Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21STCV35574, Date: 2023-03-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV35574 Hearing Date: March 14, 2023 Dept: F49
Dept.
F-49
Date:
3-14-23 (combined with 3-8-23 Motion to Strike)
Case
# 21STCV35574
Trial
Date: Not Set
DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant, Sam’s West, Inc. dba Sam’s Club, et al.
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Ana Melara
RELIEF
REQUESTED:
Demurrer
to the Second Amended Complaint
·
1st
Cause of Action: Concealment
·
2nd
Cause of Acton: Aiding and Abetting
·
6th
Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
·
7th
Cause of Action: Violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200
Motion
to Strike
·
Allegations
in support, and claim for, punitive damages
SUMMARY
OF ACTION:
Plaintiff
Ana Melara was an employee of Defendant Sam’s West, Inc. dba Sam’s Club and
Walmart from 2006 to July 21, 2012. On October 4, 2011, Plaintiff was assigned
to tasks involving food stored in a commercial grade walk in refrigerator.
Plaintiff was apparently inside the refrigerator and became locked in for an
unspecified duration of time. Plaintiff alleges Defendant both concealed the
known inability to open the freezer from the inside, and improperly failed to
report the incident to OSHA. Plaintiff subsequently applied for Workers’
Compensation benefits. Plaintiff alleges the statute of limitations tolled, due
to the filing the Workers’ Compensation claim.
On
September 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Concealment, Aiding and
Abetting, Negligence Per Se, Premises Liability, Strict Products Liability –
Failure to Warn, Strict Products Liability – Design Defect, Strict Products
Liability – Manufacturing, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. On
December 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for Concealment,
Aiding and Abetting, Strict Products Liability – Failure to Warn, Strict
Products Liability – Design Defect, Strict Products Liability – Manufacturing,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Violations of Business and
Professions Code section 17200.
The
action was transferred from the Personal Injury court to Department 49 on March
28, 2022.
On
August 5, 2022, the court sustained the demurrer of Sam’s West, Inc. dba Sam’s
Club and Walmart to the first, second, sixth and seventh causes of action with
leave to amend. On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed the second amended
complaint for Concealment, Aiding and Abetting, Strict Products Liability –
Failure to Warn, Strict Products Liability – Design Defect, Strict Products
Liability – Manufacturing, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
Violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200. “All named” parties,
“non-individual,” and/or “all Defendants” remain designated in the first,
second, sixth and seventh causes of action, while the product liability claims
in the third, fourth and fifth causes of action are only named against “Doe
Company.”
RECOMMENDED
RULING
Demurrer: Sustained without
Leave to Amend
Defendants
Sam’s West, Inc. dba Sam’s Club, and Walmart, Inc. submit the subject demurrer
to the first, second, sixth and seventh causes of action in the first amended
complaint for Concealment, Aiding and Abetting, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, and Violations of Business and Professions Code section
17200. Defendant brings the demurrer on multiple grounds, including Workers’
Compensation claim preclusion, the statute of limitations, and failure to state
sufficient facts in support of the concealment, emotional distress and unfair
business practices claims.
Plaintiff
in opposition contends the case is not precluded by Workers’ Compensation law,
as the subject conduct alleged the operative complaint falls beyond the
“compensation bargain” governing the applicability of said rules. Plaintiff
asserts the emotional distress and unfair business practices claims present
sufficient facts. The opposition lacks any specific address of the statute of
limitations argument.
Defendant
in reply reiterates the statute of limitations, Workers’ Compensation
preclusion argument, and challenges to the individual causes of action.
A
demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from
either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take
judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading
“by raising questions of law.” (Postley
v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a
pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v.
Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the
court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action
has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
726, 733.)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly
construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because
ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v.
Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the
complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising
defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty
should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]
Workers’
Compensation Preclusion
Injury claims are subject to the exclusive
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation statutory provisions, where the injury
to the employee occurs as a result of a “service growing out of and incidental”
to employment, and the employee is “acting within the course” of employment.
(Lab. Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a)(2), 3602; Charles
J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 813.) The injury must cause a disability and/or require medical
attention. (Gomez v. Acquistapace
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 740, 748.) Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s use of
the walk-in refrigerator and subsequent malfunction of the locking mechanism
preventing egress constitutes an action within the scope of employment.
