Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case 21STCV37556 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21STCV37556, Date: 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV37556 Hearing Date: August 11, 2022 Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 8-11-22

Case #21STCV37556 (lead case) related to 22VEUD00174

CONSOLIDATE

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc., et al.

RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed/Defendant, 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd., et al.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion to Consolidate

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On October 12, 2021, Plaintiffs and Hamid Mirshojae and Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc. filed a complaint for Breach of Settlement Agreement, Implied Contractual Indemnity, and Breach of Lease against Ahang Mirshojae and 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd. The subject complaint arises following three separate preceding cases: a January 9, 2017 filed action, Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc., et al. v. Zelk, et al. (LC105050), a February 3, 2017 and 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd., et al. v. Zelk, et al. (LC105208), and a March 13, 2019 action, Yadegar v. Woodland Hills Medical Clinic, et al. (19CHCV00214). The LC105208 and LC105050 settled at least in part under an alleged condition that the Ahang, et al. parties “obtain a release” on the 19CHCV00214 action, execute two deeds of trust, as well allowing the clinic to occupy the top floor of the building and parking spaces for business operations. Notwithstanding the agreement, Plaintiffs allege, Ahang, et al. continue to “orchestrate” litigation on the action in order to “extort money from and harass,” and refusal to “approve and sign” the replacement deeds of trust in order to “rectify the defects.” Plaintiffs also dispute the return of certain property belonging to both the business entity and individual. Plaintiffs also allege Defendants refuse to allow the use of the unoccupied top floor or parking spaces “for nefarious reasons.”

On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Defendant, Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc.

A notice of related cases was filed with 21STCV37556. On March 17, 2022, the court deemed 22VEUD00174 and 21STCV37556 related, thereby leading to the assignment of all cases to Department 47. On March 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a peremptory challenge, thereby leading to the reassignment of the case to Department 49 on March 22, 2022. On March 28, 2022, the court specially set a motion for reconsideration challenging the preemptory reassignment from Department 47. The motion for reconsideration was denied on June 2, 2022, and the action therefore remains assigned to Department 49.

On June 9, 2022, the court sustained the demurrer to the unlawful detainer action with 15 days leave to amend. The UD plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on June 23, 2022.

RULING: Denied.

Plaintiffs, Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc. and Hamid Mirshojae bring the subject motion to consolidate the lead case with the related unlawful detainer action. Plaintiffs bring the motion on grounds that both actions arise from the breach(es) of the settlement agreement(s) in the prior lawsuits. Plaintiffs additionally contend the unlawful detainer action should have been brought as a cross-complaint instead of a separately filed action. Because of the later filed complaint, Plaintiffs seek to consolidate the actions notwithstanding the argument that the later, separately filed unlawful detainer action was waived when not filed as a cross-complaint.

The court electronic filing system shows no opposition or reply at the time of the tentative ruling publication cutoff.

“Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 grants discretion to the trial courts to consolidate actions involving common questions of law or fact.” (Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978.) The section 1048 states, in relevant part:

(a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

(b) The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.

“Consolidation is not a matter of right; it rests solely within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (Fisher v. Nash Bldg. Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397, 402.) There are two types of consolidation under §1048: “a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.)

The motion depends on a tangential finding that the subject (fourth filed) lawsuit involving the (majority of) the parties’ settlement agreement on the three prior actions, and the subject unlawful detainer action challenging the interpretation of the actual lease agreement (plus, due to the possibility that the unlawful detainer action was filed for purposes of harassment and/or collateral advantage). Plaintiffs make the additional argument that because of the untimely and improper filing of the separate unlawful detainer action, the court should also rectify this mistake.

The court finds no basis for the sought after consolidation presents a valid and necessary basis for consolidation. Nothing in the motion supports a showing of necessity for the court to consolidate due to common questions of law and fact. The unlawful detainer solely addresses lease terms based on the use of parking spaces, while the subject action addresses the settlement agreement for dismissal of an employment/wage and hour claim, deeds of trust from an apparent business agreement(s), and use of the premises outside the parking lot issue. Said claims are in no way squarely related to the claims in the unlawful detainer, and at best tangential, but more likely part of the greater retaliatory transactional history of the parties in their fourth and fifth lawsuits now pending. Thus, the vast majority of the disputes, if not all of them, insufficiently overlap to establish any reduction of costs, gains in efficiency, or reduction of prejudice. The court also finds insufficient reason for consolidation order to rectify the alleged mistake(s) of opposing counsel (e.g. the allegedly misfiled unlawful detainer action). The unlawful detainer action can therefore address any and all parking lot issues as it relates to possession, while the instant court is only presented with compliance on the settlement agreements. The court therefore denies the request to consolidate the actions.

Motions to Quash on lead case set for August 17, 2022, with three additional discovery motion on calendar from August 30 to September 30, 2022.

Plaintiffs to give notice.