Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21STCV37268, Date: 2024-03-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV37268 Hearing Date: March 4, 2024 Dept: 68
Dept. 68
Date: 3-4-24
Case: 21STCV37268
Trial Date: Not Set
DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, City of Los Angeles
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Kris Louis
RELIEF REQUESTED
Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint
· 1st Cause of Action: Premises Liability/Dangerous Condition of Public Property
SUMMARY OF ACTION
Plaintiff Kris Louis, a resident of Pennsylvania, was operating a motorized scooter on October 17, 2020, at or near 530 W. 7th St., Los Angeles, when “the wheel struck an uneven portion of the roadway, causing Plaintiff severe damages.” Plaintiff alleges the subject scooter was manufactured and/or distributed by defendant Lyft, Inc. and contained a malfunctioning accelerator thereby causing the scooter to increase its speed before hitting said uneven portion of pavement. Plaintiff maintains Lyft provides the scooters without safety training or protective gear, insufficient inspection for good working order, and otherwise induces consumers to engage “impulse” decisions to utilize this form of unsafe conveyance.
On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Premises Liability, Strict Products Liability, and Negligence against City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, California Department of Transportation, Lyft, Inc., Segway, Inc., and United Grand Corporation. Segway, Inc. answered on July 21, 2022, The State of California answered on July 22, 2022. On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed California Department of Transportation (State of California). On August 8, 2022, the City of Los Angeles filed an answer.
On October 18, 2022, the court sustained the demurrer of Lyft to the second and third causes of action in the complaint. On November 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal of the entire action. On May 23, 2023, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the dismissal. On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for Premises Liability, Strict Products Liability, and Negligence.
On October 3, 2023, the action was deemed “P.I. Complicated” and transferred from Department 28 to Department 68. On November 21, 2023, the court sustained the demurrer of Lyft, Inc. and City of Los Angeles to the first amended complaint. On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint for Premises Liability, Strict Products Liability, and Negligence.
On February 2, 2024, the court entered an order pursuant to the oral request of Plaintiff for the dismissal of County of Los Angeles, California Department of Transportation, Segway, Inc., and United Grand Corporation without prejudice, thereby leaving Lyft, Inc. and City of Los Angeles as the only remaining defendants.
RULING: Overruled.
Defendant City of Los Angeles (City) brings the subject demurer to the first cause of action in the second amended complaint for Premises Liability. City challenges the operative complaint on a lack of sufficient facts both establishing liability for condition of said property, and overcoming established government immunity. Plaintiff counters that the premises liability causes of action is sufficiently pled. City in reply reiterates the lack of any factual basis for liability and immunity. City in reply reiterates the lack of sufficient allegations after three drafts of the complaint and two demurrers, including allegations supporting the existence of the dangerous condition and causation.
A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]
City substantially compares the operative complaint to the first amended complaint under the guise of the order sustaining the demurrer to the first amended complaint. Because the case was reassigned to the subject court, the court will independently review the operative complaint.
“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code, § 835.) “‘Dangerous condition’ means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).)
“A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
“(a) A public entity is not liable under subdivision (a) of Section 835 for injury caused by a condition of its property if the public entity establishes that the act or omission that created the condition was reasonable. The reasonableness of the act or omission that created the condition shall be determined by weighing the probability and gravity of potential injury to persons and property foreseeably exposed to the risk of injury against the practicability and cost of taking alternative action that would not create the risk of injury or of protecting against the risk of injury.
“(b) A public entity is not liable under subdivision (b) of Section 835 for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the public entity establishes that the action it took to protect against the risk of injury created by the condition or its failure to take such action was reasonable. The reasonableness of the action or inaction of the public entity shall be determined by taking into consideration the time and opportunity it had to take action and by weighing the probability and gravity of potential injury to persons and property foreseeably exposed to the risk of injury against the practicability and cost of protecting against the risk of such injury.”
(Gov. Code, § 835.4.)
“The limited and statutory nature of governmental liability mandates that claims against public entities be specifically pleaded. (Citation.) Accordingly, a claim alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on generalized allegations [citation] but must specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition. (Citation.) Although it is the general rule that it is a factual question whether a given set of facts and circumstances creates a dangerous condition, the issue may be resolved as a question of law if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion. (Citations.) Accordingly, if the facts pleaded by the plaintiff as a matter of law cannot support the finding of the existence of a dangerous condition within the meaning of the statutory scheme, a court may properly sustain a demurrer to the complaint. (Citations.)” (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439-440.) “A dangerous condition exists when public property ‘is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself,’ or possesses physical characteristics in its design, location, features or relationship to its surroundings that endanger users.” (Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1347–1348.) “Sidewalk elevations ranging from three-quarters of an inch to one and one-half inches have generally been held trivial as a matter of law.” (Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1107.)
