Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCP00338, Date: 2023-04-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CHCP00338 Hearing Date: April 17, 2023 Dept: F49
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Dept.
F-49 |
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Date: 4-17-23 |
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Case No:
22CHCP00338 |
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DEMURRER TO THE
COMPLAINT
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant, Armen Vardanyan
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Ararat Yousefi
RELIEF
REQUESTED:
Demurrer
to the Complaint
·
1st
Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
·
2nd
Cause of Action: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
·
3rd
Cause of Action: Dissolution of Partnership
·
4th
Cause of Action: Quiet Title
·
5th
Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief
Motion to
Strike
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff
Ararat Yousefi alleges the formation of a partnership with defendant Armen
Vardanyan and a subsequent oral agreement for the purpose acquiring, renovating
and reselling 10330 Eton Ave., Chatsworth. The agreement required the property
purchased in the name of Defendant, with the later addition of Plaintiff to
title upon the completion of renovations. Plaintiff further represents
agreement to a one-half interest in the property at all relevant times.
The
property was apparently acquired with funds provided by Plaintiff.
Notwithstanding the agreement, Plaintiff alleges Defendant used some or all of
said funds for purposes not related to the acquisition and/or renovations, plus
allegedly committed “waste” at other properties owned by the parties
On September
28, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint for Breach of Contract, Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, Dissolution of Partnership, Quiet Title, and Declaratory
Relief. On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of pending action.
RULING
Demurrer: Overruled in Part/Sustained with
Leave to Amend in Part.
Request
for Judicial Notice: Granted.
Defendant Armen
Vardanyan brings a demurrer to the entire complaint for Breach of Contract,
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Dissolution of Partnership, Quiet Title, and
Declaratory Relief on grounds of failure to state valid claims.
A demurrer
is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either
the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a
demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of
law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of
determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a
view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The
court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .”
’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally
construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.
(Picton v. Anderson Union High School
Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where
a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified
under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of
California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules,
where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently
apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for
uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]
1st
Cause of Action, Breach of Contract: Overruled.
Defendant
challenges the lack of terms regarding the partnership agreement and basis of
the agreement itself. Defendant also maintains any such contract agreement
based on an oral agreement is barred by the two year statute of limitations.
Plaintiff maintains the contract is properly pled, and cites to the definition
of a partnership as a basis of the claim. Defendant in reply challenges the
lack of specific opposition challenging the type of partnership.
“To state a cause of action for breach of contract, [a plaintiff] must plead the
contract, his performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance,
[defendant’s] breach and the resulting damage. (Citation.) Further, the
complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or
implied by conduct. (Citation.)” (Otworth
v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458–59;
Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388.) In examining a
breach of contract claim, the court is required to examine the terms, or at
least the legal effect of the contract. (Blank
v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p.
318 [“we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole
and its parts in their context”]; Otworth
v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., supra,
166 Cal.App.3d at p. 459 [“If the action is based on an alleged breach of a
written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the
complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated
by reference”]; Construction Protective
Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189,
198–199 [“In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead
the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language”].) Formation of a
contract requires four elements: The parties
capable of contracting, the parties consent, the contract is for a lawful
object, and sufficient consideration is given. (Civ. Code, § 1550.) Consent of
the parties must be free, mutual and communicated by each to the other. (Civ.
Code, § 1565.)
Plaintiff
alleges both the formation of a partnership agreement, and a later formation of
the oral contract for the purchase of the property at a price of $1.025
million, renovation and sale of the property. Property would be held equally,
but “not necessarily by a recorded document,” though Plaintiff would be added
onto title at a late date. All proceeds would be shared upon the deduction of
costs. [Comp., ¶ 6.] The actual breach of contract cause of action alleges
additional claims including improper use of funds and refusal to account for
expenses.
The
agreement is summarized as an itemized statement of partnership ownership
interests. [Comp., ¶ 20.] The
terms are sufficient. The court declines to consider the conflated argument
regarding the oral partnership agreement, as the later oral contract is in fact
alleged. The court also declines to consider the statute of limitations. The
argument lacks any specific dates, and the court declines to infer any dates
extrinsic to the operative pleading. The demurrer is overruled.
2nd
Cause of Action, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Overruled.
Defendant
challenges the subject cause of action on grounds of the lack of a validly pled
fiduciary duty, due to an insufficiently pled partnership agreement foundation.
Plaintiff cites to the complaint in support of the existence of the partnership
agreement and therefore a fiduciary duty. Defendant in reply challenges the
lack of address to the type of fiduciary duty argument.
A
fiduciary duty is founded upon a special relationship imposed by law or under
circumstances in which “confidence is reposed by persons in the integrity of
others” who voluntarily accept the confidence. (Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan &
Eisenberg (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1139, 1150.) “A fiduciary or confidential
relationship can arise when confidence is reposed by persons in the integrity
of others, and if the latter voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the
confidence, he or she may not act so as to take advantage of the other's
interest without that person's knowledge or consent.” (Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101–02.) “The elements of a cause of action for
breach of a duty of loyalty, by analogy to a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, are as follows: (1) the existence of a
relationship giving rise to a duty of loyalty; (2) one or more breaches of that duty; and (3)
damage proximately caused by that breach. (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 400, 410.)
The
operative complaint alleges the existence of the parties’ partnership
agreement. [Comp., ¶ 6.] The court
finds no dispute over the imposition of a fiduciary duty between partners, and
therefore finds the allegations otherwise adequate. Arguments regarding
corporate officers and punitive damages are both extrinsic to the demurrer
and/or not pertinent to the determination of a validly pled cause of action.
