action against three different entities within the
Greek Orthodox organization) and Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and/or
Retention (three causes of action against three different entities within the
Greek Orthodox organization). On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint Negligence (three causes of action against three different entities
within the Greek Orthodox organization) and three causes of action for
Negligent Supervision, Negligent Hiring and Retention.

On
June 22, 2021, the action was transferred from Department 31 to Department 47. On
July 2, 2021, Defendants filed a 170.6 challenge to Department 47, thereby
leading to reassignment to Department 49. On September 27, 2021, the court
overruled the demurrer to the complaint and denied the motion to strike.
Defendants answered on October 6, 2021.

On
July 27, 2022, the court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
the statute of limitations, but granted the motion for summary adjudication as
to the recovery of treble damages.

RULING: Denied.

Requests
for Judicial Notice: Granted.

The
court takes judicial notice of the filing of the pleadings, but not the content
of the pleadings for the truth of the matter asserted.

Request
for Judicial Notice in Reply: Denied.

Evidentiary
Objections to the Declaration of Paul Nicks: Overruled.

Defendant
Saint Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church moves for summary judgment, and
alternatively summary adjudication, on grounds that Plaintiff cannot state a
basis of duty against the church: Father Adamakis was never an employee of the
church; even if he was an employee, said conduct was outside the course and
scope of employment; and, Plaintiff lacks evidence of any “special relationship”
establishing a basis for a duty of care.

Plaintiff
in opposition challenges Defendant’s showing of sufficient grounds to shift the
burden. Plaintiff next contends that triable issues of material fact exist on
grounds of agency, thereby rendering the church defendant liable for the action
of its ordained priest. Plaintiff maintains that a special relationship was in
fact created through the invitation of Father Admakis to the classroom on
church premises where Father Adamakis undertook a duty of care for the welfare
of Plaintiff on behalf of the church.

Defendants
in reply challenge the existence of any triable issues of material fact
regarding special relationship between Adamakis and Plaintiff. Defendants next
deny any agency relationship. Finally, Defendants describe the testimony from
the witnesses relied upon in opposition as unreliable and inadmissible (though
only challenge the declaration of Nicks).

The
purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide
courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to
determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to
resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those
allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App.
4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon
Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving
party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of
material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary
judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no
merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action .
. . cannot be established.”  (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

“When
deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the
evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has
sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn
form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at
467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “An issue of fact can only
be created by a conflict in the evidence. 
It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.”
(Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank
(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

The
argument regarding the lack of a formal employment relationship/assignment
relies on factual denial of any such relationship, without any specific legal
authority normally considered when determining an employment relationship. In
support of the lack of employment argument, Defendant acknowledges Father
Adamakis was previously “secularly” employed by the greater church
organization, but was never specifically “assigned” to the Northridge parish as
a priest. The bishop of the church, Bishop Spyridon of Amastris, separately and
indisputably confirms that he was the only assigned priest at the church during
the relevant period, with two other assistants, not including Father Adamakis.

On
the associated employment, Defendant cites to a letter, whereby Father Adamakis
represents new employment in an “executive administrative position” with a free
clinic, then a subsequent position as “Project Director” for a senior citizen
program in Santa Monica. According to Defendant, Adamakis associated with the
Northridge parish, because his parents lived in the area, but was in fact under
the diocese of San Francisco. [Statement of Exhibits, Ex. 14; Deposition of
Bishop Spyridon.] Finally, an April 10, 1981, letter from Reverend George
Stevenson, whereby Bishop Spyridon was informed that Father Adamakis remained
assigned to the Diocese of San Francisco, and was denied permission to perform
any services or celebrate Sacraments with any other parish.

Plaintiff
in opposition to the motion relies on a general finding of foreseeability
founded by prior knowledge by the Church of the alleged predilections by Father
Adamakis. Although Defendant submitted the deposition of Bishop Spydiron under
seal, Plaintiff cites to the deposition testimony whereby the Bishop was
informed by Bishop Anthony about Father Adamakis. The April 10, 1981, letter is
also referenced as a source of the information.

Plaintiff
also relies on the deposition testimony and declarations of witnesses regarding
the presence of Father Adamakis performing the liturgy and presiding over the
congregation contrary to the denials of Bishop Spyridon. [Deposition of Timothy
Mullen; Declaration of Paul Nicks.] Candace Andreno denied seeing Father
Adamakis ever performing the liturgy, but specifically recalls seeing him
present on church grounds without his priest “habit.”

Timothy
Mullen also specifically testifies to informing Father Thanos of how Adamakis
inappropriately touched him, while Mullens was suffering from a seizure.
[Mullen Depo.] Mullen proceeds to explicitly describe efforts to report the
activity of Adamakis to which Father Thanos purportedly countered that any
claims from a neurologically impacted teenage parishioner lacked credibility
against the word of a college educated priest with a degree in psychology. [Ibid.]
The alleged molesting activities by Adamakis continued following seizures by
Mullen. [Ibid.]

The
court finds both Father Adamakis was present and associated with church
activities in some capacity, regardless of whether Adamakis was authorized or
unauthorized from conducting any form of religious services at the subject
church. Thus, Plaintiff establishes the presence of Adamakis at all relevant
times. [Depositions of Mullen and Andreno, Declaration of Nicks.] The evidence
also establishes that Father Adamakis was at a minimum “employed” with a
related entity under the San Francisco diocese and/or a senior citizen facility
associated with the church for purposes of the time frame. [Ex. 14.] Again, the
motion itself offers no legal address of the employment criteria or
acknowledgment of the alleged associations with other related entities. The
court finds no sufficient basis of support for a finding of a lack of any
employment relationship for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary
judgment simply based on the denial of any employment relationship with the specific
parish itself. The court therefore denies the motion for summary judgment, and
summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for negligent hiring on
grounds of a failure to establish the lack of a legal or factual basis for
summary judgment.