In challenging the sufficiency of the second amended complaint, City specifically focuses on the lack of sufficient facts articulating the existence of a dangerous condition. The three sections of the operative complaint referencing the condition repeat a combination of the following terms: an area characterized as an “uneven, raised, broken, deteriorating portion of the roadway [] allowed to exist and be left in disrepair.” [Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 18, 30-31.] Plaintiff in opposition maintains the subject allegations are collectively sufficient with general citation to the entire cause of action. [Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 28-37.] Plaintiff also challenges any conclusion of a trivial defect strictly based on a height differential, and instead includes all the circumstances and conditions. (Huckey v. City of Temecula, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.) In ruling on the demurrer to the second amended complaint, the court must find the existence of a statutorily supported dangerous condition. (Brenner v. City of El Cajon, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 443-444.)
The court finds the additional allegations regarding “uneven, raised, broken, deteriorating portion of the roadway [] allowed to exist and be left in disrepair” adds sufficient distinction from the first amended complaint, which only alleged an uneven portion of roadway. The collective allegations holistically articulate a standard beyond a mere trivial defect allegation, and establish a foreseeable danger by a user such as a scooter operator for purposes of ruling on the demurrer. The court declines to make a finding as a matter of law characterizing the alleged defect as strictly based on height differential, and additionally factually determine the potential existence of a trivial defect given the lack of dependence on height differential. (Gov. Code, § 835.4; Cerna v. City of Oakland, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1347–1348; Brenner v. City of El Cajon, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 439-440.) In other words, the claim is not strictly limited to height differential/trivial defect doctrine, and such argument is beyond the scope of the demurrer. The court therefore also finds no basis of immunity at the pleading stage. (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges actual notice. [Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶ 31.] While more detail is required for constructive notice, a simple allegation of actual notice suffices. (Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 712 [“As to actual knowledge, [] a general allegation is sufficient”].)
Finally, on causation, the court declines to make a finding as a matter of law. The operative complaint alleges injury as a result of the dangerous condition, thereby causing Plaintiff to lose control of the scooter. [Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 29-30.] Even with consideration of extrinsic inference, the court cannot make only one conclusion regarding causation for the injuries. (Milligan v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1, 9.)
Again, under the demurrer standard, the operative complaint sufficiently articulates the claim, and the court declines to find as a matter of law that Plaintiff lacks facts and cannot articulate facts supporting said claim. The demurrer is therefore overruled. City to answer the complaint within 10 days of this order.
The court will concurrently conduct the Case Management Conference.
City to give notice.
Dept.
68
Date:
3-4-24
Case:
21STCV37268
Trial
Date: Not Set
DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant, Lyft, Inc.
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Kris Louis
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Demurrer
to the Second Amended Complaint
·
2nd
Cause of Action: Strict Product Liability
·
3rd
Cause of Action: Negligence
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff
Kris Louis, a resident of Pennsylvania, was operating a motorized scooter on
October 17, 2020, at or near 530 W. 7th St., Los Angeles, when “the wheel
struck an uneven portion of the roadway, causing Plaintiff severe damages.”
Plaintiff alleges the subject scooter was manufactured and/or distributed by
defendant Lyft, Inc. and contained a malfunctioning accelerator thereby causing
the scooter to increase its speed before hitting said uneven portion of
pavement. Plaintiff maintains Lyft provides the scooters without safety
training or protective gear, insufficient inspection for good working order,
and otherwise induces consumers to engage “impulse” decisions to utilize this
form of unsafe conveyance.
On
October 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Premises Liability, Strict
Products Liability, and Negligence against City of Los Angeles, County of Los
Angeles, California Department of Transportation, Lyft, Inc., Segway, Inc., and
United Grand Corporation. Segway, Inc. answered on July 21, 2022, The State of
California answered on July 22, 2022. On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed
California Department of Transportation (State of California). On August 8,
2022, the City of Los Angeles filed an answer.