The demurrer is overruled.
3rd
Cause of Action, Dissolution of Partnership: Overruled.
Defendant
challenges the dissolution of partnership claim on ground that the complaint
fails to identify the type of partnership, thereby precluding any claim all
together. Plaintiff counters that the complaint sufficiently alleges the
existence of a partnership and the arguments are otherwise extrinsic. Defendant
in reply reiterates the lack of the type of partnership as the basis for the
lack of an underlying basis for dissolution.
The court
finds the complaint sufficiently articulates the formation of the partnership
agreement. The right to pled a dissolution of the agreement exists regardless
of the underlying basis of the agreement. The arguments beyond the right to
seek a dissolution are beyond the scope of the demurrer. The demurrer is
overruled.
4th
Cause of Action: Quiet Title: Sustained with Leave to Amend.
Defendant
challenges the quiet title claim on grounds of lack of a verified complaint,
and failure to state facts supporting a claim based on the request for judicial
notice showing title only in the name of Defendant. Plaintiff concedes to the
lack of verification, but offers proof of verification. Plaintiff alleges the
complaint states a claim for quiet title based on equitable interests.
Defendant reply reiterates the lack of verification, and failure to respond to
the statute of frauds argument.
The
complaint is not verified, and the court declines to consider the notice of
errata submitted as part of the opposition to the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) The demurrer is therefore
sustained on this basis for purposes of allowing Plaintiff to file the
verification with the amended pleading. The court declines to consider the
equity arguments given the lack of a valid, verified underlying cause of
action.
5th
Cause of Action, Declaratory Relief: Overruled.
Defendant
challenges the declaratory relief claim on the lack of an actual ongoing controversy.
Plaintiff alleges the complaint alleges an ongoing controversy based on the
exclusion from ongoing business operations arising from the partnership
agreement. Defendant in reply reiterates the prospective emphasis of
declaratory relief, and contends the subject action is strictly seeking to
remedy past wrongs.
Declaratory
relief arises under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, which states in part:
“Any
person interested under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her
rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon
property … may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and
duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint
in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in
the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a
declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the
court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be
either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall
have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has
been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is
sought.”
“‘[S]ection
1060 does not require a breach of contract in order to obtain declaratory
relief, only an ‘actual
controversy.’ Declaratory relief pursuant to this section has
frequently been used as a means of settling controversies between parties to a
contract regarding the nature of their contractual rights and obligations.’” (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v.
DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 365.)
Declaratory relief operates prospectively. (Id.
at p. 366.)
“[U]nder
California rules, an actual controversy that is currently active is required
for such relief to be issued, and both standing and ripeness are
appropriate criteria in that determination. (Citation.) One cannot analyze
requested declaratory relief without evaluating the nature of the rights and
duties that plaintiff is asserting, which must follow some recognized or cognizable
legal theories, that are related to subjects and requests for relief that are
properly before the court.”
(Otay Land Co.v. Royal Indemn. Co. (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 556, 563.)
To
the extent the operative complaint relies on the ongoing partnership dispute,
the court finds the complaint sufficiently alleges declaratory relief. The
demurrer is overruled.
Motion to Strike: Moot/Denied in
Part/Granted in Part
Defendant
moves to strike the entire complaint as well as (alternatively striking) the
claims for punitive damages in the second cause of action.
To
the extent the motion to strike constitutes a challenge to the adequacy of the
pled causes of action, the court declines to turn the subject motion into the
functional equivalent of a demurrer. (PH
II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-1683
[While a demurrer is not the exclusive means to challenge a cause of action, a
motion to strike generally applies to parts of a cause of action, claim for damages,
or where the cause of action or primary right is barred as a matter of law.]; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006)
140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281 [“Where a whole cause of action is the proper
subject of a pleading challenge, the court should sustain a demurrer to
the cause of action rather than grant
a motion to strike”].) The court already considered the merits
of the claims in the demurrer. The motion is moot as to quiet title, and denied
as to the entirety of the remaining causes of action.
Civil Code
Section 3294, subdivision (c) authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of
malice, oppression, or fraud, which are defined
as follows:
(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause
injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.
(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel
and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the
part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights
or otherwise causing injury.
Punitive
damages require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24
Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) Specific facts must be pled in support of punitive
damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co.
(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) “The
mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant
an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances
of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts
must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157
Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. Omitted [emphasis added].)
The complaint lacks specific facts in support of punitive damages beyond
the breach of fiduciary claim itself. The
motion to strike is granted without prejudice as to the punitive damages claim.
In
summary, the demurrer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend as to the quiet
title cause of action, and overruled as to the remainder. The motion to strike
is moot as to the quiet title cause of action, denied as to the challenges to
the entire operative complaint, and granted as to the claims for punitive
damages in the second cause of action.
Plaintiffs
may not add any new or different causes of action, and may only add facts within
the scope of the quiet title claim only, including verification. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) Any new causes of action added without leave from
court are subject to a motion to strike. If Plaintiff declines to file an
amended pleading, Defendant is ordered to answer the remaining cause of action
within 10 days of the lapse of the amendment deadline. Assuming no alterations
of the overruled causes of action, any subsequent challenges to any other
causes of action other than the quiet title cause will be barred under the
successive demurrer rule. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (b).)
Defendant to
give notice.