Assuming
Father Adamakis was an employee of the church, if not the specific parish
without any specifically assigned priestly duties, Defendant frames the conduct
of the priest as outside the scope of conduct of a priest, and therefore not
rendering the church liable. Additionally, Defendant denies any “ratification”
of said conduct, even if sexual misfeasance was occurring. Plaintiff
alternatively relies on a claim that the presence of Adamakis with access to
the facilities created an agency relationship thereby establishing a basis of
liability. Plaintiff relies on the presence of Father Adamakis and access to non-public
portions of the premises following the alleged prior reports, as the basis of
liability. Said presence and access are established in the deposition testimony
and declaration, including the deposition of Plaintiff. [Deposition of RW.]

“A
principal is responsible for no other wrongs committed by his agent … unless he
has authorized or ratified them, even though they are committed while the agent
is engaged in his service.” (Civ.
Code, § 2339.) “[A]n employer may be liable for
an employee's act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or
subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort. (Citations.) The failure
to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of
ratification. (Citation.) The theory
of ratification is generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or
respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort, such as
assault or battery. (Citations.) Whether an employer has ratified an employee's
conduct is generally a factual question. (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151,
169–170; Delfino v. Agilent
Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 810.) “[R]atification [generally] relates back to the time
the tortious act occurred.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169
Cal.App.4th 1094, 1111.)

Defendant cites to the
leading case on vicarious liability involving an accused molesting priest. “It would defy
every notion of logic and fairness to say that sexual activity between a priest
and a parishioner is characteristic of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic
Church. There is simply no basis for imputing liability for the alleged conduct
of the individual defendant-priests in this instance to the respondent
Archbishop. Similarly, appellant has not pointed out any fact which could lead
this court to a conclusion that the Archbishop ratified’ the concupiscent acts
of the priests.” (Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1986) 187
Cal.App.3d 1453, 1461.) The court finds the case definitive in terms of
discharging any intentional tort liability claims against Defendant.
Nevertheless, as Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the impact of the case, the issue
naturally dovetails into consideration of a special relationship established
between the parties, thereby imposing an alternative basis of negligence
liability.

“A defendant cannot be held liable
in negligence for harms it did not cause unless there are special
circumstances — such as a special relationship to the parties — that give the
defendant a special obligation to offer protection or assistance. This rule
reflects a long-standing balance between several competing interests. It avoids
difficult questions about how to measure the legal liability of the stranger
who fails to take affirmative steps to prevent foreseeable harm, instead
leaving the stranger to make his or her own choices about what assistance to
offer. (Citation.) At the same time, it extends a
right of recovery to individuals in relationships involving dependence or
control, and who by virtue of those relationships have reason to expect the defendant's
protection. (Citation.) [¶] Where such a special relationship exists between
the defendant and a minor, the obligation to provide such protection and
assistance may include a duty to protect the minor from third party abuse.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021)
11 Cal.5th 204, 220 “Brown.”)

Defendant anticipates
this argument and denies any such basis of liability. In denying the lack of
any special relationship, Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s admission that he was
not a parishioner, and never otherwise enrolled or participated in any church
organized activities, such as Sunday school or other educational programs,
altar boy duties, or youth programs. Of the multiple incidents, only one
occurred on church premises. [Deposition of RW.]

As
addressed above, the court finds triable issues of material fact regarding the
presence of Father Adamakis on the parish premises before during and after the
alleged time of the incident with access to non-public facilities regardless of
any assigned priestly duties. Again, the existence of an employment
relationship or not in no way impacts consideration for the determination of a
special duty. Thus, the existence of a special duty can present a separate and
independent basis of liability against moving defendant. Again, the testimony
of RW clearly places RW and Father Adamakis on church premises, when Father
Adamakis allegedly engaged in sexual misconduct with minor Plaintiff. [RW
Depo.] The court also cites back to the testimony of Mullen regarding reports
to Father Thanos regarding prior incidents involving Father Adamakis, as well
as the notice from Reverend Stevenson. The court therefore finds moving
Defendant was at least potentially aware of potentially wrongful activity on
the premises, and chose to allow Adamakis to both remain on the premises, but
also maintain unfettered access to private portions of the facility. Even
without accessibility to private premises, and the reliance on claims of
activity occurring off-site, Adamakis was still present around minor
parishioners at all relevant times, thereby imposing a special duty of care on
the church organization.

Public policy articulated in the Brown case
imposes a special duty of care to protect under age/ minor congregants and
guests alike from a known threat of a pedophile priest with access to
non-public portions of church premises. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 220.) Nothing in this situation requires further
consideration for determination of a duty of care under Rowland. “[T]here may be other circumstances that give rise to a
comparable affirmative duty to protect. (Citation.) But where no such circumstances exist, the Rowland factors
do not serve as an alternative basis for imposing duties to protect. The
purpose of the Rowland factors is to determine whether the relevant
circumstances warrant limiting a duty already established, not to recognize
legal duties in new contexts.” (Id. at p. 221.) The court therefore
finds triable issues of material fact regarding the basis of a special duty of
care as a matter of law based on deposition testimony, declarations, and
evidence submitted.

The motion is denied in its entirety.

Motions for summary judgment/summary adjudication
currently set for January 9 and 10, 2024, respectively. Trial remains set for
March 18, 2024.

Moving
party to give notice.