Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 21STUD00059, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 21STUD00059, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STUD00059 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 3-6-25 a/f 6-23-25

Case #24STUD00059

Trial Date: N/A

ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant, Precious Reliford, et al.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant, Greta Curtis

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On January 8, 2021, Plaintiff Greta Curtis filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Defendants Precious Reliford, Tyrone Collier, and Rodnay Moore. On April 29, 2024, Defendants answered and filed a cross-complaint for 1. Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955 et seq. 2. Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq. 3. Negligence, Cal. Civil Code §1714 4. Breach of Contract 5. Breach Of The Implied Warranty of Habitability (Contract) 6. Breach Of The Implied Warranty Of Habitability (Tort) 7. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 8. Nuisance 9. Violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 11. Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.

On May 13, 2024, the court filed a notice of reclassification of the action. On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a 170.6 challenge to Department 58, thereby leading to reassignment to Department 68 on May 24, 2024.

On September 30, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed a first amended cross-complaint for 1. Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955 et seq. 2. Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq. 3. Negligence, Cal. Civil Code §1714 4. Breach of Contract 5. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability (Contract) 6. Breach of the Implied Warranty Of Habitability (Tort) 7. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 8. Nuisance 9. Violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 11. Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., and 12. Violation of Los Aneles Municipal Codd section 45.33.

On January 14, 2025, Defendants filed a notice of settlement of the entire case. On January 28, 2025, Defendants filed a request for dismissal of their “April 29, 2024” filed cross-complaint.

RULING: Denied without Prejudice.

Defendants Precious Reliford, Tyrone Collier, and Rodnay Moore move to enforce the settlement agreement with Plaintiff Greta Curtis. Curtis, in pro per, in a three (3) court day/five (5) calendar day late “objection” challenges the right of Reliford to appear on behalf of the other co-plaintiffs, denies any agreement to pay any filing fees associated with the small claims action, and reiterates the filing exemption previously granted. Plaintiffs in reply challenge the late filed opposition, maintains dissatisfaction with the settlement agreement will not constitute grounds for refusal to comply, the agreement requires payment of filing fees, and any challenge to said to the loss of the exemption is an issue for Curtis to address with the filing office.

The court first notes, Defendants are all represented by counsel. While Reliford appears as the moving party as both the only cross-complainant and a co-defendant, counsel represents all parties for purposes of the subject motion.

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.)

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute. (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.) Accordingly, “parties” under section 664.6 means the litigants themselves, not their attorneys. (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586 (holding “we conclude that the term ‘parties’ as used in section 664.6 means the litigants themselves, and does not include their attorneys of record.”).) Additionally, the settlement must include the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement, and against whom enforcement is sought. (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.)

“Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809.) When ruling on a section 664.6 motion, the trial court acts as a trier of fact to determine whether a settlement has occurred, which is also an implicit authorization for the trial court to interpret the terms and conditions to settlement. (Id.) The court may not “create the material terms of a settlement,” and must instead decide on what terms the parties agreed upon. (Id.; Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1460; Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360; Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 565-566.) “In acting upon a section 664.6 motion, the trial court must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement of all or part of the case. In making this determination, trial judges, in the sound exercise of their discretion, may receive oral testimony or may determine the motion upon declarations alone.” (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 994.)

The parties agreed to certain terms:

“A. Plaintiff shall file dismissal of the entire action for LASC Case No. 21STUD00059 against Cross-Complainant, Tyrone Collier, and Rodnay Moore with prejudice within 14 calendar days of the full execution of this Agreement. B. Cross-Complainant shall file a dismissal of the entire cross complaint for LASC Case No. 21STUD00059 against Plaintiff and D&G with prejudice within 14 calendar days of the full execution of this Agreement. C. Cross-Complainant shall file an Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Judgment for the small claims judgment for LASC Case No. 22STSC00743 within 14 calendar days of the full execution of this Agreement.”

[Declaration of Heeyoung Park, Ex. 1.]

Reliford represents an inability to submit the Acknowledgment and Satisfaction of the small claims judgment due to an outstanding payment of $70 in filing fees now demanded by the deputy clerk of the court. The fees were previously waived by order of fee waiver. Reliford represents that the clerk stated the fees are due from Curtis, due to an apparent rescinding of the prior fee waiver. [Park Decl., Ex. 2: Declaration of Precious Reliford, Ex., 2C-D.] Defendants therefore seek an order requiring Curtis pay the $70 outstanding fee under the guise of complying with the “further assurances” reference in the agreement requiring all parties to “execute all documents and perform all acts necessary or appropriate to effectuate performance of the agreement.”

The court finds the agreement was voluntarily agreed upon and executed. The subject dispute apparently arises from an unanticipated issue, e.g. the demand for payment upon the apparent lapse of the fee waiver in the underlying small claims action. The court is not in a position to reinstate the fee waiver order by the small claims court or otherwise question the validity of the demanded fee. The issue therefore requires consideration of whether this unexpected fee payment demand constitutes a term within the contemplation of the agreement. The court agrees with Defendants’ position that certain sections of the agreement allow for the facilitation of required steps in order to implement the settlement, including section four (4) entitled “Assumption of Risk of Differences in Facts,” section five (5) “Continuing Duty to Cooperate,” and section 10 “Interpretation.” The court also holds certain equitable authority to enforce agreements. (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1061.)

It remains unclear however whether the court can order Curtis to pay fees under its equitable powers. (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.) The court finds no basis of authority to compel payment of such fees as part of enforcement of a settlement agreement, and instead elects to set a hearing for sanctions against Curtis in pro per regarding obstreperous conduct preventing compliance with the agreement and conclusion of this action. The court sets the hearing in order to question Curtis’ specific and categorical refusal to engage in efforts to contact the clerk’s office for resolution of the fee dispute, and prevent resolution of the action following voluntary entry into the settlement agreement, thereby requiring compliance.

Accordingly, on the court’s own motion Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant, Greta Curtis, is hereby ordered to appear at hearing in Department 68 on April 29, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. to show cause why Curtis should not be sanctioned pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7(b), (c)(2) and 177.5 in an amount up to $70 for the refusal to pay now demanded filing fees for conclusion of the small claims action and allow for entry of the acknowledgement and satisfaction of the judgment. Curtis may alternatively appear at the hearing via LACourtConnect by telephonic or video conference.

Curtis has a 21-day plus window from the date of service of the subject order to pay the fee and allow for the filing of the acknowledgment and satisfaction of the judgment, or re-establish the fee waiver in order to allow for the filing of the acknowledgment and satisfaction of the judgment. If Curtis pays the fee or establishes the waiver (again) on the small claims action no later than April 7, 2025; the notice of acknowledgment is subsequently filed or denied for reasons other than non-payment of the filing fee no later than April 16, 2025; and, Curtis or Reliford then notifies the clerk of the said payment and filing effort, the court will discharge the OSC and take April 29, 2025, hearing off-calendar. If the Curtis submits no proof of compliance and no notice to the court is otherwise provided by any party, the court will conduct the hearing whether Curtis appears or not, and may still impose sanctions. Curtis may NOT simply disregard the order and seek to deflect responsibility for complying with the terms, and/or expect others to inform the court. Continued and repeated failure for refusal to pay any sanctions can lead to additional OSC hearings and cumulative sanctions. In other words, the court may set new hearings and impose additional sanctions as long as the settlement terms remain out of compliance. The court will assign any all sanctions orders for collection.

The motion for enforcement is therefore denied without prejudice pending the April 29, 2025, OSC re: Sanctions.

Moving parties to give notice.