Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21STCV35155, Date: 2025-03-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV35155    Hearing Date: March 4, 2025    Dept: 68

Dept.
68

Date:
3-4-25

Case
21STCV35155

Trial
Date: 4-28-25

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

MOVING
PARTY: Defendants Inglewood Properties II, LLC; Warren Family Limited
Partnership; Joanne C. Warren, trustee of the Frank R. Warren and Joanne C.
Warren Trust; J&J Cohen Properties, LLC; and Warren Properties, Inc.

RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff Charles Crosier  

 

RELIEF
REQUESTED

Motion
for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication

 

SUMMARY
OF ACTION

This
arises from habitability issues in a residential landlord-tenant relationship
between plaintiff Charles Crosier, tenant, and defendant Inglewood Properties,
II, LLC, alleged owners and managers of the premises located at 4949 W. Century
Blvd., Inglewood, California 90304.  

 

RULING: Summary judgment
denied. Summary adjudication as to fraud cause of action granted.

 

The
plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are overruled.

 

The
defendants’ first, second, and third evidentiary objections are sustained. The
defendants’ remaining evidentiary objections are overruled. The defendants’
request for judicial notice is granted.

 

The defendants move for summary judgement on the following three
grounds: (1) the plaintiff signed an agreement dated March 28, 2021 that
clearly, unambiguously, and expressly releases the defendants from claims,
potential claims, losses, liens, attorney fees, actions, causes of action, and
liability which arise out of or concern the plaintiff’s tenure as a resident at
the subject property; (2) the plaintiff testified that the defendants made no
misrepresentations; and (3) collateral estoppel bars the claims.

 

A party may move
for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action in an action if the
party contends that the cause of action has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) The defendant moving for summary
judgment or adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting
facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
1510, 1520.)

 

Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action
or a defense.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) 

 

1st
Ground:  Release

The motion for summary judgment is predicated on the
following release clause:

 

“In consideration of the benefits obtained by this
Stipulation, most importantly waiver and unconditional sealing, Defendant and
his agents, insurers, attorneys, representatives, executors, administrators,
and assign does hereby fully and forever completely release, acquit and
discharge Plaintiff, and all of Plaintiff’s associated persons, employees,
agents, representatives, successors, heirs, assigns, officers, directors,
shareholders, members, partners, predecessors, past, present and future
attorneys, and insurers from all claims and potential claims, any and all
demands, losses, liens, attorney fees, actions, causes of action, and liability
of whatever kind and nature, including, without limitation whether none or unknown,
suspected or claimed, which Defendant has, had, or may have in the future,
which arise out of, or are directly or indirectly related to, or arising out
of, or concerning Defendant’s tenure as a resident at the Premises.” (SSUF No.
14)

 

Release Language:

Defendants argue that the agreement clearly, unambiguously,
and expressly releases the defendants from all liability.

 

In the opposition, plaintiff argues that no defendant other
than Inglewood Properties II, LLC was intended to be released. Plaintiff also
argues that the release fails to identify whether it applies to “past, present,
and future” members or affiliates. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the
release does not cover defendants’ prospective acts.

 

When a dispute
arises over the meaning of contract language, the first question to be decided
is whether the language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged
by the party. (Epic Commc'ns, Inc. v. Richwave Tech., Inc. (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348–49.)

 

Based upon the Court’s review of the release language and
the release, it does not find the language reasonably susceptible to the
interpretation urged by the moving party here. The settlement agreement is a
simple and straightforward agreement between a tenant and landlord. No other
clauses manifest a contrary intention, making the agreement not susceptible to
a contrary interpretation.

 

Consideration
For the Release

The plaintiff also
argues in opposition that there is no consideration for the release. However,
as discussed above, the release is consideration of the benefits obtained by
the stipulation between the plaintiff and Inglewood Properties II, LLC.

 

Breach
Suspending Performance

In addition,
the plaintiff argues in opposition that Inglewood Properties II, LLC materially
breached based on the following. 
Inglewood Properties II, LLC delayed in providing the plaintiff with a
written confirmation that it had paid for and had planned for the plaintiff to
stay at a hotel for two months; thus, the plaintiff was unable to move out of
the subject property until April 3, 2021. The defendants argue that this
obligation was material because “the dismissal of the case shall be fore credit
purposes” related to Plaintiff’s ability to qualify for subsequent housing.

 

Whether a
breach of obligation is a material breach to excuse performance by the other
party is a question of fact. (Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
265, 277.)

 

Based on the
above, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that Inglewood Properties II, LLC’s
delay in providing the plaintiff written confirmation that it had paid for and
planned for the plaintiff to stay at a hotel for two months was a material
breach of the lease. The Court rejects the plaintiff’s argument.

 

Unconscionability

The plaintiff claims procedural unconscionability, arguing
that the release was an adhesion contract due to the landlord's superior
bargaining power over the tenant. The plaintiff also asserts that Inglewood
Properties II, LLC drafted the release and provided no opportunity for
negotiation.

 

Procedural unconscionability centers on surprise,
oppression, or unequal bargaining power in the formation of the agreement. (Armendariz
v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 C4th 83, 114.)
While it is acknowledged that landlords and tenants may have unequal bargaining
power in this context, the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient explanation or
supporting evidence for this claim.

 

Plaintiff also argues that the release was substantively
unconscionable, induced through fraud. But substantive unconscionability
focuses on whether the substance of the agreement is overly harsh or
one-sided. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra,
24 Cal.4th 83 at pg. 114.) It is not about fraud.

 

2nd Ground: Fraud

The defendants argue that the plaintiff cannot assert
fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment because he testified
there was “no smoke and mirror” in the representations by the defendants. (Deposition
of Plaintiff, pg. 94:2-9; Ex. 3 to Sep Vol.)

 

The defendants also argue that the plaintiff contends that
he relied on the false representations to his detriment, but Inglewood
Properties II, LLC did not obtain the plaintiff’s signature on the stipulation;
rather, it was emailed by the plaintiff’s representative, Ryan Kendall of the
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles. (Ex. 1 to Declaration of Brook Davis)

 

Further, the defendants argue that Plaintiff signed the
release and stipulation, and a person who signs a release may not later rely on
the unspoken intention not to waive those claims to escape the effect of the
release. The defendants cite Edwards v. Comstock Insurance Co. (1988)
205 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1166.

 

The defendants have met their initial burden, so it now
shifts to the plaintiff.

 

The plaintiff does not oppose the fraud cause of action, but
argues substantive unconscionability induced through fraud.   The Court grants summary adjudication as to
this cause of action.

 

3rd Ground: Collateral Estoppel

Defendants argue that the plaintiff could have raised many
of his claims in the instant action as a defense to the unlawful detainer
action. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigating the same cause
of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with
them, while collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigating
of the issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit
raises different causes of action. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) But res judicata and claim preclusion apply to causes of
actions and issues already litigated, not ones that could have been litigated.  The Court denies the motion on this ground.

 

Other Issues

Defendants question if Davis should be the person most
knowledgeable as to the matters asserted. Defendants also assert that Davis’s
conclusion should be viewed with distrust when stronger documentary evidence is
within the power of the party to produce. In addition, the defendants assert
that no admissible evidence was provided to prove any existing relationship
with Inglewood except with Warren Properties, Inc.

 

But there is no weighing of evidence or credibility in a
summary judgment motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (e).)

 

Based on the above, summary judgment is denied. Summary
adjudication is granted to the fraud cause of action only.  

 



































































































































































Defendants to give notice.