On
October 18, 2022, the court sustained the demurrer of Lyft to the second and
third causes of action in the complaint. On November 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a
request for dismissal of the entire action. On May 23, 2023, the court granted
Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the dismissal. On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff
filed a first amended complaint for Premises Liability, Strict Products
Liability, and Negligence.
On
October 3, 2023, the action was deemed “P.I. Complicated” and transferred from
Department 28 to Department 68. On November 21, 2023, the court sustained the
demurrer of Lyft, Inc. and City of Los Angeles to the first amended complaint.
On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint for Premises
Liability, Strict Products Liability, and Negligence.
On
February 2, 2024, the court entered an order pursuant to the oral request of
Plaintiff for the dismissal of County of Los Angeles, California Department of
Transportation, Segway, Inc., and United Grand Corporation without prejudice,
thereby leaving Lyft, Inc. and City of Los Angeles as the only remaining
defendants.
RULING: Overruled.
Defendant
Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) brings the subject demurer to the second and third causes of
action in the second amended complaint for Strict Product Liability and
Negligence. Lyft challenges the operative complaint on a lack of sufficient
facts both establishing liability via a defect in the scooter under the design,
manufacturer, or failure to warn standards, and lack of facts regarding
causation. On negligence, Lyft challenges a lack of duty and basis of
causation. Plaintiff counters that both claims are sufficiently pled for
purposes of withstanding a demurrer. Lyft in reply reiterates the lack of any factual
basis for liability.
A
demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from
either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take
judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading
“by raising questions of law.” (Postley
v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a
pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v.
Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the
court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action
has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
726, 733.)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly
construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because
ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v.
Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the
complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising
defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty
should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]
Lyft
substantially compares the operative complaint to the first amended complaint
under the guise of the order sustaining the demurrer to the first amended
complaint. Because the case was reassigned to the subject court, the court will
independently review the operative complaint.
2nd
Cause of Action: Strict Product Liability
“Strict
liability has been invoked for three types of defects—manufacturing defects,
design defects, and “warning defects,” i.e., inadequate warnings or failures to
warn.” (Anderson v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995.)
A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer is liable in tort if a defect in the
manufacture or design of its product causes injury while the product is being
used in a reasonably foreseeable way. (Soule
v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th
548, 560.)
The operative complaint alleges all three bases of
liability based on unexpected acceleration of the scooter, thereby placing
Plaintiff into a perilous situation in the course and scope of intended use.
[Sec. Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 19, 26, 27, 39-44.] The court acknowledges the prior
court holding regarding the insufficient lack of distinction between the three
bases of liability in the first amended complaint, but finds the operative
complaint, at a minimum, sufficiently pleads failure to warn liability. [Sec. Amend.
Comp., ¶¶ 26-27.] (Johnson v. American Standard,
Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64-65; Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 995-996.) Whether future
discovery yields additional information in support of potential design or
manufacturing claims falls beyond the scope of the subject demurrer.
As for
causation, the court also finds the claim sufficiently pled. Again, the court
notes the prior court finding of conflation regarding causation between the
alleged road hazard/dangerous condition versus the scooter itself. In context
of the failure to warn allegations, especially in regard to the failure to warn
of the possibility for unintended and out of control acceleration, the court
finds a sufficient nexus between the purported defect and the operation of the
scooter in the intended environment—road conditions and all. The court therefore
both finds no improper conflation of allegations, and declines to make a
finding of no causation as a matter of law. The demurrer is therefore overruled
as to this cause of action.
3rd Cause of Action: Negligence
Lyft challenges the subject claim on grounds that
Plaintiff fails to allege a product liability claim.
“As with an
action asserted under a strict liability theory, under a negligence theory the
plaintiff must prove a defect caused injury. (Citation.) However,
‘[u]nder a negligence theory, a plaintiff must also prove “an additional
element, namely, that the defect in the product was due to negligence of the
defendant.”’ [Citations].) ... [¶] ... [¶] “‘Negligence law in a
failure-to-warn case requires a plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer or
distributor did not warn of a particular risk for reasons which fell below the
acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
have known and warned about.’” (Chavez
v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1304-1305; Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 478-479.) To the extent the court finds the failure to
warn claim valid, the court also finds Plaintiff meets the negligence standard
as well.
The demurrer to the Strict Products Liability and Negligence causes
of action in the second amended complaint by Lyft is OVERRULED. Lyft to answer
the complaint in 10 days of this order.
The court will concurrently conduct the Case Management
Conference.
Defendant Lyft to give notice.