Plaintiff in opposition relies on the argument
that the known defective door lock renders the action outside the scope of the
compensation bargain. Plaintiff in reply only offers only general
argument, while Defendant seeks to characterize the concealment claim under
Labor Code section 3602.
“The employee is afforded relatively swift and
certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury
without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of
damages potentially available in tort.” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 708; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.) The exclusive remedies may not apply where “the
employer…stepped out of their proper roles.” (Shoemaker v. Myers, supra,
52 Cal.3d at p. 16.)
“An employee … may bring
an action at law for damages against the employer, as if this division did not
apply, in the following instances: … (2) Where the employee's injury is
aggravated by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the existence of the
injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the employer's
liability shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by the
aggravation. The burden of proof respecting apportionment of damages between
the injury and any subsequent aggravation thereof is upon the employer.”
(Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (b)(2).)
“[A]n
employee seeking to state a cause of action against an employer
under section 3602(b)(2) must ‘in general terms’ plead facts that if found true by the trier of fact, establish
the existence of three essential elements: (1) the employer knew that the
plaintiff had suffered a work-related injury; (2) the employer concealed that
knowledge from the plaintiff; and (3) the injury was aggravated as a result of
such concealment.” (Palestini v. General Dynamics Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 80, 89–90.)
Defendant emphasizes the lack of any allegations regarding an aggravation of
any injuries as a result of the concealment.
The plain language of
the operative complaint indicates that Plaintiff sustained the injury while
performing job duties involving food handling and storage. Thus, the activity
clearly falls within the scope of employment. [Sec.
Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 24, 27-28.] Plaintiff follows up the work scope allegations
with claims of a known dangerous condition regarding the lock malfunctioning.
[Id., ¶¶ 30-31, 49-50.]
The alleged concealment of the defective locking mechanism and
unintended additional time in the cold storage unit in and of itself remains
the alleged cause of injury. Courts must distinguish between the injury causing
event itself, and any potential lingering damages. (Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 306, 310.)
Workers’ Compensation preclusion applies even if the cause of the initial
injury occurs as the result of concealment. (Id. at p. 311.) Nothing in concealment of knowledge regarding the
defective lock, and subsequent additional exposure time in the cold unit, in
any way articulates aggravation of injuries as a result of concealment.
Plaintiff was apparently ultimately freed from the freezer at which time the
detainment and exposure to the cooler temperatures stopped. Plaintiff lack any
allegations of lingering effects independent of the locked time as a direct
result of the concealed defective lock, thereby removing the claim from the
scope of the Workers’ Compensation proceeding.
To the extent the
additional causes of action all derive from the underlying workers’
compensation precluded injury, the court finds the subject causes of action are
also preluded. Plaintiff presents no opposition on this argument. [Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 48-50, 53-55, 66-68, 72, 118, 121, 138.] (Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State
Comp. Ins. Fund, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 812.) The court declines to
address the other arguments regarding the validity of the individual causes of
action beyond the workers’ compensation preclusion claims.
Statute of Limitations
Defendant also submits
an unopposed argument on the statute of limitations. The argument relies on a
claim date of October 4, 2011. [Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶
1.] The second amended complaint itself presents allegations for the tolling of
the statute of limitations, which Defendants challenge. The finding of any tolling relies on the
assumption of a timely submitted workers’ compensation claim, which tolled the
statute for the lengthy period, as well as general conclusions of concealment. [Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 42-47.] The operative complaint lacks any
actual dates regarding the submission of the claim. The court declines to make
any assumptions regarding timeliness or untimeliness based on extrinsic
inference or reference, though, again, Plaintiff submits no opposition to the
argument. The court can therefore only find that the complaint insufficiently
alleges a factual basis of tolling. Nevertheless, given the court finds no basis for the subject
claim under the preclusion section, the court declines to additionally sustain
the demurrer on the statute of limitations. As addressed below, the court the
court finds no further basis for leave to amend is warranted under the
preclusion argument, thereby rendering further consideration of the statute of
limitations superfluous.
Conclusion
The court has now twice
considered the argument regarding workers’ compensation preclusion, and finds
Plaintiff cannot allege new or different facts justifying further leave. The
demurrer is therefore sustained without leave to amend.
Motion to Strike: Moot.
Moving Defendants are now dismissed from the
action. The court will inquire on the status of substituting in and service of
any potential defendants on the product liability claims at the time of the
hearing.
Moving
Defendants to give notice.