Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCP00400, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22CHCP00400    Hearing Date: August 30, 2023    Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 8-30-23 (combined with 8-25-23 and 8-29-23 motions)

Case #22CHCP00400

Trial Date: Not Set

 

PROTECTIVE ORDERS

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Daniel Torres

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Abel Gonzalez, et al.

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motions for Protective Orders

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiffs Abel Gonzalez , Albert Gonzalez, Sr., and Albert Gonzalez, Jr. allege a 50% ownership interest in Pueblo Restaurant, Inc., as follows: Abel with 25%, Albert Sr. with 9.95%, and Albert Jr. with 15.05%. Defendant Daniel Torres owns the other 50% share. Pueblo Restaurant operates in “four properties” within the County of Los Angeles.

 

The parties are all identified corporate officers. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Torres is also responsible for operations management. Plaintiffs allege Torres improperly hired family members and “directed funds” towards them, unilaterally increased his salary without approval of the board, and utilized corporate revenues for personal lifestyle expenses and withdrew cash. Plaintiffs also allege that Torres excluded Plaintiffs from operations, failed to pay any returns on shares, or provide an accounting. Plaintiffs additionally allege the opening of a new restaurant and “event production company” with a third party in Bakersfield without the consent of Plaintiffs, yet using corporate funds.

 

On November 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their 177 paragraph verified complaint for Involuntary Dissolution of Corporation, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Accounting. Defendant Torres answered on January 9, 2023. On March 21, 2023, the court granted the motion for appointment of a receiver, and denied the motion for injunctive relief. On May 10, 2023, the court approved the terms for appointment of the receiver, and entered the order appointing the receiver on May 17, 2023.

 

RULING: Denied

Defendant, Daniel Torres moves for protective orders on three sets of discovery items: Special Interrogatories (set one) served by Abel Gonzalez, Special Interrogatories (set one) served by Albert Gonzalez, Jr., and Request for Production of Documents (sets one and two) served by Abel Gonzalez. The court consolidates the ruling and hearing given the similarity of relief requested, with differences noted, where applicable and necessary.

 

On the document production, Torres moves for relief on grounds that the requests for production are redundant and burdensome. Torres previously produced over 5,000 pages of documents, and the information is equally available. Plaintiffs in collective opposition challenge any showing of burden warranting a protective order. Plaintiffs reiterate the necessity of the discovery. Set two of the requested discovery specifically addresses claims presented in defense of the motion for appointment of a receiver. Plaintiffs’ own investigation and access into the bank records presents a disparity in the amounts represented. Set one seeks banquet information, which includes information beyond bank accounts as well. Plaintiffs contend the timing with the motion presents an effort to delay. Torres in reply maintains the motion is supported with good cause, and denies any gaming with the timing of the motion.

 

A Court may make any order that justice requires to protect a party from “unwanted annoyance, embarrassment or oppression or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (b), 2031.060, subd. (b), 2033.080, subd. (b).) The burden of proof is on the party seeking the protective order to show “good cause” for the order he or she seeks. (Fairmont Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)  A motion for a protective order “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090.) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

 

On the documents, Torres at least in part relies on an argument regarding equal availability and a burdensome objection as well. The prior production of “over 5,000 pages” remains undisputed, but the court lacks any ability to determine what was produced in response to what requests.

 

A review of the subject items presents a focused source of inquiry regarding disputed items Plaintiffs were unable to resolve with their own access to bank accounts, as well as information not readily available simply from bank account review. The court therefore finds the equally available objection without merit. (Bunnell v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 720, 723–724.)

 

On the burdensome/oppressive/harassing objections, the court also finds a lack of support. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) “[S]ome burden is inherent in all demands for discovery. The objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (Id. at p. 418.) Again, prior production in and of itself will not demonstrate further requests are presumptively burdensome. The court therefore finds no support for the protective order on the requests for production of documents (sets one and two).

 

On the special interrogatories, Torres again presents the equally available argument and third party privacy concerns. Plaintiffs in opposition again cite to the disparity in arguments over cash expenditures versus revenue, as addressed in the motion to appoint a receiver. The reply again reiterates the merits of the motions.

 

As addressed above, the court finds the subject requests specific and based on unavailable information following review of equally available records. The court again finds the motion lacks support for a showing of burden in that mere service of two sets of interrogatories in no way demonstrates an unreasonably burdensome amount of production.

 

Finally, to the extent Torres suggests third party privacy concerns, the motion lacks specific support. Nothing in the motion establishes the actual disclosure of third party private information simply based on responding to interrogatories of already identified booking parties for certain banquet events. While provisions can be made for notification if necessary, the court finds no implication of third party privacy right invasions as presented. (See Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 374-375; Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 561-562; Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center v. Superior Court (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 288, 307, 311.)

 

The motion is denied in its entirety.

 

The court imposes $750 in sanctions ($250/motion) against both Torres and counsel, joint and several. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (d), 2031.060, subd. (h).)

 

Torres to give notice to all parties.