Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21STCV38371, Date: 2024-02-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV38371 Hearing Date: February 2, 2024 Dept: 68
Dept. 68
Date: 2-2-24
Case # 21STCV38371
Trial Date: N/A
ATTORNEY FEES
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Leanor Leanos
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Robert Bolanos
RELIEF REQUESTED
Motion for Attorney Fees
SUMMARY OF ACTION
On October 18, 2021, plaintiff Leanor Leanos filed a
complaint for Partition and Accounting, Declaratory Relief, and Breach of
Warranty of Title and Quiet Enjoyment against Robert Bolanos. On November 16,
2021, Bolanos filed a cross-complaint against Leanos for Partition on Real
Property, Accounting/Unjust Enrichment, Quiet Title, and Declaratory Relief.
On October 31, 2023, during the bench trial, the court
dismissed all unnamed defendants, and entered the stipulation of the parties
for partition of the property. On November 17, 2023, the court entered judgment
for partition, which also included an additional damages award of $34,650 to
Plaintiff. On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs.
RULING: Denied.
Plaintiff Leanor Leanos moves for
$27,615 in attorney fees, as the prevailing party in the action, and for the
common benefit of the partition action. Defendant Robert Bolanos in opposition maintains
that the recovery of fees are partitioned as to the respective benefits of each
party. Thus, the 50-50 split of the property renders the individuals
responsible for their respective costs. Plaintiff in reply counters that the
fee request is justified due to Defendant forcing Plaintiff to prosecute the
action until the eve of trial, even after an offer to waive any attorney fee
claim five (5) days before the trial date.
It remains undisputed the
partition action provided a “common benefit” to all parties. The Code of Civil
Procedure provides for the recovery of partition costs, which includes: “Reasonable
attorney's fees incurred or paid by a party for the common benefit.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 874.010, subd. (a).) Apportionment of fees should be accorded by
ownership interests. (Stutz v. Davis (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 1, 4–5.) “(a)
The costs of partition as apportioned by the court may be ordered paid in whole
or in part prior to judgment. (b) Any costs that remain unpaid shall be
included and specified in the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.110.) Fees are
subject to the discretion of the court. (Orien v. Lutz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 957, 967–968;
see Capuccio v. Caire (1932)
215 Cal. 518, 529-530.)
The court finds a lack of support for the imposition of
attorney fees in the subject action. As acknowledged in the opposition, the
court cannot consider the circumstances of any settlement discussions for
purposes of determining an agreement for the recovery of fees. (Evid. Code,
§1152.) Section four (4) of the judgment itself provides the only reference to
potential of recovery of fees and costs in connection with the damages award.
The court respects the frustration caused by the dispute leading up to the
trial, but again no language of the judgment or other pre-order supports the
award of additional, separate attorney fees. (Orien v. Lutz, supra,
16 Cal.App.5th 957, 967–968 [Resistance to partition in no way undermines the
common benefit analysis applicable to the determination of legal fees].) Again,
the law requires a prorated split of fees by ownership—in this case, an equal
split. The motion lacks establishment for recovery beyond the equitable
principles underlying a common benefit partition action. An award of fees
contrary to the prevailing standard and based on consideration of privileged
information would constitute an abuse of discretion. (Finney v. Gomez
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 548; Stutz v. Davis, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at pp.
4–5.)
The motion is denied.
Moving parties to give